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11 ABSTRACT 
In  this  study  I  empirically  examine  the  valuation  and  value  relevance 
characteristics  of  specific  consolidated  and  segment-disaggregated  corporate  financial 
information. 
On  the  consolidated  level,  I  investigate  the  relationships  (in  terms  of  value 
relevance  and  pricing)  between  the  UK  firms'  equity  market  values  and  the  firm-level 
contemporaneous  equity  book  values,  earnings  and  dividends.  The  objective  here  is  to 
identify  and  explore  factors  and  contexts  that  impact  on  the  value  relevance  and  pricing 
of  consolidated  financial  statement  information  reported  by  UK  publicly  traded  firms 
over  the  period  from  1987  to  2002. 
On  the  segmental  level,  the  study  capitalises  on  the  insights  gained  from  the 
consolidated  level  findings  and  investigates  (i)  whether  financial  information,  on 
specific  geographic  and  line-of-business  segments'  operations  of  a  cross-section  of  UK 
multi-segment  firms,  is  associated  with  the  equity  market  value  of  the  entire  firm  (i.  e., 
value  relevant);  (ii)  whether  such  operations  are  being  differentially  priced  (by  the  stock 
market)  into  the  equity  market  value  of  the  firm;  and  (iii)  how  the  factors/contexts 
affecting  value  relevance  and  pricing  of  the  firm-level  accounting  fundamentals  impact 
on  the  value  relevance  and  pricing  of  the  segment-level  results.  Additionally,  this  study 
provides  further  empirical  evidence  on  the  adequacy  of  the  UK  segment  reporting 
accounting  standard  SSAP  25,  and  the  quality  of  segment  disclosures  in  the  UK. 
The  employed  valuation  model  represents  a  fusion  of  valuation  frameworks 
developed  in  earlier  studies  [e.  g.,  Edwards  and  Bell  (1961),  Peasnell  (1981,1982), 
Ohlson  (1989,1995),  Rees  (1997),  Garrod  and  Rees  (1998),  Wysocki  (1998)].  On  the 
consolidated-level,  the  model  expresses  the  size-deflated  equity  market  value  of  the  firm 
as  a  linear  function  of  size-deflated  equity  book  value,  earnings  for  ordinary,  dividends 
for  ordinary  shareholders  and  additional  control/dummy  variables.  In  the  segment-level 
analysis,  the  earnings  variable  is  further  disaggregated  into  its  segment-level  elements. 
With  regard  to  the  firm-level  analysis,  the  study  uncovers  a  range  of  contexts 
and  factors  that  affect  the  value  relevance  and  pricing  of  specific  accounting  value 
drivers.  Among  these  are:  the  sign  of  reported  earnings  and  book  values;  whether  the 
iii firm  trades  at  a  premium/discount  to  its  book  value;  the  economic  periods;  the  dividend 
status  of  the  firm;  diversification  profile  of  the  firm;  and  the  industrial  affiliation  of  the 
firm.  In  addition,  the  firm-level  analysis  indicates  that  the  industrially  diversified  firms 
have  lower  valuation  than  the  focused  firms,  while  the  geographically  diversified  firms 
have  higher  valuation  than  the  domestic  firms. 
The  segment-level  accounting  data  is  found  to  communicate  value  relevant 
information,  which  is  often  incremental  to  the  consolidated-level  data.  In  particular, 
segment  disclosures  have  incremental  information  content  in  situations  where  on  the 
consolidated  level  the  firm  reports  losses  (which  are  not  priced),  while  on  the 
disaggregated  level  profits  are  reported  for  some  of  the  disclosed  segments. 
Nevertheless,  geographic  segment  reports  are,  on  average,  relatively  more  informative 
(value  relevant)  than  the  business  segment  reports.  This,  perhaps,  reflects  the  relatively 
lower  precision,  implied  in  SSAP  25,  with  which  firms  are  allowed  to  identify,  group 
and  report  the  line-of-business  operations. 
It  is  also  found  that  neither  value  relevance  nor  relative  pricing  of  different 
segments  remains  constant  throughout  the  sample  period.  For  example,  during  the  early 
economic  periods  (pre-1994  or  pre-1996)  segmental  profits  reported  from  the  America 
segment  had  the  highest  capitalisation,  while  in  the  period  from  1994  to  1997  the  UK 
segment  was  associated  with  the  highest  relative  contribution  to  firm  value.  In  the  most 
recent  economic  period  (1998-2002)  none  of  the  foreign  segments  are  value-relevant. 
There  is  considerable  variation  of  the  value  relevance  of  segmental  earnings  among 
business  segments  operating  in  different  industries.  Segments  operating  in  the  Hi-Tech 
and  knowledge-intensive  sectors  (e.  g.,  IT,  Telecommunication  services,  etc.  ),  and 
services  sectors  have  the  highest  pricing  and  relevance  to  the  value  of  the  firm.  In 
contrast,  the  `traditional'  sector  segments,  such  as  Agriculture,  Mining,  Basic  Industries 
and  Utilities,  are  associated  with  the  lowest  relative  contribution  to  the  equity  market 
value  of  the  firm. 
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9 CHAPTER  1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  PURPOSE  OF  THE  STUDY 
The  growing  importance  of  financial  markets  in  recent  decades  has  led  to  a 
continuous  increase  in  the  demand  by  the  investment  community  for  more 
comprehensive  and  timely  financial  information  to  be  reported  by  companies.  In 
response  to  these  needs,  accounting  regulators  have  amended  existing  and/or  produced 
new  financial  reporting  standards  which  invariably  require  companies  to  disclose  more 
comprehensive  and  detailed  corporate  information  in  their  financial  statements.  One 
such  development  in  the  UK  has  been  the  adoption  of  the  SSAP  25  standard,  in  June 
1990,  where  companies  are  required  to  disclose  specific  financial  information  about 
their  geographic  or  business  segments,  subject  to  materiality  thresholds  (10%  rule)  in 
respect  of  the  identification  of  reportable  segments.  This  standard  reflects  the 
increasingly  global-orientation  and  multi-industry  versatility  of  UK  listed  companies 
and  recognises  the  need  for  informative  segment-level  financial  information  to  be 
disclosed  to  the  general  investment  public  in  assessing  the  future  of  the  company. 
It  is  recognised  in  both  the  academic  and  professional  literature  that  the  disclosure 
of  segment-disaggregated  information  is  (or  should  be)  of  some  value  or  relevance  to 
investors.  As  is  mentioned  in  SSAP  25,  the  reporting  of  segment  disaggregated 
information  should  be  more  beneficial  to  the  consumers  of  this  information  to  the  extent 
that  firm's  operations  in  particular  segments  are  associated  with  different  expected  risk, 
return  and  growth  characteristics'.  According  to  Herrmann  and  Thomas  (2000), 
financial  analysts  worldwide  consistently  identify  segment  information  as  vital  to  their 
1A  narrow  definition  of  `consumers  of  information'  is  implied  here:  principal  parties,  investors,  -  e.  g., 
market  analysts  and  informed  investors  -  who  actively  contribute  to  the  formation  of  the  market  value  of 
the  firm's  equity. 
10 work.  In  a  survey  of  sell-side  analysts,  Brown  (1997)  finds  that  segment  reporting  is 
ranked  as  one  of  the  three  most  useful  corporate  financial  data  items  along  with  the 
statement  of  income  and  the  statement  of  cash  flows.  The  extant  literature,  reviewed  in 
Chapter  2,  identifies  and  tests  conditions  under  which  reporting  disaggregated  data 
would  be  more  informative  in  terms  of  its  usefulness  for: 
(i)  the  assessment  of  the  firm's  expected  future  performance,  or 
(ii)  the  valuation  of  the  equity  market  value  of  the  firm. 
The  current  research  builds,  in  part,  on  this  literature,  though  the  focus  is 
different.  The  fact  that  multi-segment  firms  are  required  to  report  segmental  data 
enables  an  investigation  into  the  value  association  of  specific  disclosed  segments.  I 
investigate  whether  the  operations  of  a  cross-section  of  UK  multi-segment  firms, 
reported  from  specific  geographic  or  industrial  segments  are  perceived  by  investors  to 
have  differential  relative  contributions  to  (and  associations  with)  the  equity  market 
value  of  the  entire  firm.  Stated  differently,  the  research  questions  are:  whether 
consistent  valuation  patterns  (e.  g.,  differences)  can  be  identified  for  segments  that  have 
specific  geographic  or  line-of-business  profiles,  and  what  contextual  factors  impact 
upon  the  identified  differentials.  This  should  not  be  confused  with  the  firm's 
performance  on  the  segmental  level  per  se.  This  is  an  empirical  investigation  of  the 
market's  assessment  of  the  average  (cross-sectional)  value  contributions  associated  with 
distinct  geographic  locations  or  business  lines  of  a  generic  UK  multi-segment  firm. 
Among  the  questions  that  this  study  seeks  to  answer  is,  for  example,  whether  investors 
value  operations  reported  by  UK  firms  from  the  `America'  geographic  region 
higher/lower,  on  average,  than  those  from  the  `Continental  Europe'  region,  and  what 
context-specific  factors  affect  the  observed  valuation  differential. 
In  addition  to  the  segment-related  analyses  and  results,  this  study  also  provides 
further  empirical  evidence  in  relation  to  a  number  of  broader  issues,  including:  the  value 
11 relevance  of  financial  statement  information  in  the  UK  settings  over  the  period  from 
1987  to  2002;  the  adequacy  of  the  segment  reporting  accounting  standard  SSAP  25;  and 
the  quality  of  segment  disclosures  in  the  UK. 
The  empirical  findings  might  contribute  to  our  knowledge  and  understanding  of 
the  complex  relationships  existing  between  the  market's  perception  of  equity  value  and 
the  specific  accounting  fundamentals.  In  addition  to  the  contribution  to  the  academic 
literature,  the  findings  of  this  study  may  also  be  of  interest  to  corporate  and  regulatory 
policy  makers  such  as  accounting  standards  setting  bodies,  investors  and  corporate 
finance  directors,  who  remain  largely  responsible  for  decisions  regarding  the  content 
and  detail  of  segment  disclosures. 
The  following  methodological  considerations  underpin  the  empirical  analysis  of 
the  study.  By  considering  the  multi-segment  firm  as  being  the  sum-total  of  its  reported 
constituent  parts  (geographic  or,  on  the  other  dimension,  industrial  segments),  the  value 
of  the  entire  firm  should  then  reflect  values  contributed  by  or  associated  with  each  of  its 
specific  segments.  I  acknowledge  that  the  equity  value  of  the  firm  might  reflect  more 
than  a  simple  sum-total  of  its  separate  segments.  In  addition  to  the  simple  sum-total  of 
values  contributed  by  each  segment  individually,  the  entire  firm  value  could  also  reflect 
positive/negative  synergies  resulting  from  combining  different  operations  (segments). 
Although  in  some  empirical  sections  I  test  the  relative  valuation  of  diversified  vs.  non- 
diversified  firms,  the  direct  investigation  of  synergies  associated  with  geographic  or 
industrial  diversification  is,  however,  outside  the  scope  of  this  study. 
The  premise  that  the  value  of  the  multi-segment  firm  should  reflect  the  sum  of 
values  contributed  by  the  segments  constituting  the  firm,  allows  the  use  of  a  rigorous 
accounting-based  valuation  model.  The  empirical  analysis  consists  of  a  decomposition 
of  this  accounting-based  valuation  model  to  assess  the  relative  value  contributions 
associated  with  specific  segments. 
12 Empirical  research  into  the  valuation  contributions  associated  with  geographical 
segments  is  limited,  and  has  largely  been  restricted  to  US  data  [e.  g.,  Bodnar  and 
Weintrop  (1997)].  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge  there  have  only  been  two  studies, 
Garrod  and  Rees  (1998)  and  Bodnar  et  al.  (2003),  that  have  investigated  the  value 
association  of  foreign  operations  reported  by  UK  multi-segment  firms.  Furthermore,  I 
am  unaware  of  any  empirical  work  that  uses  UK  firms  to  investigate  the  value 
contributions  associated  with  specific  business  segments  (i.  e.,  relating  to  specific 
economic  sectors  or  industries). 
This  study  extends  the  mentioned  above  studies  in  several  respects.  First  of  all,  I 
investigate  both  dimensions  of  the  corporate  segment  disclosures:  geographic  and  line- 
of-business.  Secondly,  in  addition  to  testing  the  differential  valuation  of  `domestic'  vs. 
`foreign'  operations,  I  investigate  the  relative  pair-wise  valuations  across  all  geographic 
segment  locations  (i.  e.,  UK,  Europe,  America,  Asia,  and  Middle  East  &  Africa).  A 
similar  pair-wise  approach  is  used  to  assess  the  differential  value  contributions 
associated  with  segments  operating  in  specific  industries.  Finally,  this  study  uses  a 
longer  time  period  and  a  wider  range  of  valuation-affecting  contexts  than  has  been 
applied  in  prior  studies. 
1.2  IS  IT  DIVERSIFICATION  OR  DISCLOSURE? 
Although  such  terms  as  `geographic/industrial  diversification'  and 
`geographic/business  segment-disclosure'  are  used  in  this  study  as  synonyms,  it  is 
important  to  note  that  strictly  speaking  this  study  concerns  more  the  segment-disclosure 
side  of  the  story.  On  a  technical  level,  there  is  an  important  distinction  between  these 
two  terms.  A  firm  might  operate  in  more  than  one  geographic  area  or  economic 
sector/industry,  yet  choose  not  to  report  segmental  information.  Or,  for  disclosure 
purposes,  it  might  report  segmental  data  using  highly  firm-specific  (i.  e.,  idiosyncratic) 
13 amalgamation  and  classification  criteria  and  methods.  This  might  happen,  for  instance, 
when  in  the  opinion  of  the  firm's  directors  the  disclosure  of  any  information  required  by 
SSAP  25  would  be  seriously  prejudicial  to  the  interests  of  the  reporting  entity.  Non- 
reporting  is  also  likely  when  none  of  the  segments  of  a  diversified  firm  surpasses  the 
standard's  10%  materiality  threshold.  Furthermore,  as  pointed  out  in  SSAP  25,  there  can 
be  considerable  heterogeneity,  within  the  cross-section  of  the  UK  multi-segment  firms, 
in  how  segments  are  classified,  both  in  geographic  and  line-of-business  terms.  In  other 
words,  segmental  identification  and  break-down  for  reporting  purposes  would  not 
necessarily  mirror  the  patterns  of  the  actual  operating  segments,  i.  e.  the  firm's 
diversification  characteristics.  It  would,  therefore,  be  fallacious  to  equate  segment 
disclosures  with  the  actual  diversification  profile  of  the  firm.  Therefore,  in  strict  terms, 
this  study  is  not  an  investigation  into  the  valuation  properties  of  `real'  operational 
components  of  diversified  firms.  However,  because  the  literature  in  the  area  of 
corporate  diversification,  nevertheless,  relies  on  the  segmental  disclosures  as  the 
primary  source  of  data,  the  suggestion  that  these  terms  are  synonyms  is  difficult  to 
avoid  in  relation  to  discussions  of  the  existing  empirical  literature. 
1.3  DATA  AND  METHODOLOGY 
To  investigate  the  differences  in  valuation  across  specific  geographic  or  industry 
segment  operations  and  estimate  the  valuation  differentials  between  the  diversified  and 
domestic  firms,  an  augmented  version  of  the  Edwards-Bell-Ohlson  residual  income 
model  is  employed.  While  the  detailed  derivation  of  the  empirical  estimation  model  is 
the  subject  of  Chapter  3,  it  suffices  to  mention  here  that  the  model  is  designed  to  explain 
the  cross-sectional  variation  of  the  scale-deflated  equity  market  value  through  the  scale- 
deflated  contemporaneous  earnings,  book  value,  dividends  and  a  set  of  control 
variables.  For  the  segment-level  analysis,  the  model's  firm-level  accounting  data  is  then 
14 disaggregated  into  (or,  alternatively,  appended  with)  the  segmental  components.  The 
valuation  differentials  associated  with  segments,  operating  in  diverse  geographic 
regions  or  lines-of-business,  are  inferred  by  analysing  the  differences  between  the 
estimated  segment  earnings  multipliers. 
The  sample  consists  of  pooled  over  time  observations  that  belong  to  a  cross- 
section  of  the  UK  multi-segment  non-financial  publicly  limited  companies  covering  the 
period  from  1987  to  2002.  This  data  is  collected  from  the  Extel  Financial  Company 
Analysis  database. 
1.4  HYPOTHESES  AND  FINDINGS 
It  is  not  the  objective  of  this  study  to  test  hypotheses  that  would  have  been 
specifically  formulated  at  the  outset,  based  on  the  prior  literature.  The  investigation  here 
is  more  of  a  general  exploratory  nature,  with  the  objective  being  to  tap  into  one  of  the 
weakly  researched  areas  of  market-based  accounting  research,  and  to  uncover  empirical 
evidence  on  specific  relationships.  Some  testable  propositions,  however,  do  arise  in  the 
process  of  analysis,  leading  to  the  subsequent  formulation  and  testing  of  hypotheses. 
The  main  findings  of  this  study  relate  to  (i)  the  firm-level  valuation,  and  (ii) 
geographic  and  line-of-business  segment  valuation.  With  regard  to  the  firm-level 
analysis,  the  study  uncovers  a  range  of  factors  and  contexts  that  influence  the  value 
relevance  and  pricing  of  such  firm-level  financial  statement  variables,  as  book  value, 
earnings  and  dividends.  These  relationships  are  found  to  be  affected  significantly  by: 
the  sign  of  reported  earnings  and  book  values;  whether  the  firm  trades  at  a 
premium/discount  to  its  book  value;  the  economic  periods;  the  dividend  paying  status  of 
the  firm;  diversification  profile  of  the  firm;  industrial  affiliation  of  the  firm. 
Findings  on  the  segmental  level  provide  an  insight  into  how  the  market 
perceives  and  prices,  into  the  equity  market  value  of  the  firm,  operations  that  the  UK 
15 firms  might  carry  out  in  specific  geographic  locations  or  industries.  In  addition,  the 
study  provides  further  evidence  on  how  the  international  and/or  industrial 
diversification  profile  of  UK  firms  reflects  upon  the  market's  valuation  of  the  firms. 
Finally,  the  study  provides  new  evidence  on  the  de  facto  quality  of  corporate  segmental 
reporting  and  the  adequacy  of  the  requirements  of  the  UK  segment  disclosure  standard. 
1.5  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  THESIS 
Chapter  2  presents  the  literature  review  classified  into  four  sections  relevant  to 
the  study.  The  first  section  reviews  segment  disclosure  requirements  in  the  UK  and 
some  debate  in  the  literature  on  its  relevance  to  financial  statement  users.  In  the  second 
section  I  review  literature  on  usefulness  and  value  relevance  of  line  of  business  and 
geographic  segment  information.  The  third  section  examines  previous  studies  on 
valuation  of  geographical  and  industrial  diversification.  Section  four  discusses  some  of 
the  studies  in  the  area  of  accounting-based  valuation  models. 
Chapter  3  consists  of  seven  sections  and  deals  with  methodology  used  to  conduct 
the  study.  Following  the  introduction  section,  the  second  section  justifies  the  selection 
of  a  rigorous  accounting  based  valuation  model,  which  is  used  in  the  subsequent 
empirical  analysis  chapters.  Section  3  presents  alternative  approaches  to  the  formal 
derivation  of  the  model,  the  underlying  assumptions  and  further  adjustments  used  for 
operationalising  the  theoretical  model.  Section  4  discusses  the  issues  of  scale  and  scale 
effects,  and  measures  that  can  mitigate  this  problem  in  the  context  of  market  based 
accounting  research  in  general,  and  in  the  employed  test  design  in  particular.  Section  5 
augments  the  model  for  the  purpose  of  segment-level  analysis.  Section  6  discusses  the 
hypothesised  economic  (and,  where  relevant,  econometric)  role  of  the  intercept, 
additional  valuation  factors,  and  instrumental  variables  included  in  the  model.  Section 
seven  concludes  the  chapter. 
16 Chapter  4  analyses  empirically  the  properties  of  the  empirical  valuation  model 
for  the  firm-level  data  and  consists  of  five  sections.  Following  the  introduction  section, 
Section  2  explains  the  data  selection  and  collection  procedures,  defines  variables, 
examines  some  primary  characteristics  of  the  entire  sample,  and  reports  and  analyses 
the  variables'  descriptive  statistics.  Section  3  presents  the  results  of  empirical  tests  for 
alternatively  partitioned  samples,  in  order  to  identify  influential  contexts  that  need  to  be 
controlled  for  during  the  segment-level  analysis.  Section  4  discusses  the  issue  of 
sensitivity  of  the  results  to  alternative  definitions  of  outliers  and  performs  additional 
robustness  checks.  Section  5  discusses  major  finding  of  the  firm-level  analysis  in  light 
of  their  implications  to  segment-level  analysis. 
Chapter  5  consists  of  four  sections  and  is  devoted  to  the  analysis  of  value 
contributions  associated  with  operations  reported  from  specific  geographical  locations. 
Section  2  follows  the  introduction  section,  and  provides  details  on  data  collection 
procedure,  variables  description  and  the  analysis  of  data  descriptive  statistics.  Section  3 
is  the  core  of  the  chapter  and  presents  the  regression  results  and  subsequent  analysis  of 
findings.  In  section  4I  perform  additional  checks  for  the  robustness  of  the  previous 
findings,  by  using  alternative  deflators,  and  conclude  the  chapter. 
Chapter  6  is  methodologically  and  structurally  similar  to  Chapter  5,  but 
concentrates  on  the  analysis  of  value  contributions  associated  with  specific  line-of- 
business  segments. 
Chapter  7  concludes  the  study,  by  providing  the  summary  of  results,  their 
importance  and  implications,  outlines  the  limitations  of  the  study  and  directions  for  the 
future  research. 
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BACKGROUND  AND  LITERATURE  REVIEW 
2.1.  INTRODUCTION 
In  this  chapter  I  examine  the  literature  in  specific  areas  of  such  disciplines  as 
accounting,  market  based  accounting,  and  finance,  that  contextualise  the  objectives  of 
this  research  and  set  up  the  background  for  the  research  questions  addressed  in  this 
study. 
The  chapter  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  2.2  outlines  and  discusses  the 
segment  disclosure  requirements  in  the  UK.  Section  2.3  reviews  three  main  strands  of 
the  literature  in  the  general  area  of  usefulness  of  segmental  information,  i.  e.,  (i) 
predictive  ability  of  segmental  data,  (ii)  market's  reaction  to  segment  information,  and 
(iii)  differential  valuation  of  different  business  and  geographic  segments.  Section  2.4 
examines  some  of  the  empirical  works  in  the  area  of  valuation  of  corporate  industrial 
and/or  geographic  diversification.  Section  2.5  discusses  accounting-based  valuation 
models  in  light  of  their  application  to  this  study. 
2.2  BACKGROUND  AND  DISCUSSION  OF  SEGMENT  DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS  IN  THE  UK 
The  introduction  chapter  stresses  that  the  primary  issues  of  my  research  are  the 
investigation  of  value  contributions,  as  perceived  by  the  stock  market,  of  specific 
geographic  and  industrial  segments  of  UK  multi-segment  companies,  as  well  as  the 
equity  value  implication  of  such  corporate  characteristics  as  industrial  and/or 
geographic  diversification.  In  this  study,  the  very  fact  of  whether  the  firm  is  diversified 
or  not  and,  if  so,  whether  it  is  diversified  into  specific  geographic  regions  and/or  lines  of 
business,  is  inferred  from  the  firm's  disclosure  or  non-disclosures  of  segment-level 
18 information  in  its  financial  reports.  It  is,  therefore,  of  vital  importance  to  understand 
how  and  what  segment  information  might  be  reported  by  UK  companies.  For  this 
purpose,  it  is  necessary  to  review  the  rules,  set  by  the  accounting  standard  setting 
bodies,  which  guide  segment  reporting  in  the  UK.  In  the  section  that  follows  I  present  a 
summary  of  current  UK  segment  disclosure  rules,  along  with  some  literature  on  the 
quality  of  segment  disclosure  rules  and  segment  disclosures  per  se. 
In  the  UK  the  requirements  to  provide  segmental  information  come  from  two 
sources:  the  Companies  Act  1985,  and  a  more  recent  segment  reporting  standard,  the 
Statement  of  Standard  Accounting  Practice  No.  25,  adopted  in  June  1990. 
2.2.1  Companies  Act  1985 
Until  the  adoption  of  SSAP  25,  the  UK  segment  disclosure  requirements, 
stipulated  by  the  Companies  Act,  were  generally  considered  less  onerous.  According  to 
the  Companies  Act,  UK  companies  were  only  required  to  disclose  turnovers  by  (a) 
Class  of  business  and  (b)  Geographical  market,  including  the  destination  (i.  e., 
geographic  locations  where  products/services  were  marketed)  and  the  origin  (i.  e., 
geographic  locations  where  products/services  were  produced)2.  The  Act  requires  that 
where  a  company  has  operated  in  classes  of  business  or  supplied  markets,  which,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  directors,  differ  substantially  from  each  other,  the  notes  to  the  accounts 
should  disclose  turnover  attributable  to  classes  of  business  and  to  markets  [GAAP 
2004].  Only  those  classes  of  business  or  markets  which  contribute  materially  need  be 
disclosed.  The  amounts  which  are  not  material  may  be  included  in  amounts  stated  in 
respect  of  another  class  or  market,  or  combined  together  and  shown  as  `other'. 
The  Act  gives  little  guidance  for  determining  classes  of  business,  but  suggests  that 
the  directors  should  have  regard  to  the  manner  in  which  the  company's  activities  are 
2  The  requirements  in  the  US  where  more  extensive,  with  FAS  14  calling  for  disclosure  of  line  of  business 
and  geographical  information  on  sales,  intra-group  transfers,  profits  and  identifiable  assets  (FASB, 
December  1976). 
19 organised.  It  is  suggested  that  this  term  might  reasonably  be  regarded  as  equivalent  to 
the  `principal  activities'  of  the  company  which  should  be  disclosed  in  the  directors' 
report.  Similarly,  for  markets,  it  states  that  a  market  means  a  geographical  market,  but  it 
gives  no  further  criteria  for  determining  when  markets  differ  substantially  from  each 
other  [GAAP  2004]. 
The  requirements  of  the  Act  are  subject  to  the  proviso  that  when,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  directors,  disclosure  of  this  information  would  be  seriously  prejudicial  to  the 
interests  of  the  company,  it  need  not  be  given,  but  the  fact  that  the  information  has  not 
been  disclosed  must  be  stated  [GAAP  2004]. 
2.2.2  Statement  of  Standard  Accounting  Practice  25  (SSAP  25) 
SSAP  25  recognises  the  fact  that  segment  information  is  becoming  increasingly 
important  as  more  and  more  companies  trade  globally  and  carry  out  numerous  classes  of 
business  or  operate  in  several  geographical  areas,  with  different  rates  of  profitability, 
different  opportunities  for  growth  and  different  degrees  of  risk.  The  standard  notes  that 
it  is  not  usually  possible  for  the  user  of  the  financial  statements  of  such  an  entity  to 
make  judgements  about  either  the  nature  of  the  entity's  different  activities  or  their 
contribution  to  the  entity's  overall  financial  results  unless  the  financial  statements 
provide  some  segmental  analysis  of  the  information  they  contain.  As  mentioned  in 
SSAP  25,  the  purpose  of  segmental  information  is  to  provide  information  to  assist  the 
users  of  financial  statements: 
(a)  to  appreciate  more  thoroughly  the  results  and  financial  position  of  the  entity  by 
permitting  a  better  understanding  of  the  entity's  past  performance  and  thus  a  better 
assessment  of  its  future  prospects;  and 
(b)  to  be  aware  of  the  impact  that  changes  in  significant  components  of  a  business 
may  have  on  the  business  as  a  whole. 
20 SSAP  25  repeats  the  statutory  disclosures  of  the  Companies  Act  and  then  adds  the 
requirement  to  disclose  both  profit/loss  before  tax  and  net  assets  by  class  of  business 
and  geographical  market.  These  disclosures  are  required  to  be  given  by  certain 
companies  and  are  encouraged  to  be  given  by  all  other  entities.  It  does  not  seek  to 
change  the  requirement  of  the  Act  to  report  segments  which  differ  substantially  from 
each  other,  but  rather  seeks  to  provide  guidance  to  assist  the  directors  in  determining 
what  is  `substantially  different'.  It  is  the  directors  who  make  the  decisions  as  to  what 
defines  a  reportable  segment  [GAAP  2004]. 
Those  definitions,  once  made,  should  be  reviewed  annually  and  redefined  as 
appropriate.  If  a  change  is  made  to  the  definitions  of  the  segments  or  to  the  accounting 
policies  that  are  adopted  for  reporting  segment  information,  the  nature,  reason  for  and 
effect  of  the  change  should  be  disclosed.  Comparatives  should  be  restated  in  accordance 
with  the  newly  defined  segments  [SSAP  25]. 
SSAP  25  is  meant  to  ensure  that  the  segmental  information  reported  by  an  entity  is 
disclosed  on  a  consistent  basis,  year  by  year.  The  fundamental  objective  of  this  standard 
is  to  achieve,  as  far  as  possible,  consistency  and  comparability  between  years.  However, 
the  standard  emphasises  that  caution  should  be  exercised  in  comparing  similar  segments 
in  different  entities,  because,  in  addition  to  any  differences  in  accounting  policies 
adopted,  the  basis  of  accounting  for  inter-segment  sales  or  the  treatment  of  common 
costs  may  not  be  consistent  between  entities. 
Under  SSAP  25  an  operating  segment  is  likely  to  be  determined  in  substantially 
the  same  way  information  is  reported  internally  and  used  by  the  enterprise's  chief 
operating  decision  maker  to  evaluate  performance  and  make  operating  decisions.  This 
means  operating  segments  could  include  components  of  an  enterprise  that  sell  products 
to  others  in  the  consolidated  group  (vertically  integrated  operations)  as  well  as  start-up 
operations.  The  measures  and  amounts  of  assets  and  operating  results  of  these  segments 
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disclosing  in  its  financial  statements.  The  financial  statements  are  also  required  to  report 
reconciliations  of  segmental  amounts  to  consolidated  totals,  and  often  include  the 
nature/characteristics  of  reconciliation  differences. 
In  identifying  a  reportable  segment,  the  SSAP  25  requires  that  directors  have 
regard  to  the  overall  purpose  of  giving  segmental  disclosure,  which  is  to  provide 
information  that  will  allow  a  more  thorough  understanding  of  the  results  and  financial 
position  of  a  reporting  entity  and  highlight  the  impact  of  changes  on  significant 
components  of  the  business.  SSAP  25  cites  paragraph  55  of  Schedule  4  of  The 
Companies  Act  1985,  where  it  is  stated  that  it  is  for  the  directors  to  determine  whether 
the  company  has  carried  on  business  of  two  or  more  classes  or  has  supplied  markets  that 
differ  substantially  from  each  other.  Similarly,  where,  in  the  opinion  of  the  directors,  the 
classes  of  business  or  the  markets  do  not  differ  substantially  from  each  other  they  may 
be  treated  as  one. 
Because  SSAP  25  emphasises  a  management  approach  in  reporting  segments,  its 
primary  benefits  to  financial  statement  users  are  (as  noted  in  GAAP  2004)  expected  to 
include: 
(a)  the  ability  to  see  an  enterprise  through  management's  eyes,  thereby  making  it 
easier  for  the  user  to  predict  management  actions  or  reactions  that  can  have  a 
significant  effect  on  the  enterprise's  prospects  for  future  cash  flows;  and 
(b)  reporting  that  is  more  consistent  with  discussions  about  the  enterprise's 
components  elsewhere  in  the  annual  report  and  in  company  press  releases. 
Classes  of  business  or  geographical  segments  should  be  identified  if  they  are  significant 
to  the  entity  as  a  whole.  A  segment  is  normally  considered  significant  if  it  accounts  for 
10  per  cent  or  more  of  the  total  turnover,  results  or  net  assets  [SSAP25]. 
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an  entity  that  provides  a  separate  product  or  service  or  a  separate  group  of  related 
products  or  services  and  accounts  for  10  per  cent  or  more  of  the  total  turnover,  results  or 
net  assets.  The  determination  of  classes  of  business  depends  on  the  judgement  of  the 
directors  and  there  is  no  single  set  of  characteristics  that  can  be  universally  applied  to 
differentiate  classes  of  business,  but  the  following  factors  should  be  taken  into  account: 
(a)  The  nature  of  the  product  or  services; 
(b)  The  nature  of  the  production  process; 
(c)  The  markets  in  which  the  products  or  services  are  sold; 
(d)  The  distribution  channels  for  the  products; 
(e)  The  manner  in  which  the  entity's  activities  are  organised;  and 
(f)  Any  separate  legislative  framework  relating  to  part  of  the  business. 
A  geographical  segment  is  defined  by  SSAP  25  as  a  geographic  area  comprising 
an  individual  country  or  a  group  of  countries  in  which  an  entity  operates,  or  to  which  it 
supplies  products  or  services.  A  geographical  analysis  should  help  the  user  to  assess  the 
extent  to  which  an  entity's  operations  are  subject  to  such  factors  as: 
(a)  Expansionist  or  restrictive  economic  climates; 
(b)  Stable  of  unstable  political  regimes; 
(c)  Exchange  control  regulations; 
(d)  Exchange  rate  fluctuations. 
Where  an  entity  has  carried  on  business  in  two  or more  different  business  classes 
or  geographical  areas  the  SSAP  25  requires  the  following  disclosures  for  each  segment: 
(a)  Turnover  by  location  of  operations; 
(b)  Results,  before  accounting  for  taxation,  minority  interests  and  extraordinary  items, 
normally  by  location  of  operations;  and 
(c)  Net  Assets  by  location  of  operations. 
23 SSAP  25  provides  some  further  guidance  on  segmental  results.  As  interest  is 
normally  a  result  of  the  company's  financial  policy  rather  than  individual  segments' 
policy,  it  is  usually  excluded  from  the  segments'  results  as  it  would  lead  to  a 
meaningless  allocation  between  segments.  Where  interest  income  or  expense  is  central 
to  the  business,  interest  should  normally  be  included  in  arriving  at  the  segment  result.  A 
problem  arises  where  costs  are  incurred  which  are  common  to  more  than  one  segment. 
The  SSAP  gives  some  guidance  on  this  and  suggests  that  entities  may  apportion 
common  costs  to  segments  in  a  way  that  the  directors  deem  appropriate,  as  long  as  the 
apportionment  would  not  be  misleading.  Any  common  costs  not  apportioned  should  be 
deducted  from  the  total  of  the  segment  result. 
Regarding  segmental  Net  Assets,  SSAP  25  notes  that  in  most  cases  the  net  assets 
of  each  reportable  segment  will  be  the  non-interest  bearing  operating  assets  less  the 
non-interest  bearing  operating  liabilities.  Interest  bearing  assets  and  liabilities  will  only 
be  included  if  the  segmental  results  include  interest  because  the  entity's  business  is  to 
earn  and  incur  interest.  Where  assets  or  liabilities  do  not  relate  exclusively  to  one 
segment  (i.  e.,  common  assets),  they  should  be  allocated  to  segments  on  a  reasonable 
basis.  The  total  of  any  assets  or  liabilities  not  allocated  to  segments  should  be  shown  as 
an  item  reconciling  the  segment  net  assets  to  the  total  balance  sheet  net  assets. 
In  general,  the  importance  of  segment-level  information  is  well  recognised  not 
only  in  the  UK,  but  across  the  international  investment  community.  In  the  United  States 
the  American  Institute  of  Certified  Public  Accountants,  the  Financial  Accounting 
Standards  Board  (FASB),  financial  analysts  and  investors  have  all  stressed  the 
important  role  which  segment  reports  have  in  the  financial  reporting  arena.  For 
example,  the  Association  for  Investment  Management  and  Research  (AIMR)  concluded 
in  its  paper  (AIMR  1993,  pp.  59-60)  that  industry-level  segment  reports  are  "vital, 
essential,  fundamental,  indispensable  and  integral  to  the  investment  analysis  process... 
24 Different  segments  will  generate  dissimilar  streams  of  cash  flows  to  which  are  attached 
disparate  risks  and  which  bring  about  unique  values.  Thus,  without  disaggregation, 
there  is  no  sensible  way  to  predict  the  overall  amounts,  timing,  or  risks  of  a  complete 
enterprise's  future  cash  flows.  There  is  little  dispute  over  the  analytic  usefulness  of 
disaggregated  financial  data.  " 
In  response  to  calls  from  the  investment  community  for  more  desaggregated 
information,  standard  setters  and  regulators  worldwide  have  made  considerable  efforts 
to  expand  segment  disclosure  requirements  (e.  g.,  Statement  of  Standard  Accounting 
Practice  25  in  the  UK;  SFAS  No.  131  in  the  US;  and  International  Accounting  Standard 
No.  14R). 
One  of  the  main  rationales  for  a  segment  disclosure  standard  is  to  provide 
investors  with  improved  predictive  ability  regarding  corporate  prospects.  SSAP  25 
provides  a  wide  range  of  factors  which  may  be  taken  into  account  when  determining 
reportable  segments.  However,  the  list  is  so  diverse  that  various  approaches  might  be 
consistent  with  this  standard,  allowing  companies  to  define  segments  in  the  way  they 
find  suitable.  Therefore,  the  level  and  the  mode  of  aggregation  of  transactions  reported 
in  corporate  financial  statements  and,  connected  with  this,  the  quality  of  disclosures  is  a 
central  debate  in  financial  accounting  (both  in  the  UK  and  abroad). 
There  is  a  large  body  of  US  and  UK  literature  on  quality  of  segment  disclosures. 
In  the  UK,  some  studies  address  the  issue  of  quality  of  segment  disclosures  [Emmanuel 
and  Garrod  (1999,2002)]  and,  in  particular,  changes  in  disclosure  quality  associated 
with  the  adoption  of  new  segment  disclosure  standards  [Emmanuel  et  al.,  (1999)]. 
Emmanuel  et  al.,  (1999)  address  the  issue  of  the  initial  impact  of  SSAP  25  on 
segment  disclosure,  the  ways  in  which  managers  have  interpreted  the  standard  and  its 
materiality  guideline,  and  whether  these  have  changed  as  company  directors  have 
become  more  familiar  with  the  disclosure  requirements.  Their  findings  suggest  that 
25 although  the  introduction  of  the  standard  has  increased  the  volume  of  disclosure, 
notably  net  asset  data,  the  growing  familiarity  with  the  standard  led  to  a  subsequent 
decline  in  the  detail  of  disclosure3,  particularly  the  number  of  reported  geographic 
segment  operations.  They  also  find  that,  contrary  to  the  intention  of  the  standard,  the 
rule  is  used  to  identify  fewer  and  larger  segments  and,  overall,  the  10%  rule  has  induced 
a  disclosure  pattern  which  confounds  the  original  intention  of  the  standard. 
Additionally,  they  analyse  the  issue  of  ambiguity  associated  with  possible 
interpretations  of  SSAP  25  disclosure  requirements.  Their  critique  of  SSAP  25  includes 
the  following  arguments:  (i)  directors  might  select  one  criterion  -  turnover,  result  or  net 
asset  -  to  identify  reportable  segments;  (ii)  the  10%  rule  might  be  applied  individually 
on  any  of  the  criteria;  (iii)  the  guidance  rule  might  be  interpreted  as  meaning  that 
segments  are  to  be  individually  identified  if  they  exceed  10%  of  turnover,  result  and  net 
asset.  Based  on  a  hypothetical  example,  Emmanuel  et  al.,  (1999)  also  demonstrate  that 
under  these  alternative  interpretations,  different  numbers  of  segments  will  be  reported. 
They  conclude  that  the  10%  materiality  rule  is  flawed  by  not  stating  maximum 
materiality  criteria  for  reportable  segments,  by  failing  to  recognise  negative  assets  and 
by  failing  to  state  whether  that  rule  is  to  be  applied  separately  or  in  combination. 
The  interpretation  of  segment  disclosure  rules  by  firms'  managers  is believed  to  be 
influenced  by  their  perceptions  of  advantages/disadvantages  associated  with  the 
provision  of  segmental  information.  Some  US  literature,  for  example,  suggests  that 
because  of  the  considerable  laxity  of  segment  disclosure  requirements,  firms  will 
increase  disclosure  when  the  valuation  benefits  from  disclosure  exceed  the  cost  of 
disclosure  [Verrechia  (1983),  Dye  (1986),  Healy  and  Palepu  (1993),  Hayes  and 
Lundholm  (1996)].  That  is,  managers  of  firms  with  `good  news'  about  the  value  of  the 
entire  firm  will  disclose  the  additional  information,  thereby  receiving  a  valuation  greater 
3  This  conforms  with  findings  from  an  earlier  study  by  Emmanuel  and  Garrod  (1992)  which  suggested 
that  companies  were  particularly  sensitive  to  providing  return  information  for  small  segments,  as  this 
might  provide  return  information  on  single  investment  projects. 
26 than  the  current  non-disclosure  price.  On  the  other  hand,  Choi  and  Levich  (1991)  infer 
that  US  firms  believe  that  disclosure  of  geographic  operations  results  in  a  competitive 
disadvantage  by  providing  privileged  information  to  competitors.  Therefore,  to 
minimise  US  multinationals'  competitive  disadvantage,  management  might  report 
ambiguous  measures,  which  can  be  done  easily  considering  the  discretion  allowed 
management  in  complying  with  disclosure  requirements.  The  authors  conclude  that 
market  participants  may  find  geographic  disclosures  of  limited  value  because  the 
disclosing  firm  is  attempting  to  provide  limited  information  to  its  competitors. 
A  counterargument  to  the  competitive  disadvantage  hypothesis  is  that 
management  wants  to  disclose  useful  information  to  market  participants  to  reflect  the 
profitability,  growth,  and  risk  associated  with  each  significant  geographic  component  of 
cash  flow  [Lev  (1988)].  Management  may  be  motivated  to  reduce  excess  price 
variability.  The  author  suggests  that  one  means  of  accomplishing  this  goal  is  to  reduce 
information  asymmetry  by  disclosing  useful  geographic  disaggregation.  To  the  extent 
that  management  desires  to  provide  useful  information  to  the  market,  market 
participants  may  perceive  geographic  segment  disclosures  as  providing  useful 
information. 
The  above  review  of  the  segment  reporting  standards  and  some  of  the  literature  on 
disclosure  requirements  exposes  the  problematic  character  of  segment  information  and 
the  controversy  regarding  its  adequacy  to  the  intended  objectives  of  disclosure 
standards.  The  implications  of  SSAP  25  for  the  segment-level  empirical  results  of  my 
study  are  discussed  in  relevant  sections  of  Chapters  5  and  6. 
27 2.3  LITERATURE  ON  USEFULNESS  OF  LINE  OF  BUSINESS  AND 
GEOGRAPHIC  SEGMENT  REPORTING 
In  the  previous  section  I  reviewed  the  past  and  present  segment  disclosure 
requirements  in  the  UK  and  briefly  touched  on  some  of  the  literature  concerned  with  the 
effectiveness  of  the  segment  disclosure  standards  and  disclosure  quality.  This  was 
necessary  for  a  better  understanding  of  the  nature  and  attributes  of  segmental 
information  which  constitutes  an  input  for  the  subsequent  empirical  analyses  of  this 
study. 
In  the  current  section,  I  review  and  analyse  the  literature  which  focuses  on  the 
valuation-related  aspects  of  the  segment-level  information  and,  therefore,  constitutes  the 
theoretical  and  methodological  background  for  this  study.  Depending  on  the  research 
objectives,  these  studies  could  be  categorised  into  three  strands  of  research4: 
1.  Predictive  ability  of  segmental  data. 
This  strand  of  research  investigates: 
"  whether  geographic  or  line  of  business  data  disclosed  by  companies  contains 
additional  information  that  can  be  used  to  improve  forecasts  (of  earnings  or  the 
firm's  market  value)  that  outperform  forecasts  based  on  past  consolidated  data 
only;  and 
"  whether  segment  disclosures  help  improve  the  accuracy  of  forecasts  made  by 
financial  analysts. 
2.  Market's  reaction  to  segment  information. 
This  strand  of  research  investigates: 
4  It  shall  be  noted  that  the  boundaries  between  these  categories  might  not  always  be  distinct. 
28 "  whether  the  stock  market  reacts  to  segment  disclosures  and 
contemporaneously  discounts  this  information  into  the  share  price; 
"  whether  the  equity  returns  react  to  segment  disclosures; 
"  whether  the  segment  disclosures  affect  the  market's  perception  of  the 
equity's  risk. 
3.  Differential  valuation  of  segments. 
This  strand  of  research  investigates: 
"  whether  segmental  disclosures  might  provide  evidence  of  differential  valuation 
of  operations  from  specific  geographic  locations  or  lines  of  business. 
In  the  following  sections  I  will  review  the  literature  related  to  each  of  these 
categories. 
2.3.1  Predictive  ability  of  segmental  data 
The  research  on  the  usefulness  of  segment  data  to  the  predictive  ability  of  decision 
makers  is  the  most  extensive  and  includes  numerous  studies.  Overall,  earlier  research 
finds  that  forecasts  using  segment  information  are  more  accurate  than  forecasts  using 
only  aggregated  information  [e.  g.,  Barnea  and  Lakonishok  (1980)].  Studies  by  Kinney 
(1971),  Collins  (1976),  and  Silhan  (1982)  using  model  based  research  methods  show 
that  disclosure  accompanies  improved  earnings  predictions.  Market-based  research  by 
Kochanek  (1974),  Collins  (1975),  and  Foster  (1975)  find  evidence  of  an  association 
between  segment  disclosure  and  improved  accuracy  of  earnings  estimates,  as  well  as  a 
positive  predictive  relationship  between  release  of  segment  data  and  market  returns.  The 
results  presented  by  Kochanek  support  the  position  that  external  financial  reports,  which 
contain  segmental  data,  do  provide  a  useful  source  of  information  to  investors 
appraising  the  investment  potential  of  a  diversified  firm.  Collins  (1976)  also  supports 
29 this  conclusion  in  a  finding  that  market  prices  do  not  fully  reflect  the  non-public- 
segment  data. 
More  recent  research,  by  and  large,  reconfirms  earlier  research  findings. 
Emmanuel  and  Pick  (1980)  investigate  whether  industrial  segmental  disclosures  by  39 
UK  firms  improve  the  ability  to  forecast  corporate  sales  and  profit.  Using  several 
alternative  prediction  models  (that  use  line  of  business  data  vs.  consolidated  data  to 
generate  forecasts  of  earnings)  they  test  the  hypothesis  that  industrial  segment  sales  and 
profit  disclosure,  together  with  industry  sales  projections,  provide  significantly  more 
accurate  estimates  of  future  total-entity  sales  and  earnings  than  do  those  procedures  that 
rely  totally  on  consolidated  data.  Their  results  strongly  support  the  hypothesis. 
Silhan  (1983)  conducts  a  similar  study  in  the  US  settings  and  comes  to  similar 
conclusions.  These  findings  of  improved  forecasts  when  line  of  business  data  is  used 
has  also  been  found  by  Baldwin  (1984)  who  considers  the  forecasts  of  financial 
analysts.  However,  there  is  evidence  that  the  relative  superiority  of  line  of  business 
based  forecasts  depends  upon  the  specific  characteristics  of  the  individual  company,  in 
particular  the  degree  of  diversification  of  the  company  and  the  correlation  of  the 
performance  of  specific  industries  with  the  overall  economy  [Garrod  and  Emmanuel 
(1987)]  as  well  as  the  size  of  company  and  number  of  segments  reported  [Silhan 
(1984)]. 
Roberts  (1989)  examines  whether  the  geographical  segment  data  disclosed  by 
some  78  UK  multinationals  over  the  period  of  1981-1982  can  be  used  to  generate 
forecasts  of  earnings  that  outperform  forecasts  based  upon  past  consolidated  data.  By 
using  modifications  of  the  random  walk  model  and  alternative  methods  of  segment- 
based  multiples,  she  finds  that  the  segment  sales  and  segment  earnings  based  models 
generally  outperform  the  consolidated  random  walk  model.  Roberts  (1989)  also  finds 
30 that  there  is  no  significant  additional  advantage  in  terms  of  forecast  accuracy  in  using 
segmental  earnings  vs.  segmental  sales  data. 
Investigation  of  geographic  segment  disclosure  more  recently  have  included  work 
by  several  researchers.  Using  both  random  walk  and  growth  adjusted  models  for  a 
sample  of  89  US  multinational  companies  over  the  period  from  1979  to  1985, 
Balakrishnan,  Harris  and  Sen  (1990)  examine  whether  geographic  segment  revenues 
and  earnings  provide  more  accurate  predictions  of  future  consolidated  revenues  and 
earnings,  respectively,  than  do  consolidated  data.  To  control  for  errors  in  forecasting 
Gross  National  Product  (GNP)  and  exchange  rates,  the  authors  assume  perfect  foresight 
using  the  actual  year-ahead  changes  in  these  economic  factors.  The  perfect  foresight 
assumption  is  then  relaxed  so  that  forecasts  of  these  variables  can  be  examined.  The 
results  are  not  conclusive.  In  the  case  of  perfect  foresight,  the  segment  model 
outperforms  the  consolidated  model  for  both  revenues  and  earnings.  However,  the 
results  using  forecasts  of  GNP  and  exchange  rates  find  no  significant  differences  in  the 
predictive  ability  of  the  segment  and  consolidated  forecast  models.  The  authors  attribute 
the  insignificant  results  when  using  forecasts  of  GNP  and  exchange  rates  to  the  lack  of 
detailed  geographic  segment  disclosures  (i.  e.,  insufficient  disaggregation),  which  reduce 
the  ability  to  utilise  certain  country-specific  macroeconomic  forecast  variables.  A 
caveat,  they  suggest,  is  that  inaccuracy  in  forecasting  country-specific  growth  and 
exchange  rates  restricts  the  potential  usefulness  of  the  geographic  segment  data. 
Overall,  their  results  suggest  that  geographic  area  disclosures  can  enhance  the 
information  set  used  to  predict  annual  income  and  sales.  Balakrishnan  et  al.,  (1990)  also 
discuss  a  formal  mathematical  proof  demonstrating  theat  the  use  of  disaggregated 
geographical  information  can  result  in  less  accurate  forecasts. 
Herrmann  (1996)  examines  whether  geographic  information  disclosed  at  an 
increasingly  disaggregated  level  (i.  e.,  consolidated  vs.  continent  vs.  country)  results  in 
31 increased  predictive  ability  of  operating  results.  Fifty-five  multinational  companies  were 
simulated  by  combining  the  annual  operating  results  of  six  individual  companies,  one 
from  each  of  six  countries,  in  order  to  compare  the  forecasting  accuracy  of  data 
disclosed  at  the  country,  continent,  and  consolidated  level.  The  study  finds  that, 
consistent  with  the  fineness  theorem,  the  accuracy  of  forecasts  increases  as  sales  and 
gross  profit  are  disclosed  at  a  more  disaggregated  geographic  level.  Forecast  accuracy  is 
significantly  greater  at  the  country  level  in  comparison  to  the  continent  level. 
Hussain  (1997)  investigates  the  impact  of  finer  segment  definitions  on  the 
accuracy  (errors)  of  UK  analysts'  corporate  earnings  forecasts,  generated  22  months 
prior  to  the  announcement  dates.  His  results  provide  evidence  of  predictive  gains  to 
both  line-of-business  data  and  geographic  data,  although  these  gains  appear  to  be 
concentrated  within  a  sub-sample  of  firms  for  which  analysts  appear  to  have  specific 
difficulty  in  forecasting  earnings,  i.  e.,  those  experiencing  negative  changes  in  earnings. 
In  their  theoretical  paper  Herrmann  and  Thomas  (2000)  point  out  that  the  most 
common  approach  used  by  analysts  in  estimating  future  earnings  is  to  disaggregate  the 
company  into  individual  segments  and  develop  forecasts  of  the  performance  for  each 
segment.  The  forecasts  are  then  aggregated  to  form  an  overall  forecast  of  company 
performances.  The  authors  suggest  an  analytical  model  of  the  usefulness  of  segment 
information  in  forecasting  earnings.  The  model  derives  four  conditions  under  which 
segment  information  is  expected  to  increase  earnings  forecast  precision.  According  to 
their  analytical  framework,  forecast  precision  should  increase  with  (1)  greater 
differentiation  across  segment  forecasts  factors  (i.  e.,  expected  segment  growth,  expected 
inflation,  political  risk),  (2)  greater  disaggregation  of  earnings,  (3)  greater  predictive 
accuracy  of  segment  forecast  factors,  and  (4)  greater  accuracy  in  measuring  the  segment 
S  Surveys  of  UK  analysts'  forecasts  procedures  by  Arnold  and  Moizer  (1984)  also  show  that  many  use  a 
break-down  and  build-up  approach  to  forecasting  earnings.  They  find  that  segmental  data  is  used  in 
conjunction  with  specialist  industrial  and  economic  forecasts,  to  predict  future  consolidated  earnings. 
32 weights.  They  also  outline  conditions  when  forecasts  using  consolidated  information 
would  outperform  forecasts  using  segment  information. 
Herrmann,  Inoue  and  Thomas  (2001)  question  the  market's  efficiency  with  respect 
to  accounting  information,  yet  it  is  of  relevance  to  my  study,  particularly  with  respect  to 
possible  interpretations  of  my  empirical  findings  and  suggestions  for  future  research. 
They  investigate  the  extent  to  which  parent-only  earnings  and  subsidiary  earnings  in  the 
current  year  persist  into  consolidated  earnings  in  the  next  year.  They  also  examine 
whether  the  market  understands  these  time-series  behaviors  of  earnings  components, 
and  hypothesise  that  if  subsidiary  earnings  are  important  in  predicting  next  year's 
consolidated  earnings  and  market  participants  do  not  fully  understand  this,  then  stock 
prices  will  lag  reported  subsidiary  earnings. 
Their  sample  consists  of  8490  firm-year  observations,  drawn  from  Japanese  listed 
firms,  over  the  period  1985-1997. 
Their  results  indicate  that  the  Japanese  stock  market  adjusts  correctly  for  the 
persistence  of  parent-only  earnings,  but  the  market  appears  to  underestimate  the 
persistence  of  subsidiary  earnings  in  current  stock  prices.  Consequently,  stock  prices 
correct  in  a  predictable  manner  in  the  subsequent  year,  resulting  in  a  significant, 
positive  relation  between  stock  returns  in  year  t+1  and  subsidiary  earnings  in  year  t.  In 
other  words,  subsidiary  earnings  provide  information  beyond  parent-only  earnings  in 
forecasting  next  period's  consolidated  earnings  and  prices  do  not  fully  reflect  the 
persistence  of  incremental  subsidiary  earnings  in  the  current  period.  The  authors  note 
that  this  anomaly  is  more  likely  attributable  to  market  mispricing  than  failure  to  control 
for  cross-sectional  differences  in  risk. 
Overall,  regardless  of  the  empirical  test  designs  or  models  employed  in  different 
studies,  their  general  findings  appear  to  be  in  consensus.  That  is,  forecasts  developed  by 
33 using  the  segment  information  are  more  accurate  than  those  that  totally  rely  on  the  firm- 
level  aggregated  data. 
2.3.2.  Market's  reaction  to  segment  information 
Early  research  into  stock  market  reactions  to  line  of  business  information  tends  to 
suggest  that  the  disclosure  of  this  data,  in  general,  conveys  useful  information  to 
investors,  with  the  average  effect  being  a  significant  downward  shift  in  their  assessment 
of  a  firm's  market  riskiness  (i.  e.,  the  company's  beta)  [Simonds  and  Collins  (1978), 
Collins  and  Simonds  (1979),  Ajinkya  (1981)]. 
Dhaliwal  (1978)  found  a  decrease  in  the  cost  of  capital  for  US  firms  affected  by 
the  Security  Exchange  Commission  disclosure  requirement,  suggesting  that  the  market 
values  such  disclosures  positively.  In  addition,  there  appears  to  be  a  higher  correlation 
in  the  risk-equalised  returns  on  portfolios  of  companies  that  did  and  did  not  voluntarily 
produce  industrial  data  after  industrial  disclosures  were  made  compulsory  [Ajinkya 
(1980)]. 
Prodhan  (1986)  investigates  the  association  between  geographic  segment 
disclosures  and  the  time-series  behaviour  of  equity  security  return  systematic  risk 
(betas)  for  a  group  of  firms  listed  on  the  London  Stock  Exchange  and  affected  by  the 
UK  geographic  area  disclosure  requirements.  Using  an  uninterrupted  time  series 
analysis,  he  finds  an  abrupt  decrease  in  the  equity  security  systematic  risk  for  sample 
firms  (i.  e.,  the  disclosure  of  geographic  segment  data  results  in  a  significant  shift  in 
these  firms'  betas).  These  results  imply  that  geographic  segment  disclosures  have 
information  content  to  market  participants  in  the  UK. 
In  related  work,  Prodhan  and  Harris  (1989)  conducted  a  beta  shift  study  after  the 
enactment  of  FASB  Statement  No.  14  (in  December  1976)  using  82  US  multinationals 
and  found  that  disclosing  geographic  information  for  the  first  time  decreases  the 
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nondisclosing  firms. 
More  recent  papers  have  generally  supported  earlier  research  findings.  Senteney 
(1991)  investigates  whether  the  onset  of  geographic  area  disclosure  results  in  decreased 
systematic  risk  for  US  firms.  He  estimates  the  market  model  for  each  of  121  US 
multinational  companies  for  the  five-year  period  before  and  the  five-year  period  after 
implementation  of  SFAS  14.  If  geographical  segment  disclosures  are  useful  to  investors, 
then  such  disclosures  should  reduce  investor  uncertainty  and  prompt  an  informationally 
induced  shift  in  the  parameters  of  the  market  model.  The  study  finds  a  significant 
change  in  the  market  model  parameters  after  implementation  of  SFAS  14.  Both  the 
intercept  and  slope  coefficients  for  the  market  model  decrease  for  the  majority  of 
companies.  Consistent  with  the  expectations  of  portfolio  theory,  risk  appears  to  decrease 
after  the  initial  disclosure  of  geographic  segment  information.  However,  the  overall 
results  do  not  provide  conclusive  evidence  that  disclosure  results  in  a  decrease  in 
systematic  risk. 
Senteney  and  Bazaz  (1992)  investigates  potential  improvement  of  investor's 
earnings  expectations  and  find  a  reduction  in  the  unexpected  security  price  revision  for 
US-based  multinationals  to  their  consolidated  earnings  releases.  Their  results  suggest 
that  the  SFAS  14  geographic  segment  disclosures  result  in  improved  expectations 
regarding  consolidated  earnings  releases  and  provide  investors  with  important 
information.  Among  the  more  recent  studies  is  the  one  by  Conover  and  Wallace  (1995). 
They  empirically  explore  the  equity  market  effects  of  releasing  geographic  segment 
information  by  US  firms  and  show  that  as  firms  disclose  more  geographic  segment 
information,  their  equity  market  returns  increase. 
Doupnik  and  Robert  (1990)  conduct  a  field  experiment  to  investigate  the  relevance 
of  data  on  less  aggregated  geographic  areas.  Chartered  Financial  Analysts,  assigned  to 
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geographic  area  disclosures,  and  asked  to  assess  the  riskiness  of  investing  in  the 
hypothetical  multinational  corporation  depicted.  The  cases  varied  only  by  the  level  of 
geographic  segment  disaggregation  by  the  multinational  company.  Relevance  was 
measured  as  the  difference  in  risk  assessment  between  groups  receiving  different  levels 
of  aggregated  geographic  area  data.  The  results  indicated  that  the  level  of  aggregation 
significantly  affects  financial  statement  users'  assessments  of  the  risk  of  investing  in  a 
company  with  foreign  operations.  Consistent  with  the  expectations  of  signalling  theory, 
the  study  finds  that  individuals'  assessments  of  risk  generally  decline  as  the  level  of 
disaggregation  increase.  Another  finding  of  this  study,  which  is  of  direct  relevance  to 
my  research,  is  that  disaggregation  by  itself  does  not  automatically  provide  useful 
information.  Thus,  decomposing  a  hemispheral  level  of  aggregation  into  two 
components  can  significantly  affect  risk  assessment.  The  disaggregation  of  the  Eastern 
hemisphere  category  into  'Europe/Middle  East/Africa'  and  `Far  East/Pacific'  did  not 
significantly  affect  the  subjects'  perception  of  risk6,  while  disaggregation  of 
'Europe/Middle  East/Africa'  into  two  components  can  significantly  affect  risk 
assessments.  With  regards  to  information  content  of  disaggregation,  they  conclude  that 
disaggregation  by  itself  does  not  automatically  provide  useful  information  unless 
geographic  areas  are  disaggregated  into  groups  that  better  reflect  differences  in 
investment  risk. 
Conover,  Conover  and  Karafiath  (1994)  observe  the  equity  market  performance  of 
US  multinationals  surrounding  the  closure  of  the  Mexican  peso  foreign  exchange 
market  on  August  12,1982.  The  closure  caused  the  risk  of  Mexican  operations  to 
greatly  increase  and  should  therefore  have  caused  a  reduction  in  security  prices  for 
companies  with  operations  in  Mexico.  The  authors  find  that  companies  disclosing  a 
6  They  suggest  that  this  might  be  due  to  the  amount  of  variability  that  exists  in  each  of  the  categories. 
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following  the  crisis.  Companies  consolidating  Mexican  affiliates'  results  with  other 
geographical  regions,  companies  using  the  equity  method  of  accounting  for  Mexico 
affiliates,  and  companies  with  export  sales  to  Mexico  also  experienced  a  decline  in 
share  prices.  The  authors  conclude  that  investors  used  geographic  segment  information 
to  determine  risk  characteristics  and  revalued  shares  accordingly. 
Herrmann  and  Thomas  (1997)  present  two  theoretical  frameworks  that  establish  a 
link  between  disaggregation  and  the  risk  assessment.  First,  in  the  spirit  of  signalling 
theory,  they  argue  that  by  disaggregating  geographical  operations  into  specific 
segments,  the  company  can  change  (reduce)  its  overall  perceived  risk.  Greater 
disaggregation  of  geographic  segments  should  decrease  investor  uncertainty  and  should, 
in  most  cases,  decrease  investors'  overall  assessment  of  risk.  An  exception  is  a  situation 
in  which  finer  disaggregation  results  in  the  disclosure  of  an  especially  high-risk 
segment,  increasing  investors'  overall  risk  assessment. 
The  second  framework  relates  to  portfolio  theory.  According  to  the  portfolio 
theory,  the  benefits  of  portfolio  diversification  increase  as  the  correlation  among  the 
assets'  returns  decline.  Herrman  and  Thomas  (1997)  suggest  that  a  single  company  may 
be  thought  of  as  a  portfolio  of  assets  with  its  geographic  segments  representing  the 
different  assets.  As  such,  the  expected  return  of  the  company  (i.  e.,  the  portfolio)  is 
simply  the  weighted  average  expected  return  of  each  segment  where  the  weights  are  the 
proportions  of  returns  generated  from  each  geographic  area.  If  the  returns  of  each 
segment  are  less  than  perfectly  positively  correlated,  then  the  overall  risk  level  of  the 
company  is  reduced  through  diversification.  In  the  absence  of  sufficiently  fine  levels  of 
disaggregation,  investors  may  be  unable  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  the  returns  of 
the  individual  geographic  segments  correlate.  If  only  consolidated  data  are  disclosed, 
then  it  will  be  difficult  for  investors  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  the  company's 
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benefits.  As  the  level  of  disaggregation  increases,  the  diversification  benefit  becomes 
more  apparent  to  investors  and  should,  in  general,  decrease  the  overall  perceived  risk  of 
the  company. 
Piotroski  (1999)  investigates  whether  a  discretionary  increase  in  the  number  of 
segments  reported  communicates  value-relevant  information  to  investors  and,  given  the 
decision  to  improve  disclosure,  yields  positive  valuation  revisions.  He  employs  the 
return-based  analysis  as  a  main  test  design  and  further  complements  it  with  price- 
earnings  regressions.  The  sample  includes  423  U.  S.  firms  that  choose  to  increase  the 
number  of  reported  segments  between  1989  and  1995.  His  findings  show  that  firms  who 
choose  to  expand  their  segment  reporting  practices  experience  positive  earnings  forecast 
revisions  and  market-adjusted  stock  returns  in  the  period  surrounding  the  reported 
change.  These  revisions  and  returns  are  positively  related  to  the  new  segments' 
information,  yet  do  not  coincide  with  an  improvement  in  actual  short-term  consolidated 
operating  performance.  Piotroski's  analysis  also  suggests  that  the  reporting  changes 
were  opportunistically  motivated,  that  is,  managers  choose  to  report  a  new  segment  to 
disseminate  good  news  about  the  preponderance  of  firm  operations. 
Of  particular  relevance  to  my  study  is  his  finding  of  a  long-term  shift  in  the 
association  between  equity  prices  and  expected  earnings.  This  shift  is  reflected  by  larger 
cross-section  earnings  multiples  after  the  reporting  change,  highlighting  the  fact  that  not 
only  did  expectations  about  future  earnings  improve,  but  a  dollar  of  expected  earnings 
after  reporting  the  change  is  being  capitalised  at  a  higher  valuation  multiple.  This 
increase  is  consistent  with  a  lower  average  cost  of  capital  and  greater  expected 
persistence  of  future  earnings. 
Basu,  Douthett  and  Lim  (2000)  investigate  what  segment  characteristics  help 
make  industry  segment  reporting  more  useful  in  equity  valuation.  They  identify  three 
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persistence),  the  relative  size  of  segments,  and  the  correlation  in  segments'  earnings. 
They  measure  the  valuation  usefulness  by  comparing  the  explanatory  power  of 
disaggregate  segment  earnings  to  aggregate  company  earnings  in  a  regression  of 
cumulative  abnormal  return  (over  12  month  period)  on  earnings  changes. 
Their  empirical  tests  are  designed  under  a  two  industrial  segments  structure,  that 
is,  primary  segment  (the  one  with  higher  sales  growth  rate)  and  secondary  segment  (the 
one  with  lower  sales  growth  rate).  Their  data  sample  of  7653  U.  S.  companies  covers  the 
period  of  1987-1993  and  comprises  42780  firm-year  observations. 
They  found  that  R2  increases  (due  to  segment  reports)  when:  (i)  the  degree  of 
differential  growth  rates  in  segments'  sales  is  high,  (ii)  the  segment  size  is  equivalent  or 
comparable  between  the  two  segments  and,  (iii)  the  two  segments'  earnings  have  higher 
absolute  correlation. 
Bens  and  Monahan  (2002)  examine  the  valuation  implications  of  differences  in 
firm's  disclosure  practices  for  a  set  of  firms  that  are  diversified  by  line  of  business.  In 
particular,  they  investigate  if  there  is  a  positive  association  between  the  excess  value 
attributable  to  diversification  and  the  quality  of  firm's  voluntary  disclosures.  They 
estimate  pooled  time-series  and  Fama-MacBeth  regressions,  where  AIMR  industry- 
adjusted  disclosure  ratings  serve  as  a  disclosure  quality  proxy,  and  Berger  and  Ofek's 
measure  of  excess  value  serves  as  a  proxy  for  the  valuation  effect  attributable  to 
diversification.  They  use  multivariate  regression,  where  they  regress  the  excess  value 
proxy  on  the  disclosure  quality  proxy  and  other  potentially  influential  factors,  for  a 
sample  of  about  1200  firm-years,  drawn  from  U.  S.  multi-segment  firms  over  the  period 
of  1980-1996.  Their  results  reveal  positive  association  between  excess  values  and 
disclosure  quality  in  multi-segment  firms.  They,  in  part,  attribute  their  results  to  the 
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potentially  reduce  management's  proclivity  for  investing  in  assets  that  destroy  value. 
Overall,  despite  some  variance  of  findings  in  different  studies,  the  general 
conclusion  from  this  literature  is  that  the  disclosure  of  segmental  data  conveys  useful 
information  to  the  market,  in  that  it  impacts  upon  the  market's  valuation  of  equities  and 
investors'  perception  of  risks  associated  with  segment-disclosing  firms. 
2.3.3.  Differential  valuation  of  industrial  and  geographic  segments 
The  area  of  research  into  the  valuation  of  diversification  into  specific  geographical 
locations  or  lines  of  business  has  been  substantially  less  extensively  addressed  than  the 
issues  of.  (i)  the  valuation  of  international  and/or  industrial  diversification,  and  (ii)  the 
predictive  quality  of  (or  market's  reaction  to)  industrial  and  geographic  segmental 
information.  It  is  the  issue  of  differential  valuation  of  industrial  and  geographic 
segments  which  is  the  primary  focus  of  my  current  research. 
Among  the  studies  that  directly  link  to  my  research  are  those  by  Boatsman  et  al., 
(1993),  Prather-Stewart  (1995),  Thomas  (1996,2000),  Bodnar  and  Weintrop  (1997), 
and  Wysocki  (1998)  who  focussed  on  US  multisegment  firms,  and  Garrod  and  Rees 
(1998)  who  conduct  their  study  in  the  UK  settings.  Of  these  studies,  Garrod  and  Rees's 
(1998)  paper  has,  perhaps,  the  closest  relation  to  my  research  both  methodologically 
and  data-wise.  Below  I  review  these  studies  in  greater  detail. 
Among  the  earliest  studies  to  investigate  the  market's  valuation  of  geographic 
segment  earnings  is  Boatsman,  Behn,  and  Patz  (1993).  They  examine  the  relationship 
between  unexpected  security  returns  and  unexpected  geographic  segment  earnings, 
where  unexpected  security  returns  are  regressed  on  unexpected  geographic  segment 
earnings  for  the  period  1985-1989.  Unexpected  returns  are  measured  over  a  16-day 
period  surrounding  the  release  of  the  annual  report  for  a  sample  of  970  firm-year 
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are  measured  as  the  annual  change  in  earnings  for  that  geographic  segment,  adjusted  for 
exchange  rate  movements  for  the  year  unless  it  is  not  possible  to  identify  the  specific 
source  of  geographic  segment  earnings.  They  find  that  the  use  of  geographic  segment 
earnings  by  market  participants  is  highly  contextual  and  that,  in  general,  the  market 
does  not  appear  to  value  geographic  segment  earnings  differently.  Evidence  that 
geographic  segment  earnings  are  used  to  price  securities  is  found  if  the  market  reaction 
to  unexpected  geographic  segment  earnings  varies  across  geographic  segments. 
Specifically,  they  find  that  geographic  segment  earnings  are  used  to  value  securities 
only  when  there  is  an  unusually  large  change  in  the  geographic  segment's  earnings. 
When  outlying  observations  are  eliminated,  there  is  no  evidence  of  differential  valuation 
of  geographic  segment  earnings.  This  evidence  might  suggest  that  the  market  does  not 
value  geographic  segment  earnings  differently  because  risk  and  growth  characteristics 
do  not  vary  across  geographical  areas.  Alternatively,  the  finding  might  suggest  that 
firms  do  net  disclose  geographic  segment  earnings  in  such  way  that  would  provide 
value-relevant  information  to  the  market. 
In  his  study  Thomas  (2000)  notes  several  methodological  issues  which  may  have 
caused  the  lack  of  significant  results  in  Boatsman  et  al.,  (1993).  Firstly,  Thomas  (2000) 
argue  against  their  use  of  a  16-day  return  window  surrounding  the  filing  of  the  Form  10- 
K  to  measure  the  association  between  unexpected  returns  and  unexpected  geographic 
segment  earnings.  The  assumption  is  that  this  is  the  first  time  the  information  is  made 
available  to  the  market  and  could  therefore  be  incorporated  into  security  prices. 
However,  some  firms  may  have  voluntarily  released  this  information  in  quarterly 
reports  or  press  releases  so  that  the  change  in  annual  geographic  earnings  is  largely 
known  before  the  Form  10-K  is  filed.  Secondly,  consolidated  earnings  have  already 
been  released  before  the  16-day  window  and  the  market  may  be  able  to  reasonably  infer 
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earnings.  In  this  case,  geographic  information  may  be  impounded  well  before  the  filing 
of  the  Form  10-K. 
Prather-Stewart  (1995)  tests  the  impact  of  geographic  segment  disclosures  on 
cumulative  abnormal  returns  (CAR),  as  a  measure  of  market  reaction,  around  the  date  of 
release  of  the  1984  and  1985  financial  reports.  She  is  primarily  interested  in  the 
usefulness  (information  content)  of  the  accounting  disclosures  to  the  stock  market  by 
looking  at  segment  sales  rather  than  profits,  and  incorporates  a  country  risk  adjustment 
to  the  sales  figures.  Prather-Stewart  (1995)  tests  the  relationship  between  the  CAR  and 
(1)  the  number  of  foreign  geographic  segments  disclosed,  (2)  unexpected  risk-adjusted 
foreign  segment  sales,  and  (3)  unexpected  risk-adjusted  US  segment  sales.  The  two 
measures  of  geographic  segment  disclosures,  used  in  her  study,  are  risk-adjusted 
geographic  sales  and  the  number  of  foreign  geographic  segments  disclosed.  She 
concludes  that  geographic  segment  information  is  reflected  in  equity  market  returns  and 
that  unexpected  sales  from  different  geographic  regions  are  valued  at  different  rates. 
Overall,  her  study  suggests  that  foreign  operations  are  valued  less  highly  than  domestic 
ones. 
Thomas  (1996)  investigates  the  association  between  security  returns  and 
geographic  segment  earnings  over  long  return  intervals  varying  from  one  to  five  years. 
When  returns  and  geographic  segment  earnings  are  measured  over  long  windows  (at 
least  a  three-year  period),  the  market  differentially  values  geographic  segment  earnings 
consistent  with  the  segment's  risk  and  growth  characteristics,  and  the  predictions  of  the 
earnings  capitalisation  model.  However,  when  returns  and  geographic  segment  earnings 
are  measured  over  one  or  two-year  intervals,  no  evidence  is  found  that  the  market 
valued  geographic  segment  earnings  differently.  That  is,  geographic  segment 
disclosures  do  not  appear  to  be  a  timely  source  of  information  in  the  securities  markets, 
42 because  there  is  little  or  no  association  between  current  returns  and  current  geographic 
segment  earnings  [Boatsman  et  al.,  (1993),  Thomas  (1996)]. 
Bodnar  and  Weintrop  (1997)  investigate  the  valuation  of  foreign  and  domestic 
income  for  US  based  multinationals.  Using  2570  US  firm-year  observations  between 
1985  and  1993  they  utilise  the  segmental  data  on  the  breakdown  of  earnings  into 
domestic  and  foreign  components  and  consider  two  questions:  (1)  are  changes  in  the 
domestic  and  foreign  components  of  earnings  significantly  associated  with  changes  in 
the  market  value  of  the  firm?,  and  (2)  are  the  domestic  and  foreign  components  of 
earnings  capitalised  by  the  market  at  a  similar  rate?  Their  results  show  that  both  foreign 
and  domestic  earnings  changes  have  significant  positive  associations  with  annual  excess 
return  measures.  However,  the  association  coefficient  on  foreign  income  is  significantly 
larger  than  the  association  coefficient  on  domestic  income,  suggesting  that  the  market 
views  foreign  and  domestic  income  changes  differently  for  the  purposes  of  firm 
valuation.  They  interpret  this  as  an  indication  that  changes  of  foreign  earnings  are  more 
persistent  than  those  for  domestic  earnings,  possibly  due  to  the  unpredictable  impact  of 
exchange  rate  change.  They  also  demonstrate  that  a  larger  association  coefficient  for 
foreign  income  is  consistent  with  differences  in  growth  opportunities  between  domestic 
and  foreign  operations.  For  those  firms  where  domestic  sales  growth  is  higher  than 
foreign  sales  growth,  the  earnings  response  coefficient  is  greater  for  domestic  earnings. 
Their  analysis  also  suggest  that  the  results  are  not  driven  by  exchange  rate  effects, 
decisions  concerning  the  length  of  the  event  window,  negative  earnings,  nor  special 
charges  to  earnings.  Unlike  event  studies  that  examine  short  windows  around  earnings 
announcements  (or  other  events),  their  study  is  interested  in  the  relation  between 
earnings  changes  and  price  changes  over  the  reporting  periods.  This  approach  is 
commonly  referred  to  as  an  association  study. 
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corporate  international  diversification  of  UK  firms,  over  the  period  of  1991-1996. 
Firstly,  they  address  the  valuation  association  of  international  operations  of  UK 
multisegment  firms  and  estimate  whether  or  not  foreign  earnings  and  net  assets  are 
more  highly  valued  by  investors  than  their  domestic  equivalents.  By  using  segment 
disclosure  of  profits  and  net  assets,  which  has  been  required  of  UK  companies  since  the 
enactment  of  SSAP  25,  they  examine  the  relative  value  of  specific  foreign  operations, 
according  to  broad  geographical  classifications:  UK,  Europe,  America,  and  the  rest  of 
the  world.  They  find  that  for  multinational  firms,  there  is  no  clear  difference  between 
the  valuation  of  domestic  and  foreign  earnings  and  net  assets.  However,  the  US  appears 
to  be  an  anomaly  and  is  more  highly  valued  than  other  areas  of  operations.  They  explain 
this  finding  with  the  fact  that  during  that  period  (1991-1996)  the  American  economy 
was  going  through  a  golden  period. 
Secondly,  they  contrast  multinational  and  domestic  UK  firms  to  identify  relative 
valuation  of  these  two  groups  of  firms.  They  find  that  earnings  and  net  assets  are  more 
highly  valued  (capitalised)  for  multinational  firms  than  for  domestic  firms,  even  though 
UK  GAAP  should  have  been  applied  to  the  computation  of  the  accounting  numbers 
across  both  sets  of  firms.  Their  results  also  indicate  that  the  valuation  differences 
between  multinationals  and  domestic  firms  applies  equally  to  all  the  operations  of  the 
multinationals.  That  is,  UK  based  operations  themselves  are  more  highly  valued  for 
multinationals  than  for  their  domestic  counterparts. 
Methodologically,  Garrod  and  Rees  (1998)  operationalise  their  empirical  analysis 
by  using  a  modified  version  of  the  Edward-Bell-Ohlson's  residual  income  valuation 
model,  which  explicitly  models  the  security  price  and  expresses  it  through 
contemporaneous  equity  book  value  and  earnings.  This  levels  model  allows 
disaggregating  firm-level  earnings  and  book  value  into  their  geographical  components 
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operations.  The  model  is  applicable  to  both  domestic  and  multinational  firms,  so  that 
direct  comparison  of  the  valuation  of  these  two  groups  of  firms  can  be  made. 
Garrod  and  Rees  (1998)  argue  that  in  comparison  to  return-earnings  models  used 
in  similar  studies,  where  results  are  sensitive  to  the  window  over  which  returns  are 
cumulated,  their  model  is  theoretically  valid  at  any  point  in  time,  assuming  a  timely 
incorporation  of  information  into  prices,  and  captures  long  run  relationships  whereas  a 
returns-earnings  model  can  only  identify  short  run  associations.  Furthermore,  they 
argue,  the  parameters  estimated  using  valuation  models  are  reasonably  close  to  those 
theoretically  expected,  and  the  explanatory  power  of  such  models  is  much  higher  than  in 
returns-earnings  models. 
They  note  that  levels  models  are  also  able  to  illuminate  long  run  relationships, 
which  are  hidden  from  models  of  differences.  Thus,  an  event  study  can  say  little  about 
the  value  of  multinationalism  for  a  firm  if  the  firm's  degree  of  diversification  is  stable. 
Of  direct  relevance  to  my  research,  both  in  terms  of  research  question  and  the 
methodology  employed,  is  the  work  by  Wysocki  (1998).  He  examines  the 
informativeness  of  segment  disclosures  using  a  real-option  framework.  He  hypothesises 
that  segment  disclosures  are  useful  because  they  contain  information  about  managerial 
options  to  adapt  under-performing  segments  and  expand  segments  with  investment 
opportunities.  Wysocki  (1998)  hypothesises  and  empirically  validates  that  the 
existence  of  these  real  options  implies:  (1)  that  segment  earnings  association 
coefficients  and  the  incremental  explanatory  power  of  segment  earnings  for  stock  prices 
are  lower  for  loss-making  segments  compared  to  profitable  segments8;  (2)  segment 
earnings  association  coefficients  are  higher  for  segments  with  higher  relative  growth 
7  Adaptation  encompasses  any  real  operating  decision  that  changes  the  current  use  of  an  asset  to  a 
superior  alternate  use. 
8  This  prediction  generalises  the  firm-level  adaptation  and  abandonment  option  results  discussed  in  Hayn 
(1995). 
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prices  is  increasing  in  the  number  of  loss  segments.  He  tests  these  hypotheses  by  using  a 
simple  value  association  model  where  per  share  stock  prices  are  regressed  on  firm-level 
per  share  book  value  and  firm-level  (or  segment-level)  earnings  per  share,  for  a  sample 
of  3,150  U.  S.  firms  (covering  the  period  1990-1996)  that  disclose  two  business 
segments. 
He  finds  that  there  is  association  between  stock  prices  and  segment  profits  and 
that  the  incremental  explanatory  power  of  segment  earnings  is  higher  for  profitable 
segments  compared  to  loss-making  segments,  suggesting  that  investors  view  segment 
losses  as  transitory.  Furthermore,  the  incremental  explanatory  power  of  book  value  of 
equity  for  stock  prices  is  increasing  in  the  number  of  loss-making  segments,  consistent 
with  the  hypothesis  that  book  value  of  equity  is  more  relevant  to  investors  as  adaptation 
of  segments  becomes  more  likely  than  their  continued  use. 
His  regression  results  also  demonstrate  that  earnings  association  coefficients  are 
higher  for  segments  with  higher  relative  growth  options  as  measured  by  industry 
market-to-book  ratios,  and  that  earnings  association  coefficients  are  reliably  lower  for 
negative  firm-level  and  segmental  earnings.  His  results  also  suggest  that  investors 
utilise  industry  information  in  valuing  segments  within  multi-division  firms.  Although 
Wysocki's  tests  are  all  performed  for  business-disaggregated  segments,  his  hypotheses, 
the  model  and  testing  methods  would  also  be  directly  applicable  for  researching  the 
valuation  of  geographically  disaggregated  segments. 
Thomas  (2000)  examines  whether  geographic  segment  earnings  reported  by  US 
firms  over  the  years  1984-1995  provide  value-relevant  information.  The  author 
estimates  earnings  coefficients  for  specific  geographic  locations  by  (i)  regressing 
unexpected  security  returns  on  unexpected  geographic  segment  earnings  and  (ii) 
regressing  leading-period  returns  on  current  geographic  segment  earnings.  Evidence  of 
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differ  across  geographic  segments,  but  if  the  coefficients  do  not  differ,  then  total 
earnings  is  sufficient  for  examining  security  returns.  The  results  of  the  unexpected 
returns/earnings  model  show  a  significant  difference  in  the  valuation  of  unexpected 
earnings  across  geographic  segments.  Specifically,  the  results  suggest  that  unexpected 
earnings  from  Canada  and  Asia/Pacific  regions  are  not  significant,  while  earnings  from 
the  Domestic  (i.  e.,  U.  S.  )  and  South  America/Mexico  segments  are  generally  valued  less 
than  the  earnings  from  other  areas,  whereas  earnings  from  the  U.  K.,  Europe  and  Other 
Foreign  segments  are  generally  valued  more  highly.  For  the  leading-period  returns 
model,  little  significant  evidence  is  found  for  the  market's  differential  valuation  of 
geographic  segment  earnings  coefficients  for  one-  and  two-year  return  intervals.  When 
the  return  intervals  extend  to  three  years  or  more,  significant  evidence  is  found  that  the 
market  values  geographic  segment  earnings  differently,  which  suggests  that  such 
disclosures  reflect  information  used  by  market  participants  in  setting  security  prices. 
Chen  and  Zhang  (2003)  apply  a  real-option-based  valuation  approach  to  develop 
and  test  a  model  that  addresses  the  incremental  value  relevance  of  segment  data  beyond 
firm-level  accounting  data.  Their  question  is:  given  aggregate  data  that  firms  are  already 
required  to  report,  how  is  equity  value  related  to  the  information  conveyed 
incrementally  by  segment  data?  They  note  that  in  a  multiple-segment  firm,  different 
segments  generally  face  different  investment  opportunities  (due  to  different  external 
market  conditions),  and  have  different  investment  opportunities  (due  to  different 
abilities  to  manage  business).  They  establish  that  the  cross-sectional  variation  in 
usefulness  of  segment  data  beyond  aggregate  data  relates  to  heterogeneity  of  investment 
opportunities  across  segments,  caused  by  divergences  of  segment  profitability  and 
growth  potential.  More  generally,  when  a  firm's  segments  operate  in  industries  or 
markets  that  have  different  growth  opportunities,  equity  value  depend  not  only  on  the 
47 divergence  of  profitability,  but  also  on  the  distribution  of  growth  opportunities  across 
segments. 
Their  model  decomposes  equity  value  into  (1)  the  part  explained  by  aggregate 
firm-level  accounting  data,  and  (2)  an  incremental  component  attributable  to  differences 
across  segments  in  operating  profitability  and  investment  opportunities  as  conveyed  by 
segment-level  data. 
They  estimate  their  regressions  of  scaled  market  values  on  scaled  segmental 
profits  and  other  option-related  parameters  for  a  sample  that  includes  13463  firm-years 
of  U.  S.  quoted  multi-segment  firms  over  the  period  1986-1997. 
Their  empirical  findings  indicate  that:  (1)  controlling  for  firm-level  accounting 
information,  divergence  of  segments'  profitability  (DOP)  exhibits  a  significantly 
positive  effect  on  equity  value;  (2)  the  incremental  value  effect  of  a  given  DOP  varies 
with  firm  overall  profitability  and  growth  opportunity;  and  (3)  the  distribution  of 
segment  growth  opportunities  within  a  firm  is  important  in  determining  the  value  effect 
of  DOP.  That  is,  the  incremental  value  effect  of  DOP  is  positive  if  growth  opportunities 
are  more  highly  concentrated  in  segments  that  are  relatively  profitable,  and  is  negative  if 
the  opposite  is  the  case.  Their  results  suggest  that  segments  can  be  aggregated  without 
loss  of  information  when  they  have  similar  profitability  and  growth  opportunities. 
By  and  large,  in  this  strand  of  literature  there  is  little  or  no  consensus  across  the 
findings  reported  in  different  studies.  The  empirical  evidence  on  the  differential  pricing 
and  value  association  of  specific  geographic  or  business  operations,  and  contexts 
affecting  the  pricing  and  value  relevance  of  segments,  remain  inconclusive.  The  further 
thorough  examination  of  these  issues  constitutes  the  primary  objective  of  my  study. 
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DIVERSIFICATION 
In  chapters  5  and  6I  provide  some  empirical  evidence  on  the  relative  valuation  of 
firms  which  are  diversified  geographically  or  industrially.  To  put  these  results  into 
perspective  they  need  to  be  related  to  previous  findings  from  other  studies.  Most 
research  on  this  subject  has  focused  on  the  negative  impact  on  firm  value  of 
diversification  across  different  lines  of  business.  These  studies  tend  to  conclude  that,  on 
average,  industrially  diversified  firms  are  notably  less  valuable  than  combinations  of 
comparable  single  industry  firms.  In  contrast  to  the  negative  value  impact  of  industrial 
diversification,  the  majority  of  the  theoretical  predictions  and  empirical  studies 
regarding  geographic  diversification  suggest  that  there  is  a  positive  value  impact  on  the 
firm.  Below  I  review  some  of  these  studies  in  more  details. 
2.4.1  Industrial  diversification 
The  impact  of  industrial  diversification  on  firms'  value  has  been  more  thoroughly 
examined  (both  theoretically  and  empirically)  than  that  of  geographic  diversification. 
Overall,  studies  concerned  with  valuation  effect  of  product  or  industrial  diversification 
find  that  related  diversifiers  outperform  unrelated  diversifiers,  and  that  multisegment 
firms  are  valued  at  a  discount  compared  to  focused  firms  [e.  g.,  Bettis  (1981),  Rumelt 
(1982),  Palepu  (1985),  Lang  and  Stulz  (1994),  Berger  and  Ofek  (1995),  Comment  and 
Jarrell  (1995)]. 
Lang  and  Stulz  (1994)  investigate  whether  the  market's  valuation  of  a  firm, 
proxied  by  Tobin's  q,  is  correlated  with  its  degree  of  diversification.  By  studying  the 
relation  between  q  and  the  degree  of  diversification  at  a  point  in  time,  they  investigate 
the  relative  efficiency  of  diversified  firms  even  if  these  firms  do  not  change  their  degree 
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stock  returns  around  changes  in  firms'  degree  of  diversification. 
By  comparing  the  Tobin's  q  of  diversified  US  firms,  over  the  period  of  1978- 
1990,  to  the  Tobin's  q  of  specialised  firms,  they  find  that  through  the  late  1970s  and  the 
1980s,  single-industry  firms  are  valued  more  highly  by  the  capital  markets  than 
diversified  firms. 
Further,  highly  diversified  firms  (defined  as  those  firms  that  report  sales  for  five 
segments  or  more)  have  both  a  mean  and  a  median  Tobin's  q  below  the  sample  average 
for  each  year  in  their  sample. 
They  also  check  whether  this  relation  reflects  industry  effects  (i.  e.,  whether 
diversified  firms  are  concentrated  in  industries  with  fewer  growth  opportunities)  yet 
results  remain  qualitatively  unchanged.  They  also  find  that  shareholder  wealth  would 
increase  on  average  if  diversified  firms  could  be  dismantled  in  such  a  way  that  each 
division  would  have  the  average  q  of  specialised  firms  in  its  industry. 
Berger  and  Ofek  (1995)  use  segment-level  data  to  estimate  whether  diversification 
enhances  or  decreases  corporate  value  and  to  examine  the  potential  sources  of  value 
gains  or  losses.  They  do  so  by  comparing  the  sum  of  the  imputed  stand-alone  values 
(using  the  industry  multiplier  approach)  of  the  segments  of  diversified  companies  to  the 
actual  values  of  these  companies. 
In  their  sample  of  US  firms  (5233  multisegment  firm-year  observations  covering 
the  period  from  1986  to  1991)  they  document  that  diversified  firms  have  values  that  are 
13-15%  below  the  sum  of  the  imputed  values  of  their  segments.  They  also  show  that 
loss  in  value  is  considerably  less  for  related  diversification,  and  the  value  loss  increases 
with  the  number  of  segments. 
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include  (1)  the  greater  propensity  of  multi-segment  firms  to  overinvest,  and  (2)  the 
cross-subsidisation  of  poorly  performing  segments. 
Comment  and  Jarrell  (1995)  investigate  valuation  consequences  of 
increases/decreases  in  focus  of  the  firm.  Their  formal  analysis  correlates  fiscal-year 
changes  in  focus  with  both  same-year  stock  returns  and  prior-year  returns,  using  a 
multivariate,  pooled,  time-series  cross-sectional  regression  covering  about  two  thousand 
exchange-listed  firms  per  year,  over  the  period  from  1978  to  1989.  They  control  for  the 
size  effect  and  find  that  focused  firms  are  significantly  less  frequently  involved  in 
acquisitions  and  divestitures.  Their  main  result  was  to  find  that  during  the  1978-89 
period  there  was  an  increase  in  focus,  which  is  consistent  with  shareholder  wealth 
maximisation,  implying  that  focus  increased  in  part  because  economies  of  scope  were 
negative  on  balance. 
Sambharya  (1995)  examines  the  individual  and  joint  effects  of  product  and 
international  diversification  on  firm  performance  by  using  multiple  measures  of  both 
international  and  product  diversification,  and  accounting  measures  of  performance.  He 
also  examines  the  interaction  between  product  diversification  and  international 
diversification. 
The  study  finds  that  firms  that  were  more  internationally  diversified  according  to 
four  different  measures  were  no  more  successful  than  less  diversified  ones.  In  large 
firms  there  exists  an  inverse  relationship  between  product  and  international 
diversification,  that  is,  multinationals  in  single  businesses  are  the  most  diversified 
internationally  and  vice-versa.  The  author  also  finds  that  both  international  and  product 
diversification  strategies  are  not  profitable  by  themselves,  that  is,  neither  type  of 
diversification  leads  to  better  firm  performance.  Among  the  limitations  of  the  study  is 
that  it  does  not  use  market  measures  of  performance  and  it  only  include  data  from  53 
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findings  for  longer  time  periods,  and  wider  cross-section  of  firms. 
Servaes  (1996)  focuses  on  the  issue  of  whether  industrial  diversification  leads  to 
higher  market  values  during  the  period  of  the  conglomerate  merger  wave,  examining 
whether  the  benefits  of  diversification  outweigh  the  costs.  He  examines  samples  of  U.  S 
firms  in  three  year  intervals  over  the  1961-1976  period  to  gauge  how  diversification  was 
perceived  by  capital  markets.  ' 
He  finds  that  diversified  firms  are  valued  at  a  discount  compared  to  single 
segment  firms  in  the  1960s  and  early  1970s,  but  the  discount  declines  to  a  zero  level  in 
later  years.  These  results  hold  after  controlling  for  industry  effects  and  for  differences 
between  diversified  and  undiversified  firms  in  profitability,  leverage  and  investment 
policy.  The  author  concludes  that  what  causes  the  diversification  discount  to  change 
over  time  remains  a  puzzle. 
Lins  and  Servaes  (1999)  examine  the  valuation  effects  of  industrial  diversification 
for  174  (227)  German,  808  (118)  Japanese  and  391  (341)  UK  firms  for  years  1992 
(1994)  using  Berger  and  Ofek's  (1995)  excess  value-based  approach.  Their  results 
suggest  that  diversification  is  differently  reflected  in  the  firm  value  across  different 
countries.  Thus  for  German  firms,  diversification  does  not  reduce  shareholder  wealth, 
yet  the  Japanese  and  UK  firms  are  valued  at  a  discount  of  10  and  15  percent 
respectively.  The  valuation  discount  of  UK  firms  is  very  similar  to  the  discount  reported 
by  Berger  and  Ofek  (1995)  for  the  US  firms.  The  major  factor  that  the  authors  find  to  be 
contributing  to  the  differential  valuation  of  industrial  diversification  across  these 
countries  is  the  cross-country  differences  in  corporate  governance. 
Graham,  Lemmon  and  Wolf  (2002)  provide  evidence  on  whether  the  fact  of 
corporate  diversification  destroys  value,  or  whether  the  divisions  that  make  up 
conglomerates  would  trade  at  a  discount,  even  if  they  operated  as  stand-alone  firms.  The 
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systematic  differences  between  the  divisions  of  conglomerates  and  the  stand-alone  firms 
to  which  they  are  benchmarked.  By  using  a  sample  of  356  acquisitions  of  U.  S.  firms, 
over  the  period  of  1980-1995,  they  find  that  the  units  that  are  combined  into  other  firms 
are  systematically  different  to  stand-alone  firms,  and  suggest  that  methodologies  that 
benchmark  divisions  of  conglomerates  to  stand-alone  firms  might  overstate  the 
magnitude  of  diversification  discount.  That  is,  a  main  point  of  their  paper  is  that  value 
measurement  methodology  destroys  value,  but  not  the  fact  of  diversification.  What  is 
particularly  relevant  to  my  study  is  their  finding  that  firms,  which  increase  their 
reported  number  of  segments  due  to  pure  reporting  changes,  do  not  experience  a  decline 
in  excess  value  at  the  time  of  reporting  new  segments. 
The  three  studies  reviewed  below  have  attempted  to  investigate  valuation  effects 
when  firms  are  simultaneously  diversified  across  the  geographical  and  industrial 
dimension. 
In  their  studies,  Bodnar,  Tang  and  Weintrop  (1999,2003)  suggest  that  the  failure 
to  simultaneously  consider  geographic  diversification  as  a  potential  source  of  value  for 
corporations  affects  the  interpretation  of  existing  studies  on  the  effect  of  industrial 
diversification  on  firm  value.  They  examine  the  joint  effect  of  geographic  and  industrial 
diversification  on  firm  value  for  a  sample  of  31,000  firm  year  observations  of  US  firms 
from  1984-1997.  They  use  such  measures  of  firm  valuation  as  (i)  excess  market  value  of 
equity-to-sales  ratio,  (ii)  asset-to-book  value  of  asset  ratio,  and  (iii)  a  technique  similar 
to  that  used  by  Berger  and  Ofek  (1995).  Their  results  indicate  that  the  value  of  a  firm 
with  international  operations  is  2.7%  higher  than  a  comparable  single-activity  domestic 
firm,  while  the  value  of  a  multiactivity  firm  is  6%  lower  than  a  comparable  portfolio  of 
single-activity  domestic  firms.  They  also  find  that  the  value  of  geographic 
diversification  is  increasing  in  the  degree  of  diversification,  but  that  the  industrial 
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also  show  that  the  international  diversification  premium  is  negatively  related  to  the 
value  of  the  US  dollar,  but  positively  related  to  the  breadth  of  international 
diversification  as  well  as  corporate  characteristics  consistent  with  growth  opportunities. 
Senteney  and  Bazaz  (2002)  consider  geographic  and  business  diversification 
simultaneously  and  investigate  how  investors  perceive  the  impact  of  US  based  firms' 
diversification  on  the  association  between  the  firms'  cumulative  abnormal  equity 
returns  and  annual  changes  in  earnings.  Using  pooled  cross-sectional  annual  earnings 
response  regressions  for  the  years  1993-1997  they  find  that  firms  with  higher 
geographic  diversification  have  greater  association  between  magnitudes  of  annual 
earnings  changes  and  equity  security  returns  than  multinationals  with  lower  geographic 
segment  diversification,  especially  when  the  companies  have  low  business 
diversification.  Furthermore,  multinationals  with  greater  industrial  diversification  have 
comparatively  similar  association  between  magnitude  of  annual  earnings  changes  and 
equity  security  returns  at  both  high  and  low  levels  of  geographic  segment 
diversification. 
2.4.2  Geographic  diversification 
Studies  that  focus  on  the  value  implications  of  international/geographic 
diversification  tend  to  find  that  internationally  diversified  firms  perform  better  than 
domestic  firms.  For  example,  studies  by  Leftwich  (1974),  Buhner  (1987),  Grant  (1987) 
find  that  multinationals  are  more  likely  to  have  higher  profitability  and  profit  stability. 
These  firms  also  tend  to  have  higher  valuation  than  their  domestic  counterparts. 
Most  research  in  this  area  has  been  concerned  with  the  performance  of 
multinationals,  which  may  be  viewed  as  portfolios  of  internationally  diversified  assets, 
relative  to  the  performance  of  pure  domestic  firms.  The  empirical  findings,  however,  are 
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incremental  value  embedded  in  the  firm's  multinational  dimensions.  Below  I  outline 
just  a  few  of  the  studies  in  this  area  in  greater  detail  and  summarise  the  findings  for 
other  studies  in  the  area. 
Errunza  and  Senbet  (1981)  investigate  the  existence  of  monopoly  rents  (excess 
valuation)  associated  with  international  operations  of  UK  firms  due  to  such  factors  as 
differential  international  taxation  and  imperfections  in  the  product,  factor  and  financial 
markets.  This  study  involves  empirical  assessment  of  the  effects  of  international 
operations  in  the  market  value-theoretic  framework.  Their  empirical  results  cover  the 
period  of  1968-1977  and  are  based  on  the  analysis  of  multipartial  correlations  between 
the  regression  coefficients  of  excess  market  value  and  measures  of  diversification.  Their 
main  finding  is  that  firms'  excess  values  are  positively  related  to  (the  degree  of) 
international  involvement.  They  also  find  some  evidence  that  this  relationship  is 
dynamic,  as  it  was  stronger  during  the  earlier  period  characterised  by  stronger  barriers 
to  capital  flows. 
They  note  that  the  full  value  of  the  special  opportunities  that  a  multinational  firm 
possesses  should  be  reflected  in  the  current  price  of  its  stock.  Consequently,  an 
empirical  analysis  based  on  a  risk-return  trade-off  cannot  capture  these  special 
opportunities.  In  other  words,  since  the  diversification  services  provided  by 
multinationals  are  already  `priced  out',  attempts  to  verify  these  services  through 
traditional  performance  evaluation  techniques  as  well  as  through  risk-return  generating 
processes  are  unwarranted.  They  note,  however,  that  benefits  of  direct  foreign 
investment  can  be  detected  by  an  empirical  investigation  based  on  market  valuation. 
9  Errunza  and  Senbet  (1984)  continue  this  investigation  over  a  different  time  frame.  By  holding  constant 
firm's  capitalised  equity  value  and  using  various  measures  of  the  degree  of  international  involvement, 
they  find  a  robust  and  positive  association  between  firms'  share  value  and  degree  of  international 
involvement. 
55 Among  other  points  of  relevance  of  their  research  to  mine  is  their  theoretical 
analysis  of  factors  that  might  contribute  to  differential  excess  valuation  of 
miltinationals.  My  measures  of  diversification  are  similar  to  those  referred  to  by 
Errunza  and  Senbet  (1981),  that  is,  foreign  operations'  net  earnings,  net  assets  or  sales. 
They  use  group  sales  as  a  regression  deflator.  They  theoretically  specify  the  conditions 
under  which  differential  international  taxes  contribute  to  differential  market  valuation 
for  the  domestic  and  multinational  firms. 
Fatemi  (1984)  investigates  the  rates  of  return  realised  by  the  shareholders  of  the 
internationally  diversified  relative  to  those  of  domestic  firms.  He  also  provides  some 
evidence  on  the  effect  of  the  event  of  corporate  international  diversification  on 
shareholders'  returns.  His  sample  covered  the  period  of  1976-1980  and  included  84 
multinational  and  52  domestic  firms.  His  results  indicate  that  the  rates  of  return  on  the 
two  types  of  firms  are  identical,  yet  the  rates  on  multinationals  fluctuate  less  than  those 
on  domestic  firms,  suggesting  that  corporate  diversification  reduces  the  degree  of 
systematic  risk.  Results  also  indicate  that  the  relative  degree  of  riskiness  declines  as  the 
degree  of  international  involvement  increases. 
Fatemi  (1984)  also  touches  on  some  other  aspects  that  are  of  relevance  to  my 
research.  Among  those  is  his  analysis  that  to  the  extent  that  economic  activity  in  foreign 
countries  is  less  than  perfectly  correlated  with  domestic  economic  activity,  foreign 
operations  should  provide  the  stockholders  of  multinationals  with  risk-return 
opportunities  superior  to  those  available  to  the  stockholders  of  purely  domestic  firms. 
The  author  suggests  that  if  the  markets  are  rational  and  efficient,  any  net  advantage 
associated  with  corporate  international  diversification  will  be  discounted  and  reflected 
in  the  price  of  the  multinational's  shares  around  the  time  of  such  diversification.  This 
will  bring  the  subsequent  returns  to  the  `normal'  level. 
56 Doukas  and  Travlos  (1988)  presents  evidence  on  the  impact  of  the  event  of 
international  diversification  on  the  stock  market  values  of  US  firms,  in  an  attempt  to 
provide  evidence  on  whether  direct  foreign  investment  is  a  wealth-increasing  corporate 
action.  Their  data  cover  the  period  of  1975  through  1983  and  include  301  foreign- 
acquisition  announcements.  Their  results  indicate  that  shareholders  of  the  firm  not 
operating  in  the  target  firm's  country  experience  significant  positive  returns  at  the 
announcement  of  acquisitions10.  Shareholders  of  the  multinational  firms  already 
operating  in  the  target  firm's  country  experience  insignificant  negative  abnormal 
returns. 
Agmon  and  Lessard  (1977),  regressing  the  returns  of  217  US  multinationals  on  the 
US  stock  market  index  and  an  international  factor,  found  the  coefficient  of  the  world 
factor  to  be  correlated  with  a  sales  measure  of  multinationals'  international 
involvement.  They  suggested  that  the  international  diversification  objective  of  the 
investor  can  be  achieved  by  holding  a  portfolio  of  multinational  stocks.  Jacquillat  and 
Solnik  (1978),  using  a  sample  of  forty  European  and  twenty-three  US  firms,  concluded 
that  investing  in  multinationals  is  a  poor  substitute  to  international  portfolio 
diversification.  Senchack  and  Beedles  (1980)  arrived  at  the  same  conclusion.  Hughes, 
Logue  and  Sweeney  (1975)  showed  that  the  results  obtained  in  all  these  studies  are 
sensitive  to  the  market  index  used  to  compute  the  betas.  Mickhail  and  Shawky  (1979) 
reported  that  multinationals  earn  excess  returns.  However,  Brewer  (1981),  using  a 
different  research  design,  reported  no  difference  between  multinationals  and  pure 
domestic  firms  in  terms  of  the  security  market  line.  Michel  and  Shaked  (1986)  found 
that  domestic  corporations  have  significantly  superior  risk-adjusted  market-based 
performance,  are  significantly  less  capitalised,  and  have  higher  total  risk  as  well  as 
higher  systematic  risk  relative  to  multinationals. 
10  Another  finding  is  that  shareholders  of  multinationals  benefit  the  most  when  their  firms'  expansion  is 
taking  place  in  less  developed  countries,  that  is  geographical  areas  that  are  less  related  and  developed 
relative  to  the  US  economy. 
57 Morck  and  Yeung  (1991)  examine  the  value  impact  of  various  measures  of 
geographic  diversification  for  1644  US  domestic  and  multinational  firms  for  the  year 
1978.  They  show  that  geographic  diversification  is  positively  related  to  Tobin's  q  and 
that  even  upon  controlling  for  other  sources  of  intangible  assets  such  as  R&D  and 
advertising  expenditure,  q  is  positively  correlated  with  the  number  of  foreign 
subsidiaries  or  countries  in  which  the  firm  operates.  Their  results  suggest  that  each 
foreign  subsidiary  increases  q  by  0.33%  and  that  operations  in  an  additional  foreign 
country  increases  q  by  0.55%. 
In  brief,  the  existing  literature  emphasises  the  risk-reduction  aspects  of 
international  diversification,  but  it  does  not  provide  conclusive  evidence  regarding  the 
effect  of  international  corporate  expansion  on  shareholders'  wealth. 
2.5  LITERATURE  ON  ACCOUNTING-BASED  VALUATION  MODELS 
2.5.1  On  valuation  models 
Conducting  research  within  a  particular  area  of  empirical  accounting  requires  the 
articulation  of  a  research  design  which  can  `best'  operationalise  the  testing  of 
relationships  or  phenomena  in  question.  Empirical  research  into  value  relevance, 
valuation  or  predictive  ability  of  accounting  information  must  often  choose  between 
return-earnings  type  of  models,  in  which  returns  are  regressed  (typically)  on  scaled 
earnings,  earnings  changes  and  other  financial  statement  variables,  and  price-levels 
models,  in  which  equity  market  values  are  regressed  on  earnings  and  other  accounting 
variables. 
Both  price  and  return  models  begin  with  a  standard  valuation  model  in  which 
price  is  the  discounted  present  value  of  expected  net  cash  flows  or  dividends.  Both 
models  also  rely  on  the  hypothesis  that  current  earnings  contain  information  about 
expected  future  net  cash  flows  [Kothari  and  Zimmerman  (1995)].  Although  both  types 
58 of  models  are  similar  in  essence,  they  are  often  used  in  the  literature  to  address 
somewhat  different  research  questions.  Furthermore,  both  model  types  are  not  free  of 
econometric  problems  and  the  importance  of  the  avoidance  of  the  specific  econometric 
problem(s)  in  the  context  of  a  given  research  question  often  determines  the  choice  of 
model  type.  Below  I  briefly  review  some  of  these  issues,  as  referred  to  in  the  literature. 
The  vast  majority  of  market  based  accounting  research  studies  tend  to  choose  to 
model  returns  rather  than  value.  Return-earnings  models  have  been  extensively 
employed  by  event  studies  investigating  the  information  content  of  accounting  numbers. 
Using  short  returns  windows  (usually  several  days)  these  studies  are  designed  to 
investigate  whether  an  earnings  announcement,  per  se,  contains  information  which 
causes  investors  to  revise  their  cash  flow  expectations,  whilst  studies  using  returns  over 
much  longer  periods  address  the  slightly  different  question  of  whether  the  earnings 
figure,  or  any  other  accounting  data,  captures  relevant  information  for  the  market 
[Collins  and  Kothari  (1989)]. 
In  contrast  to  return-earnings  models,  price-levels  or  valuation  models  are 
increasingly  more  often  used  to  gauge  the  link  (association)  between  the  market's 
valuation  of  the  firm  and  its  accounting  fundamentals.  Walker  (1997)  points  out  that 
researchers  adopting  an  association  perspective  tend  to  turn  to  valuation  rather  than 
returns  models,  and  this  change  in  emphasis  is  partially  due  to  the  Edwards-Bell-Ohlson 
(EBO)  model.  In  the  literature  this  model  is  often  referred  to  as  Edwards-Bell-Ohlson, 
residual  value  or  residual  income  valuation  model. 
EBO  provides  a  solid  theoretical  framework  for  a  simple  accounting  based 
valuation  model,  which  is  equivalent  to  the  traditional  dividend  discounting  model.  The 
EBO  (or  RI)  makes  no  assumptions  not  already  incorporated  in  the  dividend 
discounting  model  and  expresses  the  market  value  of  the  equity  of  the  firm  as  the  sum 
of  the  book  value  of  the  firm  plus  the  present  value  of  future  residual  incomes.  A 
59 theoretical  link  between  current  market  value  of  the  firm  and  current  book  value  and 
future  residual  incomes  is  established,  in  one  way  or  another,  by  Preinreich  (1936), 
Edwards  and  Bell  (1961),  Peasnell  (1981,1982),  Ohlson  (1989)  and  others.  A  recent 
straightforward  derivation  is  provided  by  Ohlson  (1995),  and  Feltham  and  Ohlson 
(1995).  They  establish  how  the  clean  surplus  relation  transforms  the  classical  valuation 
model  based  on  discounted  future  dividends  into  an  accounting  model,  based  on  two 
fundamental  accounting  variables:  book  value  and  earnings. 
Despite  its  appeal  to  the  empirical  accounting  research  literature  which  deals  with 
valuation  issues,  this  model,  however,  includes  expectations  of  abnormal  income.  This 
does  not  make  it  practically  more  applicable  than,  say,  the  dividend  or  cash  flow 
discounting  models.  The  literature  has  dealt  with  this  problem  in  different  ways. 
On  an  empirical  level,  for  instance,  Frankel  and  Lee  (1998)  incorporate  analysts' 
forecasts  into  the  model.  On  a  theoretical  level,  the  studies  of  Ohlson  (1995)  and 
Feltham  and  Ohison  (1995)  establish  how  the  clean  surplus  relation,  in  conjunction  with 
linear  information  dynamics  of  abnormal  accounting  earnings,  transforms  the  EBO  or 
classical  dividend  discount  valuation  model  into  an  accounting  model.  This  model  is 
based  on  two  fundamental  accounting  variables:  book  value  and  earnings.  In  his  study 
Rees  (1997)  suggests  an  alternative  avenue  for  re-expressing  the  EBO  into  a  simple 
accounting  model.  Here,  the  firm  value  is  expressed  in  terms  of  the  current  book  value 
and  earnings.  This  is  achieved  by  imposing  a  structure  for  expectations:  expected 
earnings  and  book  values  are  increasing  functions  of  current  earnings  and  book  values. 
It  shall  be  noted,  however,  that  there  is  still  little  consensus  regarding  the  appropriate 
specification  of  these  models,  and  many  of  these  studies  have  taken  an  ad  hoc  approach 
to  model  building.  The  Chapter  on  Methodology  and  Test  Design  provides  more 
detailed  review  of  how  EBO  is  usually  operationalised. 
60 Despite  the  disadvantages  associated  with  the  need  to  deal  with  expectations,  the 
use  of  such  accounting  based  valuation  models  resolves  the  problems  associated  with 
the  length  of  returns  windows  and  the  definition  of  unexpected  earnings.  The  latter  is 
not  required  and  the  valuation  model  is  theoretically  valid  at  any  point  in  time  as  long  as 
all  publicly  available  accounting  information  is  reflected  in  security  prices  [Rees 
(1997)].  Thus,  even  if  prices  lead  earnings  the  information  contained  in  accounting  data 
will  be  incorporated  into  security  prices  at  any  point  in  time. 
Valuation  models  have  the  additional  desirable  property,  especially  for  the 
research  questions  addressed  in  this  study,  of  lending  themselves  to  explanatory 
variable  decomposition. 
In  this  study,  a  price-levels  accounting  valuation  model  is  chosen  as  the  research 
tool  as  it  is  more  adequate  for  addressing  the  research  question. 
Below  I  present  some  arguments,  drawn  from  the  literature,  highlighting  the 
shortcomings  of  returns-models  in  comparison  with  value-based  modelling. 
1.  A  substantial  number  of  studies  in  this  area  indicates  that  the  forecasting  focus  of 
event  studies,  used  since  the  work  of  Ball  and  Brown  (1968),  is  misplaced  and  that 
returns  relationships  are  only  fully  revealed  when  prices  are  allowed  to  lead  earnings 
[Kothari  (1992),  Kothari  and  Sloan  (1992),  Kothari  and  Zimmerman  (1995), 
Donnely  and  Walker  (1995),  Basu  (1997),  and  Rees  (1999)]  11.  Rees  (1999)  notes 
that  because  prices  are  likely  to  anticipate  the  accounting  variables  used  as 
regressors  (i.  e.,  prices  lead  earnings),  the  changes  in  price  for  one  period  may  well 
relate  to  the  change  in  the  regressors  for  a  subsequent  period,  giving  rise  to  potential 
`errors  in  variables'  problems.  This  problem  does  not  occur  when  using  levels,  as  all 
11  Collins  and  Kothari  (1989)  demonstrate  that  a  twelve  month  period  concluding  shortly  after  the 
announcement  of  the  years  financial  results,  is  not  necessarily  the  period  that  gives  the  highest 
explanatory  power.  This  is  because  share  prices  incorporate  expected  changes  in  earnings  somewhat 
before  the  conventional  event  window  starts  and  hence  the  normal  formulation  of  the  returns-earnings 
model  is  misspecified.  Easton  et  al.,  (1992)  provide  supporting  evidence  showing  that  modelling  long  run 
returns  by  long  run  earnings  mitigates  the  above  problem  and  results  in  higher  explanatory  power.  In 
general  the  window  should  often  be  extended  backwards  to  capture  the  share  price  reaction  to  changes  in 
expectations  which  only  appear  in  accounting  numbers  sometime  later. 
61 price  reactions  to  available  information  are  included  in  the  current  price  [Rees 
(1997)]  12. 
2.  Estimated  regression  coefficients  on  earnings,  in  the  returns  model,  tend  to  be 
biased  [Collins  and  Kothari  (1989),  Kothari  and  Zimmerman  (1995)].  Bartov  et  al., 
(2001)  point  out  that  one  of  the  most  persistent  features  of  the  return-earnings  based 
research  is  the  finding  of  implausibly  small  earnings  response  coefficients.  They 
name  two  sets  of  factors  that  likely  contribute  to  the  small  earnings  response 
coefficients:  measurement  error  (e.  g.,  choice  of  the  earnings  expectations  proxy, 
noise  in  reported  earnings,  etc.  );  and  model  misspecification  (e.  g.,  failing  to  model 
nonlinearities,  etc).  Kothari  and  Zimmerman  (1995)  and  Rees  (1997)  note  that 
empirically,  unlike  the  parameters  estimated  in  returns-earnings  models,  the 
parameters  estimated  using  valuation  models  are  closer  to  those  expected  from 
theory.  Furthermore,  Ohlson  (1995)  and  Collins,  Pincus  and  Xie  (1999)  conclude 
that  price-level  models  provide  a  clearer  theoretical  interpretation  with  respect  to 
valuation  coefficients  than  return  models. 
3.  Collins  and  Kothari  (1989)  and  Kothari  and  Zimmerman  (1995)  demonstrate  that 
the  performance  of  returns  models  is  sensitive  to  the  window  over  which  returns  are 
cumulated.  Also  the  conclusions  reached  by  return-earnings  studies  are  heavily 
influenced  by  their  sample  period  and  the  width  of  the  event-windows,  resulting  in 
difficulty  of  interpretation  of  a  finding  of  poor/good  performance. 
4.  Return-earnings  models  are  also  associated  with  the  difficulty  of  separating  (or 
controlling  for)  the  value  effect  of  other  value  relevant  events  that  coincide  with  the 
event  of  interest  [Lang  and  Stulz  (1994)]. 
5.  From  the  literature  it  is  also  evident  that  problems  exist  in  all  return  studies  in  the 
definition  and  computation  of  unexpected/abnormal  equity  returns  or  earnings.  Lang 
12  Rees  (1997)  notes  that  although  the  price  will  include  the  information  derived  from  expectations 
regarding  future  accounting  numbers,  this  will  only  constitute  noise  in  the  dependent  variable,  and  is  not  a 
serious  econometric  problem. 
62 and  Stulz  (1994),  for  example,  note  that  the  choice  of  a  benchmark  for  performance 
comparisons  is  always  a  problem.  As  is  evident  from  studies  by  Brown  et  al., 
(1987),  Capstaff  et  al.,  (1995),  Garrod  and  Rees  (1999)  and  others,  there  is  no 
consensus  about  the  most  appropriate  forecasting  model  based  on  temporal  series  of 
earnings,  and  whether  statistical  models  such  as  these  are  to  be  preferred  to 
expectations  based  on  financial  analysts'  forecasts. 
6.  Rees  (1999)  argues  that  explanatory  variables  which  are  relatively  stable  from 
period  to  period  can  have  little  effect  on  the  model  when  incorporated  as  differences 
even  if  they  are  substantive  drivers  of  value. 
7.  Another  characteristic  of  the  price-levels  regression  models  is  that  they  demonstrate 
substantially  higher  explanatory  power  than  returns  models. 
8.  The  valuation  model  is  also  desirable  as  it  captures  the  long  run  relationships,  while 
a  return-earnings  model  only  captures  the  short  run  associations. 
9.  Changes  in  accounting  practices,  in  capital  structure,  or  in  the  composition  of  the 
group  may  render  the  change  variables  (in  the  returns  models)  misleading.  Rees 
(1997)  argues  that  this  problem  can  be  avoided  by  working  with  levels  (where  only 
the  current  year's  accounting  variables  need  be  used)  rather  than  changes. 
10.  Garrod  and  Rees  (1998)  suggest  that  in  the  levels  equation  it  is  a  simple  matter  to 
investigate  the  influence  of  elements  of  the  income  statement  or  balance  sheet,  by 
restating  earnings  or  book  value  into  their  component  parts.  In  other  words,  it  allows 
comparing  the  value  relevance  of  various  constituent  parts  of  an  accounting  variable 
in  question.  For  the  research  question  addressed  in  my  study,  this  property  of  the 
levels  model  is  particularly  desirable. 
The  price-levels  models  are  less  prone  to  the  above  listed  ten  problem  areas. 
Nevertheless,  the  review  of  the  literature  reveals  that  albeit  considerably  similar,  the 
design  of  price-level  models  changes  considerably  from  study  to  study,  reflecting 
63 different  assumptions  regarding  the  formation  of  expectations,  or  different  objectives  in 
hypothesis  testing.  The  differences  include:  measuring  market  value  at  the  accounting 
year-end  or  with  a  delay  to  ensure  that  all  relevant  information  is  publicly  available;  not 
deflating  or  deflating  the  model  by  a  wide  variety  of  scale-proxies  (number  of  shares, 
beginning  or  end-of-period  book  value  or  market  value  of  equity,  as  well  as  total  assets 
or  turnovers);  using  linear  or  other  functional  form  for  the  model;  using  alternative 
regression  types  (OLS,  MAD,  WLS,  rank-regression,  etc.  );  choosing  how  outliers  or 
influential  observations  should  be  dealt  with;  incorporating  control  and/or  signal 
variables;  and  choosing  precisely  which  variables  (fundamentals)  should  be  included  as 
regressors. 
The  issue  of  how  the  EBO  is  operationalised  in  this  study  is  the  subject  of  Chapter 
3.  For  now,  it  suffice  to  point  out  that  in  its  basic  form  the  model  that  I  use  in  this  study 
expresses  the  market  value  of  equity  in  terms  of  three  basic  value  drivers:  current  book 
value,  earnings  and  dividends.  It  is,  therefore,  important  to  review  some  of  the  empirical 
findings  on  the  valuation  of  these  three  basic  value  drivers,  reported  in  papers  that  use 
similar  research  design. 
2.5.2  On  value  relevance  of  accounting  numbers 
Earnings,  book  value  of  equity  and  dividends  are  key  financial  statement  summary 
measures  and  extant  research  asserts  that  they  are  priced  [Easton  and  Harris  (1991), 
Kothari  and  Zimmerman  (1995),  Feltham  and  Ohlson  (1995),  Rees  (1997),  Stark  and 
Thomas  (1998)]. 
In  modelling  equity  market  value  or  returns,  earlier  studies  tended  to  rely  on  some 
variant  of  the  simple  earnings  capitalisation  model  [Kormendi  and  Lipe  (1987),  Collins 
and  Kothari  (1989),  Kothari  (1992)].  More  recent  studies,  however,  argue  that  simple 
earnings  capitalisation  models  that  do  not  incorporate  book  value  are  likely  misspecified 
64 because  book  value  is believed  to  be  a  value-relevant  factor  in  its  own  right.  Thus,  in  the 
spirit  of  works  by  Peasnell  (1982)  and  Ohlson  (1995),  when  a  firm  is  viewed  as  a  going 
concern,  its  book  value  would  be  a  proxy  for  expected  future  normal  earnings. 
Alternatively,  when  the  firm's  going  concern  status  becomes  questionable,  its  book 
value  will  then  proxy  for  the  liquidation  value  and/or  the  adaptation  value  [Burgstahler 
and  Dichev  (1997),  Berger  et  al.,  (1996)]. 
A  substantial  body  of  literature  is  concerned  with  the  subject-to-context  relative 
value  relevance  of  book  values  and  earnings.  Works  by  Hayn  (1995),  Burgstahler  and 
Dichev  (1997),  Barth  et  al.,  (1998),  Penman  (1998),  Collins  et  al.,  (1999),  Ou  and  Sepe 
(2002)  are  just  few  to  name  among  the  studies  that  examines  conditions  under  which 
book  value  or  earnings  would  be  relatively  more  important  in  equity  valuation. 
Ou  and  Sepe  (2002)  argue  that  when  a  firm's  current  earnings  are  not  perceived  to 
be  a  good  indicator  of  future  earnings,  due  to  either  a  large  transitory  component  in 
current  earnings  or  a  change  in  the  firm's  future  prospects,  such  as  an  increased 
possibility  of  liquidation,  market  participants  will  likely  turn  to  book  value  for  guidance 
in  valuation.  The  value-relevance  of  book  value  will  thus  increase.  Ou  and  Sepe  (2002) 
finds  robust  evidence  that  the  larger  the  spread  between  analysts  earnings  forecasts  and 
reported  current  earnings  (which  proxies  for  earnings  persistence),  the  less  value- 
relevant  are  current  earnings  and  the  more  the  market  relies  on  book  value  for  equity 
valuation. 
Penman  (1998)  shows  that  on  average,  book  value  carries  more  weight  than 
earnings  in  equity  valuation  for  firms  with  an  extreme  earnings-to-book  ratio  (i.  e., 
ROE).  Similarly,  Burgstahler  and  Dichev  (1997)  report  that  when  the  earnings-to-book 
value  ratio  is  high  (low),  earnings  (book  value)  is  a  more  important  determinant  of 
equity  value. 
65 Jan  and  Ou  (1995)  demonstrate  that  for  firms  reporting  net  losses,  earnings 
explain  very  little  of  equity  price,  while  book  value  is  an  important  determinant  of 
value.  Barth  °  et  al.,  (1998)  show  that  pricing  multiples  on  book  value  and  the 
incremental  explanatory  power  of  book  value  (earnings)  increase  (decrease)  as  a  firm's 
financial  health  deteriorates.  Collins  et  al.,  (1997)  report  that  the  value-relevance  of 
earnings  and  book  value  move  inversely  to  each  other.  They  report  that  while  the 
incremental  value-relevance  of  earnings  has  declined  over  the  past  forty  years,  the 
combined  value-relevance  of  earnings  and  book  value  has  not.  The  decreased 
importance  of  earnings  has  been  replaced  by  the  increased  value-relevance  of  book 
value.  They  also  find  that  much  of  the  shift  in  value-relevance  from  earnings  to  book 
value  over  time  can  be  explained  be  several  changes  over  the  same  time  period:  the 
increasing  frequency  of  nonrecurring  items  and  negative  earnings,  increasing  intangible 
intensity,  and  decrease  in  average  firm  size.  These  factors  all  imply  reduced  persistence 
of  current  earnings.  Barth,  Beaver  and  Landsman  (1998)  show  that  for  firms  in  financial 
distress,  the  value  relevance  of  book  value  dominates  that  of  earnings.  They  also 
demonstrate  that  the  relative  importance  of  each  variable  might  differ  across  industries 
due  to  the  degree  of  unrecognised  assets.  That  is,  the  greater  the  amount  of 
unrecognised  assets,  the  lower  the  relevance  of  book  value. 
In  short,  this  strand  of  literature  supports  the  premise  that  when  a  firm's  current 
earnings  is  not  perceived  to  be  a  good  indicator  of  its  future  earnings  power,  market 
participants  will  turn  to  book  value  for  guidance  in  valuation13 
Studies  by  Rees  (1997),  Hand  and  Landsman  (1999),  Brief  and  Zarowin  (1999) 
extend  previous  research  into  relative  valuation  of  earnings  and  book  value  by 
incorporating  dividends  into  the  analysis.  Rees  (1997)  operationalises  the  Edwards- 
Bell-Ohlson  residual  income  valuation  model  and  uses  it  to  analyse  the  value 
13  Earnings  persistence  has  also  been  identified  as  one  major  determinant  of  the  magnitude  of  earnings 
response  coefficients  in  earnings-return  models  [Kormendi  and  Lipe  (1987),  Collins  and  Kothari  (1989), 
among  others)]. 
66 associations  of  earnings,  book  values  and  dividends  for  a  sample  of  UK  firms.  He  finds 
that  dividends  have  a  bigger  impact  on  value  than  does  retained  earnings.  Inclusion  of 
dividends  into  the  model  also  improves  its  explanatory  power.  His  findings  also  indicate 
that  in  an  environment  characterised  by  information  asymmetry,  basic  accounting 
values,  such  as  earnings  and  book  value,  are  less  reliable  value  drivers.  Retained 
earnings  are  also  found  to  be  relatively  weak  for  smaller  firms  and  firms  with  negative 
(and,  therefore,  likely  transitory)  earnings  or  higher-than-average  return  on  equity.  The 
book  value  variable  is  most  influential  where  return  on  equity  is  either  abnormally  high 
or  low.  The  relevance  of  book  value  to  the  market  value  of  equity  is  relatively  weak  for 
larger  firms.  Dividends  are  found  to  be  highly  value  relevant  and  are  always  positively 
related  to  value. 
Hand  and  Landsman  (1999)  test  the  predictions  that  emerge  in  Ohlson's  (1995) 
model  by  examining  the  information  content  of  dividends.  They  employ  a  price-levels 
model  to  assess  the  pricing  of  dividends  in  stock  prices  and  find  robust  evidence  that 
dividends  have  information  content  and  are  materially  positively  priced,  which  contrasts 
with  the  negative  relation  predicted  by  the  dividend  displacement  theory.  They  also  find 
that  the  positive  pricing  of  dividends  is  at  least  three  times  larger  for  loss  making  firms 
(i.  e.,  when  earnings  are  transitory)  than  for  profit-making  firms.  The  authors' 
explanation  of  these  results  is  that  managers  of  loss-making  firms  use  dividends  to 
signal  future  profitability,  while  to  a  lesser  degree  managers  of  profitable  firms  use 
dividends  to  alleviate  concerns  about  the  misuse  of  free  cash  flow.  They  conclude  that 
dividends  are  a  component  of  other  information  about  abnormal  earnings  that  is 
reflected  in  price  but  is  not  yet  captured  by  current  financial  statements. 
Brief  and  Zarowin  (1999)  compare  alternative  valuation  models  that  relate  share 
price  to  book  value  and  earnings,  and  to  book  value  and  dividends  and  identify  some  of 
the  contexts  affecting  valuation  relevance.  They  find  that  book  value  has  greater 
67 explanatory  power  for  price  than  either  earnings  or  dividends.  However,  the 
combination  of  book  value  and  dividends  has  virtually  identical  explanatory  power  as 
book  value  and  earnings.  Furthermore,  earnings  and  dividends  alone  have  about  the 
same  individual  and  incremental  explanatory  power.  For  firms  with  transitory  earnings, 
dividends  has  greater  individual  explanatory  power  than  earnings,  but  once  again  book 
value  and  earnings  and  book  value  and  dividends  have  about  the  same  explanatory 
power.  This  shows  that  book  value  compensates  for  the  largely  valuation  irrelevant 
transitory  earnings.  For  firms  with  permanent  earnings,  earnings  has  the  greatest 
explanatory  power  of  the  three  variables.  Finally,  dividends  have  superior  valuation 
relevance  when  book  value  is  a  poor  indicator  of  value  (e.  g.,  due  to  the  presence  of 
unrecognised  assets  in  some  industries),  and  when  earnings  are  transitory. 
2.6  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
This  chapter  reviews  different  strands  of  literature  that  directly  concern  the 
research  objective  and  research  questions  of  this  study.  This  literature  provides  the 
necessary  anchors  and  `benchmarks'  for  (i)  the  theoretical  arguments  put  forward  in  this 
study,  and  (ii)  the  analysis  and  synthesis  of  the  empirical  finding. 
The  conducted  review  of  literature  on  the  usefulness  of  segmental  information 
reveals  the  lack  of  consensus  in  the  core  area  of  interest  of  this  study,  i.  e.,  valuation  and 
value  relevance  of  segmental  information.  This  issue  is  extensively  investigated  in 
Chapters  5  and  6. 
The  section  2.5  of  this  chapter  is  deliberately  kept  concise  because  the 
theoretical  aspects  of  the  chosen  accounting-based  valuation  framework  are  the  primary 
subject  of  detailed  investigation  in  Chapter  3,  while  the  empirical  side  of  the  story  is 
examined  in  Chapter  4. 
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METHODOLOGY  AND  TEST  DESIGN 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  examine  the  empirical  methods,  models  and 
methodological  issues,  as  well  as  the  choices  and  assumptions  made  in  respect  of  the 
test  design. 
The  chapter  has  the  following  structure.  Section  3.2.  discusses  the  issue  of 
model  class  selection  and  outlines  the  reasons  for  choosing  a  specific  class  of  market- 
based  accounting  valuation  model.  Section  3.3  concerns  the  derivation  of  the  basic 
model  used  in  this  study.  Section  3.4.  examines  the  implications  of  the  cross-sectional 
difference  in  scale  on  the  potential  inferences  drawn  from  the  empirical  application  of 
the  basic  model.  Section  3.5.  demonstrates  how  the  basic  models  can  be  extended  for  its 
application  on  the  segmental  level.  Section  3.6.  provides  further  explanations  on  how 
the  basic  models'  coefficients  should  be  interpreted  when  drawing  the  inferences  in  the 
process  of  empirical  analysis.  Section  3.7.  concludes  the  chapter. 
3.2.  MODEL  CLASS  SELECTION 
In  the  empirical  accounting  research,  a  choice  often  has  to  be  made  between:  (i) 
return-earnings  models,  in  which  returns  are  typically  regressed  on  a  scaled  earnings 
variable  (or  earnings  component);  and  (ii)  price-levels  models,  in  which  share  values 
might  be  regressed  on  earnings,  book  values,  dividends,  research  and  development 
costs,  etc.  Because  the  goal  of  this  study  is  to  uncover/capture  the  long-term 
relationships  and  the  adequacy  of  segmental  financial  statement  information  as  a 
summary  of  the  segment-level  events  that  have  affected  the  firm  to  date,  I  argue  that  the 
price-levels  model  specification  is  more  appropriate. 
69 To  link  and  explore  the  relationship  between  the  market  value  of  the  firm's 
ordinary  equity  and  the  segmental  information  disclosed  in  the  notes  to  financial 
statements,  I  adapt  the  residual  income  valuation  model  (RIV).  This  produces  a  price- 
levels  model  which,  in  its  most  basic  form,  expresses  the  market  value  of  equity  as  a 
linear  function  of  the  firm's  book  value  and  earnings  for  ordinary. 
The  review  of  the  literature,  presented  in  Chapter  2,  suggests  that  the  majority  of 
studies  that  have  investigated  the  valuation  of  operations  of  diversified  firms,  have  used 
returns-based  models.  On  this  basis  some  researchers  might  view  a  return-earnings  type 
of  valuation  model  as  an  alternative  to  a  price-levels  research  design.  However,  the 
emphases  in  these  studies  have  mainly  been  the  stock  market  performance  of  firms, 
measured  over  a  period  of  time.  Returns  models  consider  the  adequacy  of  financial 
statement  data  as  a  summary  of  events  that  have  affected  the  firm  over  a  specific  `return 
interval'.  As  Easton  and  Sommers  (2003)  point  out,  inferences  from  the  return  model 
may  be  more  pertinent  to  addressing  questions  regarding  the  validity  of  the  accounting 
summary  of  (specific)  events  that  have  affected  the  firm  during  the  return  period.  That 
is,  returns  models  permit  tests  of  hypotheses  regarding  the  timeliness  of  the  summary. 
However,  investigation  of  the  timeliness  of  the  accounting  summary  of  segment- 
level  events  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  study.  The  purpose  here  is  to  reveal  the  long-term 
relationships  and  examine  the  value  association  of  segmental  information  at  a  point  in 
time. 
As  discussed  in  Chapter  2,  a  price-levels  model  captures  the  long-term 
relationships,  as  it  considers  the  adequacy  of  financial  statement  data  as  a  summary  of 
all  events  that  have  affected  the  firm  to-date  (i.  e.,  it  captures  all  returns  since  the  firm 
came  into  existence).  The  model,  therefore,  does  not  depend  on  timing  since  it  deals 
directly  with  the  value  per  se  [Easton  and  Sommers  (2003)]. 
70 The  research  question  would,  therefore,  be  best  addressed  through  the  use  of  the 
price-levels  model. 
3.3  DERIVATION  OF  THE  MODEL 
Various  studies  [e.  g.,  Peasnell  (1982),  Ohlson  (1995),  Rees  (1997)]  have 
demonstrated  that  the  residual  income  valuation  model  is  theoretically  identical  to,  and 
can  easily  be  derived  from,  the  classical  dividend  discount  model  (DDM).  RIV  based 
models  are  popular  valuation  tools  in  market  based  accounting  research.  What 
positively  differentiates  the  RIV  model  from  the  DDM,  given  the  purpose  of  our 
research,  is  that  RIV  relies  entirely  on  accounting  numbers.  The  only  assumption  used 
in  the  process  of  derivation  of  RIV  from  DDM  is  that  the  relationship  between  the 
future  periods'  per  share  earnings,  book  values  and  dividends  follows  clean  surplus 
accounting.  Clean  surplus  accounting  assumes  that  changes  in  per  share  book  value 
between  two  dates  equals  to  net  income  minus  dividends.  Furthermore,  for  the  RIV 
model  to  follow  from  DDM  it  is  only  necessary  that  the  estimates  of  future  accounting 
numbers,  rather  than  past  numbers,  follow  `clean  surplus'  identity  [Rees  (1997)]. 
Below  I  outline  the  sequence  of  steps  used  in  the  literature  to  derive  the  RIV 
model  from  DDM  [see,  for  example,  Edwards  and  Bell  (1961),  Peasnell  (1981,1982), 
Ohlson  (1989,1995)].  The  DDM  holds14: 
p`  =;  [1  +  r]r 
(1) 
where: 
p1  =  price  of  the  ordinary  share  at  time  t;  d1  =  ordinary  dividends  at  time  t;  r= 
the  discount  rate;  and  E1[.  ]  =  expectations  operator  at  time  t. 
14  Investors  may  either  be  assumed  to  be  risk  neutral  or  the  cost  of  capital  may  reflect  the  risk  of  the 
dividend  stream.  It  is  also  assumed  that  there  is  no  information  asymmetry  (i.  e.,  homogeneous  beliefs), 
interest  rates  are  non-stochastic  and  have  a  flat  term  structure. 
ý 
r,  .  -,  _ 
71 The  assumption  that  the  book  value,  earnings  and  dividends  develop  in  line  with 
the  `clean  surplus'  accounting  holds: 
by,  =  bv, 
_, 
+  er,  -  d,  (2) 
where: 
bv,  and  bv1_,  =  book  value  of  equity  at  time  t  and  t-1,  respectively;  erg  =  clean 
surplus  earnings  for  period  t. 
The  dividend  variable  in  equation  (1)  can  be  replaced  by  the  expression  for 
dividends  from  (2).  This  and  some  rearrangement  gives: 
(3)  Pr  =  bv1+ 
E1  [er, 
[1  +  r] 
byr+r-,  ] 
r-I 
In  the  literature,  model  (3)  is  frequently  being  referred  to  as  the  Edward-Bell- 
Ohlson  (EBO)  model,  residual  income  valuation  model,  or  abnormal  earnings  model.  In 
this  study  these  terms  are  used  interchangeably.  This  model  has  a  straightforward 
interpretation:  the  market  value  of  a  firm's  equity  is  a  function  of  its  current  book  value 
plus  the  present  value  of  the  stream  of  future  periods'  expected  abnormal  earnings.  The 
model  implies  that  any  deviation  of  a  firm's  market  value  from  its  book  value  occurs 
due  to  limitations  in  the  accounting-based  book  values  in  recognising  the 
contemporaneous  future  expected  abnormal  earnings,  that  bears  on  a  firm's  goodwill.  It 
is  important  to  note  that  the  required  rate  of  return  `r'  used  in  conjunction  with  by  is  the 
same  as  that  used  for  discounting  future  abnormal  earnings. 
The  abnormal  income  of  each  of  the  future  periods  is  equal  to  the  difference  of 
that  period's  earnings  (er1)  and  `normal'  or  `required'  earnings  (r*bvt_j)  that  investors 
require  the  firm  to  earn  on  their  `beginning-of-period'  investment  in  the  equity  of  the 
firm.  The  abnormal  income,  second  term  in  equation  (3),  can,  therefore,  be  decomposed 
into  its  two  constituent  parts:  the  present  value  of  future  expected  earnings  [second  term 
72 in  (4)],  and  present  value  of  future  expected  `required'  or  `normal'  earnings  [third  term 
in  (4)],  respectively.  That  is: 
bv  +7 
Er  (err+T  )_'  Er  ýr  *  byr+r-t  ) 
Pr  =t 
T=I  [1  +  r]T  T_, 
[1  +  r]s 
(4) 
The  good  news  about  this  valuation  model  is  that  it  relies  on  accounting  numbers  . 
only.  The  bad  news,  however,  is  that  the  model  also  relies  on  the  expected  at  time  `t' 
future  values  of  'bv'  and  'er'  from  time  't+l  '  to  infinity.  Although  the  expected  values 
for  the  immediate  future  periods  may,  arguably,  be  proxied  by  analyst  forecasts,  there 
are  no  reliable  proxies  (forecasts)  for  future  expected  accounting  values  in  more  distant 
future  periods.  This  fact  makes  the  model,  in  its  current  format,  inapplicable  for  real-life 
valuation.  For  the  purposes  of  empirical  utilisation,  the  model  requires  some  further 
modification.  The  literature  suggests  several  approaches  to  how  this  model  can  be 
operationalised  empirically.  Although  somewhat  different  in  the  underlying  logic,  all 
approaches  rely  on  some  additional  assumptions  with  respect  to  the  process  of 
expectations  formation.  The  resulting  operationalised  models  are,  nonetheless,  very 
similar  whatever  approach  one  takes. 
In  the  sections  that  follow  I  briefly  review  three  approaches  to  operationalising 
the  EBO  that  have  been  most  frequently  used  in  the  literature,  and  explain  the  choice  of 
the  approach  taken  in  this  study's 
First  approach: 
Ohlson  (1995)  transforms  equation  (3)  into  a  linear  function  of  equity  book  value, 
current  net  income,  net  dividends,  and  a  scalar  'v'  representing  other  information  about 
future  abnormal  earnings  that  is  reflected  in  price  but  is  not  yet  captured  by  current 
is  In  section  3.5  of  this  chapter  I  review  the  third  approach,  used  by  Wysocki  (1998)  specifically  for 
segment-level  analysis,  that  results  in  the  same  operationalised  model. 
73 financial  statements.  He  does  so  by  assuming  that  abnormal  earnings  (or  unrecorded 
goodwill)  and  other  information  obey  an  autoregressive  process16 
q  *a 
xltl  -  iv  Xl  +  Vl  +  Fl. 
ltl 
* 
vt+l  -  lý  vt  +  C2. 
t+1  (s) 
where  4=  abnormal  earnings  for  period  t,  and  is  defined  as  x,  =  er,  -r*  bv, 
_, 
;  yr  is 
other  information  that  impacts  on  the  firm  equity  value  at  time  t  but  is  not  yet  captured 
in  contemporaneous  accounting  numbers;  e.,,  and  e2,  are  zero-mean  unpredictable 
disturbance  terms.  tu  and  y  are  fixed  at  time  t  known  autoregressive  parameters, 
restricted  within  the  interval  of  0  to  1. 
By  combining  equations  (2),  (3),  (5)  and  the  definition  of  abnormal  earnings  (i.  e., 
_, 
),  the  following  model  can  be  derived:  xl  =  er,  -r*  bv, 
p,  =  (1-k)bv,  +k(V  *er,  -dr)+82v, 
or 
p,  =bv,  +k(V  *err  -d,  )-kbv,  +82v, 
(6) 
(6.1) 
where  dt  =  net  dividends  plus  net  capital  outflow,  and  parameters  p,  k  and  82  are, 
respectively: 
cp=(1+r)lr>0 
k=rw1(r+1-y),  with  0:  5k-<<1 
82  =(r+1)/(r+1-w)(r+1-y) 
The  book  value  works  as  a  `rough'  measure/estimate  of  value,  whereas  the 
abnormal  earnings  and  'v'  augment  book  value  as  "correcting"  information.  Ohlson 
(1995)  demonstrates  that  ignoring  the  other  information  V,  the  valuation  model  (6)  can 
be  viewed  as  a  weighted  average  of  an  earnings  capitalisation  model  and  a  book  value 
16  It  also  follows  that  goodwill  equals  current  abnormal  earnings  scaled  by  a  constant. 
74 model.  By  letting  k=w  =1,  the  value  is  determined  only  by  earnings  and  dividends 
('pure'  earnings/dividends  model): 
p,  =co*err-d, 
Alternatively,  by  letting  k=  co  =  0,  just  book  value  is  sufficient  to  determine  the 
value  ('pure'  book  value  model): 
pr  =  bv1 
Ohlson's  model  (equation  6)  also  cleanly  reflects  Modigliani  and  Miller's  (1958, 
1961)  dividend  displacement  property.  That  is,  equity  value  and  dividends  are 
negatively  related  in  that  a  pound  of  dividends  reduces  equity  value  by  exactly  one 
pound'7.  However,  the  existing  empirical  evidence  seems  to  suggest  the  opposite: 
dividends  have  a  positive  association  with  value  (see  Chapter  2).  I  return  to  the  issue  of 
dividends  in  greater  detail  later  in  the  chapter. 
Because  equation  (6)  is  a  simple  linear  model  that  expresses  the  value  `p'  through 
'bv',  'er',  'd  'and  'v',  one  can  rewrite  it  as: 
p,  =  a;  bv,  +a2er,  +aýd,  +b'Zl  +u,  (6.2) 
where  Z  is  a  vector  of  other  value-relevant  variables,  including  the  other  information 
component  v1,  and  various  control  variables;  a;  =  (1-  k) 
,  a2  =  k(  O,  a;  =  -k  and 
b'  subsumes  coefficients  on  the  elements  of  vector  Z1. 
Model  6.2,  with  or  without  the  dividends  term,  is  frequently  applied  in  the 
empirical  studies  by  regressing  stock  price  on  current  book  value  and  current  net 
income  [e.  g.,  Rees  (1997),  Hand  and  Landsman  (1999)]  as  follows: 
p,  =  ao  +a,  bv,  +a2er,  +a3d,  +bZ,  +u,  (7) 
17  Hand  and  Landsman  (1999)  argue  that  this  valuation  property  of  dividends  in  Ohlson's  model  results 
from  the  standard  dividend  discount  model  permitting  no  information  asymmetry. 
75 where  ao  ,  a,  ,  a2  and  b  are,  respectively,  the  intercept,  and  regression-generated 
estimates  of  coefficients  a,,  a2,  a'  and  b',  respectively;  ut  is  the  regression  error 
term. 
Model  (7)  is  one  of  the  possible  operationalised  valuation  model  versions  of  the 
theoretical  EBO  (equation  3),  and  the  process  of  derivation  bears  on  the  Ohlson's  linear 
information  dynamic  assumptions. 
Second  approach: 
A  virtually  identical  specification  to  model  (7)  is  also  attainable  by  following  a 
different  set  of  assumptions.  Rees  (1997)  suggests  modelling  future  periods'  earnings 
and  book  values  as  growing  at  constant  rates  get  and  gbv.  That  is: 
Et  [bv, 
+T 
(1  +  gBV  )T  *  bvt  z=  (1,  oo) 
and 
E,  [err+Tý  - 
(1+gER)T  *eYi  r=  (1ýoo) 
(8) 
However,  constant  growth  in  earnings  and  book  values  in  each  future  time  period 
is  not  a  requirement  of  the  model.  The  only  requirement  is  that  growth  expectations  are 
equated,  in  present  value  terms,  to  a  constant  growth  term. 
The  assumption  of  how  future  expected  values  develop  is  necessary  because 
expectations  are  not  observable  in  practice,  and  the  only  factual  information  available  to 
investors/analysts  at  time  "t"  is  the  firm's  bvt  and  erl.  In  other  words,  to  operationalise 
the  EBO  model  a  certain  relationship  should  be  assumed  between  the  current  observable 
and  the  next-period's  accounting  variables.  The  hypothesised  structure  of  expectations 
allows  the  substitution  of  all  currently  "non-observable"  accounting  values  for  future 
76 periods  with  those  that  are  currently  observable'  8.  By  substituting  (8)  into  (3)  and  noting 
that  gER  and  gBV  must,  in  the  long-term,  be  less  than  unity,  equation  (3)  can  be 
transformed  to: 
Pr  =bv,  +er,  * 
1+9ER 
-bv, 
r 
r-gER  r-gev 
or 
(9) 
P,  =  bv,  1-  r+  er,  * 
1+  gER 
(9.1) 
r-gBv 
r-  gER 
Model  (9)  demonstrates  that  one  can  express  the  firm's  equity  value  via  two 
currently  observable  accounting  variables:  bvt  and  ert,  where  the  firm  value  pt  is  equal  to 
bvt  (the  baseline  value)  plus  a  linear  function  of  bvt  and  ert  that  represents  the  abnormal 
earnings. 
I (rl(  1+gý  1 
By  denoting  a,  =  11- 
r-  gav  J 
and  a2  =r- 
gER  J, 
model  (9.1)  can  be 
presented  in  a  simple  linear  regression  form: 
pt  =  aa  +a,  bv,  +azer,  +ur  (10) 
Rees's  model  is  another  operationalised  version  of  (3)  and  is  essentially  identical 
to  the  Ohlson's  equation  (7).  In  other  words,  virtually  the  same  operationalised  version 
is  attainable  by  following  substantially  different  derivation  procedure  and  assumptions. 
The  interpretation  or  economic  meaning  of  coefficients  al  and  a2,  in  across  models  (7) 
and  (10),  is  also  qualitatively  identical.  Therefore,  in  this  study  I  adopt  this 
operationalisation  as  the  basic  valuation  framework. 
18  It  is  possible  that  the  way  the  currently  observable  values  relate  to  future  unobservable  ones  may  vary 
within  the  investing  coqununity,  as  well  as  with  respect  to  different  firms,  industries  and  over  time. 
Whatever  assumption  one  makes  regarding  the  form  of  that  relationship,  it  is  going  to  be  of  restrictive 
nature.  More  importantly,  however,  is  the  very  existence  of  that  relation  but  not  its  true  pattern. 
r 
77 Some  explanations  of  the  model's  relation  to  the  firm's  accounting  system  are 
necessary.  Assuming  that  the  firm's  assets  are  all  marked-to-market  and  the  firm 
generates  (and  is  expected  to  generate  in  the  future)  `normal'  earnings,  the  equity 
market  value  pt  should  on  average  equal  its  book  value  bvt.  This  is  not  to  say  that  under 
those  conditions  there  could  not  be  short-term  random  fluctuations  of  MV  around  BV 
due  to  the  influence  of  other  value-relevant  factors  of  a  random  nature,  which  are  not 
reflected  in  accounting  numbers.  The  important  point  is  that  the  model  captures  long- 
term  relationships  where  the  short-term  random  disturbances  are  assumed  to  balance  out 
in  the  long-term. 
The  relaxation  of  the  marked-to-market  condition  does  not  change  the  above 
argument.  For  example,  if  the  accounting  system  used  by  the  firm  shows  a  persistent 
bias  (e.  g.,  conservatism),  and  investors  are  aware  of  this  fact,  then  it  is  likely  that 
investors  would  simply  adjust  the  reported  book  value  figure  to  what  they  believe  is  its 
perceived  fair  value.  In  other  words,  the  notion  is  that  analysts  would  apply  a  weighting 
multiplier  to  reconcile  the  reported  and  `fair'  book  values.  That  is 
bvunbiased  t_  li*bvbiasedr,  where  p  is  the  book  value  weighting  multiplier.  If  book  values 
are  perceived  (in  the  long  term)  to  be  equal  to  fair  value,  the  weighting  multiplier  would 
assume  the  value  of  unity.  For  downward  (upward)  biased  reported  book  values  the 
weighting  multiplier  would  be  larger  (smaller)  than  unity.  Therefore,  the  weight- 
adjusted  theoretical  coefficient  in  Ohlson's  framework  [equation  (6)]  would  be 
(1-  k),  u  ,  and  in  Rees's  approach  [equation  (9.1)]  it  would  be  1-  r 
r-gev  -)  lu  - 
It  follows,  that  this  weighting  multiplier  will  then  be  subsumed  in  coefficient  a] 
in  regression  models  (7)  and  (10).  That  is,  other  things  being  equal,  al  in  model  (7)  and 
(10)  will  be  higher  (lower)  if  the  firm's  accounting  system  is  perceived  to  be  generating 
78 downwards  (upwards)  biased  book  values.  Some  empirical  results  that  might  support  or 
refute  this  expectation  are  reported  in  Chapter  4. 
Leaving  aside  the  issue  of  accounting  system-induced  biases  in  reported  by,  the 
model  (3)  predicts  a  departure  of  a  firm's  market  value  from  its  book  value  if  the 
present  value  of  future  expected  earnings  varies  from  the  `normal'  or  `required'  level.  In 
the  operationalised  versions  of  the  model,  the  term  `a2  *ert'  proxies  for  the  present  value 
of  future  expected  earnings,  and  the  term  '(al  -1)  *bv,  '  proxies  for  the  capitalised  normal 
or  required  earnings.  Therefore,  the  difference  between  the  former  and  the  latter  terms 
bears  on  the  firm's  expected  abnormal  earnings  (goodwill),  which,  in  turn,  explains  why 
the  firm's  market  value  might  depart  from  its  book  value.  The  model  predicts  that,  all 
other  things  being  equal,  the  higher  the  capitalised  earnings  the  higher  would  be  the 
market  value  of  the  firm.  If  the  capitalised  expected  earnings  are  above  what  is 
considered  as  `normal'  earnings,  the  market  value  will  exceed  the  book  value.  The 
market  value  will  fall  below  book  value  when  the  capitalised  expected  earnings  fall 
short  of  normal  earnings.  Of  two  otherwise  identical  firms,  the  one  that  has  higher 
capitalised  expected  earnings  will  have  higher  market  value.  In  other  terms,  relative 
valuation  of  two  firms  is  entirely  determined  by  perceived  difference  in  capitalised 
expected  earnings.  Difference  between  capitalised  expected  earnings  of  two  firms  is 
inferred  by  comparing  the  values  of  regression-estimated  earnings  multiplier  `a2'. 
Therefore,  other  things  being  equal,  the  higher  the  earnings  multiplier,  the  larger  is  the 
associated  abnormal  earnings. 
On  the  whole,  in  the  context  of  this  research,  to  differentiate  between  valuations 
(value  contribution)  associated  with  different  firms  (segment-level  operations),  one 
must  be  able  to  compare  in  relative  terms  the  abnormal  earnings  associated  with 
different  firms  (segments).  Relative  abnormal  earnings  associations  are  inferred  from 
the  regression  estimated  earnings  multipliers.  This  basic  rule,  in  my  study,  guides  the 
79 process  of  drawing  inferences  regarding  the  valuation  or  value  contribution  associated 
with  of  different  firms  or  segments. 
3.3.1  Other  valuation  factors:  dividends 
One  can  notice  that  dividends  explicitly  enter  the  operationalised  model  (6)  that 
bears  on  Ohlson's  framework,  while  dividends  are  not  present  in  model  (9)  that  draws 
on  Rees's  framework.  One  can  argue  that  the  operationalised  models  oversimplify  the 
original  EBO  model,  because  they  totally  rely  on  current  period  data  rather  than  the 
future  expected  values.  The  closeness  of  the  operationalised  model  to  the  EBO  model 
would  depend  on:  (A)  how  well  the  current-period  variable  values  proxy  for  values 
expected  in  the  future;  and  (B)  the  credibility  of  the  assumptions  used  during  the 
modification  of  the  EBO,  resulting  in  a  simple  linear  relationship  between  firm  value 
and  accounting  variables. 
The  condition  (A),  in  turn,  depends  on  at  least  two  factors.  Firstly,  it  is  the  quality 
of  accounting  numbers  in  the  broad  sense.  That  is,  how  closely  accounting  numbers 
reflect  the  underlying  economic  performance  of  the  firm  and  the  fair  value  of  its  assets. 
Secondly,  it  is  the  perceived  degree  of  persistence  of  these  accounting  variables.  In 
other  words,  even  in  the  ideal  case  where  all  assets  and  liabilities  are  continuously 
marked-to-market  and  the  firm  does  not  resort  to  any  form  of  earnings  management  or 
manipulation,  current  values  might  still  convey  little  information  regarding  the  future 
expected  values  for  the  same  variables. 
Condition  (B),  in  turn,  may  not  hold.  For  example,  parameters  in  these 
operationalisations  are  modelled  as  constants  or,  at  least,  are  assumed  to  be  independent 
of  the  values  of  accounting  numbers.  In  reality,  however,  this  might  not  be  the  case. 
Extant  literature  (see  Chapter  2)  suggests  that  parameters  might  vary  depending  on,  for 
instance,  the  sign  of  earnings,  book  values,  or  might  be  affected  by  a  range  of  other 
80 contexts.  Furthermore,  the  model  predicts  that  the  firm  equity  value  would  be  zero  if  all 
accounting  numbers  entering  the  model  were  zeros.  It  is  possible  that  the  model's 
linearity/non-linearity  and  the  set  of  major  value  drivers  are  contextual  to  the  properties 
of  the  firm  (e.  g.,  the  economic  sector  affiliation  of  the  company,  size,  life  cycle  stage, 
accepted  accounting  practices,  extremity  of  reported  accounting  numbers,  etc.  )  and  the 
degree  of  market's  miss-pricing  of  the  firm's  value. 
To  limit  information  loss  and  mitigate  possible  miss-specification,  one  should  try 
to  improve  the  model  by  appending  it  with  some  `forward-looking'  variables.  Dividends 
might  be  one  such  additional  valuation  factor19.  Various  authors  attribute  different  yet 
complementary  roles  to  dividends  in  models  similar  to  (7).  For  example,  dividends  are 
imbedded  in  Ohlson's  analytical  model  (6).  This  model  predicts  a  negative  relation 
between  dividends  and  market  value,  which  closely  reflects  the  Modigliani  and  Miller 
dividend  displacement  proposition.  Application  of  a  set  of  assumptions  [e.  g.,  such  as  in 
Rees  (1997)]  which  are  different  from  those  used  by  Ohlson  to  operationalise  the  EBO, 
may  generate  similar  models  but  without  the  dividend  variable  [e.  g.,  equation  (10)]. 
Dividends  are  often  added  into  those  models  as  an  additional  value-relevant  variable. 
Common  arguments  for  adding  dividends  into  the  model  include: 
1.  First  is  the  signalling  hypothesis:  management  signals  its  inside 
information  on  the  firm's  expected  economic  performance  via  dividends.  In  this 
sense,  dividends  might  proxy  for  other  value-relevant  information  that  is  yet  to  be 
reflected  in  future  period  financial  statements.  In  this  capacity,  dividends  can  be 
applied  to  Ohlson  (1995)  model  and  proxy  for  the  `other  information  (v)'  variable. 
19  Some  studies  include  in  a  similar  valuation  framework  other  forward-looking  value-explaining  factors, 
such  as  research  and  development  costs  [e.  g.,  Green  et  al  (1996),  Stark  and  Thomas  (1998),  Stark  et  al., 
(2003)],  or  advertising  expenses  [e.  g.,  Chauvin  and  Hirschey  (1993)].  However,  it  is  essential  not  to 
overcomplicate  the  valuation  model,  particularly  when  it  comes  to  the  segment-level  analysis,  by  trying  to 
control  for  all  possible  value  drivers.  Of  the  above  factors  I  include  only  dividends,  as  I  believe  dividends 
have  a  more  fundamental  role  in  equity  valuation  and  dividend  information  is  more  readily  available. 
81 2.  Secondly,  because  firms  are  reluctant  to  frequent  changes  of  dividend 
policy,  dividends  can  also  be  viewed  as  the  high-persistence  component  of  current 
period  earnings  [Lintner  (1965)]. 
3.  Finally,  depending  on  the  set  of  specific  assumptions  used  to 
operationalise  EBO,  the  resulting  model  may  explicitly  include  dividends  as  a 
valuation  factor.  For  instance  Hand  and  Landsman  (1999)  demonstrate  how  two 
alternative  sets  of  assumptions  give  different  roles  to  dividends  in  a  model  similar  to 
(7).  In  one  case,  the  multiplier  attached  to  dividends  has  a  theoretical  value  of  `-1', 
reflecting  Modigliani  and  Miller's  (1958,1961)  dividend  displacement  theory. 
While  in  the  other  case  the  theoretical  value  of  the  dividend  multiplier  is  positive 
and  has  a  specific  structure  [see  equation  (6.1)]. 
The  above  arguments  suggest  that  including  dividends  into  the  model  is  likely  to 
mitigate  possible  miss-specification  and  value-relevant  omitted  variable  problems. 
Empirical  studies  both  in  the  UK  and  the  US  that  use  price-level  regressions  and  include 
dividends  as  an  additional  valuation  factor  tend  to  find  that  the  valuation  of  dividends  is 
contextual  to  firm-specific  characteristics  and,  contrary  to  the  dividend  displacement 
theory,  positively  associated  with  firm  value  [e.  g.,  Rees  (1997),  Hand  and  Landsman 
(1999),  Akbar  and  Stark  (2003a)]. 
Some  studies  advocate  the  use  of  additional  value-drivers  such  as  R&D  costs 
[Hirschey  and  Spencer  (1992),  Green  et  al.,  (1996)  and  Stark  and  Thomas  (1998)], 
advertising  expenses  [Chauvin  and  Hirschey  (1993)],  or  capital  contributions  [Hand  and 
Landsman  (1999)].  The  motivation  for  including  these  variables  in  the  regression  is  best 
expressed  in  Akbar  and  Stark  (2003a)  who  state  that  equation  (10)  is  clearly  a  stripped 
down  model  that  omits  a  number  of  (above  listed)  variables  that  have  been  argued  to  be 
value-relevant  in  prior  studies  in  the  US  and  the  UK. 
82 However,  it  is  essential  not  to  overcomplicate  our  valuation  model,  particularly 
when  it  is  modified  for  the  segmental  level  analysis,  by  trying  to  control  for  potentially 
numerous  valuation  factors.  Of  the  financial  statements  variables  considered  by  the 
literature  as  potentially  value-relevant,  only  dividends  are  included  in  the  model  as  I 
believe  dividends  have  a  more  fundamental  role  in  security  valuation.  Additionally,  in 
terms  of  availability  of  data,  in  the  Extel  Financial  Company  Analysis  database  -  the 
primary  source  of  data  for  this  study  -  dividends  is  a  more  frequently  reported  data  item 
than  R&D,  marketing  costs  or  capital  contributions.  Therefore,  the  following  version  of 
valuation  model  is  used  as  the  basis  for  the  empirical  sections  of  this  study: 
pr  =  ao  +  a,  bvr  +  az  err  +  a,  divr  +  bZr  +  ut  (11) 
where  Z  is  a  vector  of  various  control  variables,  which  are  detailed  in  subsequent 
empirical  analysis  chapters. 
3.4  THE  IMPACT  OF  CROSS-SECTIONAL  DIFFERENCE  IN  SCALE 
The  process  of  model  derivation  and  key  theoretical  properties  of  the  model  have 
been  examined  in  Section  3.3.  In  the  current  section  I  examine  the  practical  implications 
of  applying  the  model  to  a  cross-section  of  firms  of  different  size. 
Firms  included  in  the  sample  used  in  this  study  differ  cross-sectionally  in  terms  of 
size.  On  average  larger  firms  have  larger  values  of  variables  in  monetary  terms:  market 
capitalisation,  book  values,  net  assets,  sales,  earnings,  etc.  That  is,  these  variables  have 
an  imbedded  scale  or  size  factor.  I  demonstrate  below,  that  if  no  account  is  taken  of 
differences  in  size,  the  estimated  regression  is  most  likely  to  produce  spurious  results, 
i.  e.  be  plagued  by  econometric  problems  such  as  biased  regression  coefficients, 
heteroscedasticity-related  problems,  overstated  coefficients  of  determination,  etc. 
Although  these  problems  have  been  recognised  in  the  market  based  accounting 
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offered.  Depending  on  the  primary  emphasis  of  a  particular  research  question,  different 
studies  have  dealt  with  scale  effects  in  different  ways. 
This  study  requires  drawing  inferences  from  actual  values  of  regression-estimated 
coefficients.  More  specifically,  the  purpose  of  this  research  is  to  reveal  the  actual 
patterns  of  value  contributions  associated  with  specific  industrial  and  geographical 
segments.  The  employed  test  design  identifies  these  patterns  by  examining  the  values  of 
particular  regression  coefficients.  It  is  critical,  therefore,  to  ensure  that  coefficients  are 
sufficiently  unbiased  and  robust.  It  has  been  documented  in  the  existing  literature  that 
scale-related  effects  have  considerable  influence  on  inferences  drawn  from  the  price- 
levels  models.  A  considerable  number  of  studies  discuss  approaches  to  mitigate  the 
effects  of  scale  on  regression  results  [Bernard  (1987),  Kothari  and  Zimmerman  (1995), 
Easton  (2000),  Barth  and  Clinch  (2001),  Easton  and  Sommers  (2003)].  Unfortunately, 
all  these  studies  characterise  scale  in  different  ways.  It  appears  that  scale  is  not  a  single 
and  well-defined  concept.  For  example,  Easton  and  Sommers  (2003)  note  that  the 
nature  of  cross-sectional  data  is  such  that  the  results  of  a  regression  of  market 
capitalisation  on  financial  statement  data  are  driven  by  a  relatively  small  subset  of  the 
largest  firms  in  the  sample.  They  refer  to  this  overwhelming  influence  of  the  largest 
firms  as  the  `scale  effect'.  It  appears  though,  that  the  authors  do  not  draw  a  fine  line 
between  different  consequences  of  using  size-wise  heterogeneous  cross-sectional  data. 
They  observe  the  presence  of  heteroscedasticity  in  the  regression  and  call  it  a  `size 
effect'.  They  apply  the  same  `size  effect'  term  to  a  situation  where  the  relation  between 
variables  for  larger  firms  differs  from  the  relation  for  smaller  firms  (that  is,  large  and 
small  firms  have  different  valuation  multiples).  Review  of  studies  by  Bernard  (1987), 
Kothari  and  Zimmerman  (1995),  Easton  (2000),  Barth  and  Clinch  (2001),  Easton  and 
Sommers  (2003)  points  to  a  range  of  potential  problems  associated  with  cross-sectional 
84 scale  differences  that  need  to  be  addressed.  Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  investigate 
potential  influences  that  cross-sectional  differences  in  scale  might  have  on  regression 
results. 
It  is  unclear  a  priori  which  types  of  scale  effects  are  present  in  our  research 
context.  To  determine  whether  scale  induces  spurious  inferences,  one  must  either 
specify  the  nature  of  the  scale  effect  and  take  specific  steps  to  mitigate  it,  or  ensure 
inferences  are  robust  to  estimating  alternative  specifications  aimed  at  mitigating  various 
types  of  scale  effects.  Therefore,  diagnosing  and  mitigating  scale  effects  requires 
specifying  what  scale  is  in  the  context  of  this  research  and  how  scale  relates  to  the 
variables  employed. 
Barth  and  Clinch  (2001)  provide  a  useful  framework  for  differentiating  between 
various  (four)  types  of  scale-related  problems: 
1.  scale  differences  arising  from  the  financing  base  of  a  firm  that  is  unrelated  to 
the  success  or  failure  of  the  firm's  operating  and  investing  activities.  That  is,  there  is  a 
difference  between  firms  that  are  large  because  of  capital  infusion  and  firms  that  are 
large  because  of  successful  operating  and  investing  activities.  This  results  in  an  additive 
scale  effect. 
2.  Scale  differences  arising  at  the  formation  of  the  firm.  This  results  in  a 
multiplicative  scale  effect. 
3.  Valuation  parameters  that  vary  with  scale  (Lee  [1999]). 
4.  Heteroscadasticity. 
The  first  three  effects  can  result  in  coefficient  bias,  whereas  the  fourth  can  result 
in  estimation  inefficiency.  There  seem  to  be  consensus  in  the  literature  that  depending 
on  the  nature  of  the  scale  effect,  different  estimation  specifications  (models)  might 
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valuation  implications  of  those  four  scale  effects  in  the  settings  of  our  tests. 
3.4.1  Additive  scale  effect 
When  scale  differences  across  firms  reflect  differences  in  the  investment  base  (an 
omitted  variable),  we  have  a  scale  effect  of  the  first  type.  Among  factors  that  may 
account  for  the  differences  in  the  financing  base  are:  issues  of  new  equity;  repurchased 
stocks;  asset  revaluations;  and  interim  and  annual  paid  dividends.  Consequently,  if  one 
firm  is  larger  due  to  a  larger  financial  base  (e.  g.,  when  issuance  of  new  equity  increases 
MV  and  BV),  then  regression  estimates  could  show  a  positive  relation  between  MV  and 
BV  even  if  none  would  exist  in  scale-free  settings.  That  is,  differences  in  the  investment 
base  can  result  in  additive  scale  effects.  One  should  be  able  to  control  for  such  additive 
scale  effects  by  adjusting  the  dependent  variable  and  the  independent  variable  which 
relates  to  the  investment-base.  For  instance,  stock  buy-backs  (or  payment  of  dividends) 
reduce  book  value,  and  this  should  affect  the  market  value  approximately  on  a  pound- 
for-pound  basis20.  Therefore,  by  adjusting  market  and  book  values  to  new  stock 
issuance  (or  stock  repurchases,  paid  dividends,  etc.  ),  one  should,  in  theory,  be  able  to 
overcome  scale  effects  related  to  `differences-in-investment-base'.  In  practice,  however, 
such  adjustments  are  problematic.  Factors  like  asset  revaluations  also  affect  the 
investment  base.  The  problem  though  is  that  asset  revaluations  that  directly  affect  book 
value  might  not  impact  on  the  market  value  of  equity  on  a  pound-for-pound  basis. 
Furthermore,  the  non-availability  of  necessary  data  (such  as  new  share  issuance,  share 
redemption,  asset  revaluations,  etc.  )  on  our  sample  is  also  an  impediment.  Without  this 
20  Issues  such  as  taxation  and  information  asymmetry  might  undermine  the  pound-for-pound  relationship. 
86 information  it  would  be  impossible  to  identify  and  quantify  the  additive  scale  effect  (if 
there  is  one),  associated  with  differences  in  the  investment  base21. 
3.4.2  Multiplicative  scale  effect 
This  relates  to  the  situation  when  cross-sectional  scale  differences  reflect 
differences  arising  at  the  formation  of  the  firm  or  from  the  fact  that  firms  are  larger 
because  of  successful  operating  and  investing  activities  (including  such  events  as 
mergers  and  acquisitions).  Generally  speaking,  the  implication  of  this  type  of  scale 
effect  is  as  follows.  Suppose,  a  `unit-size'  firm  has  the  following  values  mvr,  bvr,  err, 
divr,  for  equity  market  value,  book  value,  earnings  and  dividends,  respectively.  Then  for 
an  otherwise  identical  firm,  whose  size  is  a  multiple  `s'  of  a  unit-size  factor  `s',  the 
corresponding  values  would  be  s  *mvr,  s*bv,,  s  *err,  s*div,  22.  Therefore,  if  the  value  of 
the  unit-size  firm  is  expressed  as: 
mv,  *1  =  ao  *1+a,  *(bv,  *1)+a2  *(er  *1)+a3*  div,  +u,, 
and  there  is  no  cross-sectional  variation  in  valuation  coefficients  related  to  cross- 
sectional  differences  in  scale,  then  the  value  of  the  `s'-size  firm  should  be: 
(mv,  *s)=ao*s+a,  *(bv,  *s)+a2*(ert*s)+a3*div,  +%t,. 
where  mvt*s,  bvt*s  and  ert*s  are  the  currently  observed  equity  market  value,  book 
value  and  earnings  of  a  firm  which  is  's'  times  proportionally  larger  than  the  `unit-size' 
firm.  In  the  above  model  we  have  pure  multiplicative  scale-effect,  which  assumes  that 
no  other  scale-related  valuation  differences  are  at  place.  Note  that  the  intercept  ao*s  is  a 
function  of  size  and  increases  in  proportion  to  T. 
21  Later  in  this  chapter  it  is  argued  that  deflation  by  a  scale  proxy  is  likely  to  purge  some  of  the  additive 
scale  effect. 
22  Fora  unit  size  firm  s=1. 
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likely  to  produce  spurious  results.  This  point  can  best  be  illustrated  graphically.  For 
simplicity  of  illustration  assume  that  there  is  only  one  valuation  factor,  that  is,  book 
value. 
Z/  mvt*1  =  ao*1+a1*(bvt*1) 
Small 
byº 
On  this  graph  there  are  two  groups  of  firms:  unit-size  or  `Small'  firms,  and 
`Large'  firms  that  are  proportionately  larger  by  a  factor  of  Y.  In  other  words,  a  simple 
multiplicative  scale  effect  is  assumed  in  the  group  of  larger  firms.  In  both  size  groups 
firms  have  the  same  valuation  function,  with  identical  book  value  coefficient.  If  two 
separate  regressions  [mvt*1  =  ao*1+aj*(bvt*1)  and  mvt*s  =  ao*s+aj*(bvt*s)]  were 
estimated  for  the  two  size  groups,  true  (unbiased)  estimates  the  of  book  value 
coefficient  a,  and  the  intercept  ao  would  have  been  obtained.  The  exhibit  illustrates 
that  when  large  and  small  firms  are  jointly  included  in  single  regression,  the 
regression's  estimated  coefficients  (ao'  and  aJ  ')  will  be  biased.  Other  regression 
characteristics,  such  as  the  Adjusted-R2  will  also  be  biased.  This  is  because  this  single 
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large  firms'  groups.  It  is  important  to  emphasise  that  this  line  does  not  reflect  the  true 
economic  relationships  (between  the  dependent  and  independent  variables)  which  are 
meant  to  be  explored.  Only  by  coincidence  will  these  regression  coefficients  and 
parameters  equal  the  true  coefficients. 
To  sum  up,  when  scale  effect  is  multiplicative  it  induces  spurious  correlation 
between  dependent  and  independent  variables  and  also  among  the  independent 
variables,  and  this  biases  regression  results. 
Two  methods  are  commonly  suggested  in  the  literature  to  deal  with  this  scale 
problem  [e.  g.,  Barth  and  Clinch  (2001)].  The  first  is  to  include  a  proxy  for  scale  as  an 
explanatory  variable  in  the  basic  model,  which  can  be  effective  when  the  scale  effect  is 
multiplicative  or  additive.  The  second  is  to  estimate  the  regression  after  deflating  all 
variables  by  a  scale  proxy. 
If  scale  is  multiplicative,  under  some  conditions,  deflation  is  algebraically  the 
same  as  the  inclusion  of  a  size  proxy  as  an  additional  explanatory  variable.  However, 
the  inclusion  in  regression  of  a  scale  proxy  as  an  additional  variable  is  likely  to 
complicate  the  regression  analysis  and  potentially  bias  the  results.  This  is  because  scale 
is  already  present  in  all  regression  variables  and,  therefore,  is  correlated  with  both  the 
dependent  and  independent  variables.  Its  inclusion  as  an  additional  explanatory  variable 
would  induce  spurious  correlation  between  the  scale  variable  and  the  dependent  and 
independent  variables,  and  might  bias  the  results23. 
23  Results  from  my  simulations  provide  empirical  justification  to  this  statement  and  prove  that  adding  a 
scale  variable  is  unlikely  to  solve  the  problem,  while  deflation  directly  eliminates  the  multiplicative  scale 
effect.  I  first  randomly  simulate  the  mv,  by  and  er  variables,  in  such  a  way  that  they  would  contain  no 
additive  scale  factor  and,  at  the  same  time,  would  mimic  the  average  historical  book  to  market  and  P/E 
ratios  of  my  actual  panel  data.  Then  I  regress  my  on  by  and  er  to  estimate  the  'true'  coefficients.  By 
multiplying  every  initial  variable  by  a  scale  parameter  new  variables  are  being  generated,  which  contain  a 
multiplicative  scale  factor.  Then  I  run  a  regression  that  includes  these  variables  and  one  additional 
variable  -  the  scale  factor.  Results  from  that  regression  are  clearly  different  from  those  of  the  deflated 
regression  (which  are  identical  -by  construction  -  to  the  initial  scale-free  regression). 
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scale)  there  is  de  facto  no  need  for  inclusion  of  an  additional  scale  variable.  It  is  already 
subsumed  in  the  intercept  'ao*s'  of  the  undeflated  model: 
(mv,  *s)  =  ao  *s+a,  *(bv,  *s)+a2  *(er  *s)+a,  *div,  +r, 
However,  as  it  has  been  illustrated  in  the  above  graph,  running  this  model  for  a 
cross-section  of  firms  with  different  size  will  produce  spurious  results.  It  is  only 
deflation  that  purges  the  multiplicative  scale  effects.  That  is: 
(mv,  *s)/s  =  ao  *s/s+a,  *(by,  *s)/s+a2  *(e  r  *s)/s+a3*  div,  +ir, 
is  the  same  as 
mv,  =ao+a1*by,  +a2*er,  +a3*div,  +u, 
where  all  variables  are  scale-deflated. 
Therefore  I  use  deflation  as  the  means  of  scale  control,  and  to  bring  the  regression 
to  `unit-size'  scale24.  The  choice  of  scaling  factors  is  discussed  in  Section  3.4.5 
3.4.3  Scale-varying  valuation  parameters 
The  finance  literature  suggests  that  cross-sectional  variations  in  size  may  well 
explain  differences  in  the  firm's  valuation.  For  example,  Fama  and  French  (1992)  show 
that  size  helps  explain  a  significant  portion  of  the  cross-sectional  variation  in  stock 
returns.  Furthermore,  the  existing  empirical  accounting  literature  that  specifically 
utilises  price-levels  models  (e.  g.,  Easton  and  Sommers  (2003),  Marietta-Westberg  and 
Sierra  (2000)]  suggests  that  regression-estimated  valuation  coefficients  are  not  cross- 
sectional  constants  but  can  be  scale-variant. 
24  As  rightfully  noted  by  Barth  and  Clinch  (2001),  deflation  itself  can  induce  spurious  estimation  effects  if 
scale  effects  are  not  multiplicatively  associated  with  all  variables.  However,  the  sample  in  this  study  is 
particularly  diverse  size-wise,  which  undoubtedly  affects  all  firm-level  accounting  variables. 
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of  the  presence  (in  my  sample)  of  scale-related  non-linearity  in  estimated  regression 
coefficients.  Non-linearity  means  that  the  true  coefficients  are  not  cross-sectional 
constants,  but  vary  with  scale  and  scale  is  correlated  with  un-deflated  explanatory 
variables25.  In  other  words,  coefficients  are  not  linear  but  vary  cross-sectionally.  Failing 
to  control  for  this  effect  might  bias  the  regression-estimated  coefficients  relative  to  the 
cross-sectional  mean  of  the  true  coefficients.  Barth  and  Clinch  (2001)  argue  that  the 
only  remedy  for  this  type  of  scale  effect  is  to  permit  the  coefficients  to  differ  for  firms 
with  different  scale.  Using  simulation  they  show  that  when  there  is  no  scale  effect  or 
when  the  scale  effect  derives  from  scale-varying  valuation  parameters,  the  un-deflated 
market  value  of  equity  specification  exhibits  the  least  bias  and  mean  squared  error  of  the 
coefficients. 
It  is  easy  to  demonstrate  analytically  why  simple  deflation  by  a  scale  proxy  is 
unlikely  to  remove  the  scale  effect.  The  following  hypothetical  example  illustrates  the 
case.  Assume  that  the  market  value  of  equity  of  two  independent  firms,  which  are 
identical  in  all  respects,  can  be  represented  in  terms  of  the  following  simple  valuation 
model: 
mv,  =  ao  +  a,  *  bv,  +  a2  *  er,  +  a3  *  div,  +  u, 
In  conditions  with  no  scale-related  non-linearity  in  valuation  parameters,  a  firm, 
which  is  a  simple  amalgamation  of  the  two  firms,  can  be  expected  to  have  the  following 
valuation: 
2*mv,  =2*a,,  +a,  *(bvr*2)+a2*(err*2)+a,  *div,  +e, 
25  Here  it  is  assumed  that  firm  size  is  the  main  manifestation  of  scale,  therefore  terms  `scale'  and  `size' 
are  used  interchangeably.  Nevertheless,  I  recognise  that  scale  might  not  necessarily  only  relate  to  size. 
For  instance,  true  valuation  coefficients  may  vary  depending  on  other  contextual  variables,  e.  g.  industries 
(i.  e.  industry  becomes  a  scale  proxy),  or  reflect  differences  in  unrelated-to-size  cross-sectional  differences 
among  firms.  Given  that  my  sample  includes  observations  which  are  pooled  over  time  for  a  cross-section 
of  firms,  the  `time'  might  also  be  a  scale  factor. 
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size  by  factor  `s',  is: 
(mv,  *s)=a, 
) 
*s+a,  *(bvv*s)+a2*(er  *s)+a3*divv+i% 
where  's'  is  scale  or  size  proxy. 
The  intercept  in  the  regression  model  for  the  `s'-size  firm  is  a  multiple  of  the 
factor  `s'  size  and  the  unit-size  intercept  `ao'.  This  means  that  when  the  sample  includes 
a  cross  section  of  firms  with  different  size,  the  regression  would  have  no  constant 
(term)  intercept.  In  other  words,  the  intercept  is  the  scale,  but  not  a  constant. 
It  has  been  shown  earlier  that  the  use,  in  the  regression,  of  a  cross-section  of  firms 
with  significant  differences  in  size  might  induce  spurious  correlations  between  variables 
(producing  biased  estimates  of  coefficients),  and  heteroscedasticity  in  the  error  term 
(reducing  the  efficiency  of  estimated  coefficients).  If  coefficients  were  not  related  to 
scale,  deflation  by  scale  factor  would  result  in  estimation  of  the  underlying  true  scale- 
free  model,  i.  e.: 
(mvv,  *s)/s  =  (a0  *s)/s+a,  *(bv,  *s)/s+a2  *(err,  *s)/s+a3*  div,  +2, 
or,  simply, 
my,  =ao+a,  *bv,  +a2*er+a3*div,  +u, 
where  the  dependent  and  independent  variables  are  scale-deflated. 
It  is  possible,  however,  that  amalgamation  of  two  otherwise  identical  firms,  would 
produce  some  synergistic  or  other  effects,  causing  the  value  of  the  larger  firm  to  differ 
from  the  simple  sum  of  individual  values  (value  differential).  Similarly,  due  to  a  number 
of  factors  identified  in  the  literature,  valuation  of  larger  firms  may  differ  from  valuation 
of  smaller  firms.  This  implies  that  valuation  coefficients  might  vary  with  scale.  That  is, 
for  a  firm  of  scale  `s': 
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where  4,  (s)  is  the  scale-induced  firm  value  differential;  a;  (s)  is  the  function  of 
coefficient  a;  on  scale  `s'  26.  In  the  above  model,  the  dependent  variable  includes  two 
parts.  The  first  term  is  what  would  have  been  the  value  of  the  dependent  variable  if  only 
the  multiplicative  scale  effect  existed.  The  second  term  is  the  result  of  scale-induced 
non-linearity  in  the  relationship  between  the  dependent  and  independent  variables. 
To  the  extent  that  a  multiplicative  scale  effect  is  present  in  the  data,  deflation 
purges  such  problems  as  spurious  correlations  and  heteroscedasticity,  but  it  will  not 
remove  scale-related  non-linearity  in  coefficients  unless  a,  (s)  =a,  =  const.  After 
scaling  we  have: 
(13)  mv,  +,  ý(s)Is  =ao(s)ls+a,  (s)*bvr+aZ(s)*er+a3*div,  +u, 
where  mvt  +  4r  (s)  /s=  mvt  is  the  deflated  market  value  of  equity. 
If  one  restricts  coefficients  in  the  above  regression  to  constants,  the  resulting 
coefficient  estimate  will  be  the  mean  of  the  true  coefficients  if  true  coefficients  vary 
across  firms  in  a  way  that  is  uncorrelated  with  the  explanatory  variables27.  However,  as 
with  any  mean,  extreme  true  coefficients  can  have  a  noticeable  effect  on  the  estimated 
coefficients  in  the  model. 
Ideally,  the  estimation  procedure  of  the  above  regression  should  allow 
coefficients  to  vary  with  scale.  This  entails  designing  a  model  that  is  non-linear  in 
coefficients.  In  practical  terms  this  task  is  almost  unachievable,  because  it  requires 
knowing  the  exact  functional  form  of  scale-variant  coefficients  a,  (s),  [i=0,  n]. 
Furthermore,  even  if  the  `true'  functional  form  was  known,  depending  on  the  type  of 
26  Although  the  dependent  variable  is  presented  as  a  sum  of  two  terms,  these  terms  are  not  separately 
observable.  It  is  only  the  sum  of  the  two  which  is  observed  and  constitutes  the  market  value  of  equity. 
27  In  the  context  of  the  above  scale-deflated  model,  there  is  no  a  priori  conjecture  predicting  any  specific 
association  or  relation  between  deflated  variables  and  the  scale-related  coefficients. 
93 that  function,  it  might  not  be  possible  to  reduce  this  function  to  a  regression-usable 
form.  However,  to  gain  at  least  some  empirical  summary  about  the  general  direction  in 
the  relationship  between  a  coefficient  of  interest  and  scale,  one  can  use  a  simple  linear 
function  to  model  the  coefficient,  i.  e.: 
a;  (s)=a. 
0+  aft  s 
Substitution  of  these  functions  into  (13)  gives: 
p,  =  ao,  o 
*  (1  Is)  +  ao,,  +a10  *  bv,  +  a,,,  *  [s  *  bv,  ]+  a2,  o 
*  er  +  a2,,  *  [s  *  er,  ]  +  a,,  o 
*  div,  +  u, 
This  model  estimates  the  central  tendency  of  the  coefficient  for  each  value  driver 
and  also  provides  indication  about  the  expected  direction  of  scale-related  change  in  the 
coefficients.  In  this  form  the  model  simultaneously  employs  scale-deflated  variables 
(mvt,  by,,  ert)  and  un-deflated  variables  (s*bvt,  s*ert)  variables.  To  avoid  the  biasing 
effect  on  the  regression  of  spurious  correlations  between  un-deflated  variables,  in  the 
empirical  tests  only  one  coefficient  of  interest  (e.  g.,  the  book  value  multiple)  is 
modelled  at  a  time.  For  instance,  to  control  for  non-linearity  of  earnings  coefficient 
only,  the  following  regression  will  be  estimated: 
mvr  =  ao,  o 
*  (I/  s)  +  ao,,  +  a,  *  bvr  +  a2,  o 
*  err,  +  a2,,  *  [s  *  err  ]+  as.  o 
*  divr  +  ur  (14) 
Alternatively,  one  could  partially  control  for  non-linearity  by  categorising 
regression  variables  into  scale-related  intervals  (e.  g.  size-based  quintiles),  and  then  add 
dummies  and  interaction  terms  for  each  of  the  interval.  This  procedure,  as  noted  by  Lo 
and  Lys  (2000),  is  not  an  effective  solution  because  if  scale  affects  the  entire  sample, 
then  it  will  also  be  present  in  each  partition.  Additionally,  this  procedure  would  inflate 
the  number  of  regression  parameters,  particularly  during  the  segment-level  analysis, 
producing  unreliable  results. 
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Heteroscedastic  regression  error  variances  is  another  common  form  of  scale  effect 
present  in  data  sets  drawn  from  a  cross-section  of  size-wise  different  firms.  In  empirical 
accounting  literature,  this  problem  is  typically  rectified  by  deflating  regressions  by  a 
size  proxy  (Easton  and  Sommers  (2003),  Rees  (1999),  Barth  and  Clinch  (2001),  and 
others).  For  example,  Rees  (1999)  suggests  that  when  deflated  by  some  measure  of  size, 
such  as  book  value,  the  model  is  less  likely  to  suffer  from  heteroscedasticity  and  from 
dependence  between  the  error  terms  where  the  samples  are  pooled  across  cross-section 
and  time-series.  Different  authors  advocate  the  use  of  different  variables  as  size  proxies. 
Barth  and  Clinch  (2001)  suggest  that  when  scale  effects  are  associated  either  with 
omitted  scale  variables,  related  to  external  equity  growth  or  initial  investment,  or  with 
scale-related  heteroscedasticity,  the  per-share  deflation  is  the  most  effective  of  the 
alternative  specifications.  It  can  be  argued,  however,  that  per-share  specification  is 
unlikely  to  purge  the  scale  effect,  because  the  cross-section  of  firms  is  likely  to  include 
both  penny  stocks  and  stock  with  high  value  per  share.  In  the  section  that  follows  I 
discuss  the  use  of  specific  variables  as  scale-proxy. 
3.4.5  What  is  the  'best'  scale  proxy? 
Having  examined  the  types  of  scale-related  effects  and  their  implications  to 
valuation  in  cross-sectional  settings,  I  have  argued  that  scale-deflation  and  subsequent 
inclusion  in  the  regression  of  an  unscaled  variable  of  interest  is  the  most  adequate 
treatment  of  scale  in  the  settings  of  this  study.  Now  the  choice  of  specific  variable(s)  as 
scale  proxy  needs  to  be  justified. 
There  is  no  agreement  in  the  literature  as  to  what  variable  is  the  `best'  deflator.  A 
recent  study  by  Akbar  and  Stark  (2003)  for  UK-based  firms,  compared  the  effectiveness 
of  deflation  by  alternative  scale  proxies:  sales,  number  of  shares,  opening  and  closing 
95 market  value,  and  closing  book  value.  They  conclude  that  none  of  the  deflators  are 
entirely  successful  in  eliminating  scale  effects. 
Current  or  lagged  market  or  book  value  of  equity,  number  of  shares,  group  total 
assets  or  sales  are  among  the  frequently  used  size-proxies.  Below  I  discuss  theoretical 
and  practical  implications  of  using  specific  deflators. 
1.  Number  of  shares: 
This  deflator  was  employed  in  a  number  of  studies  [e.  g.  Barth  et  al.,  (1992), 
Kothari  and  Zimmerman  (1996),  Garrod  and  Rees  (1998),  and  Hand  and  Landsman 
(1999)].  For  example,  Barth  and  Clinch  (2001)  find  some  evidence  that  when  scale 
effects  are  associated  either  with  omitted  scale  variables  related  to  external  equity 
growth  or  initial  equity  investment,  or  with  heteroscadasticity  related  to  book  value  of 
equity,  the  share-deflated  price  specification  is  most  effective  at  mitigating  scale  effects 
on  coefficient  estimation.  However,  Brown,  Lo  and  Lys  (1999)  rightfully  argue  that  the 
use  of  per  share  values  might  not  adequately  remove  scale  effects  as  shares  come  in 
different  sizes:  some  shares  are  very  large,  while  others  are  as  small  as  penny  stock. 
Easton  (1998)  notes  that  the  magnitude  of  share-deflated  dependent  variable  reflects  no 
more  than  the  choice  by  management  of  the  number  of  shares  outstanding,  which  will 
also  affect  the  scale  of  the  per  share  measure  of  many  firm  attributes,  so  that  a 
regression  of  share  price  on  the  firm  attributes  will  lead  to  coefficients  that  may  capture 
no  more  than  the  fact  that  all  variables  have  the  same  scale.  In  their  empirical  tests  of 
alternative  deflators  in  the  UK  settings  Akbar  and  Stark  (2003)  find  that  neither  OLS 
nor  WLS  regression,  with  number  of  shares  as  the  deflator,  appear  to  be  effective  in 
removing  scale  effects  or  heteroscedasticity. 
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Other  authors  argue  in  support  of  closing  market  value  being  the  only 
theoretically  justified  deflator.  Easton  (1998)  and  Easton  and  Sommers  (2003),  for 
instance,  argue  that  market  value  is  more  than  just  a  possible  scale  proxy  -  rather  it  is 
scale.  They  define  scale  effect  as  the  undue  influence  of  firms  with  large  market 
capitalisation  and  suggest  that  it  should  be  considered  as  an  appropriate  deflator  in 
price-levels  regressions.  Although  Easton  and  Sommers's  deflation  appears  to  work  in 
US  data,  Akbar  and  Stark  (2003)  replicate  Easton  and  Sommers's  tests  for  UK  firms 
and  conclude  that  market  value  is  not  superior,  in  comparison  to  other  scale  proxies,  in 
reducing  scale  effects. 
On  a  notional  level  one  can  also  suggest  arguments  for  and  against  the  market 
value  being  able  to  represent  the  `intrinsic'  scale.  Equity  market  value  could  have  been 
the  most  desirable  deflator  as  it  is  always  positive  (i.  e.,  does  not  reduce  the  sample  size 
due  to  only-positive  values  of  the  deflator)  and,  in  efficient  markets,  is  unaffected  by  the 
choice  of  accounting  practices.  There  are,  however,  some  problems  as  well.  MV  of 
equity  is  the  stock  market's  assessment  of  the  value  of  the  capital  contributed  by 
ordinary  shareholders  plus  the  capitalised  expected  abnormal  earnings  perceived  by  the 
market.  One  might  argue  that  from  the  investors'  perspective,  scale  or  size  is  the  actual 
value  of  the  capital  base  contributed  by  shareholders  and  used  by  the  firm  for  its 
operations.  It  is  the  fair  value  of  the  firm's  net  assets  (and,  therefore,  the  true  measure  of 
scale).  MV  is  the  sum-total  of  this  fair  value  and  the  perceived  present  value  of  future 
growth  opportunities  (PVGO).  The  larger  the  proportion  of  PVGO  in  the  MV,  the  more 
MV  will  deviate  from  the  true  value  of  the  capital  initially  contributed  by 
shareholders28.  Furthermore,  when  the  dependent  variable  in  the  un-deflated  basic 
28  For  instance,  goodwill  resulting  from  acquisitions  -  an  example  of  PVGO  -  often  accounts  for  a 
substantial  portion  of  MV. 
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variable  of  the  regression. 
In  addition,  an  error-in-variable,  induced  to  the  extent  that  on  the  measurement 
date  MV  will  deviate  from  the  intrinsic  value  of  a  firm  (either  because  of  stock  price 
random  fluctuation  or  more  persistent  market  mis-pricing),  will  introduce  noise  to  the 
deflated  dependent  and  independent  variables.  While  MV  can  be  very  volatile  in  the 
short-term,  the  `intrinsic'  size  of  the  firms  can  hardly  fluctuate  at  such  a  rate.  This  error 
in  variable  problem  substantially  undermines,  in  my  opinion,  the  role  of  market  value  as 
the  theoretically  unequivocal  scale  proxy. 
3.  Opening  market  value: 
As  an  alternative,  one  could  use  the  beginning  of  period  mv.  This  deflator  is  used, 
for  example,  by  Christie  (1987),  Kothari  and  Zimmerman  (1995)  and  Lo  and  Lys 
(2000).  Deflation  by  this  variable  has  all  the  deficiencies  as  deflation  by  current  period 
mv.  For  instance,  the  distortion  associated  with  MV  capturing  the  effect  of  PVGO 
would  still  exist.  In  addition,  this  would  reduce  the  sample  size  because  the  observations 
related  to  the  first  year  of  the  sample  period  would  be  lost. 
Furthermore,  deflation  by  the  lagged  market  value  produces,  in  fact,  a  return 
model.  In  other  words,  the  independent  variables  will  now  be  explaining  the  cross- 
sectional  variation  in  market  returns,  rather  than  cross-sectional  variation  in  market 
value.  And  this,  as  has  been  discussed  in  Chapter  2,  is  a  different  research  question. 
4.  Opening  book  value: 
The  beginning-of-period  by  could  have  been  the  most  theoretically  justified 
deflator  in  the  context  of  this  study,  as  it  is  associated  with  initial  capital  contributed  to 
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the  beginning  by  would  reflect  the  fair  value  of  net  assets  acquired,  regardless  of 
accounting  methods  used.  If  all  firms  in  the  sample  had  the  same  inception  date,  then  by 
deflating  the  end-of-period  accounting  data  by  the  beginning-of-period  by  would  fully 
control  for  cross-sectional  variation  of  the  initially  contributed  equity  capital.  The 
following  period's  beginning-of-the-period  BV  will  then  serve  as  the  deflator  for  the 
following  year's  end-of-period  data.  However,  this  is  the  point  when  distortions  begin. 
Unless  the  entire  cross-section  of  firms  adheres  to  mark-to-market  accounting  (for  all 
future  periods),  the  next  period's  beginning-of-period  by  could  no  longer  be  expected  to 
reflect  the  fair  value  of  total  capital  contribution  associated  with  ordinary  shareholders. 
Therefore,  by  continuing  to  use  this  measure  as  a  deflator,  one  can  no  longer  guarantee 
that  the  scale  factor  is  controlled  for.  It  could,  perhaps,  have  still  been  a  suitable  deflator 
if  all  firms  had  used  other  than  mark-to-market  yet  identical  accounting  methods29. 
However,  because  firms  exercise  considerable  discretion  in  selecting  appropriate 
accounting  practices,  the  distortion  of  by  from  the  fair  value  is  likely  to  vary 
substantially  in  the  cross-section  of  firms.  The  age  difference  of  firms  could  also  have 
its  role  in  diminishing  the  suitability  of  by  as  deflator.  Of  two  firms  that  adhere  to  the 
historical  cost  method,  the  BV  of  the  younger  firm  is  likely  to  be  closer  to  its  fair  value. 
Beginning-of-period  by  could  have  been  appropriate  if  the  sample  firms  were  all 
of  the  same  age,  operated  in  a  non-inflationary  economy,  and  used  mark-to-market  or,  at 
least,  identical  accounting  methods.  My  panel  data,  however,  spans  over  more  than  a 
decade,  and  covers  firms  of  different  age,  operating  in  different  sectors  of  the  economy. 
Another  complication  in  using  lagged  by  as  deflator  is  that  by  may  often  assume 
negative  values.  Deflation  by  negative  values  is  meaningless  and  those  cases  would 
need  to  be  eliminated  from  the  sample.  Additionally,  the  data  requirement  for  the 
29  This  would  not  safeguard  against  bias,  but  at  least  the  bias  would  be  identical  for  all  firms  in  the 
sample. 
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16%,  and  is  fraught  with  inducing  self-selection  bias  to  the  extent  that  deleted  firm- 
years  are  qualitatively  different  from  the  rest  of  the  sample.  Sample  reduction  is  highly 
undesirable  given  the  a  priori  relatively  small  segment-disclosing  firm-year  sample. 
5.  Closing  book  value: 
Although  most  of  the  points  made  above  are  also  relevant  to  current  period  BV  as 
deflator,  this  measure  is  a  popular  scale  factor  used  in  the  literature  [e.  g.,  Green  et  al., 
(1996),  Easton  (1998),  Stark  and  Thomas  (1998),  Danbolt  and  Rees  (2002)].  Easton 
(1998)  note,  for  example,  that  since  the  ratios  of  market  to  book  value  are  not  affected 
by  management's  choice  of  the  number  of  shares  outstanding,  the  inferences  from  a 
regression  where  price-to-book  is  the  dependent  variable  will  not  be  due  to  spurious 
scale  effects.  He  also  suggests  that  the  inferences  might  be  affected  by  the  inclusion  of 
book  value  in  the  denominator  of  the  dependent  and  independent  variables,  but  this 
effect  can  be  removed  by  including  the  inverse  of  book  value  as  another  explanatory 
variable  30 
. 
Theoretically,  this  deflator  is  specifically  relevant  if  one  follows  Ohlson's 
framework,  where  book  value  of  equity  is  the  perceived  volume  of  shareholders' 
investment  base.  One  of  the  possible  arguments  against  the  use  of  book  value  might  be 
the  substantial  difference  (which  are  reported  in  Chapter  4)  in  book  value-deflated 
variables  and  regression  parameters  across  different  industries.  Another  technical 
limitation  of  this  deflator  is  the  requirement  for  the  closing  book  value  to  be  positive. 
This  reduces  my  sample  by  about  4%.  Finally,  should  scale  encapsulate  the  notion  of 
firm  size,  by  of  equity  (either  lagged  or  contemporaneous)  is  no  longer  a  better  scale 
proxy  than  other  firm-level  size  proxies. 
30  In  fact,  this  is  exactly  what  I  do  in  relation  to  the  scale-proxy(ies)  used  in  this  study. 
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A  substantial  portion  of  capital  that  the  firm  uses  to  generate  positive  returns  for 
ordinary  shareholders  might  come  from  the  incurred  liabilities.  Although  debt  financing 
is  not  a  contribution  of  shareholders,  the  profits  or  losses  in  excess  of  interest  payments 
flow  to  shareholders  (leverage  effect)  and/or  impact  on  the  equity  book  value. 
Therefore,  some  size  effects  may  be  attributable  to  or  originate  from  differences  in  the 
level  of  debt.  Previously  discussed  size  proxies  ignore  debt-induced  differences  in  scale. 
In  contrast  to  BV  and  MV,  Total  Assets  (TA)  reflects  the  entire  capital  (liabilities 
plus  equity)  invested  in  the  firm.  On  a  positive  side  is  the  fact  that  TA  encapsulates  the 
book  value  of  equity  and,  has  no  negative  values,  which  saves  data  points.  On  the 
negative  side,  one  may  argue  that  ratios  of  book  value  or  earnings  to  total  assets  (i.  e., 
TA-deflated  variables)  might  be  affected  by  the  economic  sector  of  the  firm. 
7.  Sales: 
Sales  has  also  been  used  in  some  studies  as  firm-size  proxy  [e.  g.,  Hirshey  (1985), 
Barth  and  Clinch  (1998)].  It  could  be  argued  that  because  group  sales  is  an  `outgrowth' 
of  all  sources  of  the  firm's  capital  (i.  e.,  is  generated  by  employing  the  firm's  entire  asset 
base)  sales  mighty  proxy  for  firm  size.  Sales-deflation  expresses  all  variables  as  ratio, 
hence  removes  the  `per  share'  effect.  As  is  the  case  with  other  scale  factors,  the  sales- 
deflator  has  its  shortcomings.  Easton  (1998),  for  instance,  notes  that  both  the  sales- 
deflated  variables  and  the  regression  parameters  might  be  affected  by  such  factor  as  the 
industrial  affiliation  of  the  firm. 
Sales  and  TA  might  proxy  for  size,  yet  as  any  accounting  number,  both  TA  and 
Sales  can  be  distorted.  Nevertheless,  these  measures  create  less  econometric  problems 
and  do  not  require  elimination  of  observations.  Due  to  the  fact  that  total  assets  is  more 
101 highly  correlated  with  other  measures  of  size  (i.  e.,  BV  and  MV)  than  sales,  I  choose  TA 
as  the  primary  deflator  for  tests  carried  out  in  Chapter  4  31 
However,  due  to  the  lack  of  consensus  on  the  issue  of  scaling  in  market  based 
accounting  literature,  I  perform  crosschecks  for  sensitivity/robustness  of  the  empirical 
results  by  using  alternative  scale  proxies  (total  assets,  group  sales,  one  year  lagged 
equity  market  value,  and  a  composite  scale  deflator). 
3.5.  EXTENDING  THE  MODEL  FOR  SEGMENT-LEVEL  ANALYSIS 
Having  developed  the  basic  valuation  model,  it  now  has  to  be  expanded  for  the 
segment-level  use.  As  was  noted  before,  of  two  identical  firms,  the  one  that  has  higher 
capitalised  expected  earnings  will  have  higher  market  value.  That  is,  in  the  basic 
valuation  model,  relative  valuation  of  two  firms  is  determined  by  comparing  their 
capitalised  expected  earnings  that  proxy  for  the  abnormal  earnings32.  One  can  follow 
this  line  of  reasoning  to  compare  valuations  of  two  constituent  segments  of  one  firm. 
More  specifically,  one  can  consider  the  firm  to  be  the  sum-total  of  its  constituent 
reported  (domestic  and  foreign)  geographical  segments.  Hence,  the  value  of  the  entire 
firm  might  be  thought  of  as  the  sum  of  values  contributed  or  associated  with  each  of  its 
specific  segments. 
The  notion  of  the  value  contribution  of  a  segment  to  the  market  value  of  the  entire 
firm  requires  some  clarification.  Two  otherwise  identical  segments  representing,  say, 
different  geographical  regions  or  lines-of-business  might  be  perceived  by  the  market  to 
have  different  relative  capitalised  abnormal  earnings  if  these  segments  are  believed  to 
have  different  performance  prospects.  It  is  logical  to  assume  that  investors  would  attach 
a  higher  value  to  the  segment  which  is  associated  with  higher  growth  opportunities, 
31  For  few  observations  the  sales  figure  is  missing,  therefore  the  sales-deflated  sample  would  be  slightly 
smaller. 
32  Recall  that  the  capitalized  book  values  proxy  for  normal  earnings  and  the  base-value  of  firms. 
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the  future  exchange  rates.  Because  of  the  above  factors,  the  market  might  perceive 
different  segments  to  create/contribute  to  the  firm  different  values,  in  relative  terms. 
This  notion  of  different  relative  value  contributions  of  segments  is  demonstrated  below 
in  analytical  terms. 
Starting  from  the  EBO  model,  one  can  disaggregate  the  firm-level  abnormal 
earnings  component  into  the  segment-level  constituents: 
Pr  =  bvr  + 
Et  [ert+r  -r*  byr+r-1  ] 
r=, 
[1+r]r 
=> 
n  -o  Er  [er￿￿,  -  rr  *  bvr+, 
a,  r 
] 
pt  =  bvr  +  2:  2: 
z  ;  =I  :  =l 
[1  +  rt  ] 
where  subscript  i  indicates  segment. 
The  above  representation  highlights  the  conjecture  that  any  divergence  of  market 
value  of  equity  from  its  book  value  reflects  the  capitalised  abnormal  earnings  of  the 
firm's  constituent  segments.  Similar  to  the  firm-level  construct,  a  segment's  capitalised 
abnormal  earnings  is  the  difference  between  the  present  value  of  the  stream  of  the 
segment's  future  expected  earnings  and  the  present  value  of  future  required 
earnings. 
Two  points  of  clarification  are  in  order.  First,  in  accounting  terms,  the  sum  of 
segments'  earnings  or  book  values  will  always  equal  their  consolidated  counterparts. 
This  is  because  all  disaggregated  numbers  are  associated  with  specific  geographic  or 
industrial  segments,  or  `instrumental'  segments.  An  instrumental  segment  is, 
effectively,  a  balancing  item,  which  might  cover  inter-segment  operations,  or  a 
geographically  or  industry-wise  unidentified  segment.  Instrumental  segments  shall  be 
included  in  the  segment-level  model  to  maintain  its  equivalence  with  the  consolidated 
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valuation  properties  of  specific  geographical  or  business  segments. 
Second,  some  might  put  forward  an  argument  that  in  economic  terms  the  total 
may  not  equal  the  simple  sum  of  this  total's  constituent  parts.  That  is,  agglomeration 
may  be  associated  with  non-zero  synergies.  This  problem,  however,  does  not  arise  in 
our  settings.  The  notion  of  abnormal  earnings  associated  with  a  specific  segment  is  not 
used  in  the  sense  as  if  that  segment  was  in  itself  a  stand-alone  independent  firm.  In  our 
settings  the  abnormal  earnings  of  each  segment  encapsulates  its  share  in  the  total 
synergy  resulting  from  uniting  different  segments  under  one  firm's  umbrella.  In  other 
words,  our  construct  implies  that  the  non-zero  synergies  are  `allocated'  to  all  segments, 
therefore  segments'  abnormal  earnings  reflect  their  `post-synergy'  contributions  to  the 
value  of  the  entire  firm.  It  is  important  to  emphasise  that  this  study  is  not  trying  to 
`evaluate'  a  specific  segment  on  a  stand-alone  basis,  or  what  would  have  been  the 
segment's  implied  valuation  compared  to  a  comparable  single-segment  firm.  Rather,  the 
focus  here  is  on  relative  valuation  associated  with  a  specific  segment  when  it  already 
constitutes  an  integral  part  of  a  larger  economic  entity,  the  firm. 
Separating  capitalised  segmental  earnings  from  the  required  earnings  will  give: 
Pr  =  bv,  +  2:  2:  Ef  [er￿￿,  ] 
-G. 
2: 
Er  [rj  *  bvr+f-1￿  ] 
T  1f  1=I  T=1 
[I+ 
r; 
] 
1=1  T=I  [1 
+  rt 
] 
(is) 
where  the  first  (second)  bracket  represents  the  present  value  of  future  earnings  (required 
earnings)  for  segment  i,  (i  =1,  n). 
The  above  analytical  model  can  easily  be  operationalised  into  a  regression  form  in 
the  same  way  as  it  was  done  with  the  firm-level  model.  That  is,  by  applying  to  segment- 
level  earnings  and  book  values  either  Ohlson's  framework  or  Rees's  assumptions,  the 
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former  approach  implies: 
p1  =  (1-  k;  )bvr,  t  +  k;  (pi  *  er,,  t  -  kd 
1+ 
52  v1 
t=t  .  =t 
and  the  latter  approach  results  in: 
n,  rt 
n,  1+  gERr 
Pt  = 
bvrr  1-  +ert,  r 
r  rt  -  gev,  r  r  rt  -  SER,  r 
(16) 
(17) 
where  subscript  "i"  denotes  the  i`h  segment,  and  'n'  is  the  number  of  disclosed 
segment  by  the  firm  in  time  t. 
A  virtually  identical  operationalisation  that  allows  testing  the  valuation  of 
segments  can  be  obtained  by  using  Wysocki's  (1998)  model  of  firm  value.  Using  a  set 
of  initial  assumptions,  he  expresses  the  value  of  the  firm  as  a  function  of  earnings  and 
managerial  operating  decisions33: 
Pr  = 
(Max[en, 
r 
/(r  -  gER,  t  ),  A;,,  ])  (18) 
where  all  subscripts  are  as  before;  er;,,  /(r  -  gER,;  )  is  the  (market)  value  of  segment  i,  if 
the  management  exercises  future  expansion  options;  A;,  1  is  the  value  of  segment  i,  if  the 
management  `adapts'  the  segment  to  an  alternative  use3a 
Wysocki's  model  suggests  that  the  profit-maximising  manager  will  continue  to 
operate  segment  i  and  exercise  all  future  expansion  options  if  the  expansion  value  of 
segment  i  exceeds  its  current  adaptation  value  (i.  e.,  er;,,  /(r  -  gER,  J)  >A;,  t).  This  implies 
33  The  assumptions  are:  the  firm  is  comprised  of  N  independent  segments;  the  firm's  manager  maximises 
total  firm  value;  the  manager  has  the  flexibility  to  adapt  or  expand  each  segment;  segment  i  earnings,  er,,, 
follow  a  random  walk  with  drift,  gEa  i,  per  period  if  the  manager  optimally  exercises  future  expansion 
options;  the  adaptation  value  of  segment  i,  A;,  1,  follows  a  random  walk. 
3  Adaptation  encompasses  any  real  operating  decision  that  changes  the  current  use  of  an  asset  to  a 
superior  alternate  use. 
105 that  for  relatively  high  levels  of  current  earnings  from  segment  i,  the  association 
coefficient  between  firm  value  and  segment  i  earnings  will  approach  1/(r  -  gER.  r)"  If 
er,  1 
/(r  -  gER,;  )  <A1,  t,  then  the  adaptation  value  of  segment  i  exceeds  its  expansion  value. 
If  the  book  value  of  the  firm  (or  segments)  proxies  for  the  firm's  (or  segment's) 
adaptation/abandonment  value  (i.  e.,  A;,  t=bv;,  t)  then  the  value  of  a  firm  can  be  presented 
as  a  weighed-average  of  the  two  options,  expansion  and  adaptation35.  For  firm-level 
book  value  and  earnings  this  implies: 
Pt  =w*bvt+((1-w)  ert 
\r  gER) 
or,  when  values  are  disaggregated  into  segmental  counterparts: 
ný  n1_  li)ý 
*1 
Pe  =ý  bvr, 
r  w,  +  err  ; 
;;  ri  -  öER,; 
(19) 
(20) 
where  co  and  w;  (0  5  co,  w;  51)  is  the  probability  that  the  management  will 
exercise  the  adaptation  option  to  the  entire  firm  or  segment  i. 
This  operationalisation,  which  draws  on  Wysocki's  simple  model,  is  virtually 
identical  to  the  previously  examined  operationalisations  that  use  Ohlosn's  and  Rees's 
frameworks. 
The  above  three  operationalisations  [equations  (16),  (17)  and  (20)]  imply  that 
all  parameters  k,  gyp,  r,  g,,  gb,  co  attached  to  segment-level  variables  bv;  and  er,  can 
vary  across  specific  geographical  and  industrial  segments,  but  remain  constant 
within  the  cross-section  of  different  firms  and  over  time. 
In  Rees's  setting  the  earnings  multiplier  for  segment  i  is  determined  by  that 
segment's  earnings  growth  rate  (ge,,  f)  and  discount  rate  (ri);  in  Ohloon's  setting  the 
segmental  earnings  multiplier  is  determined  by  the  segment's  parameters  k,,  and  (pi.;  in 
ss  The  weigh(s)  reflect(s)  the  market's  perception  of  the  probability  that  the  management  will  exercise 
either  an  expansion  of  adaptation  option  with  regards  to  the  firm's  total  assets  or  specific  segment(s). 
106 Wysocki's  approach  the  segment's  earnings  coefficient  is determined  by  that  segment's 
earnings  growth  rate  (ge,,  i)  and  discount  rate  (r)  and  expansion  option  probability  (CO). 
In  summary,  if  across  its  various  segments  a  firm  has  different  relative  growth 
options,  degrees  of  earnings  persistence  and  capitalisation  rates,  then  earnings  from 
these  segments  should  be  valued  differently,  contributing  positively  or  negatively  to  the 
value  of  a  firm. 
In  the  above  tree  operationalisations,  both  earnings  and  book  values  are  supposed 
to  be  disaggregated  into  their  segmental  counterparts.  In  this  study,  however,  I  argue 
that  disaggregation  of  consolidated  book  values  is  unnecessary  and  impractical. 
There  are  three  practical  problems  that  make  book  value  disaggregation 
impractical. 
First  of  all,  book  values  are  not  (and  cannot  be)  reported  by  firms  on  segmental 
level.  Segmental  book  value  cannot  be  defined  in  most  real-life  cases,  because  even  the 
firm's  management  is  unlikely  to  be  able  to  determine  in  what  proportion  a  specific 
segment's  total  assets  are  financed  through  equity  vs.  liabilities.  Garrod  and  Rees 
(1998),  however,  disaggregate  firm-level  book  value,  but  replace  the  model-required 
segment-level  book  values  with  segmental  net  assets.  From  the  definition  (or,  more 
precisely,  lack  of  precise  definition)  of  segmental  net  assets  in  SSAP  25,  it  is  obvious 
that  segmental  net  assets,  as  an  accounting  item,  is  qualitatively  different  from  that 
required  by  the  theoretical  model.  Discretionary  allocation  of  long  and  short-term 
liabilities,  minority  interests  and  contributions  of  non-ordinary  equity  shareholders  to 
specific  segments  distort  what  would  have  been  the  `true'  segmental  book  values.  This 
allocation  works  in  a  straightforward  way  at  the  consolidated  level,  where  the  firm's  net 
assets  are  simply  the  difference  between  total  assets  and  long  and  short-term  liabilities. 
If  the  requirement  of  accounting  standards  were  such  that  the  firm's  liabilities  had  to  be 
allocated  to  segments  on  a  pro-rata  basis  to  their  total  assets,  disaggregation  would  then 
107 make  sense.  However,  financial  statements  liabilities  are  not  reported  with  regards  to 
specific  segments.  In  the  vast  majority  of  firms'  financial  reports,  it  is  impossible  to 
identify  or  establish  a  relationship  between  reported  segmental  net  assets  and  segmental 
total  assets  by  studying  financial  statements.  Furthermore,  even  when  there  is  some 
degree  of  consistency  in  the  definition  of  segmental  net  assets  in  one  firm,  the 
idiosyncrasy  of  what  constitutes  segmental  net  assets  will  necessarily  arise  in  a  sample 
that  represents  a  cross-section  of  firms  with  very  different  characteristics. 
Arguments  similar  to  those  offered  above  are  also  put  forward  by  Wysocki 
(1998).  He  notes  that  a  direct  test  of  value  relevance  of  segment-level  book  values  is  not 
possible  because  firms  typically  do  not  report  liabilities  for  business  segment,  reflecting 
the  fact  that  assigning  specific  liabilities  to  a  segment  may  be  difficult  and  does  not 
reflect  current  reporting  standards  and  practices  36 
Secondly,  even  when  segmental  net  assets  are  accepted  as  proxies  for  book 
values,  in  practice  firms  report  this  item  less  frequently  than  the  segmental  earnings. 
This  would  reduce  the  sample  by  approximately  12%. 
Thirdly,  because  segmental  earnings  and  net  assets  appear  to  be  strongly 
correlated  (possibly  due  to  uncontrollable  segment-level  scale  effect)  the  regression 
results  are  likely  to  be  biased  due  to  multicollinearity37. 
It  can  further  be  argued  that  disaggregation  of  the  book  value  is  also  unnecessary 
from  an  economic  perspective. 
The  third  term  in  equation  (15)  represents  the  sum  of  present  values  of  all  future 
required  earnings  from  all  segments.  Book  value  of  equity  is  the  accounting 
36  Because  the  direct  valuation  of  segmental  book  values  is  impossible,  Wysocki  hypothesises  a 
directional  relationship  that  might  exist  between  the  valuation  of  consolidated  book  value  and 
performance  of  segments.  He  suggests  that:  the  value  relevance  of  total  book  value  of  equity  should  be 
increasing  in  the  likelihood  that  a  number  of  segment  adaptation  options  (i.  e.,  any  real  operating  decision 
that  changes  the  current  use  of  an  asset  to  a  superior  alternate  use)  will  be  exercised. 
37  The  relevant  descriptive  statistics  and  the  regression  results  of  alternative  model  specifications  are 
reported  in  chapters  5  and  6. 
108 representation  of  the  actual  capital  invested  by  owners  of  the  firm  during  the  entire  life 
of  the  firm.  Hence,  investors  would  expect  these  assets  to  earn  some  required 
accounting  rate  of  return  or,  in  absolute  terms,  required  earnings.  It  is  a  fact  that 
investors,  in  general,  have  some  expectations  with  regards  to  `required'  returns  on  their 
investment  in  a  firm's  equity  capital,  which  should  be  commensurate  with  the  perceived 
riskiness  of  the  entire  firm.  Because  equity  investors  commit  their  funds  to  the  entire 
firm,  rather  than  to  a  specific  project/unit  within  the  firm,  it  is  logical  to  assume  that  it  is 
the  `required'  earnings  of  the  entire  firm  that  matters  to  investors.  When  investing  into 
the  equity  of  a  multy-segment  firm,  investors,  in  fact,  buy  a  `portfolio'  of  different 
geographical  and/or  industrial  assets/segments  which  comprise  the  firm.  If  one  takes  the 
view  that  equity  investors  act  in  spirit  of  the  Markowitz  mean-variance  portfolio 
selection,  then  it  is  the  risk-(required)retum  characteristics  of  this  entire  `portfolio'  (i.  e., 
return  which  is  relevant  to  firm-level  `systematic'/'undiversifiable'  risk)  rather  than  the 
risk-(required)return  characteristics  of  particular  segments  comprising  the  `portfolio' 
(i.  e.,  return  which  would  also  compensate  for  segment-specific  yet  within-firm- 
diversifiable  risks)  that  matters  to  investors. 
This  argument  holds  even  if  one  refutes  the  mean-variance  portfolio  selection 
argument.  Had  the  investor  invested  directly  into  the  net  asset  base  of  a  specific 
segment,  and  had  her  profits  been  tied  up  exclusively  to  the  earnings  generated  from 
that  particular  segment,  then  she  might  have  expected  a  specific  required  rate  of  return 
on  these  segmental  assets.  However,  the  decision  on  the  geographical  allocation  of  real 
assets  is  internal  to  the  firm  and  reflects  the  discretion  of  its  management. 
Furthermore,  the  nature  of  assets  might  differ  across  different  reported  segments. 
Depending  on  the  geographic  allocation  and  lines-of-business  of  firm's  operations,  the 
composition  of  the  firm's  real  assets  will  vary  across  geographic  segments  (assuming 
that  different  activities  would  require  deployment  of  different  asset  classes).  For 
109 example,  a  car  manufacturer  may  position  its  R&D  unit  (and  the  assets  attached  to 
R&D)  in  country  A,  component  manufacturing  units  (and  the  relevant  assets)  in  country 
B,  assembly  lines  in  country  C,  etc.  At  the  same  time  the  company  may  sell  cars  (and 
report  segmental  profits)  in  all  of  these  geographic  locations.  Thus,  if  one  mechanically 
infers  that  profits  from  the  segment  "A"  are  attributable  to  the  net  assets  employed  in 
that  geographic  location  (but  in  fact  these  assets  do  not  relate  to  these  segmental  profits) 
when  attempting  to  compute  the  abnormal  earnings  using  the  segment-level  model,  the 
results  would  be  misleading.  These  assets  may  reflect  different  organisational  functions 
and  market  analysts  might  not  be  able  to  "apply"  the  notion  of  required  earnings  in 
relation  to  these  segmental  assets.  Hence,  it  is  sensible  to  assume  that  investors  would 
mainly  be  considering  the  required  earnings  for  the  net  asset  base  of  the  entire  firm. 
Even  in  the  ideal  case  when  the  structure  of  assets  maintained  in  different  geographic 
segments  is  identical  (this  may  be  the  case,  for  example,  in  the  retail  sector  firms  that 
operate  similar  stores  in  different  regions),  the  management's  discretion  in  allocating 
firm's  liabilities  might  make  segmental  net  assets  figures  meaningless. 
Therefore,  in  contrast  to  the  approach  taken  by  Garrod  and  Rees  (1998),  1  do  not 
disaggregate  the  consolidated  book  value. 
Therefore,  by  appending  equations  (16)  and  (17)  with  the  adjustments  discussed 
in  Sections  3.4.2  and  3.4.3,  the  following  operationalised  segment-level  model  can  be 
derived: 
mv,  l  sr  =  ao,  o  *(I  /  s)  +  ao,,  +a,,,,  *(bv,  l  s,  )  +  a,,,  *[s,  *  (bv,  /s1)]+ 
nn 
+a20 
t*  (err,  t 
/  st  )+Z  a2,  l,  r 
*  [Sr  *(er,  /  Sl  )]  +b*Z+u, 
i=l  ;  _I 
(21) 
It  should  be  mentioned  that  similar  models  have  already  been  applied  in  segment 
valuation  literature.  Wysocki  (1998)  employs  essentially  the  same  segment-level 
earnings  disaggregation  approach,  but  without  proper  control  for  scale  and  scale-related 
110 nonlinearities,  dividends  and  other  contextual  variables.  Garrod  and  Rees  (1998) 
disaggregate  earnings  and,  additionally,  the  book  values  (which,  I  argue,  is  impractical 
and  unnecessary),  yet  do  not  control  properly  for  scale  and  scale-related  nonlinearities, 
and  other  value  affecting  contexts. 
The  section  that  follows  provides  further  particulars  regarding  the  expected 
sign(s)  and  magnitude  of  coefficients  of  interest  in  model  (21),  their  variation  depending 
on  contexts,  as  well  as  properties  of  some  variables  of  interest. 
3.6  INTERPRETATION  OF  COEFFICIENTS,  INFERENCES  AND 
HYPOTHESES 
Having  outlined  the  theoretical  valuation  framework  and  the  subsequent 
operationalised  version  of  the  model  for  both  consolidated  and  segment-level  analysis, 
in  this  section  I  explain  the  economic  meaning  of  the  models'  coefficients,  hypothesise 
on  their  magnitude,  sign,  interactions  and  context-specific  variations.  A  concise  review 
of  expectations/hypotheses  regarding  the  model's  coefficients  is  presented  in  the 
sections  that  follow. 
3.6.1  The  intercept 
The  literature  is  terse  in  theorising  the  role  of  an  intercept  and  why  it  should  (not) 
be  included  in  the  deflated  or  undeflated  regression  models  of  market  value  on 
accounting  variables.  I  argue  that  in  its  undeflated  form  the  model  has  to  be  estimated 
with  an  intercept.  Theoretically,  an  un-deflated  model  shall  be  estimated  without 
intercept  (i.  e.,  intercept  is  strictly  zero)  if  the  following  three  conditions  hold 
simultaneously: 
1.  the  RIV  model  is  a  reliable  and  unbiased  tool  for  deriving  the  `intrinsic'  value 
of  the  firm; 
111 2.  there  is  no  mispricing  or  the  market  is  informationally  semi-strong  efficient; 
and 
3.  the  simple  price-levels  regression  is  a  legitimate  statistical 
counterpart/representation  of  a  rather  complex  theoretical  RIV  model. 
Only  if  all  of  the  above  conditions  are  met  will  there  be  no  apparent  role  for  a 
non-zero  average  unexplained  cross-sectional  variation  in  market  capitalisation  in  the 
basic  un-deflated  model.  Although  the  analytical  RIV  model  leaves  no  role  to  be  played 
by  the  intercept,  a  regression-estimated  value  of  the  intercept  (if  statistically  different 
from  zero)  would  reflect  possible  misspecifications  existing  in  the  theoretical  model 
and/or  the  market's  mispricing.  Inclusion  of  an  intercept  will  at  least  partially  mitigate 
the  consequences  of  violation  of  the  above  three  conditions.  Furthermore,  if  the  un- 
deflated  model  is  to  reflect  the  reality  closer,  then  even  in  its  theoretical  form  the 
intercept  is  unlikely  to  be  zero.  For  example,  even  when  the  non-dividend  paying  firm's 
book  value  of  equity  drops  to  near-to-zero  levels  or  (in  some  unusual  circumstances) 
becomes  negative,  and,  at  the  same  time,  the  current  period's  reported  net  income  is 
near-to-zero,  the  firm  would  still  be  trading  at  above-zero  price.  In  fact,  the  market 
capitalisation  of  the  firm  may  still  be  relatively  high  if  the  current  period's  reported 
`near-to-zero'  BV  and  earnings  are  perceived  to  be  transitory,  and  the  market  expects 
them  to  improve/reverse  in  future  periods.  In  other  words,  the  theory  must  permit  an 
average  effect  that  is  not  explained  by  a  linear  combination  of  the  chosen  financial 
statement  data. 
Furthermore,  in  Section  3.4.2  and  3.4.3  it  has  been  argued  that  a  non-zero 
intercept  is  unlikely  to  be  constant  across  firms  of  different  scale.  Therefore  the 
intercept  has  been  modelled  as  a  simple  linear  function  of  scale.  Effectively,  this  means 
including  an  intercept  and  a  reciprocal  of  the  scale  variable  in  the  deflated  model.  The 
estimated  coefficient  on  the  inverse  of  the  deflator  should  be  interpreted  as  the  estimate 
112 of  the  `constant'  portion  of  a  scale-related  linearly  modelled  intercept  in  the  un-deflated 
regression. 
A  point  of  interest  in  the  deflated  regression  will  be  the  level  of  statistical 
significance  of  the  coefficient  on  the  deflator's  reciprocal,  and  the  sign  of  the  intercept: 
(1)  a  positive  (negative)  sign  of  this  intercept  would  indicate  that  the  intercept  in  the  un- 
deflated  model  is  not  a  size-unrelated  cross-sectional  constant,  but  is  positively 
(negatively)  correlated  with  the  size  of  the  firm;  and  (2)  a  statistically  significant 
coefficient  of  a  deflator's  reciprocal  would  suggest  that  in  the  undeflated  model  there  is 
a  non-zero  average  effect  that  is  not  explained  by  the  chosen  value  drivers. 
For  the  completeness  of  the  analysis  of  the  intercept,  one  potential  difficulty  is 
worth  mentioning.  When  the  intercept  in  the  undeflated  model  is  modelled  as  a  linear 
function  of  scale,  a  variable  that  is  selected  to  proxy  for  scale  might  simultaneously  be 
an  additional  value  driver  in  its  own  right.  In  this  situation  it  would  be  virtually 
impossible  to  disentangle  its  role  as  an  indicator  of  scale  vs.  an  additional  valid  value 
driver.  If,  for  instance,  one  believes  that  total  assets  belong  in  the  un-deflated  model  as 
an  additional  value  driver  and  also  the  same  variable  has  to  be  a  scale  proxy,  then  the 
value  of  the  intercept  in  the  total  assets-deflated  regression  would  produce  a  `blended 
estimate'  of  the  un-deflated  model's  two  theoretically  separate  coefficients  on:  (i)  total 
assets  variable  being  an  additional  value  driver;  and  (ii)  total  assets  in  a  linearly 
modelled  intercept.  On  the  other  hand,  if  total  assets  do  not  belong  in  the  un-deflated 
model  as  a  legitimate  value  driver,  the  value  of  an  intercept  in  the  deflated  regression 
would  only  relate  to  a  linearly  modelled  intercept  in  the  original  un-deflated  model. 
However,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  such  variables  as  group  sales  or  total  assets  have 
not  been  considered  by  the  literature  as  important  value  drivers  even  on  a  theoretical 
level.  Therefore,  in  the  empirical  analysis  chapters  I  will  not  be  interpreting  the 
intercept  as  being  a  `blended  estimate'. 
113 3.6.2  The  book  value  coefficient 
Because  this  coefficient  is  an  estimate  of  the  first  bracket  in  equations  (6)  and 
(9.1),  its  theoretical  value  has  a  limit  of  unity.  Theoretically,  its  lowest  value  depends  on 
what  framework  is  used  to  operationalise  the  model.  If  we  follow  Ohlson's  line  in 
operationalising  the  model,  then  this  coefficient  has  the  lower  limit  of  zero.  This  reflects 
the  theorisation  that  book  value  enters  the  model  twice:  first,  on  a  stand-alone  basis, 
being  the  proxy  for  the  base  value  and,  second,  in  a  capitalised  form,  being  a  proxy  for 
the  required/normal  returns.  When  Rees's  framework  of  hypothesis  is  taken,  the  book 
value  coefficient  still  reflects  the  dual  role  of  the  book  value38.  Contrary  to  Ohlson's 
approach,  however,  here  this  coefficient  might  assume  a  negative  value.  From  the 
theoretical  model,  it  will  only  have  a  positive  value  when  the  assumed  long-term  book 
value  growth  rate  is  negative  or  exceeds  the  cost  of  capital  `r'.  For  economically 
sensible  book  value  growth  rates  (i.  e.,  gBv  <  r)  the  theoretically  expected  book  value 
coefficient  is  negative  [see  equation  (9.1)].  A  negative  sign  of  the  book  value 
coefficient,  when  regressed  on  market  value,  is  rather  contraintuitive. 
In  the  empirical  tests,  I  expect  to  find  a  significant  association  of  book  value  with 
market  value,  which  would  be  suggestive  of  book  value  being  a  major  value  driver.  The 
sign  of  this  coefficient  is  expected  to  be  positive  and,  normally,  have  a  value  below 
unity.  Consistently  downwards  biased  book  values  might  result  in  book  value 
coefficient  to  exceed  the  upper  limit  of  unity'  9. 
3.6.3  Firm-level  and  segmental  earnings  coefficients 
Earnings  coefficients  are  of  central  importance  to  this  research  because  valuation 
differences  associated  with  segments  are  inferred  from  differences  between  valuation 
38  This  is because  both  approaches  originate  from  the  residual  income  valuation  model. 
39  Proof  of  this  is  available  from  the  author. 
114 multiples  associated  with  earnings  from  specific  segments.  In  all  examined 
operationalisations  (i.  e.,  Ohlson's,  Rees's  and  Wysocki's  valuation  frameworks),  the 
earnings  coefficient  has  an  expected  positive  value.  Because  the  operationalisation  used 
in  this  study  equally  well  reflects  all  three  frameworks,  the  regression-estimated 
earnings  coefficients  would,  to  some  extent,  subsume  factors  that  determine  theoretical 
coefficients  in  all  three  frameworks. 
Thus,  the  firm-level  earnings  multiple  will  `summarise'  investors  perceptions 
regarding  the  following  factors:  the  level  of  persistence  of  earnings,  the  discount  rate 
(risk-adjusted  cost  of  capital),  and  the  expected  long-term  earnings  growth  rate. 
Similarly,  the  actual  value  of  the  coefficient  on  earnings  from  a  specific  segment,  e.  g., 
the  `America'  geographic  segment,  would  be  a  summary  measure  of  investors' 
perception  about  the  persistence  of  earnings  reported  from  the  `America'  segment,  risks 
attached  to  this  segment  and  reflected  in  the  discount  rate,  and  the  expected  long-term 
rate  of  growth  of  `American'  earnings.  In  other  words,  the  earnings  valuation  coefficient 
is  the  capitalisation  rate  attached  by  the  market  to  current  period  earnings  from  a 
specific  segment,  which  summarises  investors'  perceptions  regarding  the  firm/segment 
long-term  growth  rate,  required  rate  of  return  and  degree  of  earnings  persistence.  It  is 
this  overall  assessment  of  the  earnings  capitalisation  rate  that  is  of  key  interest  in  this 
study,  as  it  allows  comparison  of  value  contributions  associated  with  specific  segments. 
The  issue  of  what  factors  are  responsible  for  identified  differences  between  segments' 
earnings  multiples  is  of  secondary  importance  and  is  addressed  by  further  appending  the 
model  by  additional  signalling  variables. 
Another  important  issue  is  the  stability  of  earnings  coefficients.  The  existing 
literature  [e.  g.,  Hayn  (1995),  Basu  (1997),  Barth,  et  al.,  (1998),  Collins  et  al.,  (1999) 
and  others]  demonstrates  that  the  capitalisation  of  earnings  (i.  e.,  earnings  coefficients)  is 
a  function  of  the  sign  of  reported  earnings  (i.  e.,  profits  vs.  losses),  and/or  normality 
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negative  (or  abnormally  high/low)  earnings  is  usually  found  to  be  much  smaller  in 
absolute  terms  and  often  statistically  not  significant.  A  transitory  quality  of  losses  (or 
unusual  level  of  reported  earnings)  is  put  forward  as  a  common  interpretation  for  this 
finding.  Whatever  is  the  explanation,  it  is  a  well-documented  fact  that  the  sign  of 
earnings  affects  the  way  the  market  perceives  and  capitalises  earnings  into  the  share 
price40.  Results  presented  in  the  empirical  Chapters  4  through  6  confirm  the  existence, 
in  my  data  set,  of  this  sign-related  effect  for  both  firm  and  segment-level  earnings. 
These  results  also  provide  further  context-related  particulars  with  reference  to  valuation 
of  negative  earnings  and  general  regression  properties. 
3.6.4  Coefficient  on  dividends 
It  has  been  argued,  in  Section  3.3.1,  that  dividends  needs  to  be  added  in  the  model 
as  an  additional  value  driver.  What  can  be  expected  from  the  valuation  of  dividends  is 
less  obvious  than  is  the  case  with  book  value  and  earnings.  From  the  Modigliani  and 
Miller's  (1958)  dividend  displacement  theory,  it  follows  that  the  payment  of  dividends 
shall  be  negatively  related  to  the  value  of  the  firm  and  replace  the  firm  value  on  a 
pound-for-pound  basis.  This  theory  would  predict  a  negative  coefficient  on  dividends  in 
our  operationalised  model.  In  Ohlson's  theoretical  framework,  dividends  closely  reflect 
the  dividend  displacement  theory  and  enter  the  model  with  a  negative  coefficient. 
However,  extensive  accounting  literature  both  in  the  UK  and  the  US  (with  test  design 
similar  to  the  one  employed  here)  tend  to  find  a  positive  valuation  role  for  dividends, 
and  put  forward  various  rationalisations  for  such  results.  As  this  issue  and  the 
expectations  regarding  the  role  of  dividends  in  the  valuation  model  employed  in  this 
study  has  already  been  analysed,  it  suffice  to  note  that  dividends  coefficient  is  expected 
40  The  economics  of  this  effect  is  outside  the  scope  or  current  research. 
116 to  have  a  positive  sign.  Having  said  that,  the  value  of  the  dividends  coefficient  is 
expected  to  vary,  being  affected  by  such  contexts  as:  loss  vs.  profit  firms;  segment- 
disclosing  vs.  non-disclosing  firms;  firms  of  different  industrial  affiliation;  and  different 
time  periods  (macroeconomic  growth  vs.  stagnation).  Results  reported  in  the  empirical 
chapters  confirm  this  expected  sensitivity  of  dividends  valuation  to  be  substantially 
contextual. 
3.7.  CONCLUDING  COMMENTS 
The  aim  of  this  chapter  has  been  to  discuss  and  justify  the  choice  of  specific 
methodological  approaches,  which  underpin  the  test  design(s)  employed  in  the 
empirical  Chapters  4  through  6.  Specifically,  the  chapter  demonstrates  how  the  RN 
model  can  be  adapted  to  allow  both  firm-level  and  segment-level  analysis.  The  chapter 
also  discussed  the  problems  and  the  choices  made  to  resolve  them,  associated  with 
scaling  and  choice  of  size-proxy  when  utilising  price-level  data  for  cross-sectional 
sample  estimates.  The  chapter  also  examined  some  of  the  important  properties  of  the 
developed  valuation  framework  and  hypothesises  regarding  the  expected  links  between 
the  market  value  of  equity  and  the  value  drivers  of  interest. 
CHAPTER  4 
CONSOLIDATED  FIRM-LEVEL  ANALYSIS 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  assess  the  general  valuation  properties  of  the 
operationalised  valuation  model,  introduced  in  Chapter  3,  by  using  the  firm-level  data. 
Among  the  main  objectives  of  this  chapter  is  to  identify  exogenous  and  endogenous 
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constitute  the  `contexts',  which  are  necessary  to  control  for  in  the  subsequent  segment- 
level  empirical  analysis  chapters. 
The  chapter  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  4.2  describes  the  process  of  data 
collection,  explains  variables  used  in  the  analysis,  examines  the  data  and  sample's 
properties  and  reports  the  descriptive  statistics.  Section  4.3  reports  the  firm-level 
regressions,  carries  out  the  empirical  investigation  of  the  contexts/factors  that  impact  on 
the  firm-level  valuation  results,  and  analyses  the  obtained  results.  Section  4.4  provides 
further  empirical  testing  of  the  sensitivity  of  the  results  to  such  potentially  influential 
factors  as  the  use  of  an  alternative  deflator,  or  the  definition  and  treatment  of  the 
extreme  observations.  Section  4.5  concludes. 
4.2  DATA,  VARIABLES,  SAMPLES  AND  DESCRIPTIVE  STATISTICS 
4.2.1  Data  collection  and  variables 
This  section  provides  details  on  data  sources,  data  selection  methodology,  types  of 
data  and  variables  selected  for  performing  the  firm-level  analysis,  and  relevant 
descriptive  statistics. 
The  data  is  collected  from  the  Extel  Financial  Company  Analysis  service,  unless 
otherwise  specified.  I  select  all  UK  based,  non-financial,  `dead'  and  `live'  quoted 
companies  with  annual  financial  statement  and  market  data  available  from  the  Extel 
database.  In  Extel  this  information  is  available  beginning  from  year  1986.  The  initial 
sample  covers  the  period  from  January  1986  to  November  2002  (date  of  data 
collection). 
The  reason  for  selecting  Extel  Financial  Company  Analysis  as  the  primary  source 
of  data  is  because  it  is  the  only  database  available  to  me  that  provides  segment-level 
financial  statement  data  for  UK  multi-segment  firms. 
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have  been  used: 
Country:  UK 
Currency:  Pound  Sterling  (amounts  are  expressed  in  thousands) 
Industry  (according  to  FTSE  Global  Classification  System): 
1.  Resources 
2.  Basic  Industries 
3.  General  Industries 
4.  Cyclical  Consumer  Goods 
5.  Non-Cyclical  Consumer  Goods 
6.  Cyclical  Services 
7.  Non-Cyclical  Services 
8.  Utilities 
9.  Information  Technology 
Status:  not  selected  (i.  e.,  all  live  and  dead  firms  are  selected) 
Data/variables  requested:  see  Appendix  4.1 
Classification  of  companies  into  specific  economic  sectors  (industries)  can  be 
done  on  the  basis  of  different  systems  of  industrial  classification.  The  definitions  of 
industries  and  economic  sectors  of  business  activities  vary  depending  on  the  choice  of 
industry  classification  system.  Although  some  big  investment  houses  (e.  g.,  Merrill 
Lynch)  use  their  -  own  systems  of  industrial  classification,  the  FTSE  Global 
Classification  System  (FTSE)  and  the  US  Standard  Industrial  Classification  System 
(SIC)  are  perhaps  the  dominant  systems  in  the  UK.  There  are  significant  structural 
differences  between  these  two  systems  (this  issue  is  analysed  in  more  details  in  Chapter 
6). 
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the  FTSE  system  does  not  guarantee  non-selection  of  firms  which  would  be  classified  as 
financials  by  the  SIC  system.  I  use  the  FTSE  system  as  the  basis  for  selecting  firms 
from  Extel. 
During  the  sample  period  some  firms  changed  their  principal  industrial 
affiliation.  For  this  reason  some  financial  firm-years  appear  in  the  initial  sample.  In  the 
empirical  analysis,  when  necessary,  these  observations  are  eliminated. 
As  of  the  date  of  final  data  collection  (01.11.2002)  there  were  3,615  (live  and 
dead)  companies  meeting  the  above  selection  criteria.  Corresponding  to  these  firms 
there  are  35,214  firm-year  observations.  This  means  that  in  this  initial  sample,  on 
average,  9.7  years  of  financial  statements  are  available  per  company  in  the  Extel 
database. 
To  minimise  losses  in  data  points,  where  possible,  the  missing  value  of  equity 
market  capitalisation  has  been  imputed  by  multiplying  the  share  price  at  the  balance 
sheet  date  and  the  number  of  ordinary  shares  outstanding.  However,  some  15,906  firm- 
year  observations  have  been  deleted  due  to  missing  market  capitalisation  data.  I  also 
delete  observations  with  missing  values  for  book  value  of  ordinary  equity  (ordinary 
shareholders'  equity)  and  firm-level  profit  before  tax.  With  respect  to  other  variables  of 
interest,  where  possible,  the  missing  values  are  retrieved  from  other  sections  of  the 
Extel  database'.  At  this  stage,  I  do  not  impose  additional  segmental  data  availability 
restrictions  on  this  initial  sample  because  segment-level  information  is  not  used  for  the 
consolidated-level  analysis  of  this  chapter. 
Extremely  thinly-trading  and  non-trading  firm-years  are  also  identified  and 
deleted  from  the  sample.  The  firm  is  identified  as  non-trading  if  in  two  or  more 
For  example,  Sales  are  reported  both  in  Extel's  "Segmental  Analysis"  and  "Earnings"  sections.  When 
the  value  is  missing  from  "Segmental  Analysis"  it  may  sometimes  be  found  in  the  "Earnings"  section.  In 
total  there  are  28  such  cases.  The  same  applies  to  PBT,  as  this  component  can  also  be  found  in  two 
different  data  sections  of  Extel. 
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share  price  and  number  of  shares  for  two  consecutive  years. 
The  above  eliminations  reduce  the  number  of  firms  in  the  sample  to  2,390  and 
number  of  corresponding  firm-year  observations  to  19,213.  That  is,  on  average,  8  years 
of  financial  statement  data  is  available  per  company. 
4.2.2  Industrial  and  yearly  sample  characteristics 
As  a  starting  point  for  the  empirical  analysis  it  is  important  to  explore  yearly  and 
industrial  characteristics  of  the  initial  sample.  The  Extel  database  reports  the  economic 
sector  affiliation  of  firms  based  on  both  FTSE  Global  classification  system  and  the 
Standard  Industrial  Classification  system.  It  is,  a  priory,  unknown  which  of  these  two 
systems  of  categorisation  of  a  firm's  industrial  affiliation  more  adequately  reflects  the 
principal  area  of  the  firm's  operations.  More  importantly,  though,  is  to  know  which  of 
these  two  systems  are  being  commonly  used  in  the  UK  by  the  investment  community 
(i.  e.,  informed  investors,  market  analysts,  fund  managers,  etc.  )  to  relate  a  firm's 
activities/performance  to  its  peer  group.  It  is  likely  that  different  members  of  the 
investment  community  use  different  classification  systems.  Furthermore,  it  is  known 
that  large  investment  houses  use  their  own  `in-house'  classification  for  economic 
sectors  and  industries.  As  there  is  no  reliable  indication  regarding  the  type  of 
classification  system  that  is  being  commonly  used  by  the  market,  I  analyse  the  sample 
firms  in  terms  of  two  widely  used  industrial  classification  systems.  Appendix  4.2 
provides  the  summary  of  the  industrial  and  yearly  properties  of  the  initial  sample. 
I  first  analyse  the  `industry-year  matrix'  of  distribution  of  firms-years,  when 
industrial  affiliation  of  firms  is  identified  according  to  the  FTSE  Global  Classification 
system. 
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accounting  for  34.4%  of  the  total  number  of  cases.  This  economic  group  includes 
retailers,  leisure,  hotel,  media  and  entertainment  companies,  business  support  and 
transportation  firms.  The  number  of  firms  in  this  industry  showed  an  increase  through 
the  years  1987-1997,  and  stabilised  in  the  years  1998-2001. 
The  second-largest  economic  group,  General  Industrials,  accounts  for  15%  of 
total  sample  and  includes  aerospace  and  defence  companies,  and  firms  that  manufacture 
machinery,  engineering  products,  electronics  and  electrical  equipment.  The  yearly 
number  of  firms  in  this  group  was  stable  throughout  1998-1996,  but  showed  a 
substantial  downward  sloping  trend  in  later  years. 
The  third-largest  economic  group,  Non-Cyclical  Consumer  Goods,  contributes 
12%  to  the  total  sample  and  represents  firms  producing  food,  beverages,  tobacco,  drug 
and  household  products.  The  number  of  companies  in  this  economic  group  had  an 
increasing  trend  until  the  mid-1990s,  but  have  been  declining  steadily  thereafter. 
Basic  Industries  firms  comprise  11.5%  of  the  total  sample  and  are  engaged  in 
chemicals,  building  materials,  timber  and  metals  manufacturing,  as  well  as  construction. 
The  yearly  number  of  firms  in  this  group  was  stable  throughout  the  1989-96  period,  but 
showed  a  pronounced  declining  trend  thereafter. 
The  Cyclical  Consumer  Goods  group  accounts  for  9.6%  of  the  sample  in  firm- 
years  and  includes  automobile  manufacturers  and  household  goods  and  textiles 
producing  firms.  In  its  pattern  of  the  yearly  firms  numbers,  this  group  is  virtually 
identical  to  Non-Cyclical  Consumer  Goods. 
The  Information  Technology  economic  group  (which  includes  IT  hardware  and 
software  manufacturers  and  service  providers)  contributes  8%  to  the  total  sample. 
However,  there  has  been  a  substantial  growth  in  the  number  of  firms  in  this  group  over 
the  entire  sample  period.  For  example,  in  1990,  IT  firms  comprised  4.9%  of  that  year's 
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15.4%  respectively! 
Firms  in  the  Resources  economic  group,  which  operate  in  mining  and  oil  and 
gas  industries,  account  for  only  3.4%  of  the  entire  sample  and  the  yearly  numbers  show 
no  apparent  trends. 
The  Utilities  economic  group  firms  and  Non-Cyclical  Services  (food  and  drug 
retailers  and  telecommunication)  firms  contribute  less  than  3%  each  to  the  number  of 
firm-years  in  the  sample.  The  number  of  Utilities  firms,  in  the  entire  sample,  has  been 
steadily  declining  from  year  1995  onwards,  yet  the  yearly  numbers  of  Non-Cyclical 
Services  firms  showed  a  steady  increase  over  the  entire  sample  period. 
Although  detailed  analysis  of  industrial  trends  and  their  economic  determinants 
is  outside  the  scope  of  this  study,  and  without  an  in-depth  examination  it  would  be 
difficult  to  ascertain  what  produces  those  trends,  some  general  overview  is  still 
necessary.  The  observed  above  `in-sample'  patterns  might  not  be  totally  descriptive  of 
the  entire  population,  yet  are  indicative  of  the  general  trends  in  economic  sectors 
because  the  sample  includes  all  major  quoted  public  limited  companies  (in  a  given 
industry)  available  from  the  Extel  database. 
There  are  industries,  in  particular  the  two  Services  sectors  and  Information 
Technology  sector,  that  tend  to  expand  (in  terms  of  number  of  firms  per  year)  over  the 
entire  sample  period.  Virtually  all  manufacturing  industries  (such  as  Basic  and  General 
Industries,  and  Cyclical  and  Non-Cyclical  Consumer  Goods)  and  the  Utilities 
`downsized'  in  terms  of  the  number  of  firms  over  the  second  half  of  1990s  and  early 
2000s,  while  the  Resources  has  been  the  most  stable  sector2.  These  patterns  reflect, 
perhaps,  shifts  in  the  industrial  composition  of  the  UK  economy  and  changing  relevant 
importance  of  particular  industries. 
2  Consolidation  within  these  industries  could,  perhaps,  partially  explain  the  observed  downward  trends  in 
the  late  1990s  and  early  2000s,  but  this  is  unlikely  as  the  global  economic  downturn  of  that  period 
substantially  depressed  mergers  and  acquisitions  activities. 
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across  SIC  classification-based  industrial  categories. 
The  Services  division  is  the  largest  economic  group  and  accounts  for  22.7%  of 
the  entire  sample.  Furthermore,  its  proportion  in  the  yearly  samples  has  been  constantly 
increasing  over  the  entire  sample  period.  Thus  in  the  early-1990s  Services  firms 
comprised  about  18%  of  yearly  samples,  in  mid-1990s  the  share  of  this  economic  sector 
went  up  to  about  22%,  and  in  late-1990s  and  early  2000s  this  percentage  topped  30%. 
This  pattern  is  virtually  identical  to  that  of  the  two  Services  sectors  in  FTSE-based 
sector  classification. 
The  second  and  third  largest  economic  sectors  are  Manufacturing  (22%)  and 
Food,  Textile,  Paper  and  Chemicals  (17%)3.  Both  sectors  expanded  steadily  until  1996, 
but  after  that  exhibited  a  substantial  downsizing  trend. 
Retail  Trade  sector  comprises  10%  of  the  total  sample,  and  steadily  expanded 
over  the  1990s  only  to  drop  in  year  2001. 
The  Wholesale  Trade  sector  firms  contribute  9%  to  the  total  sample.  This  sector 
had  no  particular  trend  up  until  the  late  1990s,  but  then  decreased  notably. 
The  Transportation,  Communications,  Electric,  Gas,  and  Sanitary  services 
sector,  comprising  8%  of  the  entire  sample,  showed  a  sharp  increase  in  the  first  half  of 
1990s,  but  had  no  particular  trend  thereafter. 
The  Construction  sector  contributes  5%  to  the  sample  and  has  a  notably 
declining  trend  in  the  late  1990s  and  early  2000s. 
The  Mining  sector  contributes  3.3%  and  is  the  most  stable  throughout  the  sample 
period.  This  pattern  is  virtually  identical  to  that  of  the  FTSE's  Resources  sector. 
The  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing  is  the  smallest  economic  sector,  and 
shows  no  particular  trend. 
s  It  should  be  noted  that  these  two  sectors  are  created  artificially,  by  splitting  the  SIC's  single 
Manufacturing  Division  into  two  parts.  That  is,  I  separate  heavy  industries  from  consumer  goods 
manufacturers,  as  these  two  groups  might  have  different  valuation  characteristics. 
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SIC-defined  economic  sectors  that  relate  to  similar  types  of  business  activities.  Thus 
Services-related  industries  both  in  the  FTSE  and  SIC  classifications  exhibit  similar 
trends  and  increasingly  comprise  the  largest  share  of  the  total  sample.  Similarly, 
identical  trends  can  be  observed  in:  the  Manufacturing  sectors  of  SIC  system  and 
General  and  Basic  Industries  of  FTSE  system;  and  Mining  sector  of  SIC  system  and 
Resources  economic  group  of  FTSE  system.  This  evidence  suggests  that  FTSE  and  SIC 
systems  of  industrial  classification  are  similar  in  nature. 
In  terms  of  both  the  FTSE  and  SIC  classifications,  yearly  samples  are  of  similar 
size,  within  1000-1450  cases,  apart  from  the  first  and  last  year  of  the  sample  period, 
where  yearly  samples  contain  about  400  and  700  cases,  respectively4. 
4.2.3  Variables-related  sample  characteristics 
Having  examined  the  yearly  and  industrial  composition  of  the  total  sample,  I 
now  turn  to  the  analysis  of  the  characteristics  of  the  key  value-relevant  financial 
statement  variables  in  the  industrial  and  yearly  sub-samples.  The  objective  is  to  identify 
those  economic  sectors  that  are  most  similar/dissimilar  to  each  other  in  terms  of  key 
financial  statement  variables.  This  information  would  provide  more  insight  during  the 
process  of  drawing  inferences  about  the  valuation  of  firm's  business  segments.  This 
may  also  reveal  industrial  sectors,  and  hence  business  segments,  which  are  qualitatively 
similar  and,  therefore,  could  be  agglomerated  without  loss  of  integrity. 
Similar/dissimilar  sectors  are  identified  by  comparing  descriptive  statistics  of  a  number 
of  accounting  and  market  variables  of  firms  from  different  industrial  sectors. 
°  This  is  because  the  data  collection  was  completed  in  November  2002.  With  regards  to  the  low  number 
of  observations  in  the  first  year,  1987,  of  the  sample  period,  at  that  time  Extel  database  was  still  in  the 
process  of  expanding  its  coverage. 
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First,  I  examine  the  frequency  of  lirm-years  with  negative  equity  book  values 
across  different  economic  sectors.  The  sign  of  the  book  value  of  equity  is  an  indication 
of  the  financial  health  of  a  company.  When  compared  across  industries,  the  frequency 
of  negative  BVs  could  provide  some  insight  into  the  relative  financial  health  of  different 
industries.  The  figure  below  ranks  industries  by  number  of  firm-years  with  reported 
negative  book  values. 
Figure  4.1 
Industry  Total  Neg.  BV  %  of  neg. 
SIC  0  145  0  0.0% 
SIC  2  923  20  2.2%  10.0% 
SIC  4  4202  94  2.2%  8.0% 
SIC  3  3304  91  2.8%  6.0% 
SIC  7  1906  58  3.0%  4.0% 
SIC  5  1523  50  3.3% 
2.0% 
SIC  6  1685  58  3.4% 
SIC  8  491  18  3.7% 
0.0% 
SIC  1  644  26  4.0% 
SIC  9  4347  361  8.3% 
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*  The  employed  industry  SIC  abbreviations  are  as  follows:  SICO  -  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing; 
SIC1  =  Mining;  SIC2  =  Construction;  SIC3  ý-  Food,  textile,  paper  and  chemical  products  (i.  e.,  two-digit 
SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SIC4  =  Manufacturing  (i.  e.,  two-digit  SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SIC5 
Transportation,  Communications,  Electric,  Gas,  And  Sanctuary  Services;  SIC6  -  Wholesale  Trade;  SIC7 
Retail  trade;  SIC8  =  Finance,  Insurance,  and  Real  Estate;  SIC9  Services. 
The  figure  shows  that  the  percentage  of  firm-years  with  negative  BVs  varies 
within  the  range  of  2-4`Y,  for  8  out  of  10  industries.  There  is  only  one  industry,  Services 
(SIC9),  with  unusually  high  proportion  of  firm-year  observations  with  negative  book 
values.  The  analysis  of  this  industry  across  the  sample  period  (see  the  previous  section) 
suggests  that  this  is  a  rapidly  growing  sector  with  more  new  firms  entering  the  market 
each  consecutive  year.  Therefore,  the  observed  high  level  of  negative  BV  cases  in  the 
Services  industry,  may  be  due  to  new  firms  being  more  likely  to  report  negative 
financial  results  in  the  initial  stage  of  their  life  cycle.  Therefore  a  special  consideration 
should  be  given  to  the  valuation  model's  results  with  regards  to  Services  industries. 
126 The  cross-sectional  mean  and  median  values  of  the  unsealed  BVs,  when 
compared  across  different  sectors,  might  be  indicative  of  differences  in  the  average  size 
of  firms  that  belong  in  different  industries.  However,  when  drawing  such  conclusions 
one  should  remember  that  some  of  the  differences  might  stem  from  possible  inter- 
industry  differences  of  the  accounting  nature,  i.  e.,  what  accounting  treatment  is  given  to 
certain  categories  of  assets,  expenses  and  transactions  or  events.  Figure  4.2  provides 
this  summary  5.  This  figure  indicates  that  'Transportation,  C'onlnamications,  Electric, 
Gas,  and  Sanitary  Services'  sector  firms  are,  on  average,  larger  than  other  firms  in  the 
sample,  while  'Services'  sector  firms  are  among  the  smallest  firms  in  the  sample.  The 
latter  agrees  with  our  previous  observation  that  the  'Services'  sector  includes  more,  new 
growing  firms.  One  can  also  note  that  median  values  are  substantially  smaller  than  the 
means,  suggesting  that  intra-sector  frequency  distributions  of  BVs  are  right-skewed. 
Figure  4.2 
Industry`  Mean  Median 
SIC  o  50.6  7.5 
SIC  9  70.1  10.1 
SIC  6  99.2  15.8 
SIC  4  128.7  19.0 
SIC  1  371.0  20.7 
SIC  3  207.6  25.6 
SIC  7  237.9  26.4 
SIC  8  270.2  30.0 
SIC  2  127.3  37.0 
SIC  5  837.3  66.0 
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*  The  employed  industry  SIC  abbreviations  are  as  follows:  SICO  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing; 
SIC]  Mining:  SIC2  Construction:  SIC3  =  Food,  textile,  paper  and  chemical  products  (i.  e.,  two-digit 
SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SIC4  -  Manufacturing  (i.  e.,  two-digit  SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SI('S 
Transportation,  Communications,  Electric,  Gas,  And  Sanctuary  Services;  SIC6  Wholesale  Trade;  SIC7 
Retail  trade:  SICK  Finance,  Insurance,  and  Real  Estate;  SIC9  Services. 
Figure  4.2  is  based  on  the  unde(lated  By.  In  the  regression  analysis,  however, 
all  employed  variables  are  deflated  by  the  scale  proxy.  ThereFore  it  would  he 
Although  the  Median  and  Mean  values  in  the  table  are  computed  only  for  firm-years  with  positive  hook 
values,  the  patterns  remain  identical  when  negative  13V  cases  are  also  included. 
127 införmative  to  examine  the  industrial  characteristics  of'  the  deflated  BV  (sec  Figure 
4.2.1)`' 
Figure  4.2.1 
BV  by  economic  sectors 
(BVs  are  scaled  by  TA,  and  exlcude  negative  cases  and  outliers) 
C 
CD 
a) 
ý 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
sic  9  sic  8  sic  7  sic  6  sic  5  sic  4  sic  3  sic  2  sic  1  sic  0 
mmm  Mean  --rr-Median 
Figure  4.2.1  demonstrates  that  the  mean  and  median  deflated  BVs  are 
remarkably  stable  in  8  out  of  10  industries.  Only  the  Alining  (SIC1)  [Construction 
(SIC2)]  industry  firms  appear  to  have  a  slight/  larger  [smaller]  mean  and  median  BV 
than  the  rest  of  industries.  By  and  large,  Figure  4.2.1  demonstrates  that  deflation  by 
scale  eliminates  most  of  the  inter-industry  variation  in  mean  and  median  of  raw  By. 
Therefore,  it  could  be  said  that  patterns  in  Figure  4.2  are  mostly  driven  by  firm  size- 
related  inter-industry  differences. 
Having  examined  the  cross-industry  differences  in  BV,  additional  insight  might 
be  gained  from  exploring  the  dynamics  of  changes  in  BVs.  Figure  4.3  below  is  called  to 
expose  yearly  patterns  in  the  sign  of  BVs.  The  figure  reveals  a  pronounced  upward 
sloping  trend,  throughout  the  decade  1988-1998,  in  the  percentage  of'  firms,  in  the  entire 
sample,  that  report  negative  book  values.  This  trend  is  somewhat  surprising,  as  that 
decade  corresponds  to  a  period  of  relatively  strong  performance  of  the  UK  economy. 
I  Irre  and  in  the  fi)IIow-up  figures  that  report  deflated  yearly  and  industrial  13V,  PHI'  and  MV,  total 
assets  are  used  as  the  scale  proxy.  I  lovvever,  deflation  by  alternative  scale-proxies,  such  as  sales,  lagged 
MV,  or  composite  deflator,  does  not  change  the  observed  patterns. 
Because  hoof:  values  are  deflated  by  total  assets,  the  reported  means  and  medians  also  reflect  the 
industry-average  capital  structure. 
128 Contrary  to  intuition,  in  the  period  of  the  1999-2001  economic  slowdown  the  frequency 
of  reported  negative  book  values  was  lower  than  in  periods  of  strong  economic  growth. 
Figure  4.3 
Year  Total  Negative  %  of  neg. 
Y  1987  393  6  1.5% 
Y  1988  1012  8  0.8% 
Y  1989  1152  20  1.7% 
Y  1990  1235  37  3.0% 
Y  19,91  1269  48  3.8% 
Y  1992  1234  57  4.6% 
Y  1993  1286  67  5.2% 
Y  1994  1364  59  4.3% 
Y  1995  1367  64  4.7% 
Y  1996  1414  69  4.9% 
Y  1997  1448  75  5.2% 
Y  1998  1395  81  5.8% 
Y  1999  1286  57  4.4% 
Y  2000  1329  39  2.9% 
Y  2001  1327  55  4.1% 
Y  2002  702  39  5.6% 
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Analysis  of  specific  industries  (not  reported  here)  also  reveals  that  this  pattern  is 
not  caused  by  a  specific  industry  8.  In  the  context  of  the  RN  mode,  which  underpins  the 
operationalised  model  developed  in  Chapter  3,  and  employed  in  the  empirical  ananlysis 
throughout  chapters  4  to  6,  negative  book  values  cannot  be  a  meaningful  valuation 
factor.  The  phenomenon  of  the  growing  frequency  of  reporting  negative  book  values 
might  ultimately  undermine  the  value  relevance  of  that  accounting  variable  in  the 
context  of  residual  income  valuation  models. 
As  has  been  discussed  in  Chapter  3,  BV  is  often  used  in  the  literature  as  a  proxy 
for  firm  size.  The  chronological  analysis  of  firms'  average  BVs,  presented  in  Figure 
4.4,  suggests  that  firms  were  growing  in  size  for  almost  the  entire  sample  period,  with 
the  exception  of  last  two  years  (2001  and  2002)9. 
8  An  in-depth  investigation  of  what  might  cause  this  phenomenon  (e.  g.  goodwill  write  offs)  would, 
perhaps,  be  an  interesting  exercise,  yet  it  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  study. 
Although  reported  in  the  table  average  numbers  exclude  cases  with  reported  negative  BVs,  inclusion  of 
such  cases  does  not  change  the  pattern. 
129 Figure  4.4 
Year  Mean  Median  i 
Y  1987  117114  12588 
Y  1988  132154  13934 
Y  1989  138974  152071i 
Y1990  152111  16217 
Y  1991  171499  16684 
Y  1992  178404  18161  1 
a`Oi 
Y  1993  185608  187251  2 
Y  1994  186047  19943' 
Y  1995  182412  20342.; 
Y  1996  186606  20485 
Y  1997  171478  19515 
Y  1998  183483  20909 
Y  1999  213643  23410 
Y  2000  342255  25400'' 
Y  2001  336281  24481 
Y  2002  429526  22222 
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To  examine  whether  this  upward  sloping  trend  is  a  size-driven  phenomenon,  I 
compute  yearly  mean  and  median  total  assets-scaled  BV  (see  Figure  4.4.1). 
Figure  4.4.1 
Figure  4.4.1  demonstrates  that  during  first  13  years  of  the  sample  period  the 
yearly  mean  and  median  sealed  ßV  had  been  virtually  constant,  while  in  the  case  of  the 
unsealed  yearly  13V  (see  Figure  4.4)  there  had  been  a  strong  upward  trend.  This 
indicates  that  the  size  of  sample  firms  was  growing  in  that  period.  Figure  4.1.1  shows 
that  there  was  a  sharp  yet,  in  percentage  terms,  small  increase  of  the  mean  and  median 
130 value  of  scaled  BV  in  year  2000.  This  seems  to  suggest  that  in  the  period  of  economic 
slowdown  of  1999-2002  the  average  indebtedness  of  firms  was  lower  (by  about  10%) 
than  in  period  1987-19981". 
Another  supporting  indication  of  the  time-related  size  increase  is  the  fact  that  the 
absolute  values  of  mean  and  median  unsealed  nc'gutive  hook  values  were  increasing 
throughout  the  sample  period  (see  Figure  4.5).  The  patterns  on  Figure  4.5  seem  to 
conform  with  intuition,  because  firms  tend  to  grow  over  time  in  real  and,  in  an 
inflationary  environment,  in  nominal  terns''.  Even  with  inflation  accounted  for,  there 
still  exists  an  upward  trend  in  yearly  BVs,  suggesting  that  firms  have  been  growing  in 
real  terms  over  the  sample  period. 
Figure  4.5 
Years  Mean 
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4.2.3.2  Profit  Before  Tax  (PBT) 
Having  examined  the  in-sample  `behaviour'  of  book  value  of  equity,  I  now 
explore,  perhaps,  the  most  important  value  driver,  earnings.  In  theory,  we  shall  he 
talking  about  `carninos  liar  ordinary  equityholders',  as  this  is  the  variable  required  by 
Examination  of  factors  that  caused  this  shift  in  capital  structure  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  study. 
Note  that  nominal  monetary  numbers  are  used  to  calculate  mean  and  median  values  in  the  table. 
131 the  opeartionalised  model.  Because  the  ultimate  purpose  of  this  study  is  the  valuation  of 
business  and  geographical  segments,  and  segmental  results  are  only  reported  in  PBT 
terms,  I  use  the  PBT  variable  for  the  firm-level  analysis.  The  major  component  of  the 
difference  between  PBT  and  earnings  for  ordinary  shareholders  is  the  net  taxes.  Other 
components  include:  after  tax  items  and  extraordinary  items,  and  the  difference  between 
total  and  ordinary  dividends.  Normally,  PB]'  is  larger  than  earnings  for  ordinary 
shareholder,  reflecting  the  net  taxes  and  the  difference  of  the  total  and  ordinary 
dividends.  To  maintain  the  equivalence  of  models  that  use  PBT  with  the 
operationalised  model  (which  is  based  on  ordinary  earnings),  I  follow  Garrod  and  Rees 
(1998)  and  append  it  with  an  adjustment  term  (Adj.  ER  =  Earnings  for  ordinary  PBT). 
Following  the  same  path  as  with  the  BV  analysis,  I  first  analyse  the  industrial 
distribution  of  loss-making  firms.  Figure  4.6  ranks  industries  by  the  percentage  of  loss- 
making  firms. 
Figure  4.6 
Industry'  Total 
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*  'I  lie  employed  industry  SIC  abbreviations  are  as  löllows:  SIC'0  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing; 
SICI  Mining;  SIC2  Construction;  S1C3  Food,  textile,  paper  and  chemical  products  (i.  e.,  two-digit 
SIC  codes  of  20  through  29):  SIC4  -  Manufacturing  (i.  e.,  two-digit  SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SIC5 
Transportation,  Communications,  Electric,  Gas,  And  Sanctuary  Services:  SICG  Wholesasle'I'rade;  SIC7 
Retale  trade;  SICH  Finance,  Insurance,  and  Real  Estate;  SIC9  Services. 
The  difference  in  the  performance  of  firms  across  industries  is  striking.  Nearly 
40%  of  firm-years  in  the  'Miring'  sector  report  losses.  A  yearly  analysis  of  firms' 
profitability  in  this  sector  (not  reported  here)  indicates  that  this  level  of  losses  was 
sustained  throughout  most  years  of  the  sample  period.  This,  combined  with  the  lhct  that 
nýnýn 
132 Mining  is  the  stalest  industry  in  terms  of  the  number  of  firms  comprising  it,  suggests 
that  this  sector  lacks  growth  opportunities  and  is  the  least  profitable.  Therefore  one  can 
expect/hypothesise  Mining  business  operations,  reported  by  multi-segment  firms,  to 
receive  low  valuation  in  segment-level  analysis. 
The  next,  least  profitable  industry  is  Services,  as  about  32%  of  firm-years  in  this 
sector  report  losses.  This  conforms  to  our  earlier  observation  that  most  of  the  firms  in 
this  sector  are  newcomers,  which  are  at  the  initial  stage  of  their  life  cycle.  However, 
because  the  number  of  firms  in  this  sector  was  rapidly  and  constantly  increasing 
throughout  the  sample  period,  it  could  be  hypothesised  that  the  business  community 
believes  in  high  growth  potential  of  this  sector.  If  this  is  the  case,  then  we  can  expect  the 
reported  `Services'  segments  of  multi-segment  firms  to  have  a  relatively  high  valuation. 
Another  surprising  observation  is  the  relatively  high  proportion  of  loss-making 
firms  in  the  Finance,  Insurance  and  Real  Estate  sector.  It  shall  be  emphasised,  however, 
that  these  firms  constitute  only  a  fraction  of  the  total  number  of  firms  in  this  sector,  as 
only  non-finance  firms  (in  FTSE  GCS  system  terms)  have  been  included  in  the  sample. 
Therefore,  because  the  analysis  in  this  section  is  based  on  the  SIC  system,  some  firms 
(which  are  non-financial  in  terms  of  FTSE  classification)  might  still  be  in  the  financial 
sector  when  the  SIC  system  is  used.  With  this  caveat  in  mind,  some  analysis  of  this 
sector  would  still  be  informative. 
The  number  of  firms  in  this  sample  of  financial  firms  had  been  increasing  up 
until  year  1995  (when  the  average  loss-making  cases  accounted  for  22.5%  of  that 
period's  sub-sample),  but  steadily  declined  thereafter  (with  the  proportion  of  loss 
making  firm-years  increasing  to  26.7%).  This  suggests  that  finance-related  business 
activities  held  low  growth  opportunities,  particularly  in  the  second  half  of  1990s,  which 
might  result  in  lower  relative  valuation  of  financial  firms  in  general,  and  in  low 
valuation  of  reported  financial  operations  of  multi-segment  firms. 
133 With  regard  to  the  remaining  sectors,  Figure  4.6  suggests  that  the  ('onshwNion, 
Maligli  cturing  and  trade-related  sectors  are  similar  in  terms  of  frequency  of  reported 
losses  (within  a  range  of  15.7-19.7%). 
The  analysis  of  profits  by  economic  sectors,  also  reveals  some  interesting 
features  (see  Figure  4.7).  Similar  to  the  case  with  BVs,  the  mean  and  median  values  of 
PBTs  indicate  that  the  'Transportation,  Communications,  Electric,  Geis,  and  Sanitara' 
Services'  sector  firms  report  the  largest  profits. 
Figure  4.7 
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*  The  employed  industry  SIC  abbreviations  are  as  follows:  SILO  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing; 
SICI  Mining:  SIC2  =  Construction:  SIC3  Food,  textile,  paper  and  chemical  products  (i.  e.,  two-digit 
SIC'  codes  of  20  through  29):  SIC4  =  Manufacturing  (i.  e.,  two-digit  SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SIC5 
'Transportation,  Communications,  Electric,  Gas,  And  Sanctuary  Services;  SIC6  Wholesasle  Trade;  SIC'7 
Retale  trade;  SIC8  =  Finance,  Insurance,  and  Real  Estate;  SIC9  --  Services. 
The  inter-industry  differences  of  raw  PBTs,  reported  in  Figure  4.7,  might 
merely  reflect  the  industry-related  differences  in  firm  sire.  Because  actual  regressions 
are  based  on  the  scale-deflated  variables,  it  would  be  more  insightful  to  examine  the 
scale-deflated  industrial  PBT,  which,  when  deflated  by  total  assets,  would  be  a  variant 
of  returns  on  asset  (ROA). 
As  is  evident  from  Figure  4.7.1,  the  mean  (median)  ROA  varies,  across 
different  industries,  within  the  range  of  6.51%,  to  12"rß%  (4"/,,  to  10.5%).  The  most 
profitable  industry  is  Services  (SIC9),  where  mean  ROA  is  121,  )x,,  while  in  the  Finance 
(SIC8)  sector  the  mean  ROA  is  only  6.5'%x.  z1gricithurc,  Alining  and  Construction 
industries  (i.  e.,  SICO,  SICI  and  SIC2)  appear  in  the  lower  profitability  band,  with  ROA 
only  positive  PBT  cases) 
134 in  the  range  of  8%  to  8.7°/,,  while  Malik  during,  "Prude-related,  and  transportation 
and  ('on,  nnuiiculion  Services-related  industries  are  in  the  higher  profitability  band,  with 
ROA  being  within  10.5%  to  1  1.5`%x. 
Table  4.7.1 
PBT  by  economic  sectors 
(PBTs  are  scaled  by  TA,  and  exlcude  negative  cases  and  outliers) 
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Patterns  in  Figures  4.7  and  4.7.1  are  completely  dissimilar,  which  indicates  that 
inter-industry  pi-oJitahility  and  level  of  profits  are  unrelated. 
Some  interesting  characteristics  emerge  from  the  analysis  of  loss-making  cases 
in  yearly  sub-samples. 
Figure  4.8 
Years  Total  Negative  %  of  neg. 
Y  1987  395  36  9.1% 
Y  1988  1011  56  5.5% 
Y  1989  1153  88  7.6% 
Y  1990  1236  181  14.6% 
Y  1991  1269  303  23.9% 
Y  1992  1234  334  27.1% 
Y  1993  1286  308  24.0% 
Y  1994  1365  232  17.0% 
Y  1995  1368  236  17.3% 
Y  1996  1415  259  18.3% 
Y  1997  1449  280  19.3% 
Y  1998  1394  315  22.6% 
Y  1999  1286  318  24.7% 
Y  2000  1330  451  33.9% 
Y  2001  1329  589  44.3% 
Y  2002  703  329  46.8% 
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135 Figure  4.8  reports  the  percentages  of  loss-making  firms  in  yearly  sub-samples. 
Two  obvious  observations  can  be  made  from  this  table.  First,  throughout  nearly  the 
entire  sample  period  (12  out  of  15  yearly  periods)  the  percentage  of  loss-reporting  firms 
showed  a  sharply  increasing  trend.  Thus  in  late  1980s  less  than  10%  of  firms  were 
reporting  losses,  while  in  the  early  2000s  more  than  30%  of  firms  were  reporting  losses. 
Even  during  the  period  of  strong  economic  growth,  1994-1998,  between  17  and  25%  of 
firms  were  posting  losses. 
Second,  in  periods  when  general  economic  conditions  of  the  UK  were  poor 
(recessions  of  1991-1993  and  1999-2002)  a  significantly  larger  number  of  firms,  in 
yearly  sub-samples,  reported  negative  results.  In  years  of  the  most  recent  economic 
downturn  of  1999-2002  that  percentage  was  exceptionally  high.  Given  these  apparent 
cross-industry  and  yearly  differences,  it  is  appropriate  to  control  for  industry  and  yearly 
effects  when  working  with  the  pooled  cross-sectional  total  sample. 
Some  additional  confirmation  of  the  previous  generalisations  can  be  found  when 
average  measures  of  yearly  PBTs  are  plotted  against  time. 
Figure  4.9 
Years  Total  sample 
Years  Mean 
Y1987  31776 
Y  1988  35826 
Y  1989  35516 
Y  1990  32986 
Y1991  28648 
Y1992  25131 
Y  1993  30762 
Y1994  36099 
Y  1995  39462 
Y  1996  38621 
Y  1997  41182 
Y  1998  43480 
Y  1999  42893 
Y  2000  43655 
Y  2001  15184 
Y  2002  -20317 
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136 Figure  4.9  explicitly  demonstrates  how  closely  the  average  (i.  e.,  mean  or 
median)  reported  yearly  profits  reflect  the  cyclic  patterns  of  the  British  economy.  When 
the  same  measures  of  central  tendency  are  separately  computed  and  plotted  for  profit 
and  loss  firms  (Figure  4.10  and  4.11),  there  is  a  clear  upward  trend  Im-  the  former,  and 
downward  trend  for  the  latter. 
Figure  4.10 
Years  Mean  Median 
Y  1987  35555  3445 
Y  1988  38016  4099 
Y  1989  39327  4258 
Y  1990  40061  4514 
Y  1991  42035  4043 
Y  1992  43141  4007 
Y  1993  44275  4311 
Y  1994  46647  5060 
Y  1995  51318  5728 
Y  1996  50857  5386 
Y  1997  53961  6062 
Y  1998  60138  6609 
Y  1999  61988  7208 
Y  2000  75163  6619 
Y  2001  60809  7228 
Y  2002  56380  6583 
Figure  4.10.1 
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137 Figure  4.11 
Years  Mean  Median 
Y1987  -5909  -698 
Y  1988  -1517  -638 
Y  1989  -10607  -912 
Y  1990  -8250  -1014 
Y  1991  -14033  -1561 
Y1992  -23400  -1955 
Y  1993  -12147  -2109 
Y  1994  -15411  -1609 
Y1995  -17407  -1999 
Y1996  -15993  -2672 
Y1997  -12174  -1852 
Y  1998  -13580  -2652 
Y  1999  -15233  -2228 
Y  2000  -17753  -3321 
Y  2001  -42138  -3621 
Y  2002  -1.  E+05  -3300 
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Figure  4.10.1  reveals  the  cyclical  nature  of  the  cross-sectional  mean  and  median 
of  total-assets  deflated  PBT  (i.  e.,  profitability  or  ROA).  Profitability  was  steadily 
increasing  during  the  period  of  strong  economic  growth  (1993-1998),  and  decreasing  in 
periods  when  the  economy  was  relatively  weak  (i.  e.  early  1990s  and  1999-2001). 
Because  the  total  assets-deflated  PBT  (i.  e.,  ROA)  does  not  show  an  increasing  time- 
related  trend  over  the  entire  sample  period  (see  Figure  4.10.1),  the  yearly  increasing 
pattern  of  the  level  PBTs  (on  Figure  4.10)  is  likely  to  be  the  result  of  time-related 
growth  in  firm  size. 
4.2.3.3  Residual  Value  (RV) 
In  the  context  of  empirical  accounting,  one  needs  to  understand  the  time  and 
industry-related  relations  between  two  measures  of  the  firm's  equity  value:  market 
value  of  equity  (MV)  and  book  value  of  equity  (BV).  For  this  purpose,  and  hearing  in 
mind  that  we  deal  with  a  residual  income-type  model,  it  might  be  more  informative  to 
analyse  the  measure  of  the  residual  income  itself  (a  measure  of  incremental  value 
created),  rather  than  to  perform  separate  analyses  of  MV  and  13V.  The  theoretical 
residual  income  model,  discussed  in  Chapter  3,  holds  that  in  expectation  residual 
138 income  shall  account  for  any  excess  (shortfall)  of  market  value  of  equity  over  (1'1'0111)  Its 
book  value.  In  other  words,  the  difference  between  the  market  and  book  value 
represents  the  residual  value.  That  is:  RV=MV-BV.  RV  is,  therefore,  a  measure  of 
incremental  value  created.  Other  things  being  equal,  the  positive  RV  (i.  e.,  firm  trades 
above  its  book  value)  indicates  the  perceived  presence  of  expected  future  abnormal 
earnings,  if  one  assumes  that  BV  approximates  the  fair  value  of  net  assets.  Conversely, 
a  negative  RV  (i.  e.,  firm  trades  below  hook  value)  indicates  that  the  market  perceives 
the  firm's  future  expected  performance  to  be  `value  destroying'.  Therefore,  as  a 
measure  of  value  creation  I  analyse  this  residual  value  (RV). 
Figure  4.12 
Industry*  Total  Neg.  RV  %  of  neg. 
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*  The  employed  industry  SIC  abbreviations  are  as  follows:  SIC()  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing; 
SICI  =-  Mining:  SIC2  =  Construction;  SIC3  Food,  textile,  paper  and  chemical  products  (i.  e.,  two-digit 
SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SIC4  =  Manufacturing  (i.  e.,  two-(Iigit  SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SICK 
Transportation,  Communications,  Electric,  Gas,  And  Sanctuary  Services;  SIC6  -  Wholesasle  'I  rade;  SIC7 
Retale  trade;  SIC8  =  Finance,  Insurance,  and  Real  Estate;  SIC9  Services. 
Figure  4.12  ranks  industries  by  their  relative  market  performance,  measured  in 
terms  of  the  frequency  of  negative  RV  firms  in  a  given  industry.  It  appears  that  more 
than  40%  of  Agriculture,  Forestcv  and  Fishing,  along  with  h'inunce,  Insurance  and  Real 
Estate  sector  firm-years  are  traded  below  book  value,  that  is,  perceived  by  the  market  to 
have  the  worst  value  creating  prospects  I2.  Construction  companies  are  also  at  the 
bottom  end  of  value  creation  prospects,  with  some  30%  of  firm-years  reporting  negative 
RV.  The  best  performers,  in  these  terms,  arc  the  two  services  sectors  (`S'rviccs  ',  and 
''  This  interpretation,  however,  comes  with  a  caveat,  as  explained  in  section  4.2.3.2. 
139 `Communication,  Transportation,  Electric,  Gas  and  Sanitary  Services)  with  only  up  to 
17%  of  firm-years  having  negative  RVs.  Although  not  reported  here,  these  patterns 
generally  hold  when  computations  are  performed  on  a  yearly  basis.  It  should  be 
mentioned  that  if  general  accounting  practices  differ  among  different  industries,  than  the 
identified  cross-industry  divergences  in  RV  might,  in  part,  reflect  the  cross-industry 
heterogeneity  in  accounting  practices.  For  example,  if  the  balance  sheet  items  are  more 
often  carried  at  fair  value  in  construction  firms,  and  at  cost  in  the  manufacturing  sectors 
than,  ceteris  paribus,  BV  (RV)  might  be  lower  (higher)  in  manufacturing  firms'3 
If  the  investors'  perceptions  of  industrial  performance  are  transferable  onto  the 
perceived  valuation  of  firm's  business  segments,  then  one  can  expect  the  business 
segments  in  the  two  services  sectors  to  have  higher  relative  valuation,  while  segments 
operating  in  Finance,  Agriculture  and  Construction  sectors  to  have  lower  relative 
valuation. 
Figure  4.13 
Year  Total  Neg.  RV  %  of  neg.  RV 
Y  1987  395  45  11.4% 
Y  1988  1011  125  12.4% 
Y  1989  1153  152  13.2% 
Y  1990  1236  360  29.1% 
Y  1991  1268  385  30.4% 
Y  1992  1234  412  33.4% 
Y  1993  1286  281  21.9% 
Y  1994  1365  196  14.4% 
Y  1995  1368  226  16.5% 
Y  1996  1415  185  13.1% 
Y  1997  1449  192  13.3% 
Y  1998  1394  273  19.6% 
Y  1999  1286  261  20.3% 
Y  2000  1330  315  23.7% 
Y  2001  1329  370  27.8% 
Percentage  of  negative  RVs 
III 
40.0% 
35.0% 
30.0% 
25.0% 
20.0% 
15.0% 
10.0% 
5.0% 
ý  0)  rn 0  Ö) 
ONi  M 
cl) 
C)  CF)  rn  0)  C)  rn  C) 
8  to  ýi 
O^)  0ý)Oý)0ÖÖ 
0)  rn  0)  rn  W  0)  000 
NNN 
}}}}}}}}} 
--f-%  of  neg.  RV 
"I  acknowledge  this  fact,  however  controlling  for  cross-industry  heterogeneity  in  accounting  practices  is 
impracticable  in  the  context  of  this  study. 
140 Figure  4.13,  which  reports  the  yearly  dynamics  of  the  RV,  indicates  substantial 
time-related  variability  of  the  proportion  of  firms  trading  below  book  value,  yet  one 
distinctive  feature  of  the  pattern  stands  out. 
The  figure  suggests  that  ears  with  a  higher  percentage  of  negative  RVs 
correspond  to  periods  when  the  UK  economy  was  weak  (1990-1992  and  1999-2002), 
while  in  strong  economic  growth  periods  (late  1980s  and  mid-1990s)  the  percentage  of 
firms  trading  below  BV  was  substantially  lower. 
Yearly  changes  in  the  percentages  of  negative  RV  reflect  the  joint  effect  of 
changes  in  MV  relative  to  changes  in  By.  It  is  virtually  impossible  to  take  the  analysis 
of  the  changing  pattern  of  the  RV  further  and  decipher  relative  contributions  of  each  of 
these  sources14 
4.2.3.4  Market  Value  of  Ordinary  Equity 
Finally,  it  is  necessary  to  have  some  insight  of  yearly  and  industry-related 
variability  of  the  market  value  of  equity  (MV).  MV  is  one  of  the  measures  of  the  firm's 
size. 
The  sector-related  difference  in  firms'  size  is  striking.  As  is  evident  from  Figure 
4.14,  the  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing  sector  firms  are  on  average  16  times  smaller 
than  firms  from  the  Communications,  Transportation,  Electric  and  Gas  services  sector, 
which  is  also  statistically  larger  than  all  other  sectors.  This  is  primarily  due  to  the  fact 
that  this  sector  includes  UK's  largest  firms  (e.  g.,  BT,  BAA,  British  Airways,  British 
Energy,  Vodafone,  Granada,  British  Sky,  Cable  and  Wireless,  etc). 
Leisure,  Personal,  Health  &  Business  services  sector  is  the  next  smallest  firms 
industry,  though  statistically  significantly  larger  than  the  Agricluture,  Forestry  and 
Fishing.  Although  the  SIC  Division  D  (Manufacturing)  has  been  subjectively  split  into 
14  The  time  series  pattern  of  MV  is  analysed  in  section  4.2.3.4. 
141 two  sectors  (i.  e.,  'Food,  Tc-vlilc',  lºu/ºc'r  &  chcºººicul  product  ºuuººrr/ruvurrr.  ý  '  and 
'ItIann/irctru-ing'),  on  average,  Munn/iwtnring  firms  are  statistically  smaller  than 
Tc.  vtilc,  Paper  ct-  C'hcnnicul  Product  Munu/ncturers. 
Figure  4.14 
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*  The  employed  industry  SIC  abbreviations  are  as  follows:  SICO  -  Agriculture,  Forestry  and 
Fishing;  SICI  -  Mining;  SIC2  =  Construction;  SIC3  Food,  textile,  paper  and  chemical  products  (i.  e., 
two-digit  SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SIC4  =  Manufacturing  (i.  e.,  two-digit  SIC  codes  of  20  through 
29);  SIC5  =  Transportation,  Communications,  Electric,  Gas,  And  Sanctuary  Services;  SIC6  =  Wholesasle 
Trade;  SIC7  =  Retale  trade;  SIC8  Finance,  Insurance,  and  Real  Estate;  SIC9  -  Services. 
Also  is  noteworthy  that  'Wholesale  trw/c'  companies  are  statistically  smaller 
than  the  'Retail  trade'  firms.  Another  characteristic  of  our  sample  is  that  inferences  are 
sometimes  sensitive  to  the  choice  of  a  measure  of  central  tendency  (mean  vs.  median). 
This  is  due  to  the  existence  of  a  few  extremely  large  firms,  which  cause  the  frequency 
distributions  of  industry-related  MVs  to  have  very  long  right  tails. 
Figure  4.14  demonstrates  the  differences  in  the  average  size  of  firms  operating 
in  different  industries.  Figure  4.14.1  provides  some  insight  into  the  industry-related 
characteristics  of  the  scaled  MV.  It  suggests  that  TA-scaled  MV  differ  notably  across 
industries.  Provided  that  (1)  capital  structure  (the  ratio  of  equity  hook  value  to  total 
assets)  is  constant  across  industries,  and  (ii)  there  are  no  inter-industry  accounting 
differences  then,  when  compared  across  industries,  the  nrean/median  'IA-scaled  MV 
would  reflect  the  market's  perception  of  relative  growth  opportunities  associated  with 
142 diflcrent  industries.  However,  if  the  above  two  assumptions  do  not  hold,  it  would  be 
difficult  to  interpret  the  patterns  in  Figure  4.14.1. 
Figure  4.14.1 
MVs  by  industries 
(MVs  are  deflated  by  TA  and  exclude  outliers) 
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It  is  also  important  to  examine  the  dynamics  of  average  size  of  sample  firms 
throughout  the  sample  period.  The  median  yearly  market  capital  1sations,  plotted  in 
Figure  4.15,  show  some  periodicity. 
Figure  4.15 
Years  Mean  Median 
1987  265  27 
1988  244  30 
1989  286  30 
1990  252  21 
1991  313  22 
1992  340  23 
1993  412  34 
1994  408  44 
1995  426  45 
1996  468  49 
1997  490  44 
1998  615  41 
1999  738  49 
2000  869  55 
2001  638  35 
2002  606  27 
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143 Overall,  the  cross-sectional  mean  and  median  MV  lines  have  an  increasing  trend 
over  the  sample  period.  However,  MV  seems  to  be  lower  in  the  periods  of  1990-92  and 
2001-02,  when  the  economy  was  weak.  These  patterns  bear  some  similarity  to  those  of 
the  residual  values.  There  is,  however,  one  significant  drop  of  median  MV  in  1998  and 
an  unexpectedly  high  median  and  mean  MV  in  year  2000,  which  does  not  `fit'  the 
economic  cycle  premise. 
As  was  the  case  in  the  industrial  analysis  section,  the  large  divergence  of  mean 
and  median  values  of  MV  for  a  specific  year  is  due  to  the  existence  of  relatively  few 
extremely  large  MVs.  Because  my  sample  includes  all  publicly  traded  companies, 
available  from  the  Extel  database,  one  can  expect  the  trend  of  yearly  mean  MVs  to 
reflect  a  broad  market  index  (e.  g.  FTSE  All-share)  for  the  same  period15.  This  is 
because  the  mean  MV  -  the  average  market  capitalisation  for  firms  in  the  sample  - 
turns  into  a  value  weighted  market  index  when  scaled  by  a  devisor,  e.  g.  mean  MV  of 
1987. 
As  is  the  case  with  a  FTSE  market  index,  mean  MVs  are  influenced  by  a  few 
large  capitalisation  companies,  whereas  median  MVs  are  unaffected  by  large 
capitalisation  firms  included  in  the  sample.  The  median  is,  therefore,  a  better  measure  of 
the  time-related  size  properties  of  firms  comprising  the  sample. 
Finally,  Figure  4.15.1  indicate  that  the  yearly  pattern  of  scaled  MV  is  not  stable 
over  the  sample  period.  Because  TA  is  an  accounting  representation  of  the  value  of  the 
entire  firm  (i.  e.,  book  value  of  the  entire  firm),  the  inter-temporal  changes  of  mean  and 
median  TA-scaled  MV  might,  to  some  extent,  reflect  the  dynamics  of  changes  in 
investors'  perception  regarding  the  growth  opportunities  associated  with  the  entire 
16 
sample  of  firms 
15  However,  the  sample  might  slightly  miss-represent  the  entire  market  because  most  financial  firms  are 
excluded  from  the  sample. 
16  This  conjecture  is  correct  if  capital  structure  remains  constant  over  the  sample  period,  so  that  the 
dynamics  of  MV/TA  and  MV/BV  would  be  similar. 
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4.2.3.5  Dividends  for  Ordinary  Shareholders 
An  interesting  pattern  is  observed  in  relation  to  dividend  payments.  There  are 
substantial  differences  in  the  `popularity'  of  this  method  of  distributing  value  to 
investors  both  across  economic  sectors  and  years.  Figure  4.16  demonstrates  this  point. 
Figure  4.16 
Industry"  Div.  ý 
Payment 
SIC1  60.4%  s5°% 
SIC9  84.7%  soo% 
SIC8  89.6%  850% 
SIC6  92.6%  80.0% 
SIC7  94.1%  750% 
SIC5  94.9%  700% 
SIC4  95.0%  550% 
SIC3  95.6%  eoo% 
SIC2  95.6% 
SICO  96.4% 
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*  The 
employed  industry  SIC  abbreviations  are  as  Billows:  SI('0  Agricullurc,  Forestry  and  Fishing;  SI('I 
Mining;  SIC2  Construction;  SIC3  Food,  textile,  paper  and  chemical  products  (i.  e.,  two-digit  Sic 
codes  of  20  through  29);  SIC4  Manufacturing,  (i.  e.,  two-digit  Sl('  codes  of  20  through  29);  SI('5 
'I  ransportation,  Communications,  Flectric,  (ias,  And  Sanctuary  Services;  SIC6  \V'holcsaslc  Prude:  SI('7 
Retale  trade;  SICK{  Finance,  Insurance,  and  Real  Fstate;  SIC)  Services. 
145 In  the  majority  of  industries  more  than  90%  of  firm-years  pay  dividends.  The 
lowest  frequency  of  dividend  payment  is  observed  in  'Mining,  `Services'  and 
'Financial'  sectors  which  is  in  direct  correlation  with  the  frequency  of  losses  reported 
from  these  sectors. 
When  the  percentage  of  dividend  paying  firm  is  analysed  by  years,  as  on  Figure 
4.17,  a  pronounced  declining  dynamics  is  observed. 
Figure  4.17 
Years  Percentage 
1987  95.5% 
1988  95.6% 
1989  94.3% 
1990  95.6% 
1991  94.5% 
1992  92.8% 
1993  91.9% 
1994  91.9% 
1995  92.9% 
1996  91.5% 
1997  91.6% 
1998  90.5% 
1999  90.1% 
2000  86.0% 
2001  82.9% 
2002  87.5% 
Dynamics  of  the  percentage  of  divident  paying  firm  years  in  yearly  samples 
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On  average,  more  that  94%  of  the  firms  were  paying  dividends  in  years  1987- 
1991.  However,  for  the  years  1992-1999  this  fell  to  between  90  and  93%,  while  during 
2000-2002  dividends  were  paid  by  less  than  86%  of  firms.  This  trend  is  highly 
correlated  with  the  dynamics  of  the  frequency  of  firms  reporting  losses  (the  correlation 
coefficient  is  -0.86).  This  seems  to  suggest  that  dividends  are  paid  more  frequently  in 
years  with  low  incidence  of  losses17. 
In  summary,  Section  4.2.3  sheds  some  light  on  additional  factors  that  should  be 
considered  in  the  process  of  subsequent  empirical  analyses.  Because  similar  yearly 
17  There  may  also  have  been  shifts  in  the  forms  of  distributions  over  time  from  dividends  to,  e.  g.,  share 
repurchases,  which  might  explain  the  patterns.  However,  an  analysis  of  share  repurchases  is  beyond  the 
scope  of  this  dissertation. 
146 patterns  were  observed  for  both  financial  statements  variables  (PBTs,  BVs,  and 
Dividends)  and  market-related  variable  (RV),  it  is  likely  that  in  `good'  and  `bad' 
economic  periods  the  market  values  firms  differently.  Therefore,  in  the  empirical  tests  it 
might  be  necessary  to  control  for  the  `time'  or  `economic  period'  effect. 
Furthermore,  some  of  the  revealed  cross-industry  differences  might  appropriate 
the  use  of,  for  instance,  fixed  industry  effects  in  our  panel  data  regressions. 
4.2.4  Descriptive  statistics  of  firm-level  variables  used  in  regression  analysis 
In  this  section  I  report  general  descriptive  statistics  for  firm-level  independent 
and  dependent  variables  used  in  further  regression  analyses.  All  analysed  variables  (i.  e., 
MV,  By,  PBT  and  DIV)  are  deflated  by  Total  Assets,  unless  otherwise  specified.  To 
lessen  the  effect  of  extreme  values  affecting  descriptive  statistics  and  subsequent 
regression  results,  I  follow  the  convention  and  eliminate  the  top  and  bottom  0.5%  of 
cases  of  each  scale-deflated  value  drivers  (i.  e.,  PBT,  BV  and  DIV)  and  scale-deflated 
dependent  variable  (i.  e.,  MV).  A  separate  section  of  this  chapter  deals  in  more  detailed 
fashion  with  the  issue  of  outliers  and/or  influential  observations.  Because  the  time  and 
industry-related  characteristics  of  scale-deflated  variables  have  already  been  analysed  in 
section  4.2.3,  descriptives  reported  in  the  current  section  relate  to  samples  where  the 
cross-sectional  data  is  pooled  over  time. 
The  discussions  in  Chapters  2  and  3  have  suggested  that  positive  and  negative 
earnings  can  be  expected  to  have  different  valuation  properties.  Therefore  variables' 
descriptive  statistics  shall  be  examined  separately  for  positive  and  negative  PBT  sub- 
samples. 
Several  points  should  be  mentioned  with  regards  to  variable  descriptive 
statistics.  As  is  evident  from  Panels  A  and  B  of  Appendix  4.3,  even  after  the 
elimination  of  extreme  values,  the  frequency  distributions  of  MV  have  long  right-tails  in 
147 both  profit-making  and  loss-making  sub-samples.  The  degree  of  variability  of  MV, 
measured  by  the  coefficient  of  variation  (Standard  Deviation  /  Mean),  is  substantially 
smaller  in  the  profit-making  sample.  In  the  profit-making  sample  the  ratio  of  the  mean 
(median)  MV  of  ordinary  equity  to  TA  is  slightly  higher  (lower)  than  unity,  while  in  the 
loss-making  sample  this  divergence  is  much  larger.  Considering  that  frequency 
distributions  of  most  variables  reported  in  Panel  A  and  B  are  substantially  skewed,  the 
median  values  might  be  more  appropriate  for  comparing  the  variables'  central 
tendencies.  By  and  large,  one  could  conclude  that  deflated  MVs  are  more  stable  cross- 
sectionally  and  over  time,  when  firms  report  profits.  In  addition,  judging  by  median 
values,  profit-making  firms  have  larger  MVs18. 
The  analysis  of  the  profit  sign-related  variability  of  the  deflated  BVs  and  PBTs 
renders  similar  conclusions.  That  is,  BV  and  PBT  of  profit-making  firms  are  more 
stable.  Because  BV  and  PBT  are  deflated  by  TA,  they  can  be  viewed  as  a  gearing  ratio 
and  return  on  asset  (ROA),  respectively.  This  provides  further  insight  into  the 
characteristics  of  the  sample  firms.  Thus,  the  mean  and  median  BV  suggest  that  in  the 
capital  structure  of  the  profit-making  firms  46%  of  financing  comes  from  ordinary 
shareholders.  With  regard  to  ROA,  assets  of  the  profit  making-firms  return,  on  average, 
10%.  However,  for  loss-making  firms  the  absolute  value  of  this  percentage  exceeds 
12%. 
The  cross-sectional  mean  and  median  values  of  firm  size-deflated  dividends 
indicate  that  profit-making  firms  pay  higher  dividends  than  loss-making  firms. 
Correlation  coefficients  reported  in  Panel  A  and  B  provide  further  details  on  the 
relations  between  equity  market  value  and  accounting  fundamentals,  subject  to  the 
profitability  of  firms.  In  the  profit-firms  sub-sample,  MV  is  highly  correlated  with 
profits,  60%,  followed  by  dividends,  22%,  while  the  correlation  with  book  value  is  9%. 
18  Using  the  means  results  in  opposite  conclusions. 
148 In  the  loss-firms  sub-sample  market  value  has  the  highest  correlation  (-  24%)  with 
earnings,  which  are  negative.  The  fact  that  this  correlation  coefficient  is  negative  is 
counter-intuitive.  This  negative  correlation  seems  to  suggests  that,  ceteris  paribus,  firms 
with  larger  scaled  losses  have  larger  scaled  equity  market  values.  19  In  the  loss-making 
sample  correlations  of  dividends  and  book  value  with  equity  market  value  is  similar  to 
those  observed  in  the  profit-making  firms.  That  is,  MV  has  the  second-larges  correlation 
with  dividends,  22%,  and  third-largest  with  By,  about  8%. 
4.3  FIRM-LEVEL  REGRESSION  ANALYSIS 
In  this  and  following  sections  I  test  the  operationalised  model,  developed  in  the 
Chapter  3.  This  involves  estimating  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  regressions  that  reflect 
the  theoretical  valuation  model.  The  operationalised  model  explains  the  cross-sectional 
variation  in  equity  market  value  by  three  key  value  drivers:  profits,  book  value  and 
dividends.  For  reasons  of  keeping  firm-level  and  segment-level  regression  results 
compatible,  I  replace  the  earnings  for  ordinary  variable,  in  the  operationalised  model, 
with  profit  before  tax  variable,  and  add  a  balancing  item,  the  adjusted  earnings  (AdjER 
=  ER  -  PBT).  The  scale-deflated  model,  therefore,  is: 
mv,  Is  =  ao,  o 
*(I  Is)  +  ao,  l  +  a,  *  (bv,  Is)  +  aZ,  o 
*  (pbt,  /s)  + 
+aZ,,  *[s*(pbt,  ls)]+a3  *(divls)+a4  *(AdjERls)+u,  (21) 
where  the  dependent  and  all  independent  variables  (mv,  by,  pbt,  div,  AdjER)  are  deflated 
by  a  scale  proxy  T.  Coefficient  ao,  0 
is  the  constant  part  of  the  would-be  intercept  in  an 
un-deflated  model,  and  ao.,  allows  for  scale-related  non-linearity  in  the  would-be 
"Further  investigation  into  possible  causes  of  this  result  suggests  that  the  negative  correlation  effect  is 
likely  to  be  caused  by  scaling.  That  is,  when  the  value  of  the  deflator  approaches  zero,  scaling  of  MV  and 
negative  PBT  would  produce  very  large  (in  absolute  terms)  values,  inducing  spurious  positive  correlation. 
149 intercept  in  an  un-deflated  mode120;  a,  is  the  book  value  valuation  multiple21;  a2,0  is  the 
profits  capitalisation  coefficient,  and  a2.,  is  similar  in  nature  to  ao.,  and  captures  a 
possible  scale-related  non-linearity  of  the  profit  coefficient  a2,0;  a3  is  the  dividend 
capitalisation  coefficient;  and  a4  is  attached  to  the  earnings  balancing  item  and  has  no 
prior  conceptualisation  of  its  value  relevance. 
4.3.1  Valuation  of  positive  vs.  negative  PBTs  and  BVs 
In  this  section  I  examine  the  issue  of  value  relevance  of  negative  earnings  and 
book  values  in  the  context  of  the  operationalised  model  (21).  The  reason  for  specifically 
addressing  negative  values  is  based  on  a  fact  well  documented  in  the  literature,  that 
negative  earnings  have  different  valuation  characteristics  [e.  g.,  Collins  et  al.  (1999)]. 
Specifically,  negative  earnings  have  been  found  to  have  weaker  association  with  value. 
Common  explanation  found  in  the  literature  is  that  reported  losses  are  perceived  by 
investors  as  temporary  [Hayn  (1995)],  and  are,  therefore,  more  weakly  associated  with 
equity  returns  than  profits.  According  to  this  literature,  losses  are  likely  to  be  considered 
temporary  because  shareholders  can  always  liquidate  the  firm,  rather  than  suffer  from 
indefinite  losses.  In  other  words,  equity  holders  have  a  put  option  on  the  future  cash 
flows  of  the  firm  whereby  they  can  sell  their  shares  at  a  price  commensurate  with  the 
market  value  of  the  net  assets  of  the  firm.  By  and  large,  the  value  of  the  firm's  equity  is 
the  higher  of  the  present  value  of  its  expected  earnings  and  its  liquidation  value. 
Consequently,  when  a  loss  is  reported,  the  value  of  the  firm  shall  not  drop  below  the 
liquidation  value  nor  decline  proportionally  to  the  change  in  earnings.  Because  of  the 
20  A  statistically  significant  coefficient  would  suggest  that  the  intercept  in  an  un-deflated  model  is  not  a 
cross-sectional  constant,  and  is  likely  to  vary  with  scale.  A  positive  (negative)  sign  of  a01  would  indicate 
that  regressions  with  larger  firms  have,  on  average,  larger  intercept. 
21  Although  the  complete  version  of  this  model  allows  for  scale-related  non-linearity  of  all  value  driver 
coefficients,  when  used  in  regressions  this  will  create  spurious  correlation  problem.  Therefore,  this  non- 
linear  structure  is  only  imposed  on  the  coefficient  of  the  main  variable  of  interest,  PBT. 
150 perceived  low  persistence  of  negative  earnings,  the  inclusion  of  loss  firm-years  in  the 
sample  is  likely  to  dampen  the  regression  estimated  earnings  coefficient  and  the  level  of 
its  statistical  significance.  For  the  loss-making  firms  the  book  value  coefficient  is  likely 
to  become  a  statistically  more  significant  value  driver. 
In  light  of  these  arguments  in  the  empirical  analysis  that  follows  I  partition  the 
sample  according  to  the  sign  of  earnings22.  Table  4.1  summarises  regression  results  of 
model  (21)  when  it  is  tested  for  such  contexts  as  the  sign  of  the  firm's  financial  results 
(i.  e.,  profit  vs.  loss  firms)  within  differently  defined  samples. 
Differences  in  the  regression  results  between  the  profit  and  loss  sub-samples  are 
self-evident.  First  of  all,  the  explanatory  power  of  the  model  is  substantially  lower  for 
the  loss-making  sub-sample.  The  absolute  value  of  the  PBT  coefficient  is  much  higher 
in  the  sub-sample  of  profitable  firms.  Unexpectedly  though,  the  PBT  coefficient  for 
loss-making  firms  is  negative  and  statistically  significant,  which  implies  that  ceteris 
paribus  higher  losses  are  associated  with  higher  value.  Book  value  capitalisation, 
however,  is  substantially  higher  in  loss-making  firms,  which  conforms  to  the  view  (and 
other  literature)  that  in  situations  close  to  financial  distress,  book  value  represents  an 
exit  option  value. 
When  comparing  models  4  and  8,  dividend  payments  appear  to  be  value- 
irrelevant  for  profitable  firms,  while  in  loss-making  firms,  they  are  statistically 
significant  at  the  1%  level  and  are  positively  related  to  the  firm  value.  Furthermore, 
negative  PBT  become  no  longer  statistically  significant  when  the  analysis  is  restricted 
to  dividend  paying  firms. 
22  Given  the  evidence  [e.  g.,  Hayn  (1995)]  that  firms  whose  earnings  are  expected  to  fall  just  below  the 
zero  earnings  point  engage  in  earnings  manipulations  to  help  them  cross  the  `loss'  barrier,  it  might  be 
reasonable  to  treat  marginally  small  positive  earnings  similar  to  losses.  However,  what  shall  be 
considered  as  marginally  small  profits  involves  subjective  judgement,  and  also  is  unlikely  to  add  value  to 
the  core  investigation. 
151 Table  4.1  Valuation  impact  of  the  sign  of  earnings  and  book  values 
mv,  ITA,  =  ao,  o  *(1/TA,  )+ao,,  +a,  *(BV,  ITA,  )+a2, 
o  *(PBT,  ITA,  )+ 
+a2.,  *  [f(TA)  *  (PBT,  ITA,  )]++a3  *(DIV  ITA,  )+a4  *  (AdjER  /  TA,  )  +  u, 
PANEL  A:  Profit  reporting  firms 
Model  1  p-value  Model  2*  p-value  Model  3*  p-value  Model  4  p-value 
Intercept  0.128  0.113  0.063  0.077 
t-ratio  5.970  0.000  5.184  0.000  2.876  0.004  3.549  0.000 
1  /TA  573.270  690.170  789.132  278.223 
t-ratio  4.883  0.000  5.032  0.000  5.970  0.000  2.256  0.024 
BV  0.251  0.257  0.348  0.146 
t-ratio  5.707  0.000  5.887  0.000  7.719  0.000  3.614  0.000 
PBT  7.836  7.211  7.128  7.804 
t-ratio  42.026  0.000  27.799  0.000  26.806  0.000  27.524  0.000 
PBT*f(TA)  1.20E-07  0.077  0.080  0.070 
t-ratio  2.270  0.023  3.396  0.001  3.573  0.000  3.129  0.002 
DIV  0.342  0.339  0.305  0.588 
t-ratio  0.717  0.473  0.717  0.474  0.677  0.498  0.857  0.391 
Adj.  ER  -0.010  0.004  -0.085  0.080 
f-ratio  -0.052  0.958  0.020  0.984  -0.351  0.726  0.294  0.769 
Adj.  R-Square  36.5%  36.5%  37.0%  42.9% 
No.  of  Cases  14487  14487  14251  13209 
PANEL  B:  Loss  reporting  firms 
Model  5  p-value  Model  6*  p-value  Model  7*  p-value  Model  8*  p-value 
Intercept  0.922  0.985  0.025  0.205 
t-ratio  10.256  0.000  11.526  0.000  0.285  0.776  3.602  0.000 
1  [TA  1336.160  1191.020  1272.830  1270.370 
t-ratio  4.573  0.000  3.877  0.000  4.570  0.000  5.081  0.000 
BV  0.894  0.894  2.698  0.532 
t-ratio  6.523  0.000  6.500  0.000  12.923  0.000  3.743  0.000 
PBT  -0.863  -1.542  -2.189  -0.793 
t-ratio  -5.692  0.000  -3.669  0.000  -3.356  0.001  -1.336  0.182 
PBT*f(TA)  1.99E-07  0.130  0.213  0.062 
t-ratio  2.614  0.009  2.292  0.022  2.592  0.010  1.124  0.261 
DIV  -15.808  -15.517  -10.586  7.510 
t-ratio  -5.525  0.000  -5.164  0.000  -4.216  0.000  3.524  0.000 
Adj.  ER  0.097  0.117  -0.078  -0.165 
t-ratio  0.332  0.740  0.399  0.690  -0.186  0.853  -1.144  0.253 
Adj.  R-Square  14.4%  14.5%  17.0%  10.6% 
No.  of  Cases  4202  4202  3791  1159 
All  variables  in  the  reported  models  are  scaled  by  total  assets,  a  size  proxy.  In  all  models  top  and  bottom 
0.5%  of  values  of  MV,  PBT,  BV  and  non-zero  DIV  are  deleted  as  outliers.  PBT*f(TA)  is  the  unscaled 
row  PBT,  where  unscaling  is  done  by  multiplying  the  scale-deflated  PBT  by  the  scale  factor.  This  implies 
that  true  regression  coefficient  on  PBT  is  a  simple  linear  function  of  the  unscaled  PBT. 
*  In  these  models  PBT*f(TA)  is  computed  by  multiplying  the  scale-deflated  PBT  by  the  5th  order  root  of 
the  scale  factor.  This  mitigates  the  effect  of  extreme  values  of  the  un-deflated  row  PBT,  and  also  allows 
for  non-linearity  in  the  functional  form  of  the  scale  PBT  coefficient. 
Model  1  is  estimated  for  only  positive  firm-year  PBT  cases.  Model  2  differs  from  Model  1  only  in 
definition  of  PBT*Sales.  Model  3  is  estimated  for  only  positive  firm-year  PBT  and  positive  firm-year  BV 
cases.  Model  4  is  identical  to  Model  3,  apart  from  that  the  sample  excludes  non-dividend  firms.  Models  5, 
6,7  and  8  are  the  same  as  Models  1,2,3  and  4  respectively,  but  are  estimated  for  negative  PBT  firm-year 
cases  only.  Estimated  coefficients'  White-adjusted  t-ratios  are  reported  below  coefficients,  and  the  level 
of  significance  (p-value)  is  reported  next  to  the  t-ratios. 
152 As  hypothesised  earlier,  the  balancing  item  AdJER  is  totally  irrelevant  to  value, 
as  its  coefficient  is  not  statistically  significant  in  any  of  the  regressions. 
High  levels  of  statistical  significance,  in  all  models,  of  coefficients  on  the 
reciprocal  of  the  scale  proxy  (i.  e.,  total  assets)  imply  the  existence  of  a  non-zero 
intercept  in  the  un-deflated  model.  Furthermore,  the  positive  and  statistically  significant 
intercepts  (as  is  in  all  models  except  Model  7)  in  scale-deflated  regressions  suggest  that 
the  intercept  in  un-deflated  model  increases  with  scale.  In  other  words,  larger  companies 
tend  to  have  larger  intercepts. 
The  PBT  coefficient  is  also  not  a  cross-sectional  constant  and,  as  indicated  by 
positive  and  statistically  significant  value  of  the  coefficient  on  PBT*f(TA),  is  positively 
related  to  scale.  In  other  words,  earnings  from  larger  firms  are  likely  to  have  a  higher 
capitalisation  rate.  In  models  1  and  5  the  PBT  coefficient  in  an  un-deflated  model  is 
hypothesised  as  a  simple  linear  function  of  a  constant  and  firm  size  proxy 
(a0,0  +  a01  *s).  This  construct  might  be  susceptible  to  extremely  large  (in  absolute 
terms)  un-scaled  PBT  values.  Therefore,  in  models  2-4  and  6-8  this  PBT  coefficient  is 
modeled  as  a  linear  function  of  a  constant  and  a  `depressed'  scale  (a0,0  +  ao,,  *5s  )23 
The  Basic  regression  results  are  qualitatively  similar  in  both  cases. 
Models  1,2,4  and  5  are  estimated  for  samples  that  include  positive  and  negative 
book  values.  It  has  been  argued  earlier  that  negative  book  value  should  be  value- 
irrelevant,  at  least  in  the  theoretical  model.  A  negative  book  value  (i.  e.,  the  total  balance 
sheet  liabilities  exceed  total  assets)  might  be  the  result  of  accounting  treatments  (e.  g., 
when  goodwill  is  written  off  against  the  reserves  in  the  equity  section  of  the  balance 
sheet)  or  indicate  that  the  firm  is  in  temporary  financial  distress  or  the  firm  is  in  the 
initial  stage  of  its  life  cycle.  Nevertheless,  I  do  not  exclude  such  firms  from  the  samples 
23  The  choice  of  the  second  term  in  the  formula  for  this  coefficient  is  arbitrary.  The  use  of  alternative 
functional  forms,  e.  g.,  logarithmic  or  exponential,  does  not  affect  empirical  results.  However,  the  5`h  root 
is  chosen  because  the  log  function  is  not  determined  for  negative  values  (i.  e.,  can  not  be  used  for  negative 
PBTs). 
153 as  negative  book  value  will  not  necessarily  result  in  the  firm  filing  for  bankruptcy24. 
However,  to  test  the  sensitivity  of  estimated  coefficients  to  negative  book  value  cases, 
regressions  3,4,7  and  8  are  estimated  with  these  cases  being  eliminated. 
This  exclusion  does  not  affect  the  PBT  and  dividend  coefficients  in  positive 
PBT  sub-samples  in  any  significant  manner  (Model  2  vs.  Model  3).  However,  in  the 
negative  PBT  sub-samples  (Model  6  vs.  Model  7)  all  key  valuation  coefficients  are 
changed  substantially.  This  is  because  negative  BVs  are  more  closely  associated  with 
the  loss-making  sub-sample:  10%  of  cases  in  the  negative  PBT  sub-sample  have 
negative  BVs,  while  only  1.6%  of  positive  PBT  sub-sample  cases  have  negative  BVs. 
An  expected  effect  of  the  exclusion  of  negative  (and  theoretically  irrelevant  to 
valuation)  BV  cases  is  the  increased  valuation  of  positive  BVs  and  an  improved 
explanatory  power  of  regressions  in  both  the  positive  PBT  (to  a  smaller  extent)  and 
negative  PBT  (to  a  larger  extent)  sub-samples. 
With  regard  to  the  valuation  of  dividends  one  shall  note  that  not  all  firm-years  in 
the  sample  pay  dividends.  Regression-estimated  dividend  coefficients  might  be  biased  if 
no  account  is  taken  of  the  dividend-paying  status  of  the  firm.  Therefore,  in  Models  4 
and  8I  exclude  all  non-dividend  paying  firms25.  Elimination  of  these  firm-years  reduces 
the  positive  PBT  sample  by  7.3%  and  does  not  change  the  valuation  of  dividends. 
In  the  negative  PBT  sample,  however,  this  elimination  reduces  the  sample  by 
69.4%  and  completely  changes  the  valuation  of  dividends.  Here,  dividends  are 
positively  associated  with  firm  value  and  are  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level, 
while  the  value  of  the  BV  coefficient  drops  notably  and  the  PBT  coefficient  is  no  longer 
24  The  firm  might  continue  its  operations  if  debt  is  not  immediately  due  or  could  be  rescheduled,  and/or 
there  are  prospects  of  future  reversal  in  the  performance. 
2$  These  results  should  be  red  with  a  caveat  that  the  elimination  of  the  non-dividend  observations  impacts 
upon  the  yearly  and  industrial  structure  of  the  sample.  Thus  the  Mining  sector  would  be  relatively  under- 
represented  in  the  new  samples,  because  only  60%  of  firms  in  this  sector  pay  dividends  (see  Figure  4.16). 
Similarly,  because  there  has  been  a  pronounced  decline  in  dividend  paying  firms  over  the  sample  period 
(see  Figure  4.17),  the  new  samples  will  include  less  observations  from  the  more  recent  years  of  the 
sample  period. 
154 statistically  significant.  This  suggests  that  in  loss-making  dividend-haying  firn's, 
dividend  is,  perhaps,  the  major  value  driver. 
4.3.2  The  effect  of  time  on  value  relevance  of  major  value  drivers 
This  section  analyses  the  characteristics  of  the  yearly  regression  results,  as 
reported  in  Table  4.2. 
Table  4.2 
nnv,  ITA,  =a0o  *(1/TA,  )+ao,,  +ai  *(BV,  ITA,  )  *(P13T,  IT,  A,  )+a, 
i 
*jf(7A)*(PB7;  17A,  ) 
+a,  *  (DIV  /TA,  )+ay  *(Adjl;  R/TA,  )+u, 
Year  Intercept  1/TA  BV  PBT 
PBT  x  DIV  Adj.  ER 
No.  of  Adj. 
f(TA)  cases  R-Square 
1987  -0.015  1463.9  0.539  4.804  0.124  -0.825  -1.859  349  37.30% 
t-ratio  -0.106  3.132  2.031  3.210  0.908  -0.209  -1.166 
P-value  0.916  0.002  0.043  0.001  0.364  0.835  0.245 
1988  0.076  833.3  0.252  6.426  -0.068  0.873  -0.876  932  56.60% 
t-ratio  1.504  2.443  2.519  11.342  -1.672  0.519  -1.889 
P-value  0.133  0.015  0.012  0.000  0.095  0.604  0.059 
1989  0.183  395.2  0.195  5.760  -0.039  2.045  -0.595  1036  43.00% 
t-ratio  3.117  1.615  1.781  9.738  -0.796  1.105  -1.908 
P-value  0.002  0.106  0.075  0.000  0.426  0.269  0.056 
1990  0.011  395.7  0.367  4.414  0.090  -0.143  -0.029  1025  48.00% 
t-ratio  0.266  1.493  5.060  11.056  2.388  -11.690  -0.115 
P-value  0.791  0.135  0.000  0.000  0.017  0.000  0.908 
1991  0.085  323.6  0.187  3.707  0.121  7.239  -0.143  940  49.50% 
t-ratio  1.758  1.059  2.263  6.385  2.086  4.401  -0.454 
P-value  0.079  0.290  0.024  0.000  0.037  0.000  0.650 
1992  0.146  -91.6  0.091  6.660  0.065  2.735  0.097  878  55.20% 
t-ratio  2.797  -0.299  0.869  9.068  1.088  1.213  0.631 
P-value  0.005  0.765  0.385  0.000  0.277  0.225  0.528 
1993  0.242  57.1  -0.076  8.144  -0.005  6.412  0.294  952  53.00% 
t-ratio  3.078  0.147  -0.480  7.561  -0.093  3.295  0.152 
P-value  0.002  0.883  0.631  0.000  0.926  0.001  0.879 
1994  0.124  457.5  0.180  5.658  -0.007  7.908  -3.881  1102  58.90% 
t-ratio  2.413  1.191  1.798  5.561  -0.120  3.819  -2.116 
P-value  0.016  0.234  0.072  0.000  0.904  0.000  0.034 
1995  0.053  737.3  0.147  5.774  0.055  5.158  -3.570  1105  61.70% 
t-ratio  1.171  2.206  1.700  7.528  1.105  2.898  -2.630 
P-value  0.242  0.027  0.089  0.000  0.269  0.004  0.009 
1996  0.015  1868.5  0.241  10.169  0.022  1.596  2.476  1130  46.00% 
t-ratio  0.172  2.726  1.357  8.943  0.340  0.560  3.315 
P-value  0.863  0.006  0.175  0.000  0.734  0.576  0.001 
1997  0.057  1669.1  0.172  8.092  -0.003  3.809  -1.824  1139  43.30% 
t-ratio  0.602  2.517  0.984  6.168  -0.036  1.182  -0.931 
P-value  0.547  0.012  0.325  0.000  0.971  0.237  0.352 
1998  0.144  1301.5  -0.183  7.293  0.222  4.735  1.512  1051  31.90% 
t-ratio  1.271  2.271  -0.871  4.512  1.994  0.940  2.226 
P-value  0.204  0.023  0.384  0.000  0.046  0.347  0.026 
(table  is  continued  on  the  next  page) 
155 Table  4.2  (continucd  from  the  previous  page) 
1999  0.308  1483.3  0.087  6.159  0.340  -3.189  -1.508  943  17.70% 
t-ratio  1.869  2.228  0.202  4.020  2.575  -0.827  -1.241 
P-value  0.062  0.026  0.840  0.000  0.010  0.408  0.215 
2000  0.169  4885.3  0.925  9.335  0.010  -6.967  1.527  855  19.00% 
t-ratio  0.973  4.338  2.367  3.549  0.071  -1.673  0.943 
P-value  0.331  0.000  0.018  0.000  0.943  0.094  0.346 
2001  0.031  1379.6  0.832  4.226  0.151  -2.394  -5.194  717  23.10% 
t-ratio  0.310  2.959  4.022  2.101  1.299  -0.845  -1.277 
P-value  0.756  0.003  0.000  0.036  0.194  0.398  0.202 
2002  0.162  899.1  0.381  4.526  0.136  3.163  1.478  366  41.10% 
t-ratio  2.215  4.243  3.017  3.784  1.787  1.293  0.807 
P-value  0.027  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.075  0.197  0.420 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients.  Yearly  regressions  are  scaled  by  TA,  estimated  for  profit-making  firms  and  exclude  the 
outliers.  PBT*t(TA)  is  the  unsealed  PBT,  where  unsealing  is  computed  by  multiplying  the  scale-deflated 
PBT  by  the  5th  order  root  of  the  scale  factor.  This  mitigates  the  effect  of  extreme  values  of  the  un- 
deflated  raw  PBT,  and  also  allows  for  non-linearity  in  the  functional  form  of  the  scaled  PBT  coefficient. 
Coefficients  which  are  statistically  significant  at  the  5'i0  level  or  higher  are  highlighted. 
Some  general  observations  are  in  order.  The  explanatory  power  of  the  basic 
model  has  a  particular  pattern  (Figure  4.18). 
Figure  4.18 
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In  the  years  1988-1995,  the  valuation  factors  comprisin  the  model  explained 
more  than  40`%  of  the  variation  in  equity  market  value,  and  this  explanatory  power  had  a 
pronounced  increasing  trend.  In  later  years  (1996-2002),  however,  the  model's  ability  to 
explain  the  equity  market  value  was  substantially  lower  and  had  a  declining  trend  in 
1996-1999.  Overall,  this  suggests  that  the  cumulative  value  relevance  of  such 
accounting-based  value  drivers  as  PEST,  dividends  and  BV  is  changing  through  time. 
156 A  rather  unexpected  finding  is  the  level  of  value  association  of  equity  book 
value.  In  10  out  of  the  16  years,  the  BV  coefficient  is  not  statistically  significant,  yet 
when  significant  it  has  the  theoretically  expected  positive  sign.  In  the  regressions 
reported  in  Table  4.2  above  I  do  not  exclude  cases  with  negative  BVs,  as  on  average 
only  3%  of  cases  in  yearly  samples  have  negative  By.  Repeating  the  tests  with  negative 
BV  cases  being  excluded  (results  are  not  reported)  partially  `rectifies'  the  situation,  yet 
still  does  not  produce  statistically  significant  book  values  in  5  out  of  16  years,  and 
repeating  the  tests  with  negative  BVs  set  to  zero  produces  statistically  insignificant  BV 
coefficients  in  7  out  of  16  years.  This  effect  can  be  easily  controlled  for,  when 
necessary,  by  appending  the  model  with  a  negative  BV-related  dummy  and  a  negative 
BV  interaction  terms. 
PBT  appears  to  be  the  most  robust  value  driver,  as  the  PBT  coefficients  are 
positive  and  statistically  significant  at  1%  level  in  all  years.  The  values  of  the  yearly 
PBT  coefficients  do  not  exhibit  trend  and  vary  substantially  in  magnitude.  The 
coefficients  on  PBT*f(TA)  indicate  that  in  11  out  of  16  years  PBT  coefficients  seem  not 
to  be  prone  to  scale-related  non-linearity. 
Another  noteworthy  result  is  the  lack  of  `incremental'  value  relevance  of 
dividends.  We  use  the  word  `incremental'  because  dividends  are  already  a  part  of  PBT. 
The  separate  dividends  variable,  which  is  additionally  included  in  the  regression,  will 
have  a  statistically  significant  coefficient  only  when  dividends  and  retained  PBT  (i.  e., 
PBT-Dividends)  have  different  value  association.  From  the  yearly  regressions  results 
one  could  infer  that  dividends  and  retained  earnings  have  statistically  similar  value 
association  in  11  out  of  16  years. 
In  the  above  regressions  the  dividend-paying  and  non-dividend  observations 
have  been  pooled,  which  might  lower  both  the  value  of  estimated  BV  coefficient  and 
the  level  of  its  statistical  significance.  Therefore,  I  re-run  the  yearly  regressions  for  only 
157 dividend-paying  firms  (see  Table  2  in  Appendix  4.6).  Although  the  pair-wise  yearly 
correlations  between  dividends  and  the  equity  market  value  are  higher  in  `only  dividend- 
paying'  yearly  samples,  dividends'  valuation  is  largely  unaffected  (except  that  the 
dividends  coefficient  in  year  the  1996  becomes  statistically  significant),  as  in  10  out  of 
16  years  dividends,  in  dividend-paying  firms,  do  not  have  incremental  value 
association.  One  surprising  result  is  observable  in  respect  of  the  dividend-paying  yearly 
samples:  the  explanatory  power  of  each  of  the  16  yearly  regressions  is  higher,  on 
average,  by  5  percentage  points. 
To  control  for  the  revealed  yearly  dynamics  of  the  combined  value  relevance  of 
the  accounting  fundamentals  and  other  time-related  effects,  regressions  on  pooled  data 
shall  be  estimated  with  yearly  fixed  effects. 
4.3.3  Firms'  industrial  affiliation  and  the  value  relevance  of  major  value  drivers 
To  examine  the  performance  of  the  operationalised  model  across  different 
industries,  I  partition  the  entire  sample  into  ten  SIC-based  industrial  sub-samples  and 
run  ten  separate  regressions. 
Results  in  Table  4.3  indicate  that  there  is  a  sharp  divergence  among  the  various 
economic  sectors  in  terms  of  regression  explanatory  power.  The  model  appears  to  work 
better  for  such  economic  sectors  as  `Finance,  Insurance  and  Real  Estate',  and  `Retail 
Trade',  with  the  Adjusted  R2  being  above  57%,  while  in  the  Services  sector  the 
financial  statement  variables  explain  only  27%  of  the  cross-sectional  variation  in  equity 
market  value.  The  apparent  cross-industry  variation  in  the  models  ability  to  explain 
value  might  necessitate  the  inclusion  of  industry-related  fixed  effects  in  the  pooled  total 
sample. 
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nm,  17A,  -u￿,  ￿ 
*(1/7A,  )+u,,  +n,  *(RI',  l'l:  -i,  )  i  a,,,,  *(/'/37;  /7:  -I,  )f  u,.,  *1  /ý(7;  I)*(l'R"l;  /7:  I,  )I  i 
a,  *(/)7V  /7A,  )+Q4  *(At/j/iR/7:  1,  )+it, 
Industry*  Intercept  1/TA  BV  PBT 
PBT  x  DIV  Adj.  ER 
No.  of  Adj.  R- 
f(TA)  cases  Square 
SIC  0  0.154  2170.2  -0.029  0.556  -0.175  19.187  -1.668  107  51.409/, 
t-ratio  2.091  4.302  -0.177  0.495  -1.602  6.878  -2.734 
p-value  0.039  0.000  0.860  0.622  0.112  0.000  0.007 
SIC  1  0.338  2185.8  0.577  4.617  -0.232  11.131  -0.048  376  31.80'/ 
t-ratio  2.432  3.373  2.502  5.405  -4.586  4.187  -0.414 
p-value  0.015  0.001  0.013  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.679 
SIC  2  0.075  1389.7  0.365  2.189  0.000  8.438  -0.184  733  44.80% 
t-ratio  2.203  5.578  3.050  3.265  0.004  5.011  -0.177 
p-value  0.028  0.000  0.002  0.001  0.997  0.000  0.860 
SIC  3  -0.003  350.1  0.323  4.689  0.170  7.286  0.396  2647  38.50% 
t-ratio  -0.051  1.662  3.385  7.289  4.596  3.503  0.647 
p-value  0.959  0.096  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.518 
SIC  4  0.063  596.2  0.249  6.181  0.027  4.220  -0.079  3299  43.20% 
t-ratio  1.825  1.912  2.517  14.789  0.918  3.111  -0.167 
p-value  0.068  0.056  0.012  0.000  0.358  0.002  0.867 
SIC  5  0.147  1951.3  -0.461  5.686  0.082  14.651  0.823  1204  50.10% 
t-ratio  2.222  1.940  -2.767  4.786  1.338  5.228  1.804 
p-value  0.026  0.052  0.006  0.000  0.181  0.000  0.071 
SIC  6  0.162  557.1  0.078  6.225  0.091  1.432  0.011  1352  41.00% 
t-ratio  3.128  4.077  0.596  9.619  1.565  0.826  0.016 
p-value  0.002  0.000  0.551  0.000  0.118  0.409  0.987 
SIC  7  0.050  869.2  0.185  7.252  0.053  4.923  0.726  1563  57.20% 
t-ratio  0.971  2.500  1.993  11.745  1.560  4.009  1.746 
p-value  0.332  0.012  0.046  0.000  0.119  0.000  0.081 
SIC  8  0.015  3023.2  0.445  2.697  0.205  -0.143  -1.630  361  70.20% 
t-ratio  0.398  8.202  6.648  1.709  1.920  -5.172  -0.620 
p-value  0.691  0.000  0.000  0.088  0.056  0.000  0.536 
SIC  9  0.250  679.7  0.407  5.468  0.471  -2.708  -0.120  2880  27.10% 
t-ratio  4.264  2.716  3.913  6.412  4.603  -2.138  -0.358 
p-value  0.000  0.007  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.033  0.720 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  the  regression 
coefficients.  Industrial  regressions  are  scaled  by  'FA,  estimated  fir  profit-making  firms  and  exclude  the 
outliers.  PB'I'*f('l'A)  is  the  unsealed  PIT,  where  unsealing  is  computed  by  multiplying  the  scale-deflated 
P13T  by  the  5th  order  root  of  the  scale  factor.  This  mitigates  the  effect  of  extreme  values  of'  the  till- 
deflated  raw  PI3T,  and  also  allows  for  non-linearity  in  the  functional  firm  of  the  scaled  I'13"I  coefficient. 
('ocf'licients  which  are  statistically  significant  at  the  5°,,  level  or  higher  are  highlighted. 
*  The  employed  industry  SIC  abbreviations  are  as  follows:  SI('(1  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing; 
SI('I  Mining;  SIC2  Construction;  Sl('3  Food,  textile,  paper  and  chemical  products  (i.  e.,  two-digit 
SI('  codes  of  20  through  29);  SIC4  Manufacturing  (i.  e.,  two-digit  SI('  codes  of  20  through  29);  SI('5 
"Transportation,  Communications,  Electric,  (las,  And  Sanctuary  Services;  SI('6  Wholesasle'Trade;  Sl('7 
Retale  trade;  SICK  Finance,  Insurance,  and  Real  Estate;  SIC9  Services. 
Figure  4.19  demonstrates  that  across  all  ten  industries  the  elimination  of  non- 
dividend  firm-years  increases  the  explanatory  power  of  the  regressions,  with  the  average 
increase  being  about  6'%%.  Recall  that  a  similar  effect  was  observed  in  the  yearly 
regressions. 
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*  The  employed  industry  SIC  abbreviations  are  as  follows:  SIC'0  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing; 
SICI  Mining;  SIC2  Construction;  SIC3  Food,  textile,  paper  and  chemical  products  (i.  e.,  two-digit 
SIC  codes  ot'20  through  29);  SIC4  Manufacturing  (i.  e.,  two-digit  SIC  codes  ol'20  through  29);  SIC5 
Transportation,  Communications,  Electric,  Gas,  And  Sanctuary  Services;  SIC6  Wholesasle'I'rade;  SIC'7 
Resale  trade;  SIC8  -  Finance,  Insurance,  and  Real  Estate;  SIC9  Services. 
With  regards  to  the  major  valuation  factors,  the  dividend  coefficients  are 
statistically  significant  in  9  out  of  10  industries.  Ilowever,  in  two  out  of  these  9 
industries  (Services  and  Finance,  Insurance  and  Real  Estate),  dividends  have  negative 
association  with  value.  This  pattern  persists  when  the  tests  are  repeated  for  dividend- 
paying  firms  only  (Figure  4.20). 
The  absolute  value  of  the  dividend  coefficients  varies  substantially  across  the 
different  economic  sectors,  and  increases  in  all  sectors  when  samples  exclude  non- 
dividend  firms. 
In  two  sectors  (Agriculture,  Pores/rt,  and  Fishin  9,  and  Finance,  Insurance  and 
Real  Estate)  the  PBT  coefficients  are  not  statistically  significant,  irrespective  of  whether 
or  not  the  non-dividend  firms  are  excluded  from  the  samples. 
The  substantial  cross-industry  difference  in  the  valuation  of'  PBTs  is  evident 
from  Figure  4.21,  with  profits  having  higher  capitalisation  in  the  trade,  maim)  icturing 
and  services  sectors.  This  might  be  a  point  of  reference  when  comparing  the  market's 
perception  of  values,  associated  with  specific  business  scgmenls,  with  the  valuation  of, 
firm-level  PI3T  coefficients  in  specific  industries. 
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*  The  employed  industry  SIC  abbreviations  are  as  follows:  SICO  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing; 
SICI  =  Mining;  SIC2  -  Construction;  SIC3  Food,  textile,  paper  and  chemical  products  (i.  e.,  two-digit 
SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SIC4  -  Manufacturing  (i.  e.,  two-digit  SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SIC5 
"Transportation,  Communications,  Electric,  Gas,  And  Sanctuary  Services;  SIC6=  Wholcsasle'fradc;  SI('7 
Retale  trade;  SIC8  =  Finance,  Insurance,  and  Real  Estate;  SIC  '9  -  Services. 
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*  The  employed  industry  SIC  abbreviations  are  as  follows:  SICO  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing; 
SICI  -  Mining;  SIC2  -  Construction;  SI('3  _  Food,  textile,  paper  and  chemical  products  (i.  e.,  two-digit 
SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SIC4  Manufacturing  (i.  e.,  two-digit  SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SIC  '5 
I  ransportation,  Communications,  Electric,  Gas.  And  Sanctuary  Scrviccs;  SI('6  Wholesaslc  Trade;  SIC7 
Rctalc  trade;  SI('8  -  Finance,  Insurance,  and  Real  Estate;  SI('9  Services. 
As  has  been  suggested  in  Chapter  3,  the  theoretical  book  value  coefficient  may 
have  a  positive,  as  well  as  negative  signor.  The  book  value  coefficient  is  not  statistically 
significant  in  2  out  of'  10  industries.  This  appears  to  he  the  case  for  one  industry 
2  From  the  theoretical  models  that  underlie  our  regressions,  it  is  difficult  to  hypothesise  about  the  sign 
and  magnitude  of  the  book  value  cocfticicnt.  As  ('haptcr  3  demonstrates,  the  theoretical  book  value 
cocfticicnt  is  the  sum  of  two  terms:  unity  and  a  negative  term  that  represents  the  present  value  factor  of 
all  future  expected  required  returns  on  ordinary  equity.  Because  we  arc  unaware  of  the  expected 
magnitude  of  the  second  term  (it  might  take  up  a  value  which  is  huger  or  smaller  than  unity),  the 
theoretical  book  value  coefficient  in  our  model  can  have  any  sign.  Therefore,  the  fact  that  in  sonic  yearly 
or  industrial  regressions  book  attic  coefficients  appear  statistically  not  significant,  does  not  mean  that  in 
those  years'  or  industries'  book  values  vycre  value  irrelevant 
.  1111]  1  1ý1 
I'] 
I 
161 ('Transportation,  Communications,  etc.  Services')  in  our  tests.  One  can  also  observe 
that,  for  all  industries,  except  the  `Finance,  Insurance  and  Real  Estate',  BV  coefficients 
have  lower  statistical  significance  than  the  corresponding  PBT  coefficients.  This, 
perhaps,  confirms  the  fact  that  the  balance  sheet  items  of  financial  sector  firms  tend  to 
be  more  closely  marked-to-market,  hence  their  value  relevance  is  relatively  high 
compared  with  that  of  PBT. 
To  take  the  examination  of  the  valuation  relevance  of  BV  further,  I  estimate  all 
industrial  regressions  with  the  BV  variable  being  omitted.  Results  (see  Table  4  in 
Appendix  4.6)  indicate  that  the  BV  variable  plays  a  marginally  low  role  in  valuation 
across  all  industries.  Omitting  the  BV  variable  from  the  regressions  reduces  the 
explanatory  power  of  9  out  of  10  industrial  regressions  only  by  less  than  2  percentage 
points,  and  in  `Financial,  Insurance  and  Real  Estate  sector'  by  less  than  4.5  percentage 
points. 
In  comparison  to  equity  book  value,  the  PBT  variable  is  clearly  a  more 
substantial  value  driver  across  all  industries.  This  becomes  evident  when  tests  (see 
Table  5  in  Appendix  4.6)  are  repeated  with  the  PBT  variable  being  omitted.  Here,  the 
explanatory  power  of  all  industrial  regressions  drops  substantially,  on  average  by  10 
percentage  points,  yet  the  BV  and  dividends  coefficients  remain  generally  unaffected. 
Finally,  the  dividend  variable  has  an  industry-variant  valuation  role.  Exclusion 
of  the  dividends  variable  from  regressions  in  the  `Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing' 
and  `Construction'  sectors  depresses  the  explanatory  power  of  the  regressions  by  20.7% 
and  6.2%  respectively,  and  this  reduction  is  statistically  significant.  In  the  remaining 
industries,  dividends  seem  to  be  a  less  important  value  driver,  as  its  exclusion  reduces 
the  explanatory  power  of  the  regressions  by  less  than  1.6%,  on  average,  and  this 
reduction  is  not  statistically  significant. 
162 Industrial  sub-samples  in  the  preceding  tests  did  not  exclude  firms  that  do  not 
pay  dividends.  Therefore,  I  repeat  these  tests  and  once  again  examine  the  valuation  role 
of  dividends  for  only  dividend-paying-firms  sub-samples.  The  results  (see  Table  4  in 
Appendix  4.6)  are  virtually  unchanged  for  most  of  the  industries,  except  for  the 
`Mining'  sector  where  the  exclusion  of  dividends  causes  a  statistically  significant 
reduction  in  the  explanatory  power  of  the  regression. 
In  summary,  it  is  evident  that  there  are  cross-industry  differences  in  investors' 
perception  of  the  valuation  role  of  various  financial  statements  variables.  The 
cumulative  value  association  of  these  variables  is  also  industry-specific.  With  regards  to 
the  segmental  analysis,  the  above  findings  appear  to  oblige  the  researcher  to,  at  least, 
control  for  industry  fixed  effects.  Furthermore,  across  all  industries,  firm-level  profits 
prove  to  be  the  `strongest'  value  driver,  whereas  equity  book  value  is  the  `weakest' 
valuation  factor.  This  finding  supports  my  argument,  put  forward  in  Chapter  3,  that  PBT 
coefficients  should  be  the  main  reference  point  when  comparing  relative  valuation  of 
specific  segments. 
4.3.4  Market-to-book  ratio  and  value  relevance  of  major  value  drivers 
The  entire  notion  of  the  RIV  model  is  to  explain  the  divergence  between  the 
equity  market  value  and  the  book  value.  According  to  the  residual  income  valuation 
model,  the  excess  of  market  value  over  book  value  implies  the  existence  of  positive 
perceived  growth  opportunities,  while  the  opposite  is  true  when  market  value  is  below 
book  value.  The  fact  that  one  firm  might  trade  above  book  value  while  another  might 
trade  at  a  discount  to  its  book  value  points  to  the  existence  of  a  divergence  between 
these  firms'  valuation.  It  follows  that  these  firms  are  most  likely  to  differ  in  terms  of 
value  association  of  key  accounting  value  drivers  (BV,  PBT,  DIV).  To  prove  or 
disprove  this  point  I  run  separate  basic  model  regressions  for  two  sub-samples  of  firms: 
163 (i)  where  the  market-to-book  ratio  (MB)  is  greater  than  unity  (i.  e.,  firms  that  trade  above 
BV),  and  (ii)  where  the  MB  is  below  unity  (i.  e.,  firms  that  trade  at  a  discount  to  BV). 
All  models  reported  in  Table  4.4  exclude  negative  profit  cases,  and  negative 
BVs  are  set  to  zero.  A  general  review  of  results  suggests  the  following: 
1.  In  the  total  sample,  there  are  about  4.6  times  more  firms  that  trade  above  book 
value  than  firms  trading  below  book  value; 
2.  The  explanatory  power  of  the  regressions  are  always  larger  for  finns  that  trade 
at  a  discount  to  book  value,  regardless  of  the  treatment  of  dividend  non-dividend  firms 
and  fixed  effects; 
3.  The  inclusion  of  industry  and  yearly  fixed  effects  always  increases  the 
explanatory  power  of  the  regressions,  and  this  increase  is  more  pronounced  for  firms 
that  trade  at  premium  to  book  value. 
Some  interesting  patterns  emerge  when  comparing  the  valuation  properties  of 
MB>1  firms  with  MB:  51  firms.  Thus,  in  all  pairs  of  corresponding  regressions  (that  is: 
Model  1  vs.  Model  3;  Model  2  vs.  Model  4;  Model  5  vs.  Model  7;  Model  6  vs.  Model  8) 
the  magnitude  of  the  PBT  coefficients  for  MB>1  firms  are  substantially  higher  and 
statistically  more  significant  than  those  of  firms  with  MB51. 
Furthermore,  among  the  MB51  models,  there  is  only  one  (Model  3)  where  the 
PBT  coefficient  is  statistically  significant  at  the  4%  level,  while  in  the  remaining  MB51 
models  the  PBT  coefficients  are  not  significant  at  the  10%  level. 
Overall,  these  results  are  persistent  in  all  the  tested  model  specifications  (with 
and  without  industry  and  yearly  effects)  and  sub-samples  (total  sample  vs.  only 
dividend-paying  firms),  which  suggest  that  earnings  do  not  play  a  significant  role  in  the 
valuation  of  firms  trading  below  book  value. 
Another  robust  result  is  the  differential  valuation  role  played  by  dividends.  First 
of  all,  dividends  are  always  value  relevant  and  are  highly  significant  in  statistical  terms. 
164 Furtherniore,  when  the  dividend  coefficients  are  compared  in  Model  I  vs.  3,  Model  2 
vs.  4,  Model  5  vs.  7,  and  Model  6  vs.  8,  it  appears  that  dividends  are  hosiliºve'h, 
(iregaNvchv)  associated  with  firm  value  when  firms  trade  ahun'  (below)  book  value. 
Table  4.4 
nrr,;  '7:  1  =u￿￿*(I/"l;  1  )+u￿i+u1  *(BI',  17A,  )+n,,,  *(l'BT,  l7A,  )+u, 
1 
*1  1(7A)*(PB7;  /7:  -1,  )ý  u,  *(l)/I'l"l'A,  )+u,  *(AiljliR/7i1,  )  i-  if, 
Dividend  and  non-Dividend  profit-making  Dividen  d  paying  profit-making  firms  only  firms 
Market-to-Book  >1  Market-to-Book<1  Market-to-Book  >2  Market-to-Book<2 
Modell  Model  2  Model  3  Model  4**  Model  5  Model  6**  Modell  Model  8** 
Intercept`  0.052  -0.048  0.027  -0.04  0.082  -0.115  0.02  -0.035 
t-s1at  2.118  -0.552  3.18  -1.213  3.347  -1.349  2.57  -1.098 
p-value  0.034  0.581  0.001  0.225  0.001  0.177  0.010  0.272 
1/TA  301.9  294.5  -53.6  -75.3  731  662.7  -1.806  -15.4 
t-scat  2.319  2.226  -0.768  -1.058  4.803  4.835  -0.033  -0.276 
p-value  0.020  0.026  0.443  0.290  0.000  0.000  0.974  0.782 
BV  0.339  0.369  0.621  0.626  0.617  0.614  0.625  0.631 
t-stat  6.689  7.448  33.475  34.636  11.075  11.451  34.739  36.045 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  6.657  6.689  0.254  0.208  6.432  6.425  0.161  0.087 
t-slat  22.212  21.408  2.058  1.627  21.969  21.39  1.359  0.706 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.040  0.104  0.000  0.000  0.174  0.480 
PBT  x 
f(ta)  0.052  0.059  0.028  0.038  0.049  0.054  0.037  0.047 
t-sau  2.29  2.575  2.698  3.411  2.06  2.305  3.725  4.384 
p-value  0.022  0.010  0.007  0.001  0.039  0.021  0.000  0.000 
Div  5.916  4.914  -0.083  -0.085  2.784  2.636  -0.08  -0.08 
t-stat  7.046  5.673  -2.897  -2.87  3.786  3.442  -2.534  -2.508 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.004  0.004  0.000  0.001  0.011  0.012 
Adj.  ER  0.404  0.236  0.002  0.009  0.105  -0.064  -0.033  -0.033 
t-star  1.616  0.914  0.014  0.083  0.574  -0.344  -0.302  -0.295 
value  0.106  0.360  0.989  0.933  0.566  0.731  0.763  0.768 
Adj.  R- 
40.26%  45.13%  47.39%  49.30%  33.60%  39.26%  47.73%  49  06% 
Square  . 
No.  of  11019  11019  2352  2352  11894  11894  2593  2593 
cases 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  each  regression 
coefficient.  Models  are  scaled  by  TA,  estimated  for  profit-making  firms  and  exclude  the  outliers. 
P13T*t(TA)  is  the  unsealed  P13T,  where  unsealing  is  computed  by  multiplying  the  scale-deflated  P13'T  by 
the  5th  order  root  of  the  scale  factor.  This  mitigates  the  effect  of  extreme  values  of  the  un-detlated  raw 
Pl3'1',  and  allows  for  non-linearity  in  the  functional  form  of  the  scaled  PBT  coefficient.  ('ocfficients  which 
arc  statistically  significant  at  the  51,,,,  level  or  higher  are  highlighted. 
**  These  models  are  estimated  with  industrial  and  yearly  fixed  effects.  For  brevity,  the  regression 
coefficients  of  yearly  and  industrial  dummies  are  not  reported  in  the  table.  Ilowever,  statistically 
significant  yearly  and  industrial  coefficients  are  discussed  in  the  text. 
*In  these  models  negative  BVs  are  set  to  /ero. 
Models  I  through  4  arc  estimated  for  only  dividend-paying  firms.  Models  5  through  S  include  both 
dividend  paying  and  non-dividend  firms.  Models  1,3,5  and  7  are  estimated  without  yearly  and  industry 
fixed  effects,  while  Models  2,4,6  and  S  include  yearly  and  industrial  dummies.  Models  I,  2,5  and  6  only 
include  firms  with  market-to-book  ratio  greater  than  I  (i.  c.,  trade  above  book  value).  Models  3,4,7  and  S 
only  include  firms  with  market-to-book  ratio  below  I  (i.  e.,  trade  at  a  discount  to  book  value). 
165 This  finding  of  dividends'  differential  valuation  is  surprising  yet  robust,  as  neither  it  is 
influenced  by  the  inclusion  of  fixed  industry  and  yearly  effects,  nor  does  it  change  when 
we  eliminate  dividend  non-dividend  firms. 
The  analysis  of  the  level  of  statistical  significance  of  the  BV  coefficients  (see 
Table  4.4)  suggests  that  whether  or  not  one  controls  for  industry  and  yearly  effects, 
BV's  value  relevance  is  higher  when  firms  trade  below  market  value.  The  analysis  of 
BV  coefficients  in  Model  1  vs.  3,  and  Model  2  vs.  4,  indicates  the  existence  of  higher 
capitalisation  of  the  BV  variable  in  firms  with  MB51.  A  similar  pattern  exists  when  this 
analysis  is  performed  for  only  dividend-paying  firms  (i.  e.,  Model  5  vs  7,  and  Model  6 
vs.  8),  yet  statistically  this  difference  is  less  robust.  This  result  might  have  the  following 
economic  interpretation:  when  the  firm's  market  value  falls  below  its  book  value,  book 
value  is  likely  to  become  the  major  indicator  of  the  fair  value  of  an  alternative  use  of  a 
firm's  net  assets.  In  other  words,  shareholders  might  demand  the  `liquidation'  of  the 
firm  to  `receive'  the  fair  value  of  their  assets  (if,  of  course,  BV  reflects  fair  value). 
To  reaffirm  this  valuation  importance  of  book  values  when  MB<1,  compared  to 
profits  and  dividends,  I  analyse  the  changes  in  the  explanatory  power  of  regressions 
when  a  specific  variable  (BV  or  PBT  and  Dividend)  is  dropped  out  from  the  regression. 
Results  (see  Table  3  in  Appendix  4.6)  confirm  prior  indications  of  BV  valuation. 
Specifically,  omitting  the  BV  from  Models  4  and  8  reduces  these  regressions' 
explanatory  power  from  49.3%  and  49.1%  to  13.6%  and  12.6%  respectively,  while 
jointly  omitting  the  PBT  and  Dividend  variables  causes  only  about  1%  fall  in  the 
explanatory  power.  Furthermore,  omitting  the  BV  from  Models  2  and  6  (i.  e.,  where 
MB>1)  only  marginally  reduces  these  regressions'  explanatory  power,  from  45.13% 
and  39.2%  to  44.7%  and  38.12%  respectively,  while  dropping  out  PBT  and  Dividend 
variables  causes  at  least  8.5%  loss  in  the  explanatory  power. 
166 In  summary,  BV  is  more  value  relevant  and  have  larger  valuation  multiples  for 
firms  that  trade  below  By.  Furthermore,  for  these  firms  BV  is  a  more  important  value 
driver  than  PBT  and  dividends,  while  for  firms  with  MB>  I  the  situation  is  exactly  the 
opposite. 
Finally,  the  estimated  coefficients  on  industrial  and  yearly  dummies  provide 
some  indication  of  the  relative  valuation  of  firms  in  specific  economic  sectors  and  over 
time,  as  the  directions  of  relative  valuation  of  specific  industries  (and  years)  appear  to 
be  contextual  to  the  MB  ratio.  Detailed  analysis  of  this  issue  is  outside  the  scope  of  this 
study. 
4.4  SENSITIVITY  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  RESULTS 
The  objective  of  this  section  is  to  extend  the  analysis  of  the  firm-level  empirical 
results  by  repeating  the  major  tests  in  new  settings.  Firstly,  I  examine  the  robustness  of 
the  previous  results  to  the  use  of  alternative  scale  proxies  (i.  e.,  deflators):  (1)  one-year- 
lagged  equity  market  value;  (2)  group  sales;  (3)  and  a  composite  scale  factor. 
Secondly,  I  explore  further  the  implications  of  the  adopted  `conventional'  view  to 
eliminating  cases  with  the  largest  and  smallest  0.5%  of  values  for  MV,  PBT  and  By,  by 
comparing  changes  in  the  regression  results  if  different  thresholds  for  the  elimination  of 
extreme  values  were  used  (e.  g.,  0.2%,  0.4%,  0.6%,  0.8%,  1%  and  1.2%).  The  effect  of 
using  different  thresholds  for  trimming  the  extreme  observations  is  analysed  separately 
for  each  of  the  key  variables  (MV,  PBT,  BV  and  Dividends)  in  order  to  identify 
variables  that  are  more  likely  to  influence  regression  results  with  their  extreme  values.  I 
also  emphasise  and  argue  that  one  should  distinguish  between  `extreme'  and 
`influential'  observations,  and  discuss  some  of  the  pertinent  empirical  implications. 
167 4.4.1  Using  the  one-year-lagged  MV  as  deflator 
Before  proceeding  to  the  empirical  results,  it  is  important  to  note  that  by  scaling 
the  basic  model  with  lagged  MV  we,  in  fact,  transform  the  price-levels  model  into  a 
return  model.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  3,  the  economic  interpretation  of  parameters  in 
return  models  is  different  from  those  of  price-levels  models.  The  dependent  variable  in 
the  lagged  MV-deflated  model  is  a  sort  of  `dirty'  one-year  return,  because:  (i)  it 
captures  one-year  change  of  the  firm's  share  price;  (ii)  it  reflects  changes  in  the  firm's 
equity  capital  which  are  due  to  issuance  of  new  shares  of  share  buy-backs;  and  (iii)  it 
ignores  the  redistribution  of  value  through  dividend  payment. 
Deflation  by  lagged  MV  substantially  reduces  the  total  sample  size  as  it  shortens 
the  sample  period  by  one  year,  that  is  we  loose  the  earliest  year  1987.  Some  more 
observations  are  also  lost  because  the  firm  composition  of  yearly  sub-samples  changes 
each  year,  that  is,  the  firm  might  exist  in  year  1995  sub-sample,  but  be  missing  from  the 
year  1994  sample,  making  the  lagged  deflation  impossible.  Overall,  deflation  reduces 
the  sample  from  the  initial  19,213  firm-year  observations  to  16,828  cases  (i.  e.,  a  12.4% 
reduction)27.  As  before,  in  the  process  of  analysis  I  partition  this  sample  according  to 
the  sign  of  PBT  and  analyse  the  two  sub-sample  results  separately.  The  positive  PBT 
sub-sample  contains  13,045  cases,  while  losses  are  reported  by  3,783  firm-years  (i.  e., 
22.5%  of  total  sample  is  loss-reporting  firms). 
4.4.1.1  General  properties 
Some  commentary  on  the  specifics  of  the  profit  and  loss  sub-samples  is  in  order. 
First,  the  frequency  of  dividend-paying  firms  is  substantially  lower  in  the  loss-making 
sub-sample,  where  only  30.6%  of  firm-years  are  dividend  paying,  compared  to  92%  in 
the  profit  sub-sample. 
27  The  reported  numbers  do  not  exclude  the  outliers. 
168 Second,  in  11.4%  of  the  loss-making  firm-years,  the  reported  BVs  are  negative, 
which  is  substantially  higher  than  the  frequency  of  negative  reported  BVs,  2.3%,  in  the 
profit  sub-sample.  Our  data  indicates  that  loss-making  firms  with  negative  BVs  are  less 
likely  to  pay  dividends,  as  elimination  of  non-dividend  paying  firms  from  the  loss  sub- 
sample  reduces  the  proportion  of  negative  BVs  to  as  low  as  2%.  In  other  words,  there  is 
a  close  association  between  the  sign  of  BV  and  the  dividend  status  of  the  firm. 
The  comparative  analysis  of  variable  correlation  matrixes  in  two  sub-samples 
reveals  some  further  particulars  (see  Appendix  4.4).  The  comparison  of  quadrants  Q1 
and  Q3  indicates  that  PBT  of  profit  firms  has  the  highest  correlation  with  MV,  while  in 
loss-reporting  firms  the  correlation  coefficient  of  PBT  and  MV  has  the  lowest  in 
absolute  terms  value,  and  is  negative.  The  negative  sign  of  this  correlation  coefficient  is 
rather  unexpected  as  it  seems  to  suggest  that  higher  losses  are  associated  with  higher 
gains  in  the  firm's  value.  Dividends  in  profit  firms  have  the  second-highest  correlation 
coefficient  with  MV,  and  have  the  highest  correlation  coefficient  in  the  loss  firm  sub- 
sample. 
BV  has  a  stronger  correlation  with  MV  in  loss-making  firms  then  in  profit  firms, 
and  setting  negative  BVs  equal  to  zero  does  not  influence  its  correlation  with  MV  and 
other  variables  (see  quarter  Q1  vs.  Q3). 
In  the  regression  analysis  that  follows  I  use  the  same  approach  as  in  the  TA- 
deflated  case  and  eliminate  top  and  bottom  0.5%  of  extreme  values  for  the  following 
regression  variables:  lagged-MV-deflated  MV,  lagged-MV-deflated  BV,  and  lagged- 
MV-deflated  PBT,  lagged  MV-deflated  dividends. 
The  difference  between  lagged  MV  and  TA-deflated  models  is  self-evident.  The 
lag-MV  deflated  regressions  (Table  4.5)  have  notably  lower  explanatory  power  and 
profits  (PBT)  multiples  than  TA-deflated  regressions. 
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Profit  making  firms  Loss  making  firms 
Dividend  and  non-Dividend  Dividend  Dividend  and  non-Dividend  Dividend 
firms  firms  firms  firms 
Model  1  Model  2  Model  3  Model  4  Model  5  Model  6 
Intercept  0.886  0.884  0.824  0.646  0.584  0.395 
t-stat  43.015  42.756  32.086  12.682  11.422  3.881 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/MV  -123.228  -125.673  -268.525  1264.74  1032.28  1788.68 
t-stat  -1.936  -1.977  -3.851  4.85  3.784  1.965 
p-value  0.053  0.048  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.049 
BV  0.091  0.095  0.041  0.35  0.504  0.13 
t-stat  4.528  4.651  1.95  6.773  7.507  2.777 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.051  0.000  0.000  0.005 
PBT  2.198  2.186  2.639  -0.527  -0.519  -0.304 
t-stat  11.211  11.131  11.973  -3.054  -2.978  -0.636 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.003  0.525 
PBT*Scale  -0.052  -0.052  -0.053  0.043  0.055  0.02 
t-stat  -4.216  -4.178  -4.416  1.862  2.329  0.428 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.063  0.020  0.668 
DIV  1.473  1.465  2.823  0.239  -0.78  8.439 
t-stat  2.408  2.394  3.222  0.148  -0.469  3.851 
p-value  0.016  0.017  0.001  0.882  0.639  0.000 
Adj.  ER  0.181  0.175  0.683  -0.337  -0.265  0.106 
t-scat  1.428  1.375  3.223  -2.602  -2.197  0.615 
p-value  0.153  0.169  0.001  0.009  0.028  0.539 
No.  of 
cases  12737  12737  11824  3691  3691  1143 
Adj.  R- 
Square  12.90%  12.90%  16.00%  11.70%  13.30%  25.20% 
White  adjusted  (hctcroskcdasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients.  Models  are  scaled  by  one-year-lagged  equity  market  value,  is  estimated  for  profit-making 
firms,  and  exclude  the  outliers.  P1T*  f(mv, 
_1) 
is  the  unsealed  PR!  ',  where  unsealing  is  computed  by 
multiplying  the  scale-deflated  P13T  by  the  5th  order  root  of'  the  scale  factor.  This  mitigates  the  effect  of 
extreme  values  of'the  un-deflated  raw  P13T,  and  also  allows  fin  non-linearity  in  the  tunettonal  form  of  the 
scaled  PUT  coefficient.  Coefficients  which  are  statistically  significant  at  the  level  or  higher  are 
highlighted. 
Models  I  through  3  relate  to  profit  firm  sub-samples.  Models  4  through  6  relate  to  loss  firms  sub-samples. 
Models  I,  2,4  and  5  include  dividend  paying  and  non-dividend  firm-years,  while  models  3  and  6  are 
estimated  for  dividend-paying  firms  only.  In  Models  2,3,5  and  6  negative  BVs  are  set  to  iero. 
I  lowever,  similar  to  the  'I'A-deflated  model,  PHI'  coefficients  1161-  loss  III-ills  are 
negative,  have  smaller  absolute  values,  and  statistically  less  significant  than  profit 
firms'  P13'I'  coefficients. 
Furthermore,  similar  to  the  TA-deflated  tests,  the  book  value  coefficients  fi)r 
loss-making  firms  have  higher  values  and  statistical  significance. 
Low  regression  explanatory  power  and  small  in  absolute  value  'earning, 
response  cocfficients',  when  the  model  has  a  `returns-earnings'  specification,  arc  well 
170 known  phenomena  in  empirical  accounting  literature.  `Pure'  returns-earnings  models 
are  usually  estimated  on  per  share  basis  in  order  to  capture  the  pure  market  performance 
only.  Because  the  dependent  variable  in  my  model  is  the  firm's  current  market 
capitalisation  scaled  by  one  year  lagged  market  capitalisation,  it  captures  both  the  pure 
market  performance  effect  and  the  change-in-the-scale  effect  (e.  g.,  issuance  or 
repurchase  of  shares),  and  therefore  the  model  has  less  straightforward  interpretation. 
Recall,  that  setting  negative  BVs  to  zero  would  imply  that  negative  BVs  should 
have  a  valuation  coefficient  equal  to  zero,  or,  in  other  words,  negative  BVs  have  no 
valuation  role.  This  conjecture  is  tested  by  means  of  running  basic  regressions  with  an 
additional  dummy  variable  (dummy=l  if  BV:  50,  and  dummy=0  otherwise)  and  a  BV 
interaction  term  (BV;,,  t=BV  if  BV:  50,  and  BV;,,  t=0  otherwise)  both  for  the  profit-firm 
sub-sample,  and  the  loss-firm  sub-sample.  Results  (Wald  p-values  are  reported  in  Table 
1  of  Appendix  4.6)  indicate  that  in  both  the  profit  and  loss-firm  sub-samples,  the 
coefficient  on  negative  BV  is  not  statistically  different  from  zero.  Consequently,  setting 
negative  BVs  to  zero  is  justified.  This  point  gains  further  support  when  comparing 
Model  1  vs.  Model  2,  and  Model  4  vs.  Model  5.  Thus,  Models  1  and  2  parameters  are 
virtually  identical,  and  so  are  those  of  Models  4  and  5. 
For  firms  that  pay  dividends,  dividends  are  positively  and  statistically 
significantly  associated  with  the  change  in  market  capitalisation  both  in  profit  and  loss 
sub-samples. 
4.4.1.2  Yearly  and  economic  sector  regression  characteristics 
In  this  section  I  examine  the  yearly  and  economic  sector-related  characteristics 
of  lagged  MV-scaled  model.  Before  analysing  yearly  regressions,  it  is  important  to 
emphasise  again  that  because  of  deflation  by  the  lagged  MV,  the  nature  of  the  model  is 
changed  and  it  is  now  a  `mixture'  of  price-levels  and  returns-earnings  model.  Therefore 
171 regression  parameters  might  be  expected  to  resemble  those  reported  in  literatures  that 
use  returns-based  regressions. 
Recall  that  in  the  undeflated  model  the  intercept  is  modelled  as  a  linear  function 
of  scale  (see  Chapter  3),  that  is,  Intercept:  =  ao  +  ao  *  scale,  . 
When  lagged  MV  is  the 
scale,  the  intercept  of  the  undeflated  model  is:  Intercept  ,=  ao  +  ao  *  mv, 
_,  . 
Consequently,  the  regression  intercept  in  the  deflated  model  would  be  the  estimate  of 
ao  . 
Noting  that  the  dependent  variable  is  mvi,  the  inclusion  of  this  intercept  into  the 
undeflated  model  would  partially  turn  it  into  a  `random  walk  with  drift'  model.  That  is: 
mv,  =  ao  +  ao  *  mv,  _, 
+  of  *  x,  +u, 
i 
where  x;  and  a;  are  vectors  of  valuation  factors  and  the  attached  coefficients 
respectively. 
The  mvt_I  variable  is  somewhat  different  from  the  rest  of  possible  deflators, 
because  not  only  it  does  proxy  for  scale,  but  it  is  also  a  variable  which  is  used  as  a 
regressor  in  the  time-series  regressions  of  market  value.  Although  this  fact  might 
complicate  the  interpretation  of  the  regression-estimated  (in  the  deflated  model) 
intercept  ao,  one  can  expect  it  to  be  positive  and  statistically  significant  because  of  the 
valuation  role  of  mvt_I  in  time-series  regressions  of  equity  market  value. 
Yearly  regressions  (Table  4.6)  prove  some  of  the  above  general  theorisations. 
First  of  all,  the  explanatory  power  of  yearly  lagged  MV-scaled  regressions  is  lower  than 
when  TA  is  used  as  deflator.  Nevertheless,  the  yearly  patterns  of  the  explanatory  power 
in  lag  MV-scaled  tests  closely  reflect  those  of  the  TA-scaled  regressions. 
Secondly,  in  all  15  yearly  regressions  the  intercept  appears  with  a  positive  sign, 
is  substantially  stable  across  all  years  (with  average  value  of  0.85),  and  is  always 
statistically  significant  at  least  at  the  0.1%  level. 
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Intercept  1/MV  BV  PBT 
PBT  x  DIV  Adj.  ER 
No.  of  Adj.  R- 
f(mv)  Cases  square 
1988  0.783  537.8  -0.003  1.764  -0.125  9.939  1.073  366  26.40% 
t-ratio  6.538  1.182  -0.030  2.204  -2.168  2.449  3.913 
p-value  0.000  0.238  0.976  0.028  0.031  0.015  0.000 
1989  0.894  -181.9  0.216  1.284  0.015  0.455  -0.044  903  11.30% 
t-ratio  11.596  -1.239  2.047  2.145  0.471  0.240  -0.109 
p-value  0.000  0.215  0.041  0.032  0.637  0.810  0.913 
1990  0.702  -44.2  0.021  1.048  0.065  -0.393  0.964  940  14.50% 
t-ratio  22.526  -1.718  0.691  2.559  3.462  -0.774  2.732 
p-value  0.000  0.086  0.489  0.011  0.001  0.439  0.006 
1991  0.710  -147.9  -0.011  1.842  0.001  5.548  -0.499  908  29.50% 
t-ratio  12.566  -0.614  -0.179  4.338  0.024  4.696  -3.044 
p-value  0.000  0.539  0.858  0.000  0.981  0.000  0.002 
1992  0.896  -382.5  0.000  3.830  -0.102  -0.819  0.022  853  20.10% 
t-ratio  16.349  -2  157  0.007  5.904  -2.432  -0.687  1.468 
p-value  0.000  0.031  0.994  0.000  0  015  0.492  0.142 
1993  0.859  -611.2  0.189  3.516  -0.114  7.794  2.818  895  27.40% 
t-ratio  12.216  -3.005  4.209  3.522  -2.426  4.719  1.876 
p-value  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.015  0.000  0.061 
1994  0.882  -184.8  0.072  4.659  -0.234  2.782  0.352  1011  31.40% 
t-ratio  13.517  -1.095  1.244  5.359  -5.908  1.308  0.224 
p-value  0.000  0.273  0.214  0.000  0.000  0.191  0.823 
1995  0.842  -302.5  -0.042  2.069  -0.065  4.699  -0.432  1050  18.50% 
t-ratio  15.440  -1.679  -0.864  3.507  -2.352  2.902  4306 
p-value  0.000  0.093  0.387  0.000  0.019  0.004  0.759 
1996  0.937  -176.5  0.039  3.145  -0.056  2.276  1.129  1042  14.50% 
t-ratio  16.604  -0.761  0.536  4.510  -1.728  1.353  2.321 
p-value  0.000  0.447  0.592  0.000  0.084  0.176  0.020 
1997  0.841  187.3  -0.012  2.798  -0.084  3.835  1.144  1028  12.50% 
t-ratio  13.635  0.694  -0.236  3.698  -2  546  1.267  2.130 
p-value  0  000  0.488  0.813  0.000  0.011  0.205  0.033 
1998  0.819  853.4  -0.125  2.406  0.104  -1.013  1.311  993  16.30% 
t-ratio  11.232  2.093  -2.379  3.043  1.754  -0.599  3.142 
p-value  0.000  0.036  0.017  0.002  0.079  0.549  0.002 
1999  0.978  759.0  0.230  0.824  0.033  -1.776  -0.149  911  10.20% 
t-ratio  12.213  1.805  2.601  1.033  0.461  -0.854  -0.154 
p-value  0.000  0.071  0.009  0.302  0.645  0.393  0.877 
2000  1.183  551.9  0.235  2.491  -0.146  -5.298  0  950  800  7.60% 
t-ratio  16.065  1.080  2.427  3.065  -3.084  -3.189  1.142 
p-value  0.000  0.280  0.015  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.253 
2001  0.736  25.4  0.097  0.600  0.072  3.023  0.290  684  20.00% 
t-ratio  20.754  0.264  2.676  1.401  1.993  3.051  0.359 
p-value  0.000  0.792  0.007  0.161  0.046  0.002  0.720 
2002  0.664  238.1  0.126  0.336  0.177  2.581  0.456  350  32.50% 
t-ratio  13.624  0.821  2.947  0.422  3.112  2.379  0  727 
p-value  0  000  0.412  0.003  0.674  0.002  0.018  0.468 
White  adjusted  (hctcroskc(iasticity-consistem)  t-ratios  and  p-Values  are  reported  below  each  regression 
cocfticient.  (uefficicu  is  which  are  statistically  significant  at  the  94  level  or  higher  are  highlighted. 
Yearly  regressions  are  scaled  by  one  year  lagged  MV  and  are  estimated  for  yearly  samples  that  eyclu(le 
negative  NIT  cases  and  outliers.  Negative  BVs  are  set  to  ecru.  PU  I'*  f(mv,  i)  is  the  unsealed  PI3"f,  where 
unsealing  is  computed  by  multiplying  the  scale-detlatcd  I'll  f  by  the  5th  order  root  of  the  scale  factor. 
This  mitigates  the  eftcct  of  ext  reme  Valdes  of  the  Lill-detlatcd  raw  Pill,  and  also  allows  for  nun-linearity 
in  the  functional  form  of'  the  scaled  NIT  coefficient. 
173 In  these  regressions  intercept  appears  to  be  by  far  the  most  robust  (and 
significant)  regression  parameter,  and  this  fact  demonstrates  the  `special'  role  that  the 
lagged  MV  would  play  in  the  undeflated  model28. 
With  regards  to  the  valuation  factors  included  in  the  deflated  model,  none  of 
them  is  an  `apparent  leader'  in  terms  of  value  relevance.  Thus,  in  the  years  1988-1998 
PBT  had  positive  and  statistically  significant  multiples,  but  became  not  significant 
statistically  in  years  1999,2001  and  2002.  Furthermore,  these  coefficients  are 
substantially  smaller  in  value  than  the  corresponding  coefficients  from  the  TA-deflated 
yearly  regressions.  This  reflects  the  fact  that  in  the  lagged  MV-deflated  model,  PBT 
coefficients  are  closer  to  the  returns-model's  earnings  response  coefficients  (ERC).  A 
relatively  lower  ERC  in  returns-earnings  models  is  a  well-documented  fact  in  the 
literature. 
With  regard  to  equity  book  value  and  dividends,  it  is  difficult  to  conjecture 
about  these  variables'  theoretical  role  in  the  current  model  specification.  Empirically, 
BV  has  clearly  a  weaker  association  with  the  dependent  variable,  and  is  statistically 
significant  only  in  7  out  of  15  years.  However,  it  is  statistically  significant  in  the  years 
(last  years  of  the  sample  period,  1998  through  2002)  when  PBT  is  not.  Dividends  are 
similarly  `weak'  in  explaining  the  lagged  MV-scaled  MV,  and  are  statistically 
significant  in  7  years. 
The  R-square  values  also  show  a  similar  trend  to  the  TA-deflated  models. 
In  general  terms,  the  industry  specific  regressions,  reported  in  Table  4.7,  exhibit  similar 
characteristics.  The  lagged  MV-scaled  regressions'  explanatory  powers  are  distinctly 
lower  than  those  for  the  TA-deflated  industrial  regressions,  and  so  is  the  value  of 
estimated  PBT  coefficients. 
28  One  would  be  keen  to  examine  the  share  of  the  explanatory  power  'contributed'  by  this  intercept  and 
compare  it  with  that  of  the  model's  other  explanatory  variables.  This,  however,  would  require  estimating 
the  deflated  yearly  regressions  without  intercept,  creating  the  econometric  problems  of  R-squares  from 
no-intercept  models  being  incomparable  to  R-squares  from  models  that  include  intercept. 
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Industry'  Intercept  1/MV  BV  PBT 
PBT  x  DIV  Adj.  ER 
No.  of  Adj.  R- 
f(mv)  Cases  Square 
SIC  0  0.525  353.4  0.026  3.646  -0.356  10.950  0.533  98  33.30% 
t-ratio  4.341  0.883  0.308  2.184  -3.249  3.914  0.301 
p-value  0.000  0.379  0.759  0.032  0.002  0.000  0.764 
SIC  1  0.939  849.3  0.346  -0.665  0.077  -1.645  -0.026  332  19.90% 
t-ratio  14.662  1.871  4.075  -1.293  1.753  -0.716  -0.785 
p-value  0.000  0.062  0.000  0.197  0.081  0.474  0.433 
SIC  2  0.598  1186.0  0.271  0.405  0.047  4.681  0.789  646  20.90% 
t-ratio  9.651  2.359  3.422  0.754  1.142  3.212  1.287 
p-value  0.000  0.018  0.001  0.451  0.254  0.001  0.198 
SIC  3  0.827  -30.9  0.034  1.728  -0.006  3.832  1.214  2322  11.70% 
t-ratio  24.727  -0.725  1.056  4.035  -0.333  3.902  1.984 
p-value  0.000  0.468  0.291  0.000  0.739  0.000  0.047 
SIC  4  0.762  330.9  0.046  3.278  -0.020  -0.612  0.646  2960  20.70% 
t-ratio  21.467  1.854  1.200  8.590  -0.829  -0.623  2.338 
p-value  0.000  0.064  0.230  0.000  0.407  0.533  0.019 
SIC  5  0.772  418.3  -0.019  2.360  -0.039  5.594  -0.172  1052  18.30% 
t-ratio  10.920  1.729  -0.289  3.847  -1.240  2.675  -0.434 
p-value  0.000  0.084  0.773  0.000  0.215  0.007  0.665 
SIC  6  0.715  252.3  0.015  3.284  -0.095  3.592  0.428  1216  21.10% 
t-ratio  11.098  1.802  0.298  4.385  -1.512  2.134  0.849 
p-value  0.000  0.072  0.766  0.000  0.130  0.033  0.396 
SIC  7  0.712  611.0  0.141  1.396  0.119  3.521  1.703  1397  18.50% 
t-ratio  10.635  1.682  3.352  1.910  2.669  1.864  6.364 
p-value  0.000  0.092  0.001  0.056  0.008  0.062  0.000 
SIC  8  0.888  378.3  0.155  1.080  -0.015  1.785  1.791  283  6.70% 
t-ratio  7.943  0.977  2.120  1.400  -0.267  0.948  2.687 
p-value  0.000  0.329  0.035  0.163  0.790  0.344  0.008 
SIC  9  1.019  -453.1  0.130  2.950  -0.148  0.539  -0.312  2408  13.20% 
t-ratio  26.552  -5.712  2.548  5.996  -3.300  0.488  -0.692 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.011  0.000  0.001  0.626  0.489 
White  adjusted  (hctcroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coctlicients.  ('octlicicnts  which  are  statistically  significant  at  the  5  Ievcl  or  higher  are  highlighted. 
Industrial  regressions  are  scaled  by  one  year  lagged  MV,  and  e\elude  negativc  PI3"I  cases  and  outliers. 
Negative  BVs  are  set  to  icro.  PI3T*  I(mv,  i)  is  the  unsealed  PIt'I',  where  unscahng  is  computed  by 
multiplying  the  scale-deflated  P13T  by  the  5th  order  root  of  the  scale  factor.  This  mitigates  the  effect  of 
extreme  values  of  the  un-deflated  raw  P13'1',  and  also  allows  for  non-linearity  in  the  functional  form  of  the 
scaled  PBT  coefticicnt. 
*  The  employed  industry  SIC  abbreviations  are  as  follows:  SICO  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing, 
SICI  -  Mining;  SIC2  -  Construction;  SIC3  Food,  textile,  paper  and  chemical  products  (i.  e.,  two-digit 
SIC'  codes  of  20  through  29);  SIC4  Manufacturing  (i.  e.,  two-digit  SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SI('S 
"Transportation,  ('onurnLill  icatioils,  Electric,  Gas,  And  Sanctuary  Services;  SI('6  Wholesasle  Trade:  SI('7 
Rclalc  trade;  SICS  Finance,  Insurance,  and  Real  Istate:  SI('9  Services. 
Furthermore,  as  in  the  case  of'  the  yearly  regressions,  the  only  robust  parameter 
in  terms  of  its  value  and  statistical  significance  across  all  industries  is  the  intercept, 
while  the  other  valuation  factors  are  less  so.  'T'hus  I113'1'  is  statistically  signil'ieant  (at  the 
5%  level)  in  only  6  out  of  10  industries,  13V  is  significant  in  5  out  of,  10,  and  I)IV  is 
175 significant  in  5  out  of  10  industries.  The  comparison  of  the  TA  and  lagged  MV-deflated 
industrial  regressions  reveals  no  consistency  in  the  corresponding  regression  parameters 
and  general  results. 
In  light  of  the  results  presented  in  this  section  and  the  theoretical  difficulties 
associated  with  lagged  MV  deflated  model  specifications,  I  conclude  that  deflation  by 
lagged  MV  creates  unresolved  ambiguities  in  terms  of  the  deflated  model's  theoretical 
implications  and  hampers  the  interpretation  of  the  empirical  results.  Therefore,  I  will  not 
be  reporting  the  results  of  the  lagged  MV-deflation  in  the  empirical  chapters  on  segment 
valuation. 
4.4.2  Using  group  sales  as  the  deflator 
Group  sales  numbers  are  missing  for  459  observations,  reducing  the  sample  to 
18,754  cases  (before  the  elimination  of  outliers).  When  the  remaining  sample  is  split 
into  industrial  sub-samples,  for  the  purposes  of  industrial  analysis,  some  39 
observations  are  further  excluded  due  to  missing  information  relating  to  the  industrial 
classification  of  the  firm. 
Two  important  facts  should  be  underlined  before  the  analysis  of  yearly  and 
industrial  valuation  pattern.  First,  unlike  lagged  MV  deflation,  deflation  by  sales  does 
not  alter  the  model  specification.  Second,  deflation  by  sales  implicitly  assumes  that:  (1) 
sales  is  the  market's/investors'  `universal'  perception  of  what  constitutes  the  notion  of 
firm  size;  (2)  there  is  no  cross-sectional  difference  among  sample  firms  with  different 
characteristics  (e.  g.,  industrial  affiliation,  financial  and  operating  structure,  stage  of  life 
cycle,  etc)  in  terms  of  the  relationships  between  group  sales  and  the  firm's  financial 
statement  and  market  data.  The  second  point  implies  that  the  relationships  between  sales 
and  PBT  (e.  g.,  profit  margin),  sales  and  By,  sales  and  equity  market  value,  etc.,  is 
176 similar  across  firms  operating  in  diflerenl  industries  or  firms  that  differ  in  some  other 
respect.  Realistically  though,  this  assumption  cannot  hold  in  practice. 
Similarly,  the  first  assumption  might  not  he  realistic  either,  as  the  whole  notion  of 
scale/size  remains  a  controversial  issue  in  the  literature.  I'hcrefore,  one  should  be 
careful  when  interpreting  the  sales-deflated  regression  results. 
Panel  A  of  Table  4.8  reports  regression  results  for  ten  till'-based  industries,  and 
Panel  B  reports  results  for  16  yearly  sub-samples.  The  industrial  regression  results 
demonstrate  how  different  the  industries  are  in  terms  of  the  pricing  of  specific  financial 
statement  information  and  the  combined  value  relevance  of'  all  accounting  variables. 
Book  values,  earnings  and  dividends  are  substantially  differently  priced  across  different 
industries.  In  addition,  the  role  of  specific  accounting  fundamentals  vary  notably  across 
different  industries. 
Table  4.8 
Panel  A:  Industry-based  regressions 
PBT  No. 
Industry**  Intercept  1/Sales  BV*  PBT  x  DIV  Adj.  ER  of 
Adj.  R- 
f(sales)  cases 
Square 
sic0  0.291  194.6  1.221  2.953  -0.842  -12.606  -5.379  92  90.1% 
t-ratio  2.452  0.292  5.665  0.959  -2379  -1.074  -1.910 
P-value  0.016  0.771  0.000  0.341  0.020  0.286  0.060 
sicl  -0.248  2424.3  1.229  5.655  -0.139  7.785  1.181  336  56.8% 
t-ratio  -1.029  3.165  8.385  2.643  -1.201  1.648  0.813 
P-value  0.304  0.002  0.000  0.009  0.231  0.100  0.417 
sic2  0.027  2345.1  0.445  1.594  -0.048  10.392  -3.093  736  527% 
t-ratio  0.850  2.766  2.675  1.369  -0.742  4.231  -2.221 
P-value  0.395  0.006  0.007  0.171  0.458  0.000  0.026 
sic3  -0.352  -20.5  1.185  7.097  0.045  6.616  1.008  2589  46.6% 
I-ratio  -5,047  -0.048  6  224  4,081  0.634  1.987  0.502 
P-value  0.000  0.961  0.000  0.000  0.526  0.047  0.616 
sic4  -0104  563.7  0.954  6.803  0.010  -2.269  -1.469  3325  42.5% 
t-ratio  -2.672  1.118  5.129  8.800  0.244  -0.818  -1.184 
P-value  0.008  0.264  0.000  0.000  0.807  0.413  0.237 
sic5  0.246  4829.8  0.064  4.337  0.120  3.960  -2.246  1197  42.0% 
t-ratio  4.730  3.200  0.706  3.459  1.600  1.128  -1.131 
P-value  0.000  0.001  0.480  0.001  0.110  0.259  0.258 
sic6  0.024  415.8  0.942  3.663  -0.023  3.639  -3.319  1371  37.3% 
t-ratio  0.317  1.068  3.818  2.429  -0.209  0.386  -1.092 
P-value  0.751  0.286  0000  0.015  0  834  0  1i99  0  275 
(tablc  is  continucd  on  the  next  page) 
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sic7  0  007  2115.1  0.234  8.782  0.038  1.918  0.789  1566  69  2'7 
t-ratio  0,332  7.421  4.148  9.931  0.889  1.055  1.284 
P-value  0.740  0.000  0.000  0.000  0374  0.291  0.199 
sic8  0.275  3213.4  -0.073  3.026  0.064  12.292  1.073  203  66.9% 
t-ratio  2.413  5.235  -0.681  1.595  0.575  4.424  0.581 
P-value  0.017  0.000  0.497  0.112  0.566  0.000  0.562 
sic9  0.283  949.7  0.708  6.603  0.249  -8.603  -0.542  2812  31.7% 
1-ratio  5.574  2.058  7.544  5.429  1.920  -4  217  -D.  800 
P-value  0  000  0.040  0  000  0.000  0-055  0  000  0  424 
Panel  B:  Yearly  regressions. 
PBT 
No.  of  Adj.  R- 
Intercept  1/Sales  BV*  PBT  x  DIV  Adj.  ER 
cases  Square 
f( f(sales) 
1987  -0  306  3890.7  0.597  6.167  0  063  16  500  4.513  354  55  4 
t-iatio  -1.852  2.095  3.475  2.346  0  245  1.622  0.897 
P-value  0.065  0.037  0.001  0.020  0.806  0.106  0.370 
1988  -0.152  1829.0  0.957  4.889  -0.097  8.007  0.232  933  62.0% 
t-ratio  -2.238  2.441  4.081  2.953  -1.136  1.948  0.289 
P-value  0.025  0.015  0.000  0,003  0.256  0.051  0.773 
1989  -0.159  347.7  1.090  5.570  0.055  -4.972  -3.125  1018  64.6% 
t-ratio  -2.195  0.813  6.833  2.978  0.641  -0.817  -1.202 
P-value  0.028  0.416  0.000  0.003  0.522  0.414  0.229 
1990  -0.133  1419.3  0.414  6.192  0.116  -2.556  0.475  999  52.7% 
t-ratio  -2.045  2.437  2.779  2.390  1.233  -0.344  1.073 
P-value  0.041  0.015  0.005  0.017  0.217  0.731  0.283 
1991  -0.010  903.2  0.525  3.803  0.070  4.586  -1.283  915  63.0% 
t-ratio  -0  214  2.403  5.021  2.338  0.740  1.424  -1.222 
P-value  0  830  0.016  0.000  0.019  0  459  0.154  0.222 
1992  0.092  192.8  0.181  6.981  0.006  1.298  -2.321  848  58.0% 
t-ratio  2.130  0.378  1.614  4.104  0.068  0.385  -0.988 
P-value  0.033  0.706  0.107  0.000  0.946  0.701  0.323 
1993  0.133  260.5  0.394  6.891  -0.099  6.104  -2.811  918  54.1% 
t-ratio  2  906  0.627  3.175  3.148  -1.366  1  546  -0.833 
P-value  0.004  0.531  0.001  0.002  0.172  0.122  0.405 
1994  0.030  610.0  0.792  7.312  -0.214  4.390  -1.887  1074  60.6% 
t-ratio  0.578  1.000  3.589  4.242  -2.835  1.224  -0.615 
P-value  0.563  0.317  0.000  0.000  0.005  0.221  0  538 
1995  -0.015  1528.0  0.539  6.748  -0.061  -0.864  -5.446  1074  63.6% 
t-ratio  -0.286  3.939  3.144  4.323  -0.811  -0.162  -1.355 
P-value  0.775  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.417  0.871  0.175 
1996  0.100  2547.6  0.431  9.631  -0.030  -2.576  1.868  1100  58.0% 
t-ratio  1.954  3.353  3342  5.480  -0.381  -0.681  2.338 
P-value  0.051  0.001  0.001  0.000  0  704  0.496  0.019 
1997  0.075  1505.0  0.866  7.474  -0.071  -4.089  -3.828  1137  42.9% 
t-ratio  1.048  1.632  3.826  4.191  -0.584  -1.061  -1429 
P-value  0.295  0.103  0.000  0.000  0.559  0.289  0.153 
1998  0.051  1630.0  0.425  8.762  0.218  -6.275  1.482  1047  33.3% 
t-ratio  0.700  1.643  3.201  4.163  1.716  -1.473  1.083 
P-value  0  484  0.100  0  001  0.000  0.086  0.141  0.279 
1999  0  158  1956.0  0.564  6  874  0.197  -3  068  -1.869  930  26.0% 
t-ratio  1510  1.607  3.427  3.165  1.377  -0.428  -0.696 
P-value  0.131  0.108  0.001  0.002  0169  0.669  0.487 
2000  0.221  2087.6  1  671  4.451  -0.018  -10.26  -3.704  825  41.2% 
t-ratio  2.1  16  2.245  8  316  2074  -0  124  -2.015  -1.163 
P-value  0.034  0.025  0000  0  038  O  901  O  044  0  :  '45 
(1a1)lc  is  cuntinucd  on  the  ncxt  pagc) 
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2001  0.208  1912.9  0.895  3.493  -0.020  -3.578  -7.184  713  46.6% 
t-ratio  2.331  2.379  4.715  1.477  -0.138  -0.994  -1.076 
P-value  0.020  0.017  0.000  0.140  0.890  0.320  0.282 
2002  0.142  1411.6  0.491  4.789  0.085  4.033  2,691  360  47.3% 
t-ratio  2.956  3.408  4.241  1.556  0.748  1.370  0.705 
P-value  0.003  0.001  0.000  0.121  0.455  0.172  0.481 
Entire  0.060  1337.4  0.711  6.427  0.031  -1.785  -0.836  14245  43.3% 
period 
t-ratio  3.066  6.369  13.155  12.414  1.019  -1.355  -1.122 
P-value  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.308  0.176  0  262 
White  adjusted  (hetcroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients.  Coefficients  which  are  statistically  significant  at  the  5"  io  level  are  highlighted.  Industrial  and 
yearly  samples  only  include  the  profit-making  firms  and  exclude  the  outliers.  Outliers  are  identified  on 
the  basis  of  the  entire  period  sample,  and  are  defined  as  top  and  bottom  0.5%  of  sale-deflated  MV,  I'll  f, 
13V  and  Div. 
*Negative  BVs  are  set  to  zero. 
**  The  employed  industry  SIC  abbreviations  are  as  follows:  SICO  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing; 
SICI  Mining;  SIC2  -  Construction;  SIC3  =  Food,  textile,  paper  and  chemical  products  (i.  e.,  two-digit 
SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SIC4  -  Manufacturing  (i.  e.,  two-digit  SI('  codes  of  20  through  29);  SICS 
Transportation,  Communications,  Electric,  Gas,  And  Sanctuary  Services;  SIC6  -  Wholesasle  Trade;  SIC7 
Retale  trade;  SICS  Finance,  Insurance,  and  Real  Estate;  SIC9  Services. 
Statistically,  there  are  three  industries  where  earnings  have  no  valuation  role: 
Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing  (SILO),  Finance  (SI('8),  and  Construction  (S1(2). 
Recall,  that  these  are  the  industries  with  the  highest  proportion  of  firms  trading  below 
book  value  (see  Figure  4.12),  implying  that  the  market  perceives  these  industries  to 
have  the  lowest  Iuture  expected  abnormal  earnings.  Bearing  in  mind  that,  in  the  context 
of  the  basic  valuation  model,  earnings  proxy  for  the  future  abnormal  earnings,  the  lack 
of  valuation  relevance  of  earnings  ill  the  three  industries  should  not  be  a  surprising 
result.  The  remaining  financial  statements  value  drivers  (i.  e.,  dividends  and  hook  value) 
and  the  control  variables  also  have  very  different  pricing  between  industries. 
Industry-related  differences  in  the  explanatory  power  of  the  regressions  are  even 
more  dramatic.  In  the  rlgriculturc,  1,  orestrt'  and  Eishing  industry,  the  basic  financial 
statement  variables  appear  to  explain  90'/)%,  of  the  cross-sectional  variation  of  the  market 
value  of  equity,  while  in  the  SL'rric"es  industry  the  Adjusted  Rý  is  only  3 
The  dynamics  of'  value  relevance  of  financial  statement  numbers  (Navel  It  ol, 
"Table  4.8)  is,  in  essence,  similar  to  that  found  in  the  TA  and  lagged  MV-deflated  yearly 
The  regressions.  c  sales-deflated  results  confirm  the  previous  finding  that  in  the  late 
179 1990s  there  has  been  a  substantial  decline  in  the  value  relevance  of  financial  statement 
numbers.  In  addition,  the  BV  and  PBT  remain  the  two  primary  value  drivers,  being 
statistically  significant  in  15  and  14  out  of  16  years,  respectively. 
By  and  large,  the  sales-deflated  regressions  reported  in  Table  4.8  generate 
somewhat  wider  divergence  in  the  results  (across  the  yearly  and  industry-related  sub- 
samples)  than  what  has  been  found  in  the  TA-deflated  regressions. 
4.4.3  Using  a  composite  scale  factor  as  a  deflator 
The  analysis  in  the  preceding  sections  demonstrates  that  empirical  results  can  be 
substantially  influenced  by  our  choice  of  the  scale  proxy.  Additional  tests  indicate  that 
outliers  (variables'  extreme  values)  are  also  excessively  influential  because  all  scaled 
variables  appear  to  have  extremely  peaked  and  right-skewed  frequency  distributions, 
engendering  spurious  correlations  between  variables.  The  analysis  suggests  that  this 
situation  is  a  scaling-driven  phenomenon,  in  that  extremely  large  (small)  values  of 
deflated  variables  are  the  result  of  extremely  small  (large)  values  of  the  size  proxy.  This 
is  particularly  true  with  regards  to  deflation  by  `sales',  because  sales  might  be 
disproportionately  high/low  in  some  firm-years.  Because  all  variables  are  sales- 
deflated,  regression  variables  are,  in  fact,  ratios.  For  this  reason  there  must  exist  some 
notional  interval  within  which  the  ratios  could  be  considered  to  have  `normal'  values. 
For  example,  it  would  be  rather  out  of  the  ordinary  for  the  MV-to-sales  or  PBT-to-Sales 
ratio  (i.  e.,  deflated  MV  or  deflated  PBT,  respectively)  to  equal  to  500,  or  0.05. 
Deflation,  however,  does  produce  numbers  of  this  degree  of  divergence. 
Furthermore,  in  a  bad  year,  for  instance,  a  large  firm  might  report  extremely  low  sales 
and  very  large  PBT  resulting  from  disposals,  asset  sales,  etc.  Note  that  in  this  case  not 
only  the  un-deflated  PBT  but  also  the  un-defalted  equity  book  value  would  go  up,  so 
180 that  scaling  by  low  sales  will  `inflate'  both  PBT  and  BV.  In  this  case,  sales  is  not 
representative  of  the  true  size  of  the  firm. 
Elimination  of  extreme  values  (top  and  bottom  0.5%)  of  scaled  variables  might 
trim  the  long  tail(s)  yet  this  only  slightly  `normalises'  frequency  distributions  and 
makes  deflated  variables  look  more  proportional,  as  discussed  above.  This  scale-driven 
problem  in  data  appears  to  exist  whichever  scale-proxy  is  used,  though  in  the  TA- 
deflated  model  specification  this  problem  is  less  severe. 
I  will  refer  to  the  above  problem  as  spurious  scaling.  In  general,  spurious  scaling 
arises  when  the  scale-proxy  fails  to  manifest  fairly  the  true  scale  of  the  firm.  The 
empirical  analysis  demonstrates  that  whichever  specific  accounting  or  market  variable  is 
used  as  a  deflator,  it  would  necessarily  generate  a  certain  percentage  of  spuriously 
scaled  firm-years.  The  good  news  is  that  one  observation  cannot  be  spuriously  scaled 
across  all  alternative  scale  proxies.  In  other  words,  if  TA  is  a  spurious  scale  proxy  for  a 
given  firm-year,  it  is  likely  that  Sales  or  MV  will  do  a  better  job  of  reflecting  that  firm- 
year's  fair  scale. 
This  prompts  the  creation  of  a  composite  scale  proxy,  which  will  partially 
diversify  away  scaling  deficiencies  inherent  in  a  particular  scale  proxy.  I  create  a 
composite  scale  proxy  by  equally  weighting  and  summing  up  three  alternative  scale 
proxies:  MV,  TA  and  Sales.  The  blended  scale  proxy  is  therefore:  scale  =  (MV  +TA 
+Sales)/3.  It  is  implicit  to  this  blended  scale  proxy,  that  every  constituent  variable 
equally  merits  for  being  regarded  as  a  scale  proxy. 
The  benefits  of  using  this  blended  scale  proxy  are: 
1.  It  recognises  the  complementary  roles  of  various  variables  in  reflecting  the 
true  size  of  the  firm; 
181 2.  It  accounts  for  three  broad  alternative  perceptions  of  what  firm  size  is,  i.  e.,  (i) 
the  stock  market  based  perception  of  size  (MV),  a  balance  sheet  based  perception  of 
size  (TA),  and  a  product  market  based  perception  of  size  (Sales); 
3.  It  substantially  diversifies  away  spurious  scaling  idiosyncrasies  specific  to  a 
single  variable-based  deflator  (see  Appendix  4.5  for  histograms  of  frequency 
distributions  of  the  alternatively  scaled  regression  variables);  and 
4.  It  is  measured  in  the  same  (monetary)  units  as  the  un-scaled  variables,  and 
also  serves  as  a  `numeraire'  for  firm  size. 
Sections  that  follow  examine  the  properties  of  composite-scaled  regressions,  for 
positive  and  negative  PBT  sub-samples,  and  yearly  and  industrial  valuation  patterns. 
Table  4.9  compares  regression  results  between  different  sub-samples  of  profit 
and  loss  firms.  A  comparison  of  model  1  vs.  2,  and  model  4  vs.  5  indicates  that  setting 
negative  BVs  to  zero  does  not  change  any  of  the  regression  parameters  in  the  profit 
firms  sub-sample,  and  only  marginally  affects  the  BV  coefficient  (making  it  even  more 
value  relevant),  yet  leaving  unaffected  the  remaining  regression  parameters,  in  the  loss 
firms  sub-sample.  In  contrast  to  the  results  from  the  entire  sample  of  profit  firms  in 
models  1  and  2,  model  3  reveals  that  in  dividend-paying  profitable  firms,  dividends  are 
positively  associated  with  value  and  are  highly  statistically  significant,  while  the  BV 
coefficient  is  lower  and  statistically  less  significant. 
When  firms  report  losses,  the  PBT  coefficient  has  a  much  lower  absolute  value 
and  level  of  statistical  significance  than  in  the  case  of  profitable  firms.  This  is  a  fairly 
common  finding  in  the  literature.  However,  this  coefficient  has  a  negative  sign,  which  is 
rather  unexpected,  as  this  would  suggest  that  the  larger  the  loss,  the  higher  is  the  firm 
value!  Recall,  that  the  same  result  was  found  in  TA,  lagged  MV  and  Sales-deflated 
regressions.  For  dividend-paying  loss-making  firms  (model  6)  the  negative  PBTs  are  no 
182 longcr  in  association  with  firm  value,  yet  dividends  appear  to  he  statistically  highly 
significant  and  positively  associated  with  value. 
Table  4.9 
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Profit  making  firms 
- 
Loss  making  firms 
--  -------------  Dividend  and  non-  --  Dividend  ---  Dividend  and  non-  Dividend 
Dividend  firms  firms  Dividend  firms  firms 
Modell  Model2  Model3  Model4  Mode15  Model6 
Intercept  0.640  0.637  0.587  1.040  0.976  0.467 
t-ratio  60.414  60.102  54.874  48.868  44.083  16.548 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Dummy  -0.509  -0.512  -0.447  -0.897  -0.930  -0.483 
t-ratio  -73.597  -74.501  -63.485  -57.582  -65.831  -27.456 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/Scale  188.2  181.7  75.5  351.5  300.6  622.5 
t-ratio  2,655  2.543  1.206  7.288  6.935  4.440 
p-value  0.008  0.011  0.228  0.000  0.000  0.000 
BV  0.257  0.267  0.149  0.497  0.672  0.537 
t-ratio  16.636  17.276  9.391  20.797  27.364  14.508 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  2.031  2.026  2.390  -0.242  -0.193  -0.062 
t-ratio  16.916  16.811  20.473  -3.377  -2.966  -0.596 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.003  0.551 
PBT*f(s)  0.041  0.041  0.039  0.043  0.047  -0.002 
t-ratio  4.604  4.531  4.595  4.425  5.055  -0.207 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.836 
DIV  0.391  0.385  2.586  -11.865  -11.769  2.523 
t-ratio  1.400  1.377  8.564  -15.828  -16.215  3.416 
p-value  0.161  0.168  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001 
Adj.  ER  0.212  0.206  0.569  0.208  0.237  0.171 
t-ratio  1.686  1.596  5.366  1.737  1.960  2.774 
p-value  0.092  0.111  0.000  0.082  0.050  0.006 
No.  of  cases  14213  14213  13146  3964  3964  1161 
Adj.  R-Square  27.5%  27.5%  30.1%  32.9%  33.2%  37.4% 
While  adjusted  (hcteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratius  and  p-values  are  reported  below  each  regression 
coefficient.  C'oef'ficients  which  are  statistically  significant  at  the  5  level  or  higher  are  highlighted. 
Models  are  scaled  by  the  composite  scale  factor,  which  is  computed  as:  scale  (MV  i  "I'A  i  Sales)3 
Models  are  estimated  for  profit-making  firms  and  exclude  the  outliers.  I'll  1*  flscale)  is  the  unsealed  143  1'. 
where  unsealing  is  computed  by  multiplying  the  scale-deflated  PI3'I'  by  the  5th  order  rout  of  the  scale 
factor.  This  mitigates  the  effect  of  extreme  values  of  the  un-deflated  raw  PU  l',  and  also  allows  for  non- 
linearity  in  the  functional  form  of  the  scaled  PI3'I'  coefficient.  Dummy  I  if  market-to-hook  ratio  is  greater 
than  unity,  and  _rru  otherwise.  Models  1  through  3  relate  to  profit  firm  sub-samples.  Models  4  through  6 
relate  to  loss  firms  sub-samples.  Models  I.  2,4  and  S  include  di\  idend  paying  and  non-di\  idend  firm- 
years,  while  models  3  and  6  are  estimated  for  dividend-paying  firms  only.  In  Models  2,3,  i  and  6 
negative  13Vs  are  set  to  iero. 
183 In  the  loss-firms  sub-samples  it  is  the  BV  variable  that  has  the  largest  statistical 
significance  and  positive  association  with  firm  value,  suggesting  that  BV  (followed  by 
dividends  in  dividend-paying  loss  making  firms)  is  the  major  value  driver.  In  profit- 
firms  sub-samples,  whether  dividend-paying  or  not,  it  is  the  PBT  which  is  the  major 
valuation  factor,  while  BV  and  dividends  are  of  second  and  third-order  importance. 
Some  other  general  conclusions  can  also  be  drawn  irrespective  of  the  firms' 
financial  results.  Firstly,  all  results  strongly  support  the  theoretical  construct,  developed 
in  Chapter  3,  that  a  positive  relation  exists  between  the  value  of  the  intercept  in  an  un- 
deflated  model  and  the  scale  of  the  firm.  The  indication  of  this  is  the  positive  value  and 
high  statistical  significance  of  the  intercept  in  all  of  the  six  scale-deflated  models  above. 
Secondly,  regardless  of  the  sign  of  financial  results,  the  PBT  coefficient  is  not  a 
cross-scale  constant,  but  is  scale-variant.  That  is,  the  PBT  coefficient,  as  indicated  by 
the  value  and  level  of  statistical  significance  of  the  PBT*f(s)  variable,  tends  to  have 
larger  absolute  value  for  firms  of  larger  scale.  Thirdly,  firms  that  trade  below  BV  have 
lower  valuation  than  what  my  model  would  predict  if  not  account  was  taken  of  this 
premium/discount.  This  is  indicated  by  highly  statistically  significant  negative  values  of 
the  dummy  variable. 
The  above  results  are  still  observable  when  the  entire  sample  is  split  into  16 
yearly  sub-samples.  However,  in  the  yearly  regressions,  as  reported  in  Table  4.10,  some 
additional  features  become  apparent. 
Among  the  three  value  drivers  (BV,  PBT,  Div)  PBT  appears  to  be  the  dominant 
valuation  factor,  with  BV  and  Dividends  `lagging'  behind.  Furthermore,  the  yearly 
`dynamics'  of  the  PBT  valuation  seems  to  reflect  the  general  economic  performance  of 
the  UK  economy:  high  in  good  years,  and  low  in  bad  years. 
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1987  0.557  -0.456  710  0.138  2.845  0.006  0.394  0.561  340  22.2% 
t-ratio  6.976  -9.305  2.592  1.179  3.450  0.113  0.173  1.002 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.010  0.239  0.001  0.910  0.863  0.317 
1988  0.462  -0.379  216  0.211  3.976  -0.090  1.228  0.130  900  30.2% 
t-ratio  10.331  -11.241  0.647  3.111  8.622  -2.873  0.958  0.423 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.517  0.002  0.000  0.004  0.338  0.672 
1989  0.473  -0.404  390  0.230  2.279  -0.024  4.689  -0.061  971  29.5% 
t-ratio  11.968  -13.666  1.020  3.951  5.582  -0.755  3.101  -0.305 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.308  0.000  0.000  0.451  0.002  0.760 
1990  0.327  -0.365  253  0.402  1.985  0.060  1.511  0.384  966  43.2% 
t-ratio  9.671  -16.438  0.936  9.041  5.451  2.078  1303  2.118 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.349  0.000  0.000  0.038  0.193  0.034 
1991  0.382  -0.377  -58  0.350  1.947  0.087  4.096  0.838  874  46.6% 
t-ratio  12.958  -16.528  -0.311  7.127  4.773  2  584  4.457  3.196 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.756  0.000  0.000  0.010  0.000  0.001 
1992  0.444  -0.392  -379  0.222  3.107  0.034  3.563  0.280  789  47.3% 
t-ratio  13.341  -13.970  -2.366  3.811  6.395  0.954  3.423  0.496 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.018  0.000  0.000  0.340  0.001  0.620 
1993  0.510  -0.381  -549  0.085  3.787  0.008  6.056  0.230  861  43.8% 
t-ratio  13.317  -12.370  -2.661  1.385  6.821  0.297  4  822  0.272 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.008  0.166  0.000  0.766  0.000  0.786 
1994  0.416  -0.356  -282  0155  4.622  -0.021  6.017  0.926  1000  45.3°/u 
t-ratio  14.019  -13.304  -1.197  2.997  9  755  -0.803  5.712  1.262 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.231  0.003  0.000  0.422  0.000  0.207 
1995  0.365  -0.307  -250  0.080  4.135  -0.021  5.794  -1.476  1014  44.6% 
t-ratio  11.347  -11.302  -0.865  1.566  7.790  -0.770  5.700  -1.331 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.387  0.117  0.000  0.441  0.000  0.183 
1996  0.530  -0.334  -46  0.002  4.408  0.028  2.777  1.008  1023  34.3% 
t-ratio  15.607  -11.019  -0.255  0.037  9.828  0.846  2.305  3.894 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.798  0.970  0.000  0.397  0.021  0.000 
1997  0.667  -0.424  206  -0.072  3.440  0.047  1.197  0.997  1047  25.9% 
t-ratio  16.915  -13.499  0.967  -1.196  7.411  1.359  0.991  2.416 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.333  0.232  0  000  0  174  0.321  0.016 
1998  0.770  -0.473  442  -0.086  1.428  0.100  1.873  0.879  950  26.7% 
t-ratio  16.744  -17.741  2.506  -1.454  3.363  3174  1.587  3.070 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.012  0.146  0.001  0.002  0113  0.002 
1999  0.884  -0.545  213  0.017  0.596  0.093  -0.347  -0173  839  21.5% 
t-ratio  16.349  -17.215  1.151  0.253  1.175  2.674  -0.294  -0.201 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.250  0.800  0.240  0.007  0.769  0  841 
2000  1.053  -0.682  -125  0.216  0.931  0,016  -4.603  0.670  715  27.4% 
t-ratio  18.899  -23.226  -0.716  3.078  1.673  0.443  -3.561  2  031 
P-  value  0.000  0.000  0.474  0.002  0.094  0.657  0.000  0  042 
(tahlc  is  crnntinucd  on  the  next  page) 
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2001  0.711  -0.561  212  0.268  1.257  0  066  -0.951  0.073  595  28.6  % 
t-ratio  14.261  -20.132  1.150  4,106  1.723  1  626  -0.778  0  049 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.250  0.000  0.085  0.104  0.437  0.961 
2002  0.477  -0.411  776  0.253  1.329  0.095  4.858  0.374  316  424% 
1-ratio  9.031  -12.510  1.851  3.634  2  157  2.167  3300  0  407 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.065  0.000  0.032  0.031  0.001  0.685 
I  Icterosckedasticity-robust  (White-adjusted)  t-ratius  ale  reported  below  coefficients.  Coefficients  which 
are  statistically  significant  at  the  5"  level  or  higher  are  highlighted. 
All  variables  in  the  reported  models  are  dcllated  by  the  composite  scale  proxy,  which  is  computed  as. 
scale  (MV  I  TA  I  Sales)/3.  Observations  with  missing  values  for  TA  or  Sales  are  excluded.  'fop  and 
bottom  0.5'%%  of  all  variables  are  excluded  as  outliers.  Outliers  are  identified  for  the  entire  pooled  sample. 
P13"1'*Scale  is  an  unsealed  raw  P13  1',  and  is  included  in  regression  to  indicate  whether  the  regression 
coefficient  on  P13T  in  the  un-deflated  model  is  a  function  ofscale.  P13T*Seale  is  computed  by  inultiplying 
the  scale-deflated  P13T  by  the  5"'  order  root  of  the  scale  factor.  The  5'1'  order  root  of  the  scale  is  used, 
instead  of  the  raw  scale,  in  order  to  mitigates  the  possible  uverintluential  effect  of  extreme  values  of 
unsealed  P13T,  and  to  allow  for  non-linearity  in  the  functional  fiirm  of  the  scales  P13T  coefficient. 
Dummy  I  if  market-to-book  ratio  is  greater  than  unity,  and  zero  otherwise.  All  yearly  regressions  include 
only  dividend-paying  profit  firms  (positive  P1'I'),  and  negative  13Vs  are  set  to  rero. 
Figure  4.22  demonstrates  that  capitalisation  of  earnings  was  low  in  periods  of 
economic  distress  (1990-91  and  1999-2002)  and  high  in  years  of  strong  economic 
growth  (1993-1997). 
Figure  4.22 
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Furthermore,  during  the  period  1999-200  1,  the  most  recent  period  of  economic 
downturn,  earnings  seem  to  entirely  have  lost  their  valuation  role,  as  P13"1'  coefficients  in 
these  years  are  not  statistically  significant  at  the  5`%o  level.  Association  ol'dividends  wilh 
firm  value  is  also  time-variant,  but  the  link  with  the  t  IK  general  economic  pcrförmancc 
186 is  less  obvious.  Dividends  are  highly  statistically  significant  and  positively  associated 
with  value  in  years  1991-1996,  while  in  more  recent  years  dividends  are  generally  not 
statistically  significant,  and  for  the  year  2000  dividends  show  statistically  significant 
and  negative  association  with  value.  Unlike  the  straightforward  valuation  role  that  the 
literature  assigns  to  earnings  (this  was  discussed  in  Chapter  3),  there  is  no  consensus  in 
the  literature  about  dividends'  valuation  role.  My  empirical  evidence  indicates  that  not 
only  the  degree  of  association  with  firm  value,  but  in  a  more  broader  cerise  the  role  of 
dividends  in  equity  valuation  is  changing  through  time.  Further  theoretical  and 
empirical  exploration  of  this  issue  might  be  a  useful  exercise,  yet  it  is  beyond  the  scope 
of  this  study. 
While  PBT  is  statistically  significant  in  13  out  of  16  years,  BV  is  significantly 
associated  with  value  only  in  9  years.  Furthermore,  the  better  the  general  economic 
outlook  of  the  country,  the  less  value  relevant  is  By.  In  other  words,  the  results  show 
that  in  `bad'  economic  years  (1990-1992  and  2000-2002),  BVs  are  positively  associated 
with  value  and  are  statistically  significant,  while  in  most  of  years  when  economic 
growth  was  strong  (1993,1995-1998)  BVs  were  value-irrelevant.  When  all  three  value 
drivers  (PBT,  BV  and  Dividends)  are  examined  jointly,  it  appears  that  throughout  the  16 
year  sample  period  the  role  of  the  major  value  factor(s)  have  been  alternating  among 
these  variables. 
The  dynamics  of  the  explanatory  power  of  yearly  regressions  shows  a  distinct 
variation  in  the  joint  ability  of  financial  statement  data  to  explain  the  firm's  equity 
market  value.  In  the  fist  half  of  the  1990s  the  explanatory  power  is  substantially  higher 
than  in  the  second  half  of  1990s.  This  result  persists  throughout  all  our  model 
specifications  and  deflation  methods,  and  is  also  in  line  with  findings  of  Core  et  al. 
(2003)  regarding  the  relative  importance  of  financial  statement  data  to  firm  valuation  in 
the  periods  of  `old'  and  `new'  economy.  Qualitatively  identical  results  in  respect  of  the 
187 regression  explanatory  power,  as  well  as  PBT,  BV  and  dividend  valuation  are  observed 
in  TA-deflated  and  Sales-deflated  regressions. 
The  yearly  regression  results  support  the  general  valuation  characteristics 
observed  in  the  total  sample.  That  is,  as  it  was  in  the  entire  sample,  all  yearly  results 
indicate  that  a  positive  relation  exists  between  the  value  of  the  intercept  in  an  un- 
deflated  model  and  the  scale  of  the  firm.  The  indication  of  this  is  the  positive  value  and 
high  statistical  significance  of  the  intercept  in  all  16  years.  Furthermore,  firms  that  trade 
below  BV  have  lower  valuation  than  what  the  model  would  predict  if  no  account  was 
taken  of  this  premium/discount.  This  is  indicated  by  highly  statistically  significant 
negative  values  of  the  dummy  variable  in  all  yearly  regressions. 
Finally  I  investigate  valuation  differences  across  industries.  Figure  4.23,  which 
is  based  on  the  results  reported  in  Table  4.11,  presents  clear  evidence  of  sharp 
differences  existing  across  industries  in  how  accounting  information  maps  into  the 
firm's  value.  The  overall  ability  of  our  scale-deflated  accounting-based  valuation  model 
to  explain  cross-sectional  variation  in  the  firm's  value  varies  substantially  across 
industries,  and  these  patters  are  similar  to  TA-deflated  regressions. 
Relative  valuation  of  PBTs  and  dividends  varies  substantially  across  different 
industries.  Thus  earnings  have  lower  capitalisation  in  such  `basic'  industries  as 
`Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing',  'Mining',  'Construction'  and,  surprisingly,  in  the 
'Finance,  Insurance  and  Real  Estate'  sector.  PBTs  from  the  Wholesale  Trade',  'Retail 
Trade'  and  'Transportation,  Communications,  Electric,  etc'  sectors  have  the  highest 
capitalisation. 
Results  in  Table  4.11  and  Figure  4.23  are  remarkably  similar  to  those  where  a 
different  scale  factor,  total  assets,  was  used.  This  reconfirms  the  robustness  of  the 
differences  in  how  investors  perceive  and  capitalise  earnings  of  firms  operating  in 
188 dilicrent  industrics.  'Flic  cross-ind(Istry  diffcrcntial  pricing  of'  carnings  might  provide  '111 
cxhlanation  with  regard  to  the  valuation  of  shecific  busificss  Segment  Operations 
Table  4.11 
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SIC  0  0.362  -0.465  402  0.622  0.395  -0.284  12.034  -1.101  101  6&9% 
t-ratio  5.354  -9.787  1.187  5.843  0.581  -2.418  3.529  -1.143 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.238  0.000  0.563  0.018  0.001  0.256 
SIC  1  1.132  -0.637  1429  -0.001  0999  -0.061  1.730  1.440  217  29.9% 
t-ratio  7.760  -10.484  1.898  -0.011  1.401  -1.803  0.661  2.048 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.059  0.992  0.163  0.073  0.509  0.042 
SIC  2  0.258  -0.331  485  0.558  0.891  -0.002  5.955  0.043  707  49.9% 
t-ratio  8.527  -18.532  1.472  7.093  2.048  -0.056  5.169  0.070 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.141  0.000  0.041  0.955  0.000  0.945 
SIC  3  0.677  -0.441  463  -0.004  1.426  0.106  2.381  0.970  2507  31.6% 
t-ratio  22.809  -25.485  3.058  -0.080  5.262  5.626  3.385  3.036 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.936  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.002 
SIC  4  0.602  -0.358  -53  -0.034  2.703  0.023  2.471  0.564  3170  34.5% 
t-ratio  27.548  -28.302  -0.476  -0.861  12.310  1.416  3.919  2.792 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.634  0.389  0.000  0.157  0.000  0.005 
SIC  5  0.620  -0.370  796  -0.066  1.964  0.031  6.880  0.371  1129  26.0% 
t-ratio  17.305  -12.866  2.321  -1.134  5.203  1.566  6.803  1.705 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.020  0.257  0.000  0.117  0.000  0.088 
SIC  6  0.411  -0.334  258  0.080  2.977  0.077  3.115  0.838  1279  34.8% 
t-ratio  16.683  -14.378  3.252  1.574  7.461  2.521  2.783  2.011 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.116  0.000  0.012  0.005  0.044 
SIC  7  0.381  -0.419  143  0.310  4.110  0.017  3.299  0.632  1478  44.7% 
t-ratio  15.537  -24.116  0.731  9.076  10.852  0.774  3.754  2.410 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.465  0.000  0.000  0.439  0.000  0.016 
SIC  8  0.216  -0.377  2222  0.248  1.013  0.119  9.805  -1.178  183  62.4% 
t-ratio  4.445  -6.296  6.019  2.842  1.124  1.835  4.563  -1.381 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.005  0.262  0.068  0.000  0.169 
SIC  9  0.856  -0.564  -243  0.176  1.672  0.109  -1.152  0.486  2415  21.7% 
t-ratio  28.960  -30.140  -2.709  5.268  4.449  2.561  -1.815  1.385 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.007  0.000  0.000  0.010  0.070  0.166 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  each  regression 
coefficient.  Coefficients  which  are  statistically  significant  at  the  5  le  el  or  higher  are  highlighted. 
Industrial  models  are  scaled  by  the  composite  scale  fäctor,  which  is  computed  as:  scale 
(MV+'I'A-ISalcs)/3.  All  models  are  estimated  for  profit-making  firms  and  exclude  the  outliers.  PI3"I'* 
f(scalc)  is  the  unsealed  PHI',  where  unsealing  is  computed  by  multiplying  the  scale-deflated  PHI  by  the 
5th  order  root  of  the  scale  factor.  This  mitigates  the  effect  of  extreme  values  of  the  Lill-deflated  racy  P131', 
and  also  allows  for  non-linearity  in  the  functional  form  of  the  scaled  PHI'  coefficient.  All  regressions 
include  only  dividend-paying  profit  firsts  (positiyc  PHI'),  and  negative  HVs  are  set  to  icro. 
*  The  employed  industry  SIC  abbreviations  are  as  follows:  SIC()  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing: 
SICI  Mining:  SIC2  Construction:  SI('i  Food,  textile,  paper  and  chemical  products  (i.  c.,  1"o-digit 
SIC  codes  of  2O  through  29):  SI('4  Manufacturing  (i.  e.,  two-digit  SIC  codes  of'_)  through  29):  SI('S 
'transportation,  ('onununicalions,  Electric,  Gas,  And  Sanctuary  Services:  SI('O  \V'holesaslc'trade:  SIC7 
Retale  trade:  SI('S  Finance,  Insurance,  and  Real  Istate:  SI('9  Services. 
",  Valuation  of  line-of-business  segments  is  addressed  in  chapter  6. 
189 Figure  4.23 
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*  The  employed  industry  SIC  abbreviations  are  as  follows:  SICO  =  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing; 
SICI  =  Mining;  SIC2  =  Construction;  SIC3  =  Food,  textile,  paper  and  chemical  products  (i.  e.,  two-digit 
SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SIC4  =  Manufacturing  (i.  e.,  two-digit  SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SIC5  = 
Transportation,  Communications,  Electric,  Gas,  And  Sanctuary  Services;  SIC6  =  Wholesasle  Trade;  SIC7 
=  Retale  trade;  SIC8  =  Finance,  Insurance,  and  Real  Estate;  SIC9  =  Services. 
Dividends  appear  to  be  the  `strongest'  valuation  factor,  as  its  coefficients  are 
highly  statistically  significant  in  8  out  of  10  industries,  compared  to  7  our  of  10 
statistically  significant  industrial  earnings  coefficients.  Furthermore,  all  statistically 
significant  dividend  coefficients  are  positively  associated  with  firm  value.  Both  in  TA- 
deflated  and  in  the  current  model  specification  dividends  paid  by  'Services'  firms 
appear  at  the  lowest  end  of  association  with  firm  value.  Furthermore,  although  not 
statistically  significant,  dividends  coefficient  in  this  sector  appears  with  a  negative  sign. 
In  contrast  to  the  'Services'  sector,  dividends  paid  by  'Agriculture,  Forestry  and 
Fishing'  firms  have  the  highest  valuation  (i.  e.,  highest  dividend  multiplier),  while 
earnings  multiplier  in  this  sector  is  not  statistically  significant.  Further  statistical 
analysis  (not  reported)  provide  some  indication  that  across  the  majority  of  industries 
dividends  (in  the  dividend-paying  samples)  are  at  least  as  value  relevant  as  earnings, 
while  book  values  are  less  relevant  in  most  of  the  industries.  The  dividend-paying 
condition  is  emphasised  because  this  result  is  no  longer  observable  when  regressions  are 
190 estimated  on  industrial  samples  that  pool  both  dividend-paying  and  non-dividend  firms. 
In  the  latter  case,  it  is  the  earnings  that  become  the  major  value  driver. 
The  ability  of  our  simple  accounting  numbers-based  model  to  explain  the  cross- 
sectional  variation  in  firm  value  also  varies  substantially  across  industries.  In  some 
economic  sectors  it  appears  to  explain  nearly  70%  of  the  variation  in  dependent 
variable,  while  in  others  the  adjusted  R-Square  is  less  than  30%.  Thus  the  accounting- 
based  valuation  model  works  consistently  (across  alternative  ways  of  scaling)  better  for 
'Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing'  and  'Finance,  Insurance  and  Real  Estate'  sectors, 
and  worse  for  the  'Services'  sector.  This  evidence,  perhaps,  provides  a  summary 
measure  of  the  reliability  of  asset  numbers,  and/or  the  quality  and  permanence  of 
earnings  numbers  across  different  industries. 
Finally,  as  was  the  case  in  the  yearly  regressions,  the  positive  sign  and  high 
statistical  significance  of  intercepts  in  all  scale-deflated  industrial  regressions  indicate 
that  the  intercept  in  an  un-deflated  model  is  not  a  cross-scale  constant,  but  varies  with 
the  firm's  scale.  Industrial  regression  analysis  also  reconfirms  the  previous  finding  that 
firms  trading  below  BV  have  lower  valuation  than  what  our  model  would  predict  if  no 
account  was  taken  of  this  premium/discount.  This  is  indicated  by  highly  statistically 
significant  negative  values  of  the  dummy  variable  in  all  yearly  regressions. 
4.4.4  Testing  the  impact  of  the  outliers  and  the  variables'  extreme  values 
Across  all  alternative  scale-proxies,  deflation  by  the  `blended  scale'  proxy 
produces  the  most  robust  regression  parameters  when  different  levels  of  variables' 
extreme  values  are  marked  and  eliminated  as  outliers.  Because  it  is  the  actual  values  of 
segment-level  earnings  coefficients  that  we  will  be  comparing  (to  draw  segment 
valuation  inferences)  during  the  segment-level  analysis,  the  robustness  of  regression 
parameters,  to  the  researcher's  discretion  over  the  choice  of  a  threshold  for  identifying 
191 and  eliminating  outliers,  is  of  vital  importance.  'I'hc  `blended  scale'  proxy  is  the  only 
deflator  that  produces  results  which  arc  by  far  less  sensitive  to  the  elimination  of 
di  f  ercnt  percentages  of'  extreme  observations  than  any  other  dc  flator. 
Table  4.12  reports  basic  regression  results  where  diflcrent  percentages  offextreme 
observations  are  being  eliminated  from  the  sample. 
Table  4.12 
nn/s=noo  *(1/s)+(I￿i  +ai  *(13V  /s")+a,,,  ls)+ 
+a,,  i 
*[T(s)*(PBT,  ls)J+a,  *(DII'ls)+a,  *(ArljliRls)+ir, 
Percentage  of  Variables'  Extreme  Values  Eliminated  as  Outliers 
0.0%  0.2%  0.4%  0.5%  0.6%  0.8%  1.0%  1.2% 
Model  1  Model  2  Model  3  Model  4  Models  Model  6  Model  7  Model  8 
Intercept  0.679 
t-ratio  42.403 
p-value  0.000 
Dummy  -0.490 
t-ratio  -50.9 
p-value  0.000 
1/Scale  140.10 
t-ratio  2.212 
p-value  0.027 
BV  0.157 
t-ratio  8.299 
p-value  0.000 
PBT  1.684 
t-ratio  10.912 
p-value  0.000 
PBT*f(s)  0.047 
t-ratio  4.014 
p-value  0.000 
Dividends  1.009 
t-ratio  1.411 
p-value  0.158 
Adj.  ER  0.183 
t-ratio  1.160 
p-value  0.246 
No.  of  cases  13432 
Adj.  R2  26.9% 
0.615  0.595  0.587  0.582  0.571  0.556  0.556 
55.300  55.219  54.874  54.541  53.736  53.481  52.894 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
-0.454  -0.449  -0.447  -0.445  -0.442  -0.439  -0.437 
-64.3  -63.6  -63.5  -63.3  -63.0  -63.485  -62.723 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
107.70  88.60  75.50  77.20  55.50  38.10  52.10 
1.747  1.418  1.206  1.222  0.880  0.602  0.828 
0.081  0.156  0.228  0.222  0.379  0.547  0.408 
0.133  0.143  0.149  0.152  0,163  0.183  0.179 
8.419  9.054  9.391  9.476  10.066  11.471  11.014 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
2.063  2.269  2.390  2.458  2.583  2.672  2.708 
17.158  19.303  20.473  21.019  22.175  23.104  23.136 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
0.045  0.042  0.039  0.040  0.038  0.034  0.035 
5.276  4.951  4.595  4.749  4.529  4.144  4.246 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
2.816  2.728  2.586  2.457  2.238  2.073  1.897 
9.315  8.939  8.564  8.114  7.458  7.028  6.326 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
0.539  0.565  0.569  0.584  0.582  0.519  0.486 
4.806  5.255  5.366  5.490  5.655  4.957  4.479 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
13324  13212  13146  13076  12952  12793  12672 
28.7%  29.8%  30.1  %,  30.3%  30.6%  31.3%  31.0% 
White  adjusted  (hetcroske(iasticity-consistent)  1-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  belay  each  rewression 
coeltieicnt.  ('oefficients  which  are  statistically  significant  at  the  5  Icyel  or  higher  are  highlighted.  All 
regressions  are  scaled  by  the  composite  scale  factor.  Model  I  includes  all  observations,  i.  e.,  no  cases  are 
excluded.  Model  2  excludes  cases  with  top  and  bottom  0.2  extreme  values  of  MV,  Piaf,  ItV  and  non- 
/cro  Dividends.  Model  3  does  so  for  the  extreme  0.4",,  o('thesc  variables'  values,  etc. 
All  regressions  itic  Iude  only  dividend-paying  profit-making  firms,  and  negative  ItVs  are  set  to  /CIO. 
192 The  eight  models  of  Table  4.12  demonstrate  that  the  biggest  `jump'  in  regression 
parameters  occurs  when  the  top  and  bottom  0.2%  of  firm-years  are  eliminated  as 
outliers,  while  the  effect  of  subsequent  eliminations  on  regression  parameters 
diminishes  gradually.  There  is  a  slightly  increasing  (decreasing),  yet  at  a  diminishing 
rate,  trend  of  the  value  of  PBT  (Dividend)  coefficients,  when  more  of  extreme  cases  are 
eliminated.  However,  this  change  is  more  likely  to  reflect  certain  valuation 
characteristics  of  accounting  numbers,  rather  than  being  an  econometric  phenomenon3o 
For  reasons  of  comparability  with  results  reported  in  other  studies,  all  tests  reported  in 
the  further  empirical  analysis  chapters  are  done  with  the  0.5%  trimming. 
4.5  CONCLUSIONS 
The  primary  objective  of  this  chapter  has  been  to  examine  the  general 
characteristics  of  the  properties  of  the  operationalised  valuation  model,  when  applied  to 
firm-level  accounting  value  drivers.  In  the  process  of  this  investigation,  a  wide  range  of 
hypotheses  and  contexts  have  been  empirically  tested  in  order  to  identify  those  which 
impact  on  the  empirical  relationship  between  the  equity  market  values  and  financial 
statement  variables. 
Prior  to  addressing  the  main  objective,  I  have  extensively  reviewed  and  analysed 
(i)  the  yearly  and  industry-specific  characteristics  of  the  sample  employed  in  this  study, 
and  (ii)  the  descriptive  statistics  of  variables  used  in  subsequent  regression  analysis. 
This  descriptive  analysis  has  revealed  some  important  contexts,  which  substantiate  the 
subsequent  empirical  results  related  to  the  primary  objective  of  this  chapter. 
30  The  existing  literature  [e.  g.,  Hayn  (1995),  Collins  et  al.  (1997)]  holds  that  value  relevance  and  pricing 
of  earnings  is  linked  to  the  level  of  their  (ab)normality.  That  is,  the  capitalisation  and  value  relevance  of 
earnings  is  higher  when  earnings  are  more  normal.  The  elimination  of  a  larger  percentage  of  outliers, 
which  include  abnormally  high/low  earnings,  increases  the  proportion  of  normal  earnings  left  in  the 
sample,  and,  therefore,  increases  the  pricing  and  value  relevance  of  earnings.  Because  dividends  are  more 
informative  when  other  value  drivers  are  perceived  to  be  of  a  lower  persistence  (e.  g.,  abnormally  high  or 
low  earnings),  the  decrease  of  the  value  relevance  and  pricing  of  dividends  can  be  expected  when  more 
normal  earnings  constitute  the  sample. 
193 The  final  sections  of  the  chapter  have  dealt  with  issues  of  robustness  of  the 
empirical  results,  such  as,  the  results'  sensitivity  to  the  choice  of  alternative  scale- 
deflators,  and/or  threshold  applied  for  eliminating  the  outliers. 
The  empirical  analysis  (and  the  results)  in  this  chapter  is  fundamental  for  taking 
the  investigation  further  on  to  the  segmental  level.  The  results,  in  its  own  right,  appear 
to  tell  an  interesting  story  about  the  contexts  affecting  the  value  relevance  of  specific 
accounting  variables.  Below  I  provide  a  brief  summary  of  the  empirical  tests'  results. 
With  regard  to  the  explanatory  power  of  the  regression  (the  Adjusted  R-Square), 
results  suggest  that  the  operationalised  model  performs  differently  across  different 
economic  sectors  and  periods.  For  instance,  the  explanatory  power  for  the  financial 
sector  firms  is  more  than  twice  as  high  as  that  of  the  mining  sector.  Results  also  reveal  a 
peculiar  historical  pattern  of  the  R-Square:  it  had  a  steadily  increasing  trend  before 
1995,  and  a  sharply  declining  trend  in  the  second  half  of  the  1990s.  The  model  also 
explains  more  of  the  cross-sectional  variation  in  equity  market  value  when  (i)  firms 
trade  at  a  discount  to  book  value,  (ii)  firms  pay  dividends,  and  (iii)  when  the  reported 
PBTs  are  positive. 
The  value  relevance  of  PBT  depends  on  its  sign.  The  reported  losses  appear  not  to 
be  value  relevant,  yet  when  the  PBT  is  positive,  it  has  a  robustly  positive  and 
statistically  significant  value  association.  In  addition,  when  the  reported  PBT  is  positive, 
the  magnitude  of  the  PBT  coefficient  appears  to  be  positively  related  to  the  size  of  the 
firm.  The  capitalisation  of  the  PBT  varies  substantially  across  different  economic 
sectors,  being  particularly  large  in  the  services  and  trade-related  sectors,  and  notably 
small  in  the  finance,  construction  and  agriculture  related  sectors.  The  capitalisation  of 
the  PBT  has  also  varied  substantially  throughout  the  sample  period,  yet  without  a 
particular  trend.  Results  also  indicate  that  the  PBT  tends  to  have  little  or  no  valuation 
role  when  the  firm  trades  below  its  book  value. 
194 Book  value  of  equity  is,  in  general,  a  value  relevant  factor,  but  the  extent  of  its 
value  association  (valuation  importance)  varies  considerably  across  the  industries  and 
the  sample  years.  It  becomes  the  major  value  driver  when  the  firm  reports  losses,  and/or 
trades  below  the  book  value.  However,  negative  book  values  have  no  association  with 
value. 
By  and  large,  results  indicate  that  dividends  are  a  key  value  driver  and,  in  the 
majority  of  situations,  are  positively  associated  with  the  firm  equity  value.  Dividends 
display  a  higher  association  with  firm  value  when  firms  report  negative  BVs  and/or 
PBTs.  However,  there  are  circumstances  when  dividends  appear  to  play  contrasting 
valuation  roles:  they  are  positively  (negatively)  related  to  the  firm  value  when  firms 
trade  at  a  premium  (discount)  to  book  value.  Finally,  results  indicate  that  the  role  played 
by  dividends  in  equity  valuation  (or  the  value  association  of  dividends)  varies  sharply 
both  across  the  ten  industry  groups  and  different  years  of  the  sample  period. 
195 APPENDIX  4.1 
The  following  Extel  reference  details,  financial  statement  and  market  data  is  collected 
for  each  company: 
1.  Extel  reference  details 
Extel  Number 
Company  Name 
Former  Name 
Year  Final 
Industry  (according  to  FTSE  Global  Classification  System) 
SIC  Industry  (according  to  Standard  Industrial  Classification  System) 
Status  (dead  or  live) 
2.  Financial  Statement  Data 
2.1.  Firm-level  data: 
Sales  (i.  e.  group  sales) 
Profit  Before  Tax  (group  profit  before  tax) 
Net  Assets  (group  net  assets) 
Total  Assets  (group  total  assets) 
Debt  (group  total  debt) 
Total  Shareholders'  Equity 
Ordinary  Shareholders'  Equity 
Net  Income 
Dividends  for  the  year 
Ordinary  Dividends 
Sales  Growth 
2.2.  Segment-level  data 
2.2.1.  Profit  Before  Tax  (PBT)  by  geographical  origin  of  profits: 
PBT  -  UK 
PBT  -  Europe  (excluding  UK) 
PBT  -  America 
PBT  -  Asia 
PBT  -  Middle  East  and  Africa 
PBT  -  Rest  (this  is  a  balancing  item  that  includes  intra-group  profits,  discontinued 
operations,  unidentified  geographical  locations,  central  cost  allocatioin, 
196 exceptional  charges,  etc.,  and  equates  group  PBT  and  the  sum  of  segment-level 
PBTs) 
2.2.2.  Sales  by  geographical  origin  of  sales: 
SALES  -  UK 
SALES  -  Europe  (excluding  UK) 
SALES  -  America 
SALES  -  Asia 
SALES  -  Middle  East  and  Africa 
SALES  -  Rest  (this  is  a  balancing  item  that  accounts  for  intra-group  sales, 
discontinued  operations,  sales  from  unidentified  geographical  locations,  etc.,  and 
equates  group  sales  and  the  sum  of  segment-level  sales) 
2.2.3.  Net  Assets  (NA)  by  geographical  location  of  assets: 
NA-UK 
NA  -  Europe  (excluding  UK) 
NA  -  America 
NA  -  Asia 
NA  -  Middle  East  and  Africa 
NA  -  Rest  (this  is  a  balancing  item  that  reflect  intra-group  net  assets,  discontinued 
operations,  unidentified  geographical  locations,  unallocated  net  assets,  etc.,  and 
equates  group  NA  and  the  sum  of  segment-level  NAs) 
3.  Firm-level  data: 
Share  Price  at  Period  End 
Number  of  Shares  at  Balance  Sheet  date 
Market  Capitalization  at  Balance  Sheet  date 
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<**** APPENDIX  4.3 
Panel  A 
Descriptive  statistics  on  key  regression  variables  when  only  profit  firm-years, 
when  total  sample  is  restricted  only  to  profit  firm-years. 
Only  positive  PBT  cases,  and  excluding  outliers' 
MV/TA  BV/TA  PBT/TA  PBT  1/TA  DIV/TA** 
Mean  1.139  0.458  0.109  50585.284  4.86E-05  0.032 
Median  0.859  0.460  0.095  5232  1.84E-05  0.027 
Standard  0.990  0.196  0.074  197018.1  0.0001  0.052 
Deviation 
Kurtosis  11.854  1.627  2.677  175.232  166.903  8874.419 
Skewness  2.855  -0.490  1.348  10.704  9.401502  85.261 
Minimum  0.023  -0.667  0.001  3  6.52E-09  8.35E-05 
Maximum  8.985  0.955  0.490  6029000  0.003  5.413 
Count  14496  14496  14496  14496  14496  13379 
*  outliers  are  defined  as  top  and  bottom  0.5%  of  MV/TA,  BV/TA  and  PBT/TA  values 
**  only  dividend-paying  firm  years  are  included 
Pearson  Correlation  matrix 
MV/TA  BV/TA  PBT/TA  PBT  1/TA 
MV/TA  1 
BV/TA  0.090  1 
PBT/TA  0.597  0.059  1 
PBT  0.052  -0.073  0.064  1 
1/TA  0.110  0.112  0.079  -0.113  1 
DIV/TA  *  0.217  0.048  0.284  0.033  0.045 
*  coefficients  are  computed  for  only  dividend-paying  firms 
200 Panel  B 
Descriptive  statistics  on  key  regression  variables  when  only  profit  firm-years, 
when  total  sample  is  restricted  only  to  loss  firm-years. 
Only  negative  PBT  cases,  and  excluding  outliers  * 
MV/TA  BV/TA  PBT/TA  PBT  1/TA  DIV/TA"' 
Mean  1.702  0.369  -0.307  -25927  0.0002  0.017 
Median  0.659  0.421  -0.127  -2325  5.58E-05  0.012 
Standard  3.094  0.569  0.605  280341  0.0006  0.019 
Deviation 
Kurtosis  32.381  51.886  59.918  1504  380.056  65.711 
Skewness  4.837  -5.528  -6.439  -36  15.329  6.188 
Minimum  0.016  -7.576  -8.987  -1.4E+07  5.8E-09  2.63E-05 
Maximum  37.446  0.984  -0.001  -5  0.020  0.272 
Count  4207  4207  4207  4207  4207  1182 
*  outliers  are  defined  as  top  and  bottom  0.5%  of  MV/TA,  BV/TA  and  PBT/TA 
values. 
**  only  dividend-paying  firm  years  are  included 
Pearson  Correlation  matrix 
MV/TA  BV/TA  PBT/TA  PBT  1/TA 
MV/TA  1 
BV/TA  0.077  1 
PBT/TA  -0.236  0.232  1 
PBT  0.026  0.002  0.009  1 
INA  0.307  -0.188  -0.402  0.028  1 
DIV/TA'  0.216  0.011  -0.187  0.012  0.017 
*  coefficients  are  computed  for  only  dividend-paying  firms 
Panel  C 
Test  of  significance  of  difference  between  variables'  mean  values  in  Panels  A 
and  B. 
Statistical  difference  between  means  of  two  sub-samples' 
MV/TA  BV?  A  PBT/TA  PBT  1/TA  DIV/TA 
Z-score  -11.627^  9.945A  44.382  ^  16.555A  -15.389A  21.09811 
*  the  significance  of  difference  between  the  means  of  two  independent  large  sample 
is  infurred  by  using  the  two-tailed  z-test  to  test  the  following  null  hypothesis: 
HO:  mean  (variable  1)  -  mean  (variable  2)  =0 
A  the  null  hypothesis  is  rejected  at  11%  level. 
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Frequency  distribution  of  deflated  MV,  PBT,  BV  and  1)1V  variables 
In  the  graphs  that  follow  the  left  hand  side  panels  show  the  scale-dellated  variables' 
frequency  distributions  before  the  elimination  of  outliers.  The  right  hand  side  panels 
show  the  frequencies  after  the  outliers,  the  top  and  bottom  0.5°  of  cases,  have  been 
eliminated. 
Exhibit  A.  composite  scale  proxy  =  1/3*MV+1/3*TA+1/3*Sales 
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203 Exhibit  B:  scale  proxy  =  Group  Total  Assets 
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206 APPENDIX  4.6 
The  names  of  variables  used  in  Appendix  4.6  regressions  are: 
BV  =  book  value  of  equity; 
PBT  =  Profit  Before  Tax; 
Div  =  ordinary  dividends; 
PBT*f(mv)  =  unscaled  PBT  in  lagged  MV-scaled  models; 
PBT*f(ta)  =  unsealed  PBT  in  Total  Assets-scaled  models; 
1/MV=the  reciprocal  of  the  scale  factor  in  the  one  year  lagged  equity  market  value- 
scaled  regressions; 
1/TA  =  the  reciprocal  of  the  scale  factor  in  the  TA-scaled  regressions; 
Adj.  ER  =  earnings  for  ordinary  -  PBT; 
1/  Dummy  =  1,  if  BV<O,  and  zero  otherwise; 
DumBV  is  the  negative  BV  interaction  term:  DumBV=BV,  if  BV<O,  and  zero 
otherwise. 
Table  1 
Profit  making,  dividend 
paying  and  non-paying  firms 
Model  I 
Coeff.  t-ratio  p-value 
Loss  making,  dividend  paying  and 
non-paying  firms 
Model  2 
Coeff.  t-ratio  p-value 
Intercept  0.854  46.632  0.000  0.576  10.926  0.000 
Dummy  0.196  3.032  0.002  0.066  0.815  0.415 
1/MV  -80.38  -1.150  0.250  1005.1  3.516  0.000 
BV  0.101  5.327  0.000  0.404  7.180  0.000 
DumBV  -0.160  -0.564  0.573  -0.543  -5.378  0.000 
PBT  2.103  10.894  0.000  -0.510  -2.920  0.003 
PBT  x 
f(mv)  -0.048  -3.939  0.000  0.056  2.349  0.019 
DIV  1.587  4.022  0.000  0.754  0.454  0.650 
Adj.  ER  0.166  1.223  0.221  -0.254  -2.074  0.038 
No.  of 
Cases  12737  3691 
Adj. 
R-square  13.0%  13.3% 
Wald 
p-value  **  0.861  0.669 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  each 
regression  coefficient. 
BV  =  book  value  of  equity;  PBT  =  Profit  Before  Tax;  Div  =  ordinary  dividends;  PBT*f(mv)  _ 
unscaled  PB;  1/MV=the  reciprocal  of  the  scale  factor  (i.  e.,  one  year  lagged  equity  market  value); 
Adj.  ER  =  earnings  for  ordinary  -  PBT;  1/.  Dummy  =  1,  if  BV<O,  and  zero  otherwise.  DumBV  is  the 
negative  BV  interaction  term:  DumBV=BV,  if  BV<O,  and  zero  otherwise. 
**  Wald  p-value  shows  the  level  of  statistical  significance  of  the  sum  of  the  BV  and  DumBV 
coefficients.  Note,  that  the  sum  of  these  two  represents  the  regression  estimated  coefficient  on 
negative  By. 
207 Table  2 
Yearly  regressions 
PBT  No.  Adj.  R- 
Year  Intercept  1lTA  BV  PBT  x  DIV  AdJ.  ER  of  Square  f(TA)  obs. 
1987  -0.067  1258.1  0.484  5.663  0.101  0.763  -0.716  335  41.4% 
t-ratio  -0.492  2.988  1.753  4.191  0.749  0.181  -0.545 
p-value  0.623  0.003  0.080  0.000  0.454  0.856  0.586 
1988  0.058  963.0  0.200  6.682  -0.056  0.534  -0.647  897  58.7% 
t-ratio  1.135  2.515  1.950  11.490  -1.340  0.302  -1.263 
p-value  0.256  0.012  0.051  0.000  0.180  0.763  0.206 
1989  0.151  1047.1  0.085  5.508  0.029  2.222  -0.179  980  46.9% 
t-ratio  2.475  2.131  0.772  8.644  0.505  1.029  -0.472 
p-value  0.013  0.033  0.440  0.000  0.614  0.303  0.637 
1990  -0.007  827.2  0.272  4.426  0.135  -0.129  0.466  985  54.0% 
t-ratio  -0.181  2.174  4.044  9.985  3.371  -11.306  1.797 
p-value  0.856  0.030  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.072 
1991  0.045  9.9  0.173  3.724  0.117  9.044  0.115  891  55.0% 
t-ratio  0.920  0.034  2.214  5.927  2.060  5.221  0.238 
p-value  0.358  0.973  0.027  0.000  0.039  0.000  0.812 
1992  0.097  -718.8  0.166  6.930  0.034  3.938  0.396  816  57.3% 
t-ratio  1.532  -2.697  1.569  7.232  0.558  1.441  0.322 
p-value  0.126  0.007  0.117  0.000  0.577  0.150  0.747 
1993  0.121  -1255.7  0.038  7.947  -0.068  9.717  -1.733  881  64.0% 
t-ratio  2.283  -4.369  0.418  7.830  -1.279  5.213  -1.063 
p-value  0.022  0.000  0.676  0.000  0.201  0.000  0.288 
1994  0.047  151.8  0.208  5.690  0.001  9.402  -3.683  1016  62.9% 
t-ratio  0.886  0.346  2.001  5.045  0.017  3.963  -1.836 
p-value  0.376  0.729  0.045  0.000  0.987  0.000  0.066 
1995  0.008  77.5  0.080  6.413  0.030  6.537  -3.130  1029  68.9% 
t-ratio  0.176  0.205  0.925  8.186  0.621  3.448  -2.437 
p-value  0.860  0.837  0.355  0.000  0.535  0.001  0.015 
1996  0.069  -60.1  -0.091  9.239  -0.026  8.713  1.894  1037  60.8% 
t-ratio  1.012  -0.184  -0.711  9.814  -0.453  3.550  3.217 
p-value  0.311  0.854  0.477  0.000  0.651  0.000  0.001 
1997  -0.042  438.3  0.047  9.317  -0.057  6.460  -1.082  1047  52.6% 
t-ratio  -0.452  0.909  0.289  7.259  -0.661  1.838  -0.579 
p-value  0.651  0.363  0.773  0.000  0.509  0.066  0.562 
1998  0.018  622.1  -0.299  7.909  0.209  6.976  1.673  953  37.6% 
t-ratio  0.158  1.363  -1.394  4.426  1.898  1.233  2.418 
p-value  0.874  0.173  0.163  0.000  0.058  0.218  0.016 
1999  0.248  77.7  -0.153  7.011  0.309  0.367  -0.731  852  22.9% 
t-ratio  1.413  0.160  -0.339  4.173  2.362  0.084  -0.641 
p-value  0.158  0.873  0.735  0.000  0.018  0.933  0.521 
2000  0.238  549.9  0.365  11.111  -0.099  -3.135  0.192  732  16.4% 
t-ratio  1.424  0.725  1.064  4.899  -0.752  -0.818  0.238 
p-value  0.155  0.469  0.287  0.000  0.452  0.413  0.812 
2001  0.057  122.1  0.451  4.147  0.157  3.459  -3.662  602  29.4% 
t-ratio  0.611  0.333  2.458  2.342  1.474  1.273  -1.354 
p-value  0.541  0.739  0.014  0.019  0.141  0.203  0.176 
2002  0.193  -11.6  0.171  4.816  0.098  3.186  -1.448  321  49.7% 
t-ratio  2.458  -0.013  1.348  4.351  1.401  1.306  -0.663 
p-value  0.015  0.989  0.179  0.000  0.162  0.192  0.508 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  each  regression 
coefficient.  Only  profit-making  dividend  firms  are  included  in  yearly  sample. 
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Q*w Table  4 
Industry  Intercept  1/TA  PBT  PBT`f(TA)  DIV  Adj.  ER  No.  of  Adj.  R- 
cases  Square 
sic  0  0.146  2143  0.512  -0.171  18.963  -1.688  107  51.90% 
t-ratio  2.401  4.569  0.509  -1.605  6.132  -2.696 
P-value  0.018  0.000  0.612  0.112  0.000  0.008 
SIC  1  0.675  2266  5.027  -0.271  9.740  -0.165  376  30.40% 
t-ratio  10.779  3.367  5.911  -5.093  3.428  -0.861 
P-value  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.390 
SIC  2  0.179  1392  2.746  0.013  9.256  0.835  733  43.20% 
t-ratio  6.600  4.907  4.319  0.299  5.588  0.892 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.765  0.000  0.373 
SIC  3  0.153  307  5.004  0.148  7.149  0.579  2647  38.10% 
t-ratio  4.244  1.368  8.015  4.046  3.469  0.950 
P-value  0.000  0.171  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.342 
SIC  4  0.162  690  6.436  0.013  4.388  0.070  3299  42.90% 
t-ratio  5.191  2.365  15.583  0.426  3.319  0.154 
P-value  0.000  0.018  0.000  0.670  0.001  0.878 
SIC  5  -0.037  1820  5.546  0.083  14.167  0.606  1204  49.60% 
t-ratio  -0.624  1.844  4.678  1.344  5.110  1.379 
P-value  0.533  0.065  0.000  0.179  0.000  0.168 
SIC  6  0.191  579  6.256  0.088  1.616  0.065  1352  41.00% 
t-ratio  4.690  4.518  9.718  1.520  0.982  0.101 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.129  0.326  0.920 
SIC  7  0.136  978  7.204  0.059  4.969  0.772  1563  57.00% 
t-ratio  4.822  2.904  11.719  1.759  4.061  1.897 
P-value  0.000  0.004  0.000  0.079  0.000  0.058 
SIC  8  0.243  3196  3.301  0.128  -0.103  -1.324  361  65.60% 
t-ratio  7.820  9.690  1.953  1.273  -2.726  -0.433 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.052  0.204  0.007  0.665 
SIC  9  0.438  696  5.673  0.435  -2.535  0.121  2880  26.60% 
t-ratio  9.521  2.852  6.679  4.302  -2.021  0.360 
P-value  0.000  0.004  0.000  0.000  0.043  0.719 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  each  regression 
coefficient.  Only  profit-making  dividend  paying  and  non-dividend  firms  are  included  in  samples. 
Regressions  are  estimated  without  the  BV  variable. 
210 Table  5 
Industry  Intercept  1/TA  BV  PBT*f(TA)  DIV  Adj.  ER  No.  of  Adj.  R- 
cases  Square 
sic  0  0.150  2253  -0.016  -0.131  19.277  -1.767  107  51.80% 
t-ratio  2.064  4.314  -0.107  -1.642  6.803  -2.705 
P-value  0.042  0.000  0.915  0.104  0.000  0.008 
SIC  1  0.263  2701  0.751  0.026  16.538  -0.329  376  26.80% 
t-ratio  1.906  3.450  3.249  0.664  6.760  -1.306 
P-value  0.057  0.001  0.001  0.507  0.000  0.192 
SIC  2  0.053  1815  0.436  0.113  9.439  -1.830  733  43.60% 
t-ratio  1.564  5.673  3.817  3.179  5.333  -1.886 
P-value  0.118  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.059 
SIC  3  0.008  766  0.492  0.349  9.997  -2.767  2647  34.80% 
t-ratio  0.155  2.603  5.157  10.144  4.637  -3.396 
P-value  0.877  0.009  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001 
SIC  4  -0.043  1794  0.523  0.395  8.734  -2.199  3299  36.50% 
t-ratio  -1.164  5.759  5.225  13.996  6.623  -2.986 
P-value  0.244  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003 
SIC  5  0.118  4082  -0.393  0.328  21.406  0.117  1204  46.90% 
t-ratio  1.698  4.590  -2.278  6.640  9.052  0.202 
P-value  0.089  0.000  0.023  0.000  0.000  0.840 
SIC  6  0.160  1011  0.174  0.497  5.969  -2.059  1352  34.30% 
t-ratio  2.963  6.260  1.294  10.628  3.427  -2.327 
P-value  0.003  0.000  0.196  0.000  0.001  0.020 
SIC  7  0.104  2423  0.125  0.445  11.523  -1.152  1563  48.90% 
t-ratio  1.915  5.664  1.271  13.878  9.622  -1.200 
P-value  0.056  0.000  0.204  0.000  0.000  0.230 
SIC  8  -0.017  3377  0.467  0.393  -0.116  -4.699  361  69.20% 
t-ratio  -0.432  9.402  7.314  4.678  -4.400  -2.621 
P-value  0.666  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.009 
SIC  9  0.211  1391  0.470  0.962  0.226  -1.334  2880  25.20% 
t-ratio  3.448  5.719  4.479  14.646  0.171  -1.879 
P-value  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.864  0.060 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  each  regression 
coefficient.  Only  profit-making  dividend  paying  and  non-dividend  firms  are  included  in  samples. 
Regressions  are  estimated  without  the  PBT  variable. 
211 Table  6 
PBT  No.  of  Adj.  R-  Industry  Intercept  7ITA  BV  PBT  x  Adj.  ER 
cases  Square 
f(TA) 
--  -  --  SIC  0  0.089  2322  0.415  1.159  0.098  -1.981  107  30.80% 
t-ratio  0.965  2.712  2.289  0.714  0.574  -2.716 
P-value  0.337  0.008  0.024  0.477  0.567  0.008 
SIC  1  0.474  2054  0.404  6.198  -0.212  -0.075  376  28.30% 
t-ratio  3.253  3.312  1.734  6.857  -3.826  -0.492 
P-value  0.001  0.001  0.084  0.000  0.000  0.623 
SIC  2  0.097  1379  0.505  3.547  -0.042  -1.041  733  38.60% 
t-ratio  2.595  5.679  4.324  4.310  -0.854  -0.874 
P-value  0.009  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.393  0.382 
SIC  3  0.084  295  0.292  5.862  0.193  0.071  2647  36.00% 
t-ratio  1.660  1.334  2.836  10.191  4.837  0.102 
P-value  0.097  0.182  0.005  0.000  0.000  0.919 
SIC  4  0.101  502  0.275  6.836  0.038  -0.075  3299  42.50% 
t-ratio  2.876  1.644  2.892  16.109  1.254  -0.153 
P-value  0.004  0.100  0.004  0.000  0.210  0.879 
SIC  5  0.213  1256  -0.337  9.237  0.036  0.031  1204  45.70% 
t-ratio  2.852  1.172  -1.897  8.782  0.547  0.052 
P-value  0.004  0.241  0.058  0.000  0.584  0.959 
SIC  6  0.166  549  0.102  6.421  0.097  -0.004  1352  41.00% 
t-ratio  3.204  4.039  0.839  10.480  1.638  -0.006 
P-value  0.001  0.000  0.402  0.000  0.101  0.995 
SIC  7  0.067  734  0.196  8.402  0.056  0.672  1563  56.20% 
t-ratio  1.277  2.157  2.102  15.637  1.580  1.385 
P-value  0.202  0.031  0.036  0.000  0.114  0.166 
SIC  8  0.017  3035  0.436  2.519  0.208  -1.942  361  69.90% 
t-ratio  0.443  8.278  6.488  1.618  1.959  -0.747 
P-value  0.658  0.000  0.000  0.107  0.051  0.456 
SIC  9  0.241  709  0.398  4.957  0.470  -0.052  2880  26.90% 
t-ratio  4.081  2.831  3.867  6.121  4.601  -0.159 
P-value  0.000  0.005  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.874 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  each  regression 
coefficient.  Only  profit-making  dividend  paying  and  non-dividend  firms  are  included  in  samples. 
Regressions  are  estimated  without  the  Dividend  variable. 
212 CHAPTER  5 
VALUATION  OF  GEOGRAPHICAL  SEGMENTS 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
In  this  chapter  I  analyse  empirically  the  core  issue  of  the  thesis  -  the  valuation  of 
specific  geographical  segments  reported  by  UK  multi-segment  firms.  The  key  purpose 
of  this  analysis  is  to  find  out  whether  the  reporting  of  specific  geographical  segments 
communicates  useful  information  to  the  market  and,  if  so,  whether  operations  reported 
from  specific  geographic  locations  have  differential  association  with  the  market  value  of 
the  firm,  hence,  differential  contribution  to  the  firm  value.  The  results  reported  in  this 
chapter  might  also  provide  evidence  on  the  adequacy  of  the  accounting  standard  SSAP 
25,  which  spells  out  the  segment  reporting  requirements  in  the  UK. 
The  chapter  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  5.2  provides  details  on  the  country- 
composition  of  specific  geographical  regions,  disclosure  characteristics  of  specific 
geographical  segments,  and  some  descriptive  statistics  of  each  segment's  specific 
financial  statement  variables.  Section  5.3  investigates  empirically  (i)  how  specific 
geographical  operations  are  associated  with  the  firm  value,  (ii)  whether  different 
geographical  locations  are  associated  with  differential  contributions  to  the  market  value 
of  the  firm,  and  (iii)  the  market's  perception  of  the  implications  of  corporate 
geographical  diversification  to  firm  value.  Section  5.4  addresses  the  issue  of  sensitivity 
of  empirical  results  to  the  use  of  alternative  deflators,  and  concludes  the  chapter. 
5.2  DATA,  VARIABLES,  AND  DESCRIPTIVE  ANALYSIS 
5.2.1  Definition  of  geographical  regions 
Segment-level  analysis  requires  delineation  of  geographical  regions.  The  UK 
GAAP  (see  SSAP  25)  on  segment  identification  and  disclosure  neither  specifies  the 
213 normative  format  for  the  firm's  segmental  report  nor  does  it  stipulate  what  country  or 
geographical  regions  breakdown  shall  be  used  during  segment  reporting.  In  terms  of 
segment  reporting,  the  firm's  management  has,  therefore,  full  discretion  with  regards  to 
the  regional  grouping  or  disaggregation  when  reporting  the  geographical  operations. 
The  finest  level  of  geographical  segment  disclosure  would  imply  reporting  operations 
from  specific  countries.  However,  examination  of  firms'  segmental  reports  indicates 
that  in  the  majority  of  cases  firms  tend  to  agglomerate  their  foreign  operations  into 
multi-country  geographical  regions  such  as  Europe,  America,  Asia,  etc. 
I  collect  the  geographic  segment-level  data  from  the  Extel  Company  Analysis 
database  where  geographical  segment-level  data  either  comes  at  the  specific  country 
level  (when  firms  report  information  by  countries)  or  is  collated  into  broader  geographic 
regions  (when  firms  report  the  agglomerated  foreign  operations). 
Table  5.1  shows  the  bottom  level  of  country  composition  of  the  broader 
geographic  regions  utilised  by  the  Extel  database  to  group  countries  into  geographical 
regions,  which  are  also  employed  in  this  study. 
There  are  five  primary  segments:  one  domestic  (the  UK)  and  four  foreign 
segments  (Europe,  America,  Asia  and  Mid  East  &  Africa).  As  is  evident  from  Table 
5.1,  the  Extel  database  provides  the  country-level  composition  of  Europe  and  Asia 
segments,  yet  for  America  and  Middle  East  &  Africa  segments  only  the  sub-regional 
constituents  are  available71. 
The  examination  of  the  frequencies  at  which  specific  countries  are  being  disclosed 
in  firms'  segmental  reports  indicates  that  very  often  firms  tend  not  to  report  foreign 
operations  on  a  specific  country  level,  but  rather  agglomerate  those  operations  into 
broader  geographical  regions.  The  result  of  this  is  that  considerably  more  data  points  are 
71  It  is,  for  instance,  unclear  which  countries  comprise  the  Middle  East  and  Africa  segment. 
214 available  at  the  region-level  rather  than  at  the  single  country-level,  and  this  relates  to  all 
variables  (segmental  PBTs,  Sales,  and  NAs). 
Table  5.1  Country  composition  of  geographical  regions  (segments) 
UK  Europe  America  **  Mid  East  & 
Africa 
Asia 
UK 
. 
Austria  Central  America  Middle  East  Australasia 
Benelux  . 
North  America  . 
Southern  Africa  Australasia 
Belgium  South  America 
. 
U&O  Mid  East  New  Zealand 
Netherlands  U&O  America*  &  Africa*  U&O*  Australasia 
Luxembourg  China  &  Taiwan 
U&O  Benelux*  China 
Eastern  Europe  Hong  Kong 
Czech  Republic  Taiwan 
Hungary  U&O  China  & 
Poland  Taiwan* 
Russia  India 
Slovakia  Japan 
U&O  East  Eur.  *  Korea 
. 
France  . 
South  East  Asia 
Germany  Indonesia 
Portugal  Malaysia 
Greece  Philippines 
Italy  Singapore 
Ireland  Thailand 
Scandinavia  Vietnam 
Denmark  U&O  South  East 
Finland  Asia* 
Norway  U&O  Asia* 
Sweden 
U&O  Scan- 
dinavia* 
Spain 
Switzerland 
U&O  Europe 
*  According  to  the  notes  in  the  Extel  database,  this  disclosed  item  may  be  classify  as  U&O  either  because 
none  of  the  other  country  headings  adequately  describe  it  or  because  it  represents  an  indivisible 
combination  of  two  or more  countries. 
**  Country  composition  of  some  of  America's  sub-regions  is  provided  in  Extel's  notes.  Thus,  Central 
America  includes  such  countries  as  Mexico,  Guatemala,  Honduras,  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica  and  Panama; 
South  America  includes  Brazil,  Argentina,  Venezuela,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Peru,  Bolivia,  Chile,  Paraguay 
and  Uruguay. 
215 Table  5.2  Frequency  of  geographic  segments  reported  from  specific  regions 
Segments 
Sales  *  PBT  *  NA* 
United  Kingdom  8471  6091  5901 
Europe  7472  4328  4356 
Austria  10  00 
Benelux  393  279  261 
Eastern  Europe  99  60  67 
France  590  316  316 
Germany  628  293  266 
Portugal  896 
Greece  77  12 
Italy  232  49  42 
Ireland  131  65  64 
Scandinavia  236  105  93 
Spain  140  51  49 
Switzerland  23  7  10 
America  5396  3813  3838 
North  America  4126  3117  3164 
Latin  America  336  194  181 
Central  America  16  19  - 
South  America  153  176  - 
U&O  America  1363  705  674 
Mid  East  &  Africa  1730  666  621 
Asia  3291  1854  1862 
Australasia  1464  816  778 
China  &  Taiwan  37  61  53 
India  28  12  17 
Japan  167  52  60 
Korea  300 
SE  Asia  72  107  103 
U&O  Asia  2386  1053  1077 
Numbers  in  this  table  summarise  the  general  segment  disclosures  characteristics  of  the  initial  sample  of 
firm-years  which  does  not  exclude  observations  with  missing  financial  statement  variables  and 
observations  which  will  be  identified  as  outliers  in  further  empirical  analysis  sections. 
*  Sales  =  the  turnover  from  a  given  geographic  region,  reported  by  the  firm  in  the  annual  report;  PBT  = 
Profit  Before  Tax  attributable  to  a  specific  geographic  segment  and  reported  by  the  firm  in  the  annual 
report;  NA  =  Net  Assets  associated  with  a  specific  geographic  segment  and  reported  by  the  firm  in  the 
annual  report. 
From  the  frequency  of  data  points  per  country,  reported  in  Table  5.2,  it  is  obvious 
that  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  take  the  analysis  of  the  core  issue  of  this  chapter 
(segments'  value  contribution)  to  the  country  level.  Therefore,  the  analysis  in  this 
chapter  is based  on  a  relatively  small  number  of  broader  geographical  regions;  the  UK, 
Europe,  Asia,  America,  and  Middle  East  &  Africa. 
216 5.2.2  Disclosure  characteristics  of  geographical  segments 
According  to  SSAP  25,  when  reporting  segments,  the  firms  are  expected  to 
disclose  at  least  one  specific  accounting  variable,  such  as  (i)  segment's  sales,  (ii)  profit 
before  taxation,  and/or  (iii)  net  assets,  for  each  reportable  segment.  The  numbers 
reported  in  Table  5.2  suggest  that  the  segmental  sales  variable  tends  to  be  reported 
more  frequently  than  segmental  PBTs  or  NAs,  both  on  the  country  and  regional  level.  In 
the  ideal  case  the  firm  would  report  the  comprehensive  accounting  information  (i.  e.,  all 
three  accounting  items)  for  each  disclosed  segment.  In  practice,  however,  the  choice  of 
segment-level  accounting  variables  to  be  reported  is  at  the  management's  discretion. 
In  the  initial  sample  of  19,213  firm-years  some,  11,271  observations  (59%) 
indicate  the  existence  of  segment  disclosures,  where  at  least  one  of  the  three  variables 
(Sales,  PBT  or  NA)  is  reported  for  at  least  one  geographical  segment.  Table  5.3 
provides  some  insight  into  the  comprehensiveness  of  segmental  disclosures  on  the 
geographical  region-level. 
Table  5.3  Number  of  cases  per  disclosed  segment,  under  different  definitions  of 
disclosure 
Sales,  or  Sales  "  PBT  NA  "  PBT  &  NA  PBT  &  PBT  &  NA 
PBT,  or  NA  Sales  "`  &  Sales 
UK  10555  8293  6047  5811  5320  3848  3557 
EU  8815  7340  4283  4310  3924  2875  2714 
America  6595  5315  3812  3827  3484  2622  2466 
Asia  3988  3234  1841  1842  1630  1138  1053 
Mid.  East  1948  1684  673  627  586  428  386 
&  Africa 
*  The  segment  is  considered  disclosed  if  any  of  the  segmental  variables  (Sales,  PBT  or  NA)  is  reported. 
**  The  segment  is  considered  disclosed  when  the  noted  segmental  variable  is  disclosed.  ***  The  segment 
is  considered  disclosed  when  all  noted  segmental  variables  are  disclosed  simultaneously  for  that  segment. 
Table  5.3  uncovers  some  interesting  segment  disclosure  characteristics.  The  table 
indicates  that  fewer  firms  simultaneously  disclose  all  three  accounting  items,  that  is, 
217 have  more  comprehensive  disclosures  on  the  segment  level.  Take  for  example  the  UK 
segment.  There  are  3,557  firm-years  when  the  UK  segment's  PBTs,  NAs  and  Sales  are 
reported  simultaneously;  6,040  firm-years  that  report  segmental  PBTs;  and  10,555  firm- 
years  that  report  at  least  one  of  the  three  accounting  variables  for  the  UK  segment.  This 
pattern  persists  across  all  foreign  geographical  segments.  Another  noteworthy  feature  of 
segment  disclosures  is  the  fact  that  in  all  geographical  segments  sales  is  the  most 
frequently  reported  figure,  followed  by  PBT  and  NA. 
The  above  observed  disclosure  properties  are  in  line  with  those  found  by 
Emmanuel  and  Garrod  (1999),  who  note  that  a  number  of  UK  companies  do  not  publish 
net  asset  figures  for  a  number  of  their  disclosed  segments.  That  is,  despite  the  explicit 
intention  of  SSAP  25  to  produce  more  useful  data  for  report  users,  almost  10%  of 
Emmanuel  and  Garrod's  sample  companies  fail  to  report  segment  net  asset  figures. 
They  suggest  that  this  could  be  willful  evasion  of  required  disclosure  or,  perhaps,  a 
symptom  of  the  tension  between  the  internal  and  external  information  requirements. 
That  is,  whilst  sales  and  PBTs  may  be  fairly  easily  generated  in  a  standard  fashion 
consistent  with  the  internal  performance  measures  of  the  company,  the  question  of 
assets  is  likely  to  be  much  more  contentious. 
The  in-sample  segment  reporting  frequencies  are  also  indicative  of  relative 
`popularity'  of  a  specific  foreign  region  as  an  investment  location  for  the  UK 
geographically  diversified  companies.  Whichever  proxy  for  this  popularity  is  used  (this 
might  be  the  frequency  of  reported  Sales,  or  PBTs,  or  NAs  from  a  given  region),  the 
Continental  Europe  segment  appear  the  most  popular,  as  it  has  the  highest  number  of 
firm-years  which  report  Sales  or  PBTs  or  NAs  from  that  segment.  The  next  most 
popular  investment  location  is  America,  followed  by  Asia.  The  Middle  East  &  Africa 
region  appears  to  be  the  least  favorite  investment  location  for  the  UK  companies. 
Judging  by  the  segmental  PBT  frequencies,  Continental  Europe  has  1.12  times  more 
218 reported  segments  than  America.  American  segments  are,  in  turn,  twice  as  numerous  as 
those  from  Asia,  and  Asia  has  2.9  times  more  segments  than  Middle  East  &  Africa. 
The  reason  for  making  more  emphasis  on  segmental  PBTs  is  because  segmental 
PBT  is  essential  for  the  empirical  analysis  of  this  chapter,  as  segmental  sales  and  net 
assets  do  not  enter  the  valuation  model  employed  in  this  study. 
Finally,  to  complete  the  picture,  I  analyse  the  segment  disclosure  characteristics 
by  years  and  industrial  affiliation  of  multi-segment  firms.  Table  5.4  summarises  these 
patterns. 
Table  5.4  Disclosure  of  specific  geographic  segments'  PBTs  by  years  and 
industries. 
Panel  A:  Yearly  frequencies  of  geographic  segment  disclosures  (based  on  PBTs)* 
Geographical  regions 
UK  Europe  America  Middle  East  &  Asia 
Years  Africa 
1987  32312 
1988  76734 
1989  66  52  49  17  31 
1990  261  195  189  48  100 
1991  389  282  266  59  135 
1992  429  316  287  62  137 
1993  486  352  310  64  153 
1994  527  385  335  69  172 
1995  531  399  338  65  170 
1996  523  378  333  56  159 
1997  526  378  323  45  159 
1998  510  366  311  41  151 
1999  500  340  296  46  144 
2000  558  347  315  48  142 
2001  509  338  308  40  131 
2002***  223  152  143  15  52 
Total  6047  4287  3812  678  1841 
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Panel  B:  Frequencies  of  geographical  segment  disclosures  by  specific  Industries  * 
Geographical  regions 
Middle  East  &  Industries  t  UK  Europe  America 
Africa  Asia 
SIC  0  50  30  32  17  45 
SIC  1  272  144  195  67  143 
SIC  2  226  113  115  24  71 
SIC  3  1070  834  738  141  382 
SIC  4  1577  1295  1268  194  503 
SIC  5  481  351  245  37  116 
SIC  6  566  394  266  85  123 
SIC  7  397  212  156  21  69 
SIC  8  88  61  53  0  43 
SIC  9  1316  853  744  92  343 
Total  "  6043  4287  3812  678  1838 
Numbers  in  this  table  summarise  the  general  segment  disclosures  characteristics  of  the  initial  sample  of 
firm-years  and  do  not  exclude  observations  with  missing  firm-level  financial  statement  variables  or 
observations  which  will  be  identified  as  outliers  in  the  empirical  analysis  sections.  *  All  numbers  are 
based  on  the  disclosure  of  segmental  PBTs.  **  Differences  between  the  total  numbers  in  Panel  A  and 
Panel  B  are  due  to  the  missing  industrial  affiliation  info  for  some  firm-years.  ***  Year  2002  is  not 
complete,  as  it  includes  only  firm-years  that  reported  their  results  within  the  first  nine  months  of  the  year. 
t  The  US  Standard  Industrial  Classification  System  (SIC)  is  employed  to  categorise  the  sample  firms  into 
ten  principal  industries:  SICO  =  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing;  SICI  =  Mining;  SIC2  =  Construction; 
SIC3  =  Food,  textile,  paper  and  chemical  products  (i.  e.,  two-digit  SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SIC4  = 
Manufacturing  (i.  e.,  two-digit  SIC  codes  of  20  through  29);  SICS  =  Transportation,  Communications, 
Electric,  Gas,  And  Sanctuary  Services;  SIC6  =  Wholesale  Trade;  SIC7  =  Retail  trade;  SIC8  =  Finance, 
Insurance,  and  Real  Estate;  SIC9  =  Services. 
The  yearly  patterns  in  Panel  A  of  Table  5.4  indicate  that  the  relative  popularity  of 
specific  foreign  regions  as  investment  locations  has  been  stable  throughout  most  of  the 
years  of  the  sample  period  (except  the  first  two  years).  These  yearly  patterns  reflect  the 
previous  conclusions  drawn  from  the  analysis  of  Table  5.3.  Panel  A  that  segment 
disclosure  was  very  poor  in  the  late-1980s.  This  is  consistent  with  the  accounting 
standards  (Companies  Act,  1985)  that  guided  the  segment  disclosure  in  the  UK  until 
July  1990  and  required  only  the  disclosure  of  line  of  business  and  geographical  sales 
and  line  of  business  earnings.  With  the  adoption  of  SSAP  25,  in  July  1990,  the  segment 
reporting  requirements  became  more  onerous72. 
72  It  is  also  possible  that  this  seemingly  nonexistent  segment  disclosure  is  partially  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
Extel  database  only  started  compiling  segment  reporting  data  in  the  late-1980s,  therefore  the  data 
220 The  segment  reporting  frequencies  for  all  segments  were  increasing  in  early- 
1990s  until  the  year  1994  and  became  relatively  stable  thereafter.  Yet  somewhat 
declining  frequencies  of  the  Asia  segment  disclosure  can  be  observed  after  1994. 
The  analysis  of  segment  reporting  frequencies  by  firms  that  belong  to  different 
economic  sectors  is  presented  in  Panel  B.  These  frequencies  indicate  that  the  relative 
popularity  of  specific  locations  does  not  change  across  most  industries,  and  the  order  of 
popularity  is  identical  to  that  reported  above  (i.  e.,  Europe  is  the  most  frequent 
investment  location,  followed  by  America,  then  Asia  and,  finally,  Middle  East  & 
Africa).  Only  in  the  case  of  the  Mining  industry  (SIC1)  does  the  Europe's  popularity 
notably  fall  short  of  America's. 
5.2.3  Descriptive  statistics  on  disclosed  segments 
In  this  section  I  analyse  the  descriptive  statistics  of  segment-level  PBTs  used  in 
the  regression  analysis  sections  of  this  chapter.  This  implies  that  all  statistics  are 
computed  for  samples  where  all  variables  are  deflated  by  the  composite  scale  proxy  and 
exclude  the  outliers. 
Because  all  segmental  PBTs  are  scale-deflated,  the  means  and  medians  provide 
some  indication  of  a  relative  average  size  of  specific  geographical  operations  across  the 
cross-section  of  UK  multi-segment  firms.  The  comparison  of  the  measures  of  central 
tendency  (both  means  and  medians)  of  segment-level  PBTs  across  geographical  regions 
suggests  that  earnings  from  domestic  (UK)  operations  account,  on  average,  for  a  much 
bigger  share  of  firms'  total  earnings  than  the  agglomerated  foreign  earnings  or,  indeed, 
the  earnings  from  any  single  foreign  location.  Thus,  the  cross-sectional  median  of 
positive  earnings  from  UK  is  1.9,2.8,4.1,6.2  and  9  times  larger  than  earnings  from 
available  in  the  Extel  database  might  not  cover  all  multi-segment  firms  that  where  operating  and  reporting 
geographical  segments  at  that  time. 
221 non-UK  segment,  America,  Europe,  Asia,  and  Middle  East  &  Africa,  respectively  (see 
the  lower  panel  of  Table  5.5). 
Table  5.5  Descriptive  statistics  on  segment-level  PBTs. 
Negative  segment-level  PBTs 
UK  non-UK  *  Europe  America  Mid  East  Asia 
Mean  -0.1349  -0.0475  -0.0244  -0.0367  -0.0099  -0.0210 
Median  -0.0566  -0.0116  -0.0054  -0.0077  -0.0025  -0.0033 
Standard  Deviation  0.2258  0.0931  0.0632  0.0765  0.0195  0.0535 
Coefficient  of  Variation  -1.6736  -1.9586  -2.5835  -2.0870  -1.9590  -2.5453 
Kurtosis  19.2130  20.5117  56.6247  19.5734  5.2141  18.3132 
Skewness  -3.8751  -4.0058  -6.5806  -4.0172  -2.5135  -4.1168 
Minimum  -1.8351  -0.8195  -0.7593  -0.6314  -0.0763  -0.3462 
Maximum  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
No.  of  cases  745  909  642  706  52  245 
Positive  segment-level  PBTs 
UK  non-UK  *  Europe  America  Mid  East  Asia 
Mean  0.0611  0.0375  0.0197  0.0278  0.0146  0.0161 
Median  0.0548  0.0282  0.0134  0.0196  0.0061  0.0089 
Standard  Deviation  0.0392  0.0341  0.0203  0.0268  0.0236  0.0218 
Coefficient  of  Variation  0.6421  0.9105  1.0286  0.9649  1.6166  1.3557 
Kurtosis  -0.1262  2.3588  5.1172  3.1456  16.5791  13.3417 
Skewness  0.6517  1.3977  1.9937  1.5943  3.5925  3.2043 
Minimum  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000 
Maximum  0.2057  0.2402  0.1314  0.1698  0.1748  0.1766 
No.  of  cases  4006  3842  2817  2382  487  1186 
Included  in  descriptive  statistics  are  observations  used  in  the  chapter's  subsequent  regression  analysis 
sections,  hence  all  segmental  PBTs  are  deflated  by  the  composite  scale  factor  and  the  outliers  (i.  e.,  top 
and  bottom  0.5%  of  segment-level  and  firm-level  regression  variables)  are  eliminated.  Descriptive 
statistics  are  computed  separately  for  positive  segmental  PBTs  (the  upper  panel)  and  for  negative 
segmental  PBTs  (the  lower  panel).  The  number  of  observations  varies  across  segments,  as  only  segments 
with  non-zero  PBTs  are  included  in  the  computations  (i.  e.,  missing  segmental  PBTs  are  NOT  treated  as 
zeros).  *  non-UK  segment  is  a  synthetic  segment  that  agglomerates  all  foreign  operations. 
Similar  conclusions  can  be  drawn  when  the  negative  segmental  earnings  are 
compared  (the  upper  panel  of  Table  5.5). 
Interestingly,  a  relationship  or  association  appears  to  exist  between  the  divergence 
of  the  (cross-sectional  average)  size  of  segments  operating  in  specific  geographical 
locations  and  relative  popularity  of  these  locations.  That  is,  segments  operating  in 
America  and  Europe  are,  on  average,  much  larger  than  those  operating  in  Asia. 
Similarly,  the  popularity  of  America  and  Europe  investment  locations  is  much  higher 
than  that  of  Asia  (see  Section  5.2.2).  Segments  operating  in  Middle  East  &  Africa  are, 
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location.  These  conclusions  remain  unchanged  when  segment-level  net  assets  or  sales 
are  used  as  indicators  of  the  relative  cross-sectional  average  size  of  specific 
geographical  segments,  and  are  robust  to  the  choice  of  the  measure  of  central  tendency 
(i.  e.,  mean  or  median). 
Another  segment-level  descriptive  is  the  frequency  of  negative  earnings  reported 
by  firms  from  a  specific  geographical  location.  This  is  a  simple  measure  of  profitability 
associated  with  a  specific  geographical  region  that  might  provide  some  insight  into  the 
interpretation  of  segment  valuation  regression  results  later  in  this  chapter.  Thus,  23%  of 
firm-years  with  operations  in  America  report  losses  from  that  segment.  For  Europe  that 
percentage  is  18.6%,  for  Asia  -  17.1%,  for  UK  -  15.7%,  yet  Middle  East  &  Africa  has 
the  lowest  percentage,  9.6%  (see  Table  5.6).  In  other  words,  more  often  losses  are  being 
reported  from  America,  followed  by  Europe,  Asia  and  UK,  and  less  often  from  Middle 
East  &  Africa73. 
In  the  subsequent  sections,  where  the  segment  valuation  is  studied,  some  of  the 
regressions  are  estimated  for  samples  that  correspond  to  profit-making  firms  only. 
Therefore,  I  additionally  examine  what  happens  to  the  frequency  of  negative  segmental 
earnings  when  the  sample  excludes  cases  with  firm-level  losses  (see  Table  5.6). 
In  this  sample,  only  3.9,11.6,13.9,12.1,  and  7.7  percent  of  earnings  reported 
from,  respectively,  the  UK,  Europe,  America,  Asia,  and  Middle  East  &  Africa  segments 
are  negative.  This  suggests  that,  as  one  would  expect,  the  percentage  of  segment-level 
losses  are  considerably  lower  in  the  sample  that  only  includes  profit-making  firms. 
Furthermore,  it  is  the  losses  reported  from  the  domestic  (UK)  region,  rather  then  losses 
reported  from  foreign  locations,  which  are  considerably  more  strongly  associated  with 
73  It  is  difficult  to  conclude  what  causes  such  notable  differences  between  these  geographical  segments. 
On  the  one  hand  the  higher/lower  occurrence  of  losses  in  a  given  location  might  reflect  the  objective 
reality  of  market  conditions  in  that  region.  On  the  other  hand,  this  might  be  the  result  of  accounting 
manipulations  (e.  g.,  transfer  pricing)  made  by  managers  when  reporting  segment-level  data. 
223 the  frequency  of  the  firm-level  losses.  Results  in  Table  5.6  also  suggest  that  for  all 
geographic  locations  the  occurrence  of  segmental  losses  is  notably  lower  when  only 
dividend  paying  firms  are  considered. 
Table  5.6  The  percentage  (frequency)  of  negative  segmental  PBTs  in  differently 
partitioned  samples 
Segmental  Sign  of  No.  of  Cases  Percentage  (frequency)  of  negative  segmental  PBTs 
variable  segmental 
PBT 
Sample  I*  Sample  2*  Sample  3*  Sample  4* 
PBT  UK  +  4887 
1153  19.1%  3.9%  6.8%  2.6% 
PBT  EU  +  3468 
819  19.1%  11.6%  13.1%  11.0% 
PBT  America  +  2904 
908  23.8%  13.9%  15.8%  12.9% 
PBT  Asia  +  1492 
342  18.6%  12.1%  13.3%  11.4% 
PBT  Mid.  East  +  596 
&  Africa  -  77  11.4%  7.7%  7.5%  7.0% 
*  Sample  I  is  the  initial  total  sample;  Sample  2  excludes  negative  firm-level  PBT  cases;  Sample  3 
excludes  non-dividend  paying  cases;  Sample  4  excludes  negative  firm-level  PBT  and  non-dividend 
paying  cases. 
Table  5.7  Pair-wise  (Pearson)  correlations  between  positive  segmental  PBTs 
UK  Europe  America  Mid  East 
Non-UK  *  -0.385  -  -- 
no.  of  cases  3478 
Europe  -0.233  -  -- 
no.  of  cases  2584 
America  -0.234  0.050  -- 
no.  ofcases  2215  1791 
Mid  East  -0.205  0.000  -0.141  - 
no.  of  cases  427  404  363 
Asia  -0.211  0.074  0.108  0.338 
no.  of  cases  1063  1012  908  356 
The  number  of  cases  varies  across  the  pairs  of  segments  because  pair-wise  correlation  is  estimated  for 
firm-years  where  both  segments  have  positive  PBTs. 
*  non-UK  segment  is  a  synthetic  segment  that  agglomerates  all  foreign  operations. 
Finally,  because  the  analysis  of  segment  valuation  is  based  on  multivariate 
regressions  with  at  least  two  segment-level  profits  being  included  in  the  regression  and 
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between  segments'  PBTs.  This  information  is  reported  in  Table  5.7. 
By  and  large,  the  correlation  coefficients  reported  in  the  table  are  low,  though 
some  are  statistically  significant  (not  reported).  Therefore,  multicollinearity  is  unlikely 
to  be  a  problem  when  the  regressions  simultaneously  include  two  segments'  PBTs. 
5.3  VALUATION  OF  DIVERSIFICATION  AND  SPECIFIC  GEOGRAPHICAL 
SEGMENTS 
I  test  the  following  valuation  relationships,  where  each,  in  turn,  is  tested  for 
various  time  periods,  with  and  without  non-dividend  paying  firms,  with  and  without 
industry  and  yearly  dummies,  with  and  without  the  market-to-book  ratio-related  dummy 
variable,  and  for  the  entire  sample  vs.  only  the  profit-making  firms: 
1.  Valuation  of  differently  defined  (based  on  PBT,  NA,  Sales,  when  at  least  one 
distinct  foreign  segment  is  reported,  or  just  the  UK  one)  segment-reporting  vs. 
non-reporting  firms,  after  eliminating  the  segment  and  firm-level  outliers. 
2.  Segment  valuation  of  domestic  vs.  non-UK  operations. 
3.  Segment  valuation  of  only  those  firm-years  that  simultaneously  operate  in: 
a.  UK  and  Europe,  while  all  other  segments  are  summed  up  in  `rest' 
b.  UK  and  America,  while  all  other  segments  are  summed  up  in  `rest' 
c.  UK  and  Asia,  while  all  other  segments  are  summed  up  in  `rest' 
d.  UK  and  Middle  East  &  Africa,  while  all  other  segments  are  summed  up 
in  `rest' 
4.  Simultaneous  disaggregation  of  the  firm's  operations  into  all  segmental 
components. 
225 5.3.1  Valuation  differential  between  geographically  diversified  and  domestic  firms 
I  start  the  analysis  by  exploring  valuation  differences  between  two  mutually 
exclusive  sub-samples.  One  sample  includes  firms  whose  segmental  disclosures  indicate 
that  the  firms  are  involved  in  foreign  operations.  The  alternative  sample  includes  firms 
with  no  financial  statement-related  evidence  of  geographical  diversification.  In  terms  of 
a  broader  definition  of  diversification,  the  firm  might  be  considered  geographically 
diversified  if,  for  at  least  one  distinct  foreign  segment,  it  reports  one  or  more  segment- 
level  data  items.  That  is,  for  a  firm  to  qualify  as  geographically  diversified  it  would  be 
sufficient  to  have  segmental  Sales,  or  segmental  PBT,  or  segmental  NA  reported  on  just 
one  specific  foreign  region.  Specific  foreign  regions  are:  Europe,  America,  Asia,  Middle 
East  and  Africa. 
Because  the  frequency  of  reporting  of  the  various  segment-level  accounting  items 
varies,  one  can  further  restrict  the  definition  of  diversification.  For  example,  the  most 
restricted  definition  of  geographical  diversification  would  be  to  require  all  three 
segment-level  accounting  variables  (i.  e.,  PBT,  NA  and  Sales)  to  be  available  for  a  given 
segment.  According  to  this  restricted  definition,  a  firm  would  be  considered  as  being 
diversified  into  a  specific  foreign  location  only  if  all  three  variables  are  simultaneously 
reported  for  that  segment. 
Essentially,  this  definition  deals  with  the  richness  or  completeness  of  the 
information  set  disclosed  by  the  firm  on  a  specific  segment.  It  might  be  argued  that  the 
richness  of  the  disclosed  information  is  essential  to  investors/market  analysts  who 
assess  the  market  value  of  the  firm.  Firm-level  financial  statements  information, 
specifically  earnings,  sales  and  book  values  are  all  important  constituents  of  the  data  set 
used  by  analysts  when  deriving  the  firm's  intrinsic  value  using  various  valuation 
techniques  [see  Stowe  et  al.  (2002)].  Assuming  that  in  valuing  segments  investors  apply 
a  portfolio  of  techniques  similar  to  those  used  for  valuing  the  entire  firm,  then  it  could 
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according  to  SSAP  25,  for  each  disclosed  segment  the  firm  is  required  to  provide  at  the 
most  three  accounting  items:  PBT,  Sales  and  NA)  would  also  be  incrementally 
informative  and  exploited  by  analysts  to  arrive  at  the  most  accurate  firm/segment  value 
estimate.  However,  earnings  have  traditionally  been  the  most  important  value  driver  in 
accounting-based  firm-level  valuation  models,  therefore  segmental  earnings  are, 
similarly,  likely  to  have  the  key  role  when  assessing  the  contribution  of  a  given  segment 
to  the  entire  value  of  the  firm.  One  can  only  speculate  if  segmental  net  assets  or  sales 
can  be  a  good  substitute  (in  the  process  of  valuation)  for  missing  segmental  PBT  data. 
When  only  one  accounting  item  such  as  Sales  or  NA  is  reported  for  a  given  segment, 
the  ability  of  the  investors  to  assess  the  value  contribution  of  that  segment  is  likely  to  be 
undermined  or,  even  worse,  made  impossible.  One  might  argue  that  in  the  latter  case  the 
segment  could  be  treated  as  not  disclosed. 
In  light  of  the  above  reasoning,  the  valuation  differences  that  might  exist  between 
segment-reporting  (diversified)  and  non-diversified  (domestic)  firms  could  be  tested  by 
using  alternative  definitions  of  when  the  firm  is  considered  as  segment-disclosing 
(diversified).  Specifically,  alternative  definitions  include: 
Definition  1:  the  firm  is  considered  geographically  diversified  if  at  least  one 
accounting  item  is  reported  for  a  specific  foreign  segment.  This  will  be  the  least 
restricted  definition  of  a  diversified  firm. 
Definition  2:  the  firm  is  geographically  diversified  only  when  the  PBT  data  item 
is  available  for  at  least  one  foreign  segment.  This  is  to  reflect  the  possibility  that 
such  segmental  information  as  NA  or  Sales  might  be  discarded  by 
investors/analysts,  in  the  process  of  valuation,  when  the  major  segmental  data 
item,  i.  e.  PBT,  is  not  reported. 
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considered  diversified  would  be  important  if  significant  valuation  differences  could  be 
observed  between  the  two  sub-samples  of  firms  with  alternative  definitions  of 
diversification.  However,  the  empirical  results  in  Table  5.8  (see  Appendix  5.1:  Model 
5,  and  Model  1  vs.  2,  Models  3  vs.  4)  do  not  reveal  any  economically  significant 
differential  value  association  of  accounting  fundamentals  between  the  two  sub-samples 
(Tables  5.8  through  5.17  are  reported  in  Appendix  5.1).  This  result  is  further  reinforced 
in  Model  5,  which  includes  a  dummy  variable  and  an  interaction  term  for  each  variable. 
That  is,  all  variables  are  allowed  to  vary,  depending  on  whether  the  observations  relates 
to  definition  1  or  2.  The  fact  that  none  of  the  interaction  terms  or  dummy  variables  are 
statistically  significant  at  the  5%  level  suggests  that  the  choice  of  definition  does  not 
materially  affect  valuation  associations. 
Having  discussed  the  potential  importance  of  the  definition  of  the  term  diversified, 
in  the  sections  that  follow  I  compare  and  contrast  valuation  characteristics  of  diversified 
vs.  domestic  firms  in  alternatively  specified  samples. 
When  the  basic  model  regression  is  run  for  the  entire  sample,  following  the 
findings  in  Chapter  4,  all  valuation  variables  are  paired  with  corresponding  interaction 
terms  to  control  for  discrepancy  in  coefficients  induced  by  the  sign  of  firm-level 
financial  results  (profit  vs.  loss).  Because  the  firm-level  analysis  in  Chapter  4  revealed 
highly  statistically  significant  differences  in  the  overall  valuation  of  firms  trading  below 
book  value,  a  corresponding  dummy  (MB  dummy=1  if  MV<BV,  dummy=0  otherwise) 
is  also  included  in  all  regressions  that  follow. 
Because  both  theoretically  and  in  terms  of  empirical  evidence  reported  in  Chapter 
4  the  composite  scale  factor  appears  to  address  more  appropriately  the  problem  of  cross- 
sectional  scale  difference,  all  models  that  follow  are  scaled  by  the  composite  scale 
factor.  As  a  cross-check  of  the  robustness  of  regression  results,  all  regressions  are  also 
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5.4. 
Table  5.9  (see  Appendix  5.1)  reports  the  results  from  variously  specified 
regressions  aimed  at  bringing  to  light  firm-level  valuation  differences  between 
geographically  diversified  firms  and  geographically  focused  (domestic)  firms. 
The  first  six  models  (Model  1  through  6)  are  estimated  for  samples  that  include 
both  profitable  and  loss-making  firms,  therefore,  they  all  include  a  negative  PBT 
dummy  and  corresponding  interactions  terms  for  all  variables.  Models  1  through  4 
reflect  firm-level  valuation  for  geographically  diversified  firms,  while  models  5  and  6 
are  for  non-diversified  firms.  Furthermore,  all  12  models  in  the  table  could  be  grouped 
into  6  pairs  (model  1&2,  model  3&4,  etc.  ),  where  the  first  model  of  each  pair  includes 
observations  from  dividend-paying  and  non-dividend  paying  firms,  while  the  second 
model  includes  only  the  dividend-paying  firms.  Note,  that  econometrically  more  valid 
inferences  about  the  valuation  of  dividends  could  be  drawn  from  the  second  models, 
i.  e.,  where  none  of  the  observations  have  missing  or  zero  values  for  dividends. 
Recall  that  the  primary  issue  of  interest  in  this  section  is  the  valuation  differences 
between  geographically  diversified  and  domestic  firms.  It  is  important  that  this 
comparative  analysis  is  performed  between  samples  that  are  qualitatively  similar  in  all 
respects  but  vary  only  in  terms  of  the  characteristic  of  interest,  i.  e.  diversified  vs.  non- 
diversified.  In  empirical  terms  this  implies  the  identification  of  differences  between  the 
following  groups  of  models  in  Table  5.8:  Model  1&2  vs.  Model  5&6;  Model  7&8 
vs.  Model  9&  10;  and  Model  11  vs.  Model  12.  Below  I  analyse  these  relationships. 
Before  analysing  key  valuation  factors  (PBT,  BV  and  Dividends)  some  general 
conclusions  are  in  order.  The  structure  of  the  intercept  in  the  deflated  models  is 
presented  below. 
1.  for  profit  firms  that  trade  above  book  value: 
229 Intercept  =  one 
2.  for  profitable  firms  that  trade  below  book  value: 
Intercept  =  one  +  dummy  2 
where  dummy  2=1  if  PBT>O  &  MV<_BV  and  zero  otherwise; 
3.  for  loss-making  firms  that  trade  above  book  value: 
Intercept  =  one  +  dummyl 
where  dummy  1=1  if  PBT:  50  &  MV>BV  and  zero  otherwise; 
4.  for  loss-making  firms  trading  below  book  value: 
Intercept  =  one  +  dummy  3 
where  dummy3  =1  if  PBT:  50  &  MV<_BV;  and  dummy3  =0  otherwise. 
In  all  tests,  when  the  firm  is  profit-making  and  is  trading  above  book  value,  the 
intercept  has  positive  value  and  is  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level.  The  value  of 
the  intercept  is  substantially  lower,  yet  still  positive  and  statistically  significant  at  the 
1%  level,  for  profit-making  firms  trading  at  a  discount  to  book  value  and  loss-making 
firms  trading  at  a  premium  to  book  value.  The  intercept  has  the  lowest,  in  absolute 
terms,  value  and  is  not  statistically  significant  for  loss-making  firms  trading  at  a 
discount.  Furthermore,  the  intercept  becomes  negative  and  statistically  significant  at  the 
1%  level  when  non-dividend  payers  are  excluded  from  the  loss-making  firms  trading  at 
a  discount  (model  '11  vs  model  12).  In  other  words,  in  the  context  of  the  employed 
model,  the  loss-making  firms  trading  at  a  discount  have  the  lowest  cross-sectional 
relative  valuation,  while  profit-making  firms  that  trade  at  a  premium  to  book  value  have 
the  highest  relative  valuation.  The  remaining  two  categories  of  firms,  loss-making 
premium  firms  and  profit-making  discount  firms,  appear  to  be  in  the  middle  range  of 
valuation.  These  conclusions  conform  to  the  economic  intuition. 
In  the  sections  that  follow  I  compare  the  valuation  of  PBT,  BV  and  Dividends 
variables,  and  the  relative  valuation  discount/premium  of  diversified  firms,  in  a 
230 consecutive  order,  between  diversified  and  domestic  firms.  Sections  5.3.1.1  through 
5.3.1.6  draw  on  results  reported  in  Table  5.9  (Appendix  5.1),  where  models  1  through  6 
are  estimated  on  the  complete  sets  of  data,  while  models  7  through  12  are  estimated 
separately  for  two  mutually  exclusive  sub-samples  of  firms:  profit  firms  and  loss  firms. 
5.3.2.1  Valuation  of  BV 
Regardless  of  the  dividend  status  of  the  firm,  geographically  diversified  profit- 
making  firms  have  lower  value  of  the  BV  coefficient  than  the  domestic  profit-making 
firms.  Examination  of  regression  results  in  models  1  through  10  presents  clear  evidence 
that  the  BV  coefficients  of  domestic  profit-making  firms  are  always  positive, 
statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level  and  is  always  substantially  higher  than  that  of 
profit-making  diversified  firms.  Furthermore,  the  analysis  of  parameters  from  models  2 
vs.  6,  models  4  vs.  6,  and  models  8  vs.  10  suggests  that  the  BV  coefficient  is  not 
statistically  significant  (even  at  the  10%  level)  when  only  dividend-paying  profit- 
making  diversified  firms  are  considered,  while  domestic  dividend-paying  profit-makers 
have  positive  and  statistically  significant  (at  the  1%  level)  BV  multiples. 
This  conclusion  regarding  the  excess  valuation  of  BVs  in  domestic  firms  also 
holds  when  these  models  are  estimated  without  the  non-dividend  firms  being  excluded 
from  the  sub-samples  and  are  analysed  in  terms  of  diversified  vs.  domestic  firms  (see 
model  1  vs.  5  and  model  3  vs.  5). 
These  patterns,  however,  vanish  when  regressions  are  estimated  for  loss-making 
firms.  In  loss-making  firms  such  characteristics  of  the  firm  as  geographical 
diversification  or  dividend  paying  status  no  longer  influence  the  valuation  of  BVs.  Here, 
BV  coefficients  are  always  positive,  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level,  and  have 
higher  values  than  in  all  alternative  regression  specifications  of  profit-making  firms. 
231 Therefore,  one  might  conclude  that  regardless  of  the  diversification  or  dividend 
paying  status-related  characteristics  of  the  firm,  BV  is  a  more  important  value  driver 
when  firms  are  reporting  losses.  This  conforms  to  the  existing  in  the  literature 
theorisation  and  empirical  evidence  (see  Chapter  2)  that  the  valuation  role  of  BV  is 
subject  to  the  sign  of  the  firm's  financial  results.  Another,  more  important  conclusion 
for  this  research  is  that  BV  has  higher  valuation  multiples  and  is  a  more  value-relevant 
valuation  factor  for  domestic  firms.  In  other  words,  BV  is  perceived  by  the  market  to  be 
a  weaker  value  driver  in  geographically  diversified  firms.  However,  a  word  of  caution 
shall  accompany  this  interpretation  of  results.  In  my  sample,  the  geographically 
diversified  firms  are  generally  larger  than  domestic  firms.  It  is  possible  that  this 
differential  valuation  of  BVs  is  not  purely  a  result  of  the  phenomenon  of  diversification, 
but  rather  is  a  reflection  of  the  firm's  size-related  differential  valuation  of  BV  by 
investors,  if  investors  value  small  and  large  companies  differently. 
5.3.2.2  Valuation  of  PBT 
It  shall  be  noted  at  the  outset  that  in  all  alternative  tests  reported  in  Table  5.9, 
negative  PBTs  do  not  have  statistically  significant  (at  any  acceptable  level)  associations 
with  firm  value.  In  other  words,  firm-level  losses  have  no  information  content  and  are 
value  irrelevant.  This  finding  reconfirms  the  previous  results,  reported  in  the  Chapter  4, 
and  does  also  conform  to  prior  empirical  finding  in  the  related  literature  (see  Chapter  2). 
Positive  PBTs,  as  expected,  have  positive  association  with  firm  value  and  are 
highly  statistically  significant  (at  least  at  the  0.1%  level)  regardless  of  the  dividend 
payment  or  diversification-related  characteristics  of  the  firm.  The  primary  issue  of 
interest  is  whether  capitalisation  of  positive  PBTs  (i.  e.,  profits)  is  different  between 
diversified  and  domestic  firms.  The  regression  estimated  PBT  coefficients  always  have 
higher  values  for  firms  which  are  geographically  diversified,  regardless  of  the  dividend- 
232 paying  status  or  the  definition  (discussed  earlier  in  the  chapter)  of  the  term 
'diversification'74.  However,  these  differences  are  not  statistically  significant  at  the  10% 
level.  In  other  words,  there  is  some  weak  indication  of  higher  capitalisation  of  profits 
reported  by  multinational  firms. 
Some  additional  knowledge  about  the  valuation  of  earnings  could  be  gained  from 
the  analysis  of  the  PBT*f(s)  coefficient.  Recall  that  this  variable  is  modelled  to  account 
for  possible  scale-related  non-linearity  in  the  PBT  coefficient.  A  positive  (negative)  sign 
of  the  PBT*f(s)  coefficient  would  imply  that  the  PBT  coefficient  is  not  a  cross-scale 
constant,  but  is  likely  to  have  larger  (smaller)  values  for  bigger  firms.  In  our 
regressions,  the  PBT*f(s)  coefficient  is  positive  and  statistically  significant  at  the  1% 
level  for  all  profit-making  diversified  firms.  For  profit-making  domestic  firms  this 
coefficient  is  negative,  and  is  significant  at  only  the  10%  level.  In  economic  terms,  these 
results  seem  to  suggest  that:  (1)  investors  might  apply  higher  valuation  multiples  to 
earnings  of  larger  diversified  firms;  and  (2)  investors  are  more  likely  to  apply  higher 
valuation  multiples  to  earnings  of  smaller  domestic  firms  75 
. 
Finally,  both  in  diversified  and  domestic  loss-making  firms'  regressions,  this 
coefficient  is  not  statistically  different  from  zero.  One  would  expect  this  result  given  the 
prior  evidence  that  negative  earnings  are,  in  general,  value-irrelevant. 
5.3.2.3  Valuation  of  Dividends 
In  Chapter  3I  outlined  and  discussed  major  prerequisites  for  including  dividends 
into  the  basic  model  and  emphasised  that  the  expected  value  and  sign  of  the  regression 
estimated  dividend  coefficient  is  subject  to  alternative  hypothesised  roles  which 
dividends  might  play  in  firm  valuation.  Because  there  is  no  clear  agreement  in  the 
empirical  accounting  literature  both  in  terms  of  dividend  valuation  theorisation  and 
74  This  fact  is  apparent  when  contrasting  PBT  coefficients  in  corresponding  regressions,  that  is:  Models  I 
&3  vs.  model  5,  and  Models  2&4  vs.  6. 
75  The  second  point  conforms  to  what  is  often  referred  to  in  the  literature  as  the  small-firm  effect. 
233 empirical  findings,  I  do  not  put  forward  and  test  a  priori  specific  hypotheses  regarding 
the  expected  sign  and  magnitude  of  the  dividend  multiple. 
Empirical  results  reported  in  Table  5.9  (see  Appendix  5.1)  provide  a  clear 
indication  of  the  existence  of  a  divergence  in  dividend  valuation  between  two  categories 
of  firms:  diversified  vs.  domestic  firms.  Regardless  of  the  financial  results  (i.  e.,  profit 
vs.  loss)  reported  by  firms,  dividend  coefficients  are  always  positive  and  statistically 
significant  at  least  at  the  0.3%  level  for  domestic  firms.  In  contrast,  for  diversified 
firms,  both  in  dividend-paying  profit-making  and  loss-making  firms,  dividends 
coefficients  have  substantially  lower  (yet  positive)  values  and  become  statistically 
significant  only  at  the  7%  level  (see  models  8&  11).  The  latter  statistically  weak  yet 
positive  valuation  of  dividends  is  further  eroded  when  the  alternative  Definition  2  of 
diversification  is  applied  (see  section  5.3.1).  Here,  dividends  are  completely  value- 
irrelevant  in  profit-making  firms. 
An  interesting  `anomaly'  can  be  observed,  with  regards  to  the  valuation 
coefficient  of  dividends,  when  dividend-paying  and  non-dividend  diversified  firms  are 
pooled  into  one  sample  (see  models  1&  3).  Here,  the  value  association  of  dividends 
turns  negative  and  statistically  significant  at  the  5%  level.  This  is  clearly  a  spurious 
result,  as  far  as  valuation  of  dividends  is  concerned,  in  light  of  statistically  significant 
and  positive  valuation  of  dividends  in  dividend-paying  firms.  Because  this  sample 
includes  firms  that  do  not  pay  dividends  (i.  e.,  the  value  of  dividends  for  this  subset  of 
firms  is  equal  to  zero),  the  valuation  of  dividends  in  this  larger  sample  shall,  other 
things  being  equal,  only  reflect  the  valuation  associated  with  dividends  in  dividend- 
disclosing  firms.  This  change  of  the  dividend  coefficient  sign  from  positive  (in 
dividend-paying  sample)  to  negative  (in  dividend-paying  and  non-dividend  sample)  can 
only  be  possible  if.  (i)  zero  vs.  non-zero  dividend  firms  have  differential  valuation,  and 
(ii)  the  very  fact  that  the  firm  pays  (or does  not  pay)  dividends  serves  as  a  signal  of  that 
234 differential  valuation.  In  other  words,  the  very  dividend  status  of  the  firm  (i.  e.,  zero  vs. 
non-zero  dividends  firms)  might  be  in  correlation  with  an  omitted/unknown  valuation 
context  (this  might  be  an  additional  vector  of  omitted  value  drivers  or,  in  a  more 
general  case,  intrinsically  differential  model  specification,  subject  to  different  settings), 
which  might  influence  the  specification  of  the  model.  If  the  omitted/unknown  valuation 
context  is  indeed  correlated  with  the  type  of  firm  (i.  e.,  dividend-paying  or  non- 
dividend),  then  spurious  valuation  of  dividends  in  the  total  sample  could  be  purged  by 
including  a  dummy  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  unity  for  dividend-paying  firms,  and 
zero  for  non-dividend  firms. 
I  re-run  all  models  with  this  dummy  variable  being  included  as  an  additional 
variable.  In  these  new  regressions,  dividends  no  longer  have  negative  and  statistically 
significant  valuation  coefficients,  which  supports  the  omitted/unknown  valuation 
context  theorisation.  Furthermore,  the  coefficient  on  the  dividend-related  dummy  is 
highly  statistically  significant  and  has  a  negative  sign.  This  suggests  that  the  valuation 
of  firms  might  be  subject  (i)  to  their  `dividend-paying  characteristics'  (i.  e.,  dividend- 
paying  or  non-dividend  firms),  or  (ii)  to  some  intrinsic/true  valuation  context,  which  is 
being  proxied  by  the  `dividend-paying  status'  of  firms.  In  the  latter  case,  the  employed 
basic  model  might  have  an  omitted  correlated  variable  (or  a  set  of  unaccounted  for 
factors,  i.  e.,  contexts)  problem,  with  the  dividends  being  highly  correlated  with  the 
omitted  contexts.  The  negative  sign  of  this  dummy  coefficient  suggests  that  firms  whose 
intrinsic  valuation  context  is  correlated  with  the  `dividend-paying  characteristics'  (or 
whose  valuation  context  is  in  itself  the  `dividend-paying  characteristics')  have  lower 
valuation. 
Overall,  the  results  suggest  that  dividends  have  different  valuation  roles  in 
domestic  vs.  geographically  diversified  firms.  Dividends  have  positive  and  statistically 
235 significant  association  with  the  value  of  domestic  firms,  but  have  no  apparent  valuation 
role  for  diversified  companies. 
5.3.1.4  Valuation  of  diversification:  do  investors  value  multi  nationality? 
To  explore  the  general  valuation  properties  of  the  two  categories  of  firms, 
diversified  vs.  domestic  firms,  I  pool  these  observations  in  a  single  regression  and 
include  a  binary  dummy  variable,  which  takes  the  value  of  unity  if  an  observation 
comes  from  a  domestic  firm,  and  the  value  of  zero  otherwise.  No  interaction  terms  are 
included. 
This  simple  test  restricts  the  regression  coefficients  of  all  value  drivers  to  be  equal 
across  diversified  and  domestic  firms,  while  the  sign  of  the  dummy  variable  will 
provide  a  single  simple  measure  of  overall  valuation  differences  between  the  two  groups 
of  firms.  The  dummy  coefficient  in  the  regressions  (not  reported),  which  are  estimated 
separately  for  profit-making  (i.  e.,  positive  PBT)  and  loss-making  (i.  e.,  negative  PBT) 
firms,  is  negative  and  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level.  This  suggests  that,  on 
average,  the  domestic  firms  are  valued  at  a  discount  relative  to  internationally 
diversified  firms.  This  result  is  unchanged  even  when  I  control  for  non-dividend  paying 
firms  and/or  firms  trading  below  book  value. 
Because  yearly  regression  analyses  in  Chapter  4  demonstrate  that  throughout  the 
entire  sample  period  the  valuation  of  firms  was  changing76,  I  also  test  the  economic 
period-related  robustness  of  the  valuation  discount  found  in  domestic  firms,  by 
repeating  previous  regressions  for  two  economic  sub-periods:  the  old  economy  period 
76  It  is,  however,  subject  to  a  debate,  what  exactly  was  changing:  Is  it  the  intrinsic  value  of  firms  that  was 
changing,  so  that  the  model  simply  captured  these  changes?  Or,  was  our  model  simply  reflecting  the 
changes  in  how  investors  use  accounting  information  in  firm  valuation,  in  other  words,  was  our 
accounting-based  model  merely  capturing  the  dynamics  of  the  value  association  of  basic  financial 
statement  data? 
236 (pre-1996),  and  the  new  economy  period  (post-1996)77.  Results  indicate  that  the 
valuation  discount  of  domestic  firms  was  more  noticeable  during  the  old  economic 
period,  as  the  dummy  has  a  smaller  (larger  in  absolute  terms)  negative  value  and  is 
statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level.  In  the  new  economy  period  the  dummy  has  a 
larger  (smaller  in  absolute  terms)  negative  value,  is  significant  at  the  5%  level  for  non- 
dividend  paying  firms,  and  is  no  longer  significant  for  dividend  paying  firms.  In 
economic  terms,  this  implies  that,  during  the  old  economic  period,  investors  valued 
diversification  higher  than  in  the  new  economic  period. 
One  final  observation  concerns  the  difference  between  diversified  and  domestic 
firms  in  terms  of  the  overall  value  relevance  of  financial  statement  data.  In  all  matching 
pairs  of  diversified  and  domestic  firms  (see  Model  1&3  vs.  5;  Model  2&4  vs.  6;  Model 
7  vs.  9;  Model  8  vs.  10;  Model  11  vs.  12  of  Table  5.9),  the  explanatory  power  of 
regressions  is  always  higher  in  the  domestic  firms'  sub-samples.  Although  most  of  these 
differences  of  the  explanatory  power  do  not  exceed  five  percentage  points,  these 
patterns  remain  robust  when  additional  tests  were  carried  out:  new  economic  period  vs. 
old  economic  period;  inclusion  of  industry  and  yearly  fixed  effects  and  other  contextual 
dummies.  This  evidence  seems  to  suggest  that  the  basic  firm-level  financial  statement 
variables  (PBT,  BV  and  Dividends)  represent  a  poorer  information  set  for  more 
complex  and  (on  average)  larger  geographically  diversified  firms,  compared  to  domestic 
firms. 
5.3.2  Incremental  information  content  of  segment  disclosures 
As  noted  in  the  literature  review  chapter,  there  is  an  implicit  or,  often,  explicit 
contention  in  the  literature  on  segment  disclosure  and  value  relevance  of  segmental 
information  that  information  reported  on  the  segment-disaggregated  level  has,  or  should 
n  This  definition  of  economic  periods  was  suggested  by  Core  et  al.  (2003)  in  their  study  of  time-related 
changes  in  value  association  of  financial  statement  data. 
237 have,  incremental  usefulness  for  producing  more  accurate  estimates  of  the  entire  firm's 
future  performance.  In  other  words,  segment-disaggregated  accounting  data  would 
communicate  at  least  as  much  information  as  the  corresponding  firm-level  data. 
Assuming  that: 
(a)  to  produce  more  accurate  forecasts  of  the  firm's  future  performance,  and 
ultimately,  to  come  up  with  a  better  justified  estimate  of  the  firm's  intrinsic  value, 
investors/market  analysts  go  beyond  the  simple  firm-level  numbers  and  use  a  richer  set 
of  publicly  available  information  (which  includes  both  firm  and  segment-level  disclosed 
information  and  comes  at  no  additional  costs);  and 
(b)  the  stock  market  reacts  to  analysts'  valuations/recommendations  by  adjusting 
the  firm's  market  value  accordingly; 
then  the  firm's  market  value  should  be  more  strongly  associated  with  disaggregated 
information,  than  simple  firm-level  data.  It  follows  that  in  the  context  of  the 
operationalised  model  used  in  this  study,  the  replacement  of  a  firm-level  value  driver 
with  its  segment-disaggregated  components  might  increase  the  regressions'  explanatory 
power  relative  to  that  where  firm-level  values  were  used.  This  differential  explanatory 
power  between  the  segment-disaggregated  and  firm-level  regressions  constitutes  the 
incremental  information  content.  It  shall  be  noted,  however,  that  even  when  conditions 
(a)  and  (b)  are  in  place,  disaggregation  will  not  necessarily  release  incremental 
information,  unless  the  disaggregated  information  possesses  some  specific 
characteristics. 
Some  theoretical  studies,  reviewed  in  Chapter  2,  have  come  up  with  specific 
analytical  framework  of  preconditions  that  make  disaggregation  incrementally 
informative.  I  am,  however,  unaware  of  empirical  studies  that  investigate  the  validity  of 
these  theories.  Due  to  the  specifics  of  my  data  set,  it  is  also  impossible  to  test  or  check 
for  the  existence  of  these  preconditions  in  my  study.  Therefore,  I  do  not  develop  or  test 
238 specific  preconditions-related  hypothesis,  but  rather  follow  a  tentative  (ad  hoc) 
approach  to  detect  the  existence  or  non-existence  of  incremental  information  associated 
with  disaggregation  of  firm-level  data. 
I  also  test  the  information  effects  of  basic,  intermediate  and  finest-level 
disaggregation.  The  basic  disaggregation  implies  separating  the  firm-level  PBT  of  the 
geographically  diversified  firm  into  two  segmental  components:  PBT  from  the  domestic 
operations  (i.  e.,  PBT  UK),  PBT  from  a  generic  foreign  segment  (PBT  NONUK),  and  a 
residual  PBT  component  (PBT  Rest),  to  allow  for  the  incompleteness  in  the  segment- 
level  reporting.  For  the  first  intermediate-level  disaggregation,  I  split  the  firm-level  PBT 
into:  PBT  UK,  PBT  Europe  and  PBT  Rest.  The  next  intermediate-level  disaggregation 
implies:  PBT  UK,  PBT  Europe,  PBT  America  and  PBT  Rest.  This  series  of  consecutive 
desaggreations  is  continued  up  to  the  finest-level,  which  includes  the  PBTs  from  each 
specific  geographical  region.  The  above  tests  represent  a  narrow  definition  of 
disaggregation  as  they,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  address  the  incremental  information  content 
of  disaggregation  of  firm-level  earnings  into  the  segmental  earnings. 
5.3.2.1  Data 
Because  disaggregation  is  done  on  the  basis  of  available  segment-level  PBT 
information,  the  new  initial  sample  shall  include  only  those  firm-years  that  report 
segmental  earnings  for  at  least  one  foreign  segment.  Recall  that  when  no  segment  data- 
related  restriction  is  imposed  the  initial  composite-scale-deflated  sample  includes 
18,752  observations78.  However,  only  5,658  observations  remain  in  the  sample  when 
the  segment-level  data  availability  restriction  is  imposed,  and  this  now  constitutes  the 
new  initial  sample  for  the  geographical  segment  analysis79.  This  sample  is  further 
reduced  in  the  actual  tests  due  to  the  elimination  of  both  firm-level  and,  additionally, 
78  The  size  of  this  sample  will  vary  depending  on  the  choice  of  the  scale  proxy. 
79  That  is,  there  are  only  5658  firm-years  with  segmental  PBTs  available  for  any  of  the  following  foreign 
geographical  segments:  America,  Europe,  Asia,  Middle  East  &  Africa. 
239 segmental-PBT  outliers.  Segmental-PBT  outliers  are  defined  as  top  and  bottom  0.5%  of 
a  reported  segment's  PBT  values. 
The  first  test  addresses  the  incremental  information  content  of  the  disaggregation 
of  firm-level  PBT  into  domestic  operations'  PBT,  PBT  from  a  generic  foreign  segment, 
and  PBT  Rest.  The  generic  foreign  segment  PBT  is  the  sum  of  PBTs  of  all  four  specific 
foreign  segments:  America,  Europe,  Asia,  Middle  East  &  Africa.  PBT  Rest  accounts  for 
the  difference  between  the  firm-level  PBT  and  the  agglomerated  segment-level  PBTs, 
and  includes  such  PBT-related  components  as:  intra-group  operations,  discontinued 
operations,  central  costs,  exceptional  charges,  associated  companies,  net  interest 
expense  and  other  miscellaneous  items. 
Of  5,658  observations,  the  domestic  segment's  PBTs  are  not  disclosed  in  721 
cases,  which  are  eliminated.  This  reduces  the  size  of  the  testable  sample  to  4,937  firm- 
years.  The  elimination  of  firm-level  outliers  and  outliers  identified  separately  for  PBT 
UK  and  PBT  NONUK,  leaves  the  sample  with  4,764  observations.  Of  this  sample, 
about  3,800  cases  have  positive  firm-level  PBT,  meaning  that  some  20%  of  the  segment 
information  containing  sample  comes  from  the  loss-making  firms.  This  percentage  is 
similar  to  the  proportion  of  loss  making  firms  in  the  entire  initial  sample  of  19,213 
cases. 
5.3.2.2  Results:  Profit  making  firms 
In  the  analysis  that  follows  I  separately  test  the  incremental  information  content  of 
disaggregation  for  profit  firms  (Table  5.10  Panel  A)  and  loss-making  firms  (Table  5.10 
Panel  B). 
In  the  tests  that  involve  all  profit-making  firms,  the  statistically  significant 
increase  of  1.7  percentage  points  of  the  explanatory  power  of  Model  2  relative  to  that  of 
Model  1  from  25.3%  to  27%  (an  F-test  that  this  change  is  not  statistically  significant  is 
240 rejected  at  the  1%  level)  suggests  that  intermediate  disaggregation  (where  consolidated 
earnings  are  replaced  with  the  sum  of  PBTs  from  the  UK,  the  foreign  generic  segment 
and  the  rest  of  PBT)  does  `release'  incremental  information.  A  successive  finest-level 
disaggregation  of  the  generic  foreign  segment  PBT  into  the  PBTs  relating  to  specific 
geographical  segments,  Model  2  vs.  Model  3,  is  also  associated  with  incremental 
information.  The  increase  of  R-square  in  Model  3  relative  to  that  of  Model  2  is  very 
marginal  (0.6  percentage  points)  yet  the  F-tests  shows  that  this  increase  is  statistically 
significant  at  the  I%  level. 
One  might  hypothesise  that  information  contained  in  dividends  suppresses 
possible  information  gains  from  reporting  segment-disaggregated  profits.  Should  this  be 
true,  successive  disaggregation  of  the  firm-level  PBT  into  segmental  components  shall 
not  result  in  increasing  explanatory  power  of  regressions  and  dividends  shall  have 
statistically  significant  association  with  firm  value.  Therefore,  I  repeat  all  the  above 
tests  for  only  dividend-paying  profit-making  firms  (Models  4  through  6,  Table  5.10). 
The  above  hypothesis  can  confidently  be  discarded,  as  all  successive 
disaggregations  (Models  4  through  6)  increase  the  regressions'  explanatory  power, 
while  dividends  appear  completely  irrelevant  to  valuation.  Although  the  improvements 
in  the  explanatory  power  both  in  Models  4  vs.  5,  and  Models  5  vs.  6,  are  trivial  (1.3  and 
0.6  percentage  point  respectively),  the  F-tests  indicate  that  these  increases  are 
statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level. 
Summarising  the  above  results,  one  can  affirm  that  more  detailed  disaggregation 
of  consolidated  earnings  of  profit-making  firms  does  communicate  incremental 
information  to  the  market.  Also  is  noteworthy  the  fact  that  the  increase  in  adjusted-R2  is 
larger  in  the  first  phase  of  disaggregation,  where  consolidated  profits  are  replaced  with 
three  constituent  components  (i.  e.,  PBT  UK,  PBT  NONUK,  PBT  Rest),  and  is  smaller 
when  already  intermediately  disaggregated  profits  (i.  e.,  those  three  constituent 
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Europe,  PBT  America,  PBT  Asia,  PBT  Mid.  East&Africa,  PBT  Rest).  This  evidence 
seems  to  suggest  that  the  informativeness  of  disaggregation  is  a  diminishing  function  of 
the  fineness  of  disaggregation.  In  other  words,  each  successive  finer  disaggregation 
would  be  releasing  less  information. 
5.3.2.3  Results:  Loss  making  firms 
Similarly  interesting  are  the  results  when  the  information  effect  of  disaggregation 
is  examined  for  the  loss-making  firms.  Disaggregation  in  the  context  of  loss-making 
non-dividend  paying  firms  appears  even  more  informative  than  for  profit-making 
firms.  The  comparison  of  Models  7  vs.  8  in  Panel  B  of  Table  5.10  suggests  that  the 
explanatory  power  of  the  simple  consolidated-level  model  is  5.5  percentage  points 
lower  than  when  the  firm-level  earnings  are  disaggregated  into  domestic  earnings  (PBT 
UK),  the  generic  foreign  segment's  earnings  (PBT  NONUK)  and  the  balancing  earnings 
component  (PBT  Rest). 
This  increase  in  information  content  is  highly  statistically  significant  (at  the 
0.001%  level).  Yet  again  the  finest  disaggregation  of  Model  9  further  releases 
incremental  information  relative  to  the  information  content  of  intermediately- 
disaggregated  Model  8.  Although  the  latter  increase  in  the  adjusted-R2  is  quite  marginal 
(1.2  percentage  points),  it  is  still  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level.  This  changing 
pattern  of  the  adjusted-R2  is  similar  to  that  observed  in  profit-making  firms  and  is  yet 
another  indication  of  the  existence  of  declining  marginal  informativeness  of  segment 
disaggregation. 
In-depth  investigation  of  Models  7  through  9  offers  some  insights  into  the  reasons 
that  make  disaggregation  more  informative  in  the  context  of  loss-making  firms 
compared  to  that  of  profitable  firms.  Valuation  of  the  firm-level  earnings  (Model  7) 
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book  values  in  loss-reporting  firms,  which  is  also  found  to  be  the  case  when  the  entire 
sample's  valuation  properties  were  analysed  in  Chapter  4.  This  empirical  result  is  also 
consistent  with  the  literature  on  value-relevance  of  losses,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  2. 
When  a  geographically  diversified  firm  reports  consolidated  losses,  it  is  still 
possible  that  some  of  its  segments  are  profitable.  In  fact,  this  situation  is  of  a  frequent 
occurrence  in  my  sample  of  diversified  firms  (see  Table  5.6)  When  this  information  is 
disclosed,  the  market  has  the  opportunity  to  apply  differential  multiples  to  positive  and 
negative  segment-level  earnings,  as  it  does  for  the  consolidated  earnings.  Compared 
with  a  single-number  summary  of  the  firm's  performance  (the  consolidated  losses)  the 
segment-level  disclosure  of  earnings  communicates  to  investors  an  unequivocally  richer 
information  set  about  the  source(s)  of  firm-level  losses  and  relative  strengths  of  the 
firms  different  geographical  constituent  elements. 
This  reasoning  is  verified  by  the  results  of  Models  8  and  9,  where  positive  and 
negative  segmental  earnings  have  clearly  differential  valuation.  As  was  the  case  with 
the  valuation  of  firm-level  losses,  negative  segment-level  earnings  also  appear  value 
irrelevant,  while  the  coefficients  on  the  segments'  positive  earnings  are  nearly  always 
statistically  significant80. 
5.3.3  Joint  and  pair-wise  valuation  of  specific  segments 
The  previous  two  sections  address  the  issues  of  divergence  in  the  valuation  of 
geographically  diversified  vs.  domestic  firms,  and  incremental  usefulness  of 
segmentally  disaggregated  information,  which  pave  the  way  for  analysing  the  core  issue 
of  my  study  -  valuation  of  specific  segments. 
80  These  statistically  significant  coefficients  on  positive  segmental  earnings,  however,  have  the 
unexpected  negative  sign.  This  seems  to  suggest  that  profit-making  segments  of  loss-making  firms  are 
negatively  associated  with  firm  value,  which  is  contraintuitive. 
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previously  identified  non-segmental  but  valuation-affecting  contexts  are  properly 
controlled  for  in  the  models  addressing  the  issue  of  the  valuation  of  specific 
geographical  segments.  More  specifically,  in  a  sample  that  represents  a  large  cross- 
section  of  firms-years  pooled  over  time,  an  explicit  account  shall  be  taken  of  at  least  the 
following  effects: 
"  industries  and  yearly  fixed  effects; 
"  the  negative  firm-level-earnings  effect; 
"  the  valuation  premium  (discount)  of  firms  trading  above  (below)  book  value 
effect;  and 
"  the  dividend  paying  status  of  the  firm. 
Econometrically,  controlling  for  the  above  factors  will  help  reduce  the  error  terms 
of  the  estimated  regressions,  which,  in  turn,  will  result  in  lower  standard  errors  and 
higher  efficiency  of  the  estimated  regression  coefficients  of  the  key  variables  of  interest. 
In  the  sections  that  follow  I  analyse  the  regression  results  that  test  the  divergence 
of  valuation  of  the  following  segments: 
1.  UK  vs.  a  generic  foreign  segment  (i.  e.,  the  sum  of  non-UK  segments) 
2.  UK  vs.  Europe 
3.  UK  vs.  America 
4.  UK  vs.  Asia 
5.  UK  vs.  Middle  East  &  Asia 
6.  UK  vs.  Europe  vs.  America  vs.  Asia  vs.  Middle  East  &  Africa. 
Additionally,  different  partitions  of  relevant  samples  and  different  contexts  are 
used  to  analyse  the  sensitivity  of  the  conclusions.  All  results  reported  in  sections  5.3.3.1 
through  5.3.3.4  reflect  the  averaged  out  valuation  differential  for  the  period  of  14 
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domestic  and  foreign  segments  are  studied  separately  in  section  5.3.4  of  this  chapter. 
5.3.3.1  Testing  the  valuation  differences  between  domestic  (UK)  vs.  foreign 
operations 
The  tests  of  the  valuation  differential  between  the  domestic  and  specific  foreign 
segment  operations  are  performed  for  samples  with  available  data  on  UK  PBTs  and 
non-UK  PBTs.  In  its  complete  specification  form  all  regressions  include  industry  and 
yearly  fixed  effects,  a  binary  dummy  variable  that  controls  for  the  dividend  status  of  the 
firm  (dividend-paying  vs.  non-dividend)  and  another  binary  dummy  variable  that 
accounts  for  whether  the  firm  trades  above  or  below  its  book  value.  To  put  the  analysis 
in  perspective,  I  start  off  with  the  simplest  `stripped-off'  version  of  the  model  (where  no 
fixed  effects,  dummies  or  segmentally  disaggregated  PBTs  are  included)  and  then 
sequentially  append  it  with  fixed  effects,  dummies  and  segmentally  disaggregated 
profits. 
Panel  A  of  Table  5.11  (see  Appendix  5.1)  reports  the  results  of  5  sequentially 
appended  models.  The  sample  for  which  all  five  models  are  estimated  includes  all 
profit-making  segment-reporting  firm-years,  after  the  elimination  of  firm-level  and 
segment-level  outliers. 
Model  1  represents  the  simplest  specification,  where  the  variation  of  the 
dependent  variable  is  being  explained  by  a  simple  set  of  firm-level  valuation  factors. 
The  notable  feature  of  this  model  is  its  relatively  low  explanatory  power,  just  about 
16%.  An  additional  test  (where  this  regression  omits  the  PBT  variable)  indicates  that 
out  of  this  16%,  11.5%  is  attributed  to  the  PBT  value  driver,  while  all  remaining 
variables  (BV,  Dividends,  and  the  adjustment  terms)  jointly  explain  less  than  4.5%. 
Overall,  these  results  suggest  that  the  stripped-off  model  has  a  relatively  low  ability  to 
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level  profits  is  the  key  determinant  of  value. 
Model  2  is  an  appended  version  of  model  1  that  includes  a  dummy  variable  to 
accounts  for  whether  the  firm  trades  above  or  below  (and,  equal  to)  its  book  value81. 
This  modification  sharply  increases  the  explanatory  power  of  the  regression,  with  the 
adjusted-R2  increasing  from  15.9%  to  25.3%.  Furthermore,  the  dummy  variable  itself 
receives  the  largest  statistical  level  of  significance  among  all  the  regression  variables 
and  has  a  negative  sign,  reconfirming  an  earlier  result  that  firms  trading  below  book 
value  have  lower  market  valuation  relative  to  finns  trading  at  a  premium  to  book  value. 
In  other  words,  when  all  regression  coefficients  are  forced  to  be  constant  across  the  two 
categories  of  firms  (those  trading  above  BV  vs.  those  trading  below  BV),  the  regression 
would  overestimate  (underestimate)  the  market  value  of  the  firms  trading  below  BV 
(above  BV).  However,  these  results  shall  not  be  surprising  as  they  conform  to  those 
from  the  analysis  of  the  entire  initial  sample,  presented  in  Chapter  4.  I  also  split  the 
sample  of  geographically  diversified  firms  into  premium-firms  and  discount-firms  sub- 
samples  and  estimate  separate  basic  regressions.  The  results  produce  patterns  similar  to 
those  observed  in  the  total  initial  sample:  the  value  association  of  basic  value  drivers 
(BV,  PBT,  Dividends)  varies  strikingly  between  the  premium  and  discount  firms.  This 
means  that,  ideally,  the  model's  specification  could  have  been  improved  by  allowing  for 
all  coefficients  to  vary  depending  on  the  premium/discount  characteristic  of  the 
diversified  firm.  However,  due  to  the  reasons  outlined  in  the  Chapter  4,  I  choose  not  to 
over-complicate  the  model  and,  therefore,  only  include  a  binary  dummy  variable  that 
signifies  the  premium/discount  type  of  the  firm82. 
81  About  13%  of  the  profit-making  segment-reporting  firm-years  trade  at  a  discount  to  the  By.  For  the 
loss-making  sub-sample  this  percentage  is  equal  to  27%. 
82  This  is,  of  course,  a  limitation,  as  all  coefficients  are  effectively  being  forced  to  be  cross-sectional 
constants  across  premium  and  discount  firms.  However,  this  decision  comes  as  a  trade-off  between  this 
limitation  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  risk  of  being  left  to  work  with  an  extremely  parameterised  model 
with  potentially  serious  econometric  problems  and  difficulties  in  interpreting  the  results. 
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value  of  one  when  the  firm  is  dividend-paying,  and  zero  otherwise)  to  purge  the 
dividend  coefficient.  As  discussed  in  Section  5.3.1.3  this  dummy  captures  the  average 
differential  valuation  effect  that  is  associated  with  an  `omitted'  context  or  model 
misspecification  that  correlates  with  the  dividend  status  of  the  firm83.  Consistent  with  its 
intended  role  and  the  previous  results  reported  in  Section  5.3.1.3,  this  dummy  purges 
the  dividend  coefficient,  which  no  longer  has  a  statistically  significant  negative 
association  with  firm  value.  It  also  indicates  that  firms  that  pay  dividends  have  a  lower 
average  value  than  the  zero-dividend  firms. 
Model  3  is  upgraded  to  Model  4  by  including  nine  binary  dummy  variables  that 
correspond  to  nine  of  the  ten  industrial  affiliations  of  the  firms  in  the  sample.  Because 
each  firm  in  the  sample  is  affiliated  with  only  one  of  the  ten  specific  industries,  the 
inclusion  of  all  ten  binary  dummies  would  generate  perfect  colinearity.  Therefore,  only 
nine  industrial  dummies  are  included  while,  other  things  being  equal,  the  regression 
intercept  could  be  interpreted  as  a  proxy  for  the  omitted  industry's  dummy.  Overall,  the 
inclusion  of  industrial  fixed  effects  notably  improves  the  explanatory  power  of  the 
regression,  by  about  4  percentage  points  (from  25.8%  to  30%),  yet  leaves  the  value 
drivers'  coefficients  similar  to  those  of  model  3.  In  other  words,  the  differential 
valuation  effect  of  discount  vs.  premium  firms  remains  highly  significant,  indicating 
that  it  is  not  an  industry-drawn  phenomenon. 
Finally,  Model  5  controls  for  all  previously  identified  influential  contexts  by 
incorporating  industry  and  yearly  fixed  effects,  the  dividend  status  dummy  and  the 
market  premium/discount  dummy.  Regression  coefficients  in  Model  5  are  virtually 
identical  to  those  of  Model  4,  yet  the  final  set  of  controlling  dummy  variables  further 
improves  the  explanatory  power  of  the  regression  by  2.4  percentage  points,  to  32.4%. 
83  Recall  that  dividend  status  of  the  firm  might  itself  be  the  underlying  context. 
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estimated  on  the  basis  of  model  5,  that  is,  with  the  complete  set  of  control  variables. 
Panel  B  of  Table  5.11  reports  the  results  from  regressions  where  consolidated  profits 
are  decomposed  into  profits  from  the  domestic  segment  (PUK),  generic  foreign  segment 
(PNONUK),  and  a  balancing  item  (PREST),  which  represents  the  difference  between 
consolidated  profits  and  the  sum  of  the  two  segments'  profits.  Model  1  in  Panel  B  is  a 
segmentally  disaggregated  version  of  Model  5  in  Panel  A.  The  explanatory  power  of 
this  model  is  improved  by  1.5  percentage  point  and  although  this  change  has  a  rather 
trivial  economic  significance,  it  is  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level  (based  on  the 
F-test). 
A  cursory  inspection  of  the  results  reveals  that  all  components  of  the 
disaggregated  firm-level  profit  are  highly  statistically  significant  and,  more  importantly, 
the  PUK  coefficient  is  statistically  higher  than  that  of  PNONUK.  The  Wald  test  shows 
that  the  difference  between  the  PUK  and  PNONUK  coefficients  is  statistically 
significant  at  the  0.1%  level.  This  implies  that,  overall,  investors  attach  a  higher 
multiple  to  earnings  from  domestic  operations  compared  to  earnings  from  agglomerated 
foreign  operations.  Also  is  important  the  fact  that  profits  that  encompass  all  non- 
segment  operations  (PREST)  have  statistically  significant  differential  value  relevance. 
This,  perhaps,  shall  not  be  surprising  when  taking  into  account  that  PREST  is  a  sum- 
total  of  such  potentially  valuation-relevant  items  as  profits  from  discontinued 
operations,  intra-group  operations,  exceptional  charges,  net  interest  expense,  and  other 
items. 
It  shall  be  recognised,  however,  that  because  Model  1  (of  Panel  B)  is  estimated  for 
a  cross-section  of  firms-years  data  pooled  over  16  years,  it  fixates  the  values  of  PUK, 
PNONUK  and  PREST  coefficients  through  the  entire  sample  period  and,  consequently, 
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dynamics  of  the  relationships  is  investigated  in  more  detail  in  section  5.3.4. 
In  its  current  specification,  Model  1  ignores  that  segments  might,  in  turn,  be 
profit-making  or  loss-making.  Within  the  sample  of  3,798  firm-years,  used  in  model  1, 
in  139  (384)  cases  profits  reported  from  the  UK  (non-UK)  segment  have  a  negative 
sign.  Chapter  4  provides  strong  evidence  of  differential  valuation  of  positive  and 
negative  firm-level  earnings.  If  investors  perceive  firm-level  losses  as  transitory  and, 
therefore,  value  irrelevant,  then  similar  logic  might  underpin  the  valuation  of  segment- 
level  losses.  Model  2  in  Panel  B  addresses  this  possibility  by  including  two  interaction 
terms,  one  for  negative  profits  from  the  UK  segment,  and  the  other  for  negative  profits 
from  the  non-UK  segment.  Regression  results  demonstrate  that  similar  to  the  value- 
irrelevance  of  consolidated  earnings,  the  segment-level  losses  are  also  value  irrelevant. 
The  results  of  Wald  tests  (which  are  used  to  test  the  following  restrictions  on  regression 
coefficients:  PUK  coefficient  +  DPUK  coefficient  =  0;  and  PNONUK  coefficient  + 
DPNONUK  coefficient  =  0)  suggest  that  coefficients  on  losses  reported  from  either  the 
UK  or  non-UK  segments  are  not  statistically  significant.  Because  of  the  dampening 
effect  of  value  irrelevance  of  negative  segmental  earnings,  the  coefficients  on  segmental 
earnings  in  Model  1  are  lower  (higher)  than  coefficients  on  positive  (negative) 
segmental  earnings  in  Model  2.  The  segregation  of  positive  and  negative  segmental 
earnings  in  Model  2  also  has  an  information  effect,  which  is  reflected  in  the  increased 
R2  of  Model  2.  Although  this  increase  is  marginal,  and  economically  insignificant,  it  is 
significant  statistically  at  the  1%  level  (based  on  the  F-test). 
Model  3  is  a  replication  of  Model  2  on  a  sample  that  excluded  non-dividend 
paying  firms.  This  is  done  primarily  to  test  the  sensitivity  of  dividends  valuation  in 
differently  partitioned  samples  and  the  robustness  of  the  higher  valuation  of  domestic 
vs.  foreign  earnings.  Models  3  and  2  produce  qualitatively  identical  results  in  terms  of 
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segment-level  negative  earnings  are  not  statistically  different  from  zero. 
Model  4  is  intended  to  shed  some  light  on  the  valuation  properties  of  segmental 
earnings  for  loss-making  firms.  The  analysis  in  Chapter  4  suggests  that,  in  loss-making 
firms,  earnings  have  no  value  relevance  while  book  value  and  dividends  become  the 
primary  value  drivers.  Models  2  and  3  demonstrate  that  similar  to  the  value-irrelevance 
of  firm-level  negative  earnings,  negative  earnings  reported  from  specific  geographical 
segments  also  appear  value-irrelevant,  while  positive  segmental  earnings  are  positively 
associated  with  the  value  of  the  entire  firm.  However,  because  models  2  and  3  only 
include  firms  that  are  profitable  on  the  consolidated-level,  I  also  test  the  valuation  of 
positive  and  negative  segmental  earnings  when  those  are  reported  by  loss-making  firms 
(see  model  4). 
Results  from  Model  4  are  somewhat  unexpected  and  difficult  to  interpret.  It 
appears  that  disaggregated  segment-level  positive  earnings  are  negatively  associated 
with  the  firm  value  (i.  e.,  coefficients  on  positive  segmental  earnings  are  all  negative  and 
are  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level),  while  negative  segmental  earnings  are  value 
irrelevant.  Although  this  negative  value  association  of  segmental  positive  earnings  is 
conter-intuitive,  disaggregation  of  consolidated  firm-level  negative  earnings  into 
segmental  components  improves  the  explanatory  power  of  the  regression  by  a 
statistically  significant  five  percentage  points.  Furthermore,  the  value  of  the  coefficient 
on  non-UK  PBT  is  statistically  lower  (Wald  test  is  significant  at  the  1%  level)  than  UK 
PBT  coefficient,  suggesting  that  UK  operations  are  less  value-destructive  than  non-UK 
operations. 
One  of  the  possible  explanations  for  this  negative  association  might  be  that  the 
model  misspecifies  the  hypothesised  linkage  between  the  equity  market  value  of  the 
firm  and  financial  statements  information  when  the  firm  is  incurring  losses  on  the 
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that  are  the  main  intrinsic  value  drivers  (and  are  positively  associated  with  firm  value) 
but  are  omitted  from  the  regression,  then  negative  valuation  of  segment-level  positive 
earnings  would  simply  capture  this  omitted  variable  effect.  With  no  clear  indication  of 
what  might  cause  this  result,  this  argument  shall  be  viewed  as  only  one  of  many 
possible  explanations  of  the  observed  idiosyncratic  valuation  effect. 
In  the  final  model,  Model  5,  I  pool  profit-making  and  loss-making  firms  and 
estimate  the  overall  valuation  divergence  of  UK  vs.  non-UK  segments.  Confirming 
previous  findings  from  separately  studied  profit-making  and  loss-making  firms,  in  the 
pooled  sample  UK  earnings  have,  on  average,  higher  valuation  relative  to  non-UK 
earnings,  and  negative  segmental  earnings  are  not  associated  with  the  value  of  the  firm. 
However,  in  this  total  sample  the  actual  coefficients  on  positive  segmental  profits  are 
lower  than  in  the  profit-making  firms'  sample,  reflecting  the  negative  valuation  of 
positive  segmental  earnings  in  loss-making  firms. 
5.3.3.2  Testing  the  valuation  of  UK  vs  Continental  Europe  segments 
In  the  tests  of  the  valuation  differential  between  the  domestic  and  Europe  segment 
operations,  firm-level  earnings  are  split  into  the  following  segmental  components:  UK 
(PUK),  Europe  (PEU),  Rest  of  the  World  (PROW),  and  Rest  of  earnings  (PREST). 
Compared  to  the  tests  in  section  5.3.3.1,  here  the  non-UK  sector  is  segregated  into 
Europe  (EU)  and  the  Rest  of  the  World  (ROW).  This  disaggregation  specifically  tests 
relative  valuation  contributions  associated  with  specific  geographical  segments:  UK  and 
Europe.  In  Panel  A  of  Table  5.12  (see  Appendix  5.1),  where  I  repeat  the  five  models 
reported  in  Panel  B  of  Table  5.11,  the  firm-level  PBT  is  disaggregated  into  UK,  Europe 
and  -ROW  components.  It  appears  that  the  patterns  of  relative  valuation  of  UK  vs. 
Europe  segments  are  qualitatively  identical  to  the  valuation  of  UK  vs.  non-UK 
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valuable  than  the  Europe  segment.  Furthermore,  Europe  and  ROW  operations  seem  to 
have  identical  valuation  (Wald  test  for  the  difference  of  PEU  and  PROW  is  not 
statistically  significant).  The  fact  that  the  disaggregation  of  non-UK  operations  into 
Europe  and  ROW  does  not  identify  any  differences  between  the  two,  explains  why  the 
explanatory  power  of  models  1  through  5  in  Panel  A  of  Table  5.12  and  corresponding 
models  in  Panel  B  of  Table  5.11  are  identical. 
A  potentially  important  caveat  is  in  order.  The  models  in  Table  5.12  Panel  A  are 
estimated  for  samples  that  might  contain  missing/non-reported  Europe  segmental 
earnings  for  some  observations.  In  other  words,  all  observations  come  from  firms  that 
are  geographically  diversified,  yet  not  necessarily  into  the  Europe  region.  Because  the 
primary  issue  of  interest  is  the  relative  valuation  of  UK  vs.  Europe,  one  might  argue  that 
tests  shall  only  include  those  firm-years  that  simultaneously  operate  in  both 
geographical  locations:  UK  and  Europe.  Therefore,  in  Panel  B  of  Table  5.12  I  replicate 
the  5  models  reported  in  Panel  A  for  the  sub-samples  of  those  firms  that  simultaneously 
report  UK  and  Europe  profits.  There  are,  obviously,  fewer  firm-years  in  all  new  sub- 
samples.  Thus  the  elimination  of  firm-years  that  do  not  specifically  report  Europe 
operations  reduces  the  sub-samples  of  profit-making  firms  by  a  quarter  and  loss-making 
firms  by  a  third. 
The  results  of  tests  in  Panel  B  are,  however,  identical  to  those  of  Panel  A,  which 
adds  to  the  robustness  of  the  previous  conclusions  regarding  the  higher  valuation  of 
domestic  (UK)  operations  relative  to  Europe  operations.  Also  confirmed  is  the  previous 
finding  that  EU  and  ROW  operations  have  identical  valuations  (as  indicated  by  Wald 
tests).  This  explains  why  disaggregation  of  non-UK  operations  into  EU  and  ROW  does 
not  improve  the  explanatory  power  of  the  regressions. 
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and  Panel  B  the  valuation  of  negative  earnings  reported  from  the  Europe  geographical 
location  by  profit-making  firms  is  positively  and  often  statistically  significantly 
associated  with  firm  value84.  This  effect,  however,  disappears  in  the  total  sample  (that 
pools  profit-making  and  loss-making  firms)  where  valuation  of  negative  Europe 
earnings  becomes  value  irrelevant. 
5.3.3.3  Testing  the  valuation  of  UK  vs  America  segments 
To  identify  any  valuation  divergence  that  might  exist  between  the  UK  and 
America  segment,  the  firm's  earnings  are  disaggregated  into  the  following  geographical 
components:  UK  (PUK),  America  (PAMER),  and  Rest  of  the  World  (ROW).  In  other 
words,  the  non-UK  earnings  are  now  being  disaggregated  into  earnings  from  America 
and  the  Rest  of  the  World.  In  Panel  A  of  Table  5.13  (see  Appendix  5.1)  regressions  are 
estimated  for  samples  that  might  contain  missing/non-reported  American  segmental 
earnings  for  some  observations. 
To  test  the  sensitivity  of  inferences  to  the  exclusion  of  firm-years  that  do  not 
operate  in  America,  I  re-run  all  5  regressions  for  firms  that  simultaneously  operate  in 
both  UK  and  America  segments  (see  Panel  B  of  Table  5.13).  The  elimination  of  firm- 
years  that  do  not  specifically  report  operations  from  America  reduces  the  sub-samples  of 
profit-making  firms  by  some  34%  and  loss-making  firms  by  38%.  Regardless  of  the 
definition  of  samples  (i.  e.,  Panel  A  or  Panel  B),  regression  results  unequivocally  suggest 
that  there  exists  a  statistically  significant  (at  least  at  the  5%  level,  according  to  the  Wald 
test)  valuation  differential  between  the  domestic  (UK)  and  American  operations. 
Domestic  operations  are  always  more  valuable  than  operations  from  the  region  of 
America.  Similar  to  the  findings  in  sections  5.3.3.1  and  5.3.3.2,  the  value  association  of 
84  Additional  testing  (not  reported)  indicates  that  this  result  is  likely  to  be  driven  by  few  largest  losses 
reported  from  the  Europe  segment,  which  still  remain  in  the  sample  after  the  elimination  of  outliers. 
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and  statistically  significantly  associated  with  firm  value  while  negative  segmental 
earnings  tend  to  be  value-irrelevant.  In  the  previous  section,  where  I  compare  the 
valuation  of  UK  and  EU  segments,  there  was  an  anomalous  finding  of  positive  value 
association  of  segment-level  losses  when  these  are  reported  by  loss-making  firms.  This 
result  is  also  present  in  the  current  tests.  What  causes  this  effect  remains  unclear. 
5.3.3.4  Testing  the  valuation  of  UK  vs.  Asia  segments 
The  aim  of  this  section  is  to  assess  the  relative  valuations  associated  with  the 
domestic  (UK)  and  a  generic  segment  that  encompasses  the  entire  geographical  region 
of  Asia.  Similar  to  the  tests  that  involved  other  specific  foreign  segments,  this  test 
disaggregates  foreign  earnings  into  earnings  reported  from  the  Asia  segment  and  the 
Rest  of  the  World.  In  Panel  A  of  Table  5.14  (see  Appendix  5.1),  regressions  are 
estimated  for  samples  of  firms  that  report  segment-disaggregated  profits,  but  do  not 
necessarily  operate  in  Asia. 
The  examination  of  regression  results  reported  in  Panel  A  suggests  that  domestic 
operations  are  more  valuable  than  those  reported  from  the  Asia  segment.  This  valuation 
differential  is  similar  to  those  already  found  in  previous  sections,  with  regards  to  such 
foreign  locations  as  Europe  and  America.  Also  similar  to  findings  reported  in  sections 
5.3.3.1  through  5.3.3.3  is  the  value-irrelevance  associated  with  negative  segmental 
earnings  and  the  anomalous  negative  valuation  of  positive  segmental  earnings  reported 
by  firms  incurring  losses  on  the  corporate  level.  Nevertheless,  results  of  Model  5  (Panel 
A),  where  loss  and  profit-making  firms  are  pooled  in  one  sample,  still  suggest  that 
domestic  operations  have  higher  overall  valuation  than  those  of  Asia. 
The  tests  reported  in  Panel  A  shall  be  interpreted  with  caution,  as  there  might  be  a 
caveat  to  using  samples  where  not  all  included  firm-years  have  operations  in  the  Asia 
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samples  only  to  include  firm-years  that  specifically  report  the  Asia  segment,  that  is, 
these  firms  simultaneously  operate  in  both  the  UK  and  Asia  geographical  areas.  This 
reduces  the  size  of  sub-samples  of  profit-making  firms  by  68%  and  loss-making  firms 
by  75%. 
In  models  1  through  3  of  Panel  B  the  value  of  UK  segmental  earnings  coefficients 
are  higher  then  those  of  Asia.  These  divergences,  however,  are  not  statistically 
significant  (Wald  test  P-value  is  above  the  10%  level  in  all  tests).  This  is,  perhaps,  due 
to  the  generally  higher  standard  errors  associated  with  the  estimated  segmental  PBT 
coefficients  (as  compared  to  those  reported  in  models  of  Tables  5.11  through  5.13), 
resulting  in  the  Wald  test  failing  to  distinguish  these  segments'  valuation.  The  general 
patterns  of  valuation  of  negative  segmental  earnings  in  profit-making  firms  and  positive 
segmental  earnings  in  loss-making  firms  is  identical  to  those  observed  in  sections 
5.3.3.1  through  5.3.3.3. 
5.3.3.5  Testing  the  valuation  of  UK  vs.  Middle  East  &  Asia  segments 
In  this  section  I  test  the  valuation  divergence  of  domestic  and  Middle  East  & 
Africa  by  means  of  disaggregating  the  firm-level  PBT  into  corresponding  segmental 
components.  The  models  in  Panel  A  of  Table  5.15  (see  Appendix  5.1)  are  estimated  for 
samples  that  are  not  restricted  to  the  firm-years  with  available  earnings  for  the  Middle 
East  &  Africa  segment;  while  models  in  Panel  B  of  Table  5.15  are  estimated  for  firm- 
years  that  specifically  report  earnings  from  that  foreign  geographical  location. 
In  all  models  of  Panel  A,  coefficients  on  earnings  reported  from  the  Middle  East 
and  Africa  segment  are  not  statistically  significant,  while  those  reported  from  the  UK 
and  ROW  are  segments  positive  and  highly  statistically  significant.  Unlike  all  previous 
tests,  which  dealt  with  such  foreign  segments  as  Europe,  America  and  Asia,  in  the 
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higher  valuation  than  earnings  reported  from  the  ROW. 
Regression  results  are  somewhat  unexpected  in  the  restricted  samples  -  models  1 
through  5  of  Panel  B-  where  none  of  the  `fundamental'  valuation  factors  (BV  and 
Dividend)  and  PBT's  segmental  components  qualifies  as  value  relevant  at  the  5%  level 
of  significance.  This  is  despite  the  relatively  high  explanatory  power  and  overall 
statistical  significance  of  the  regressions.  Positive  earnings  reported  from  the  domestic 
segment  by  profit-making  firms  are  value  relevant  at  only  the  10%  level  of  significance, 
while  earnings  from  the  Middle  East  &  Africa  segment  have  negative  coefficient,  albeit 
not  significant  statistically. 
I  further  explore  the  lack  of  value-relevance  of  the  basic  value  drivers  by  re- 
running  all  regressions  without  fixed  effects  and  dummies.  The  explanatory  power  of 
the  models  now  drops  by  about  20  to  25  percentage  points  but  renders  the  BV  and  PBT 
coefficients  -  in  the  consolidated  version  of  the  model  -  statistically  significant  at  least 
at  the  5%  level.  Disaggregating  the  firm-level  PBT  into  segmental  components  further 
increases  the  explanatory  power  by  about  10  percentage  points.  Additionally,  the 
earnings  from  the  UK  and  ROW  segments  show  positive  and  statistically  significant 
association  while  value,  while  earnings  from  Middle  East  &  Africa  appear  with  a 
negative  and  statistically  not  significant  coefficient. 
A  tentative  conclusion  might  be  that  the  inclusion  of  a  large  number  of  fixed 
effects  and  dummies  `overcontrols'  the  model  and  suppresses  the  association  between 
the  segment-level  variables  and  firm  value. 
5.3.3.6  Simultaneous  tests  of  relative  valuation  of  all  geographical  segments 
Sections  5.3.3.1  through  5.3.3.5  have  examined  the  pair-wise  valuation 
differentials  between  the  domestic  vs.  a  specific  foreign  segment.  In  the  current  section 
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from  all  five  geographical  regions.  This  approach  has  benefits  and  shortcomings.  On  the 
benefit  side  is  the  fact  that  it  allows  the  comparison  of  all  pair-wise  combinations  of 
segments'  earnings  coefficients,  which  are  estimated  within  a  single  regression. 
Furthermore,  this  complete  disaggregation  is  likely  to  generate  more  accurate  (purged) 
earnings  coefficients  for  a  given  segment,  as  all  other  segments  are  controlled  for. 
However,  this  approach  might  also  have  a  problem.  Strictly  speaking,  in  order  to 
conclude  whether  for  a  generic  firm  earnings  coefficients  from  segment  A  are  more/less 
valuable  than  those  from  segment  B,  all  firm-years  in  the  sample  shall  have  both 
numbers  available.  In  a  hypothetical  extreme  cases,  if  the  regression  includes  a  cross- 
section  of  firms  where  none  of  the  firm-years  simultaneously  operate  in  both  segments, 
the  divergence  between  these  segments'  earnings  coefficient  might  prove  statistically 
significant/insignificant  but  will  have  little  economic  meaning.  That  is,  how  can  we 
conclude  that  operations  in  segment  A  are  more  valuable  than  those  in  segment  B,  if 
none  of  the  firms  in  the  sample  operate  in  both  segments  simultaneously? 
Table  5.16  (see  Appendix  5.1)  reports  results  from  four  models  with  fully 
segment-disaggregated  PBTs.  Model  1  is  estimated  for  profit-making  firms  without  the 
fixed  yearly  and  industry  effects,  while  Model  2  is  estimated  with  these  fixed  effects. 
Although  in  drawing  valuation  inferences  I  predominantly  focus  on  the  profit-making 
firms  (Models  1  and  2),  I  also  report  Model  3  (without  fixed  effects)  and  Model  4  (with 
fixed  effects),  which  are  estimated  for  the  entire  sample  in  order  to  conclude  on  the 
sensitivity  of  results  to  the  inclusion  of  loss-making  firms. 
In  each  of  the  four  models,  the  Wald  test  is  used  to  assess  the  level  of  statistical 
significance  of  differences  between  two  segments'  earnings  coefficients.  This  involves 
applying  Wald  tests  to  ten  pairs  of  segments  (i.  e.,  all  possible  paired  combinations  of 
segments): 
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"  UK  vs.  America; 
"  UK  vs.  Asia; 
"  UK  vs.  Middle  East  &  Africa; 
"  Europe  vs.  America; 
"  Europe  vs.  Asia; 
"  Europe  vs.  Middle  East  &  Africa; 
"  America  vs.  Asia; 
"  America  vs.  Middle  East  &  Africa; 
"  Asia  vs.  Middle  East  &  Africa. 
The  inclusion  of  fixed  effects  into  the  models  does  not,  by  and  large,  affect  the 
inferences  derived  from  Wald  tests  for  at  least  8  out  of  10  pairs.  In  Models  1  and  2  the 
Wald  tests  indicate  that  domestic  operations  are  statistically  more  valuable  than 
operations  from  Europe,  Asia  and  Middle  East  &  Africa.  This  agrees  with  the  previous 
findings  reported  in  sections  5.3.3.2,5.3.3.4  and  5.3.3.5. However,  in  contrast  to  the 
findings  in  section  5.3.3.3,  here  the  domestic  and  American  operations  have  virtually 
identical  valuation.  Similar  to  the  UK  segment,  operations  in  America  have  higher 
valuation  than  those  from  Europe,  Asia  and  Middle  East  &  Africa85.  The  valuation  of 
Europe  is  statistically  indistinguishable  from  that  of  Asia,  while  Middle  East  &  Africa 
has  the  lowest  valuation  with  respect  to  all  other  geographical  regions.  Moreover, 
earnings  from  the  segment  of  Middle  East  &  Africa  are  not  statistically  significant. 
Conclusions  from  Models  3  and  4  are  broadly  similar  to  those  from  Models  1  and 
2.  Foreign  operations,  (in  model  4  this  also  relates  to  America)  have  lower  valuation 
ss  Although  the  coefficient  on  earnings  reported  from  Asia  is  substantially  smaller  than  that  of  America, 
the  difference  between  the  two  is  not  statistically  significant  at  the  10%  level  when  the  model  is  estimated 
with  fixed  effects. 
258 than  the  domestic  segment.  In  terms  of  relative  valuation,  America  is  next  to  the  UK,  as 
it  has  statistically  higher  earnings  coefficient  than  Europe  and  Middle  East  &  Africa. 
America's  earnings  coefficient  is  also  higher  than  that  of  Asia,  yet  this  difference  is  not 
statistically  significant.  With  respect  to  other  segments,  Asia  and  Europe  are  in  the 
middle  range  of  valuation,  yet  further  examination  of  results  might  indicate  that  Asia  is 
slightly  higher  valued  than  Europe.  Models  3  and  4  provide  further  evidence  of  the 
lowest  valuation  of  the  Middle  East  &  Africa  geographical  location.  Not  only  has  this 
segment  the  lowest  valuation,  but  its  earnings  coefficients  in  models  3  and  4  are 
negative  (and  statistically  significant  at  the  6%  level),  suggesting  that  operations  in  that 
segment  might  even  destroy  value. 
Overall,  the  results  obtained  from  both  test  designs  (i.  e.,  from  models  testing  UK 
vs.  a  specific  foreign  segment,  and  from  a  model  that  simultaneously  tests  the  valuation 
differences  among  all  segments)  lead  to  similar  conclusions,  and  can  be  summarised  as 
follows.  The  segmental  operations  reported  from  the  UK  and  America  geographic 
regions  are  in  the  top  end  of  valuation;  Asia  and  UK  are  in  the  middle  range;  and  Middle 
East  &  Africa  is  at  the  bottom  end  of  valuation. 
5.3.4  Dynamics  of  relative  value  contribution  associated  with  specific  segments 
The  analyses  in  the  various  parts  of  section  5.3.3  were  based  on  the  assumption 
that  the  segments'  differential  valuation  is  persistent  through  time.  In  other  words, 
segmental  earnings  coefficients  were  set  to  be  constant  throughout  the  entire  sample 
period  of  16  years.  In  chapter  3I  discuss  factors  that  might  determine  segment-level 
earnings  coefficients  and  instigate  the  market's  differential  valuation  of  earnings  from 
specific  geographical  segments.  Among  the  most  important  of  these  factors  are  the 
differences  between  the  various  geographical  regions  in  terms  of. 
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as  perceived  by  the  UK  stock  market; 
2.  expected  rates  of  economic  growth; 
3.  segments'  risk-return  characteristics; 
4.  expected  changes  in  the  regions'  (foreign)  currency/pound  sterling  exchange 
rates; 
5.  the  perceived  persistence  of  profits  earned  from  a  specific  segment;  and 
6.  differences  in  profit  margins. 
The  valuation  of  earnings  from  a  specific  segment  reflects  the  collective  influence 
of  the  above  factors.  As  characteristics  of  these  factors  vary  across  geographical 
locations,  different  segments  will  have  different  valuations.  As  in  none  of  the 
geographical  regions  these  factors  are  likely  to  have  remained  stable  over  the  entire 
sample  period,  one  would  expect  (1)  the  valuation  of  segment-level  earnings  per  se,  and 
(2)  the  earnings'  valuation  differential  for  different  segments,  to  vary  over  time.  The 
firm-level  yearly  analysis  of  chapter  4  reveals  the  time-related  changing  patterns  of  the 
key  valuation  factors.  In  the  tests  that  follow  I  investigate  the  issue  of  the  time-related 
changing  nature  of  segment-level  valuation  by  splitting  the  entire  sample  into  variously 
defined  economic  sub-periods. 
The  decision  about  the  periods'  boundaries  is  discretionary.  As  a  starting  point  I 
use  the  definition  of  economic  periods  used  by  Core  et  al.  (2003)  who  split  their  sample 
into  the  pre-1996  period  (the  old  economy)  and  post-1996  period  (the  new  economy) 
and  demonstrate  empirically  that  the  value  association  of  different  valuation  factors  has 
changed  substantially  over  these  two  periods.  However,  because  any  categorisation  of 
economic  periods  is  bound  to  be  discretionary,  I  also  test  an  alternative  time  split86,  with 
86  Ideally,  one  would  estimate  a  separate  regression  for  each  of  the  16  years.  However,  splitting  the 
segment-disclosing  sample  into  16  years  produces  inappropriately  small  yearly  samples  with  insufficient 
number  of  data  points  for  some  of  the  segments. 
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2002. 
Panel  A  and  Panel  B  of  Table  5.17  (see  Appendix  5.1)  report  results  from  the 
two-period  time  split  and  three-period  splits  respectively,  and  the  Wald  test  is  used  to 
test  the  level  of  statistical  significance  of  the  divergence  between  any  two  segments' 
earnings  coefficients. 
In  the  old  economic  period  (Models  1  and  3  of  Panel  A),  earnings  from  the 
domestic  (UK)  segment  and  America  appear  to  have  statistically  and  economically 
indistinguishable  valuation  coefficients,  which  are,  in  turn,  statistically  higher  (see  Wald 
tests'  P-values)  than  those  of  all  remaining  foreign  geographical  segments87.  The  next 
most  valuable  segments  are  Asia  and  Europe.  The  fact  that  Asia's  coefficients  tend  to 
exceed  those  of  the  Europe  (yet  this  difference  is  not  statistically  significant)  and  falls 
short  of  that  of  America  and  UK  only  at  a  marginally  statistically  significant  (4%)  level, 
indicate  that  Asia  might  be  somewhat  higher  up  than  Europe  in  the  league  of  segments' 
valuation.  Finally,  the  Middle  East  &  Africa  segment's  earnings  coefficients  are  not 
different  from  zero  statistically  and  are  statistically  lower  than  all  other  segments' 
earnings  coefficients.  The  order  of  relative  valuation  of  geographical  segments  during 
the  old  economic  period  is,  therefore,  as  follows: 
Highest  valuation:  America  and  UK; 
Medium  valuation:  Asia  and  Europe; 
Lowest  valuation:  Middle  East  &  Africa. 
In  terms  of  segment  valuation,  the  new  economic  period  (Models  2  and  4  of  Panel 
A)  differs  from  the  old  period  in  at  least  two  respects: 
1.  the  relative  valuation  of  segments  is  substantially  less  distinguishable;  and 
B7  When  the  model  does  not  include  fixed  effects  (Model  1)  America's  earnings  coefficient  exceeds  that 
of  UK,  yet  this  difference  has  neither  statistical  nor  economical  significance. 
261 2.  the  regression  estimated  values  of  segmental  earnings'  coefficients  have 
radically  smaller  values. 
With  regards  to  the  first  point,  none  of  the  Wald  tests  are  significant  at  the  1% 
level;  only  one  (three)  out  of  ten  tests  in  Modell  (in  Model  4)  is  significant  at  the  5% 
level;  and  only  three  out  of  ten  tests  in  Model  2  and  Model  4  are  significant  when  the 
10%  level  is  used.  It  is  the  domestic  (UK)  location  that  is  valued  at  a  premium  relative 
to  all  foreign  regions.  In  Model  2,  with  no  fixed  effects,  it  is  only  the  UK  and  America 
segments  whose  earnings  coefficients  are  positive  and  statistically  different  from  zero  at 
the  1%  level.  In  the  Model  4,  with  yearly  and  industrial  fixed  effects,  the  UK  earnings 
coefficient  is  still  significant,  but  none  of  the  foreign  segments'  earnings  coefficients  are 
statistically  different  from  zero,  even  at  the  10%  level.  In  other  words,  the  UK 
operations  still  remain  the  most  valuable  and  value  relevant. 
With  regard  to  the  second  point,  it  shall  be  noted  that  in  the  new  economy  period 
the  segmental  earnings  coefficients  are  several  times  smaller  than  in  the  old  economy, 
even  when  statistically  different  from  zero.  This  conforms  to  patterns,  reported  in 
Chapter  4,  of  the  time-related  characteristics  of  firm-level  earnings  coefficients. 
A  thinner  split  of  the  sample  period  into  three  time  periods  (Models  1  though  3  of 
Panel  B)  indicates  that  the  changes  in  relative  valuation  and  value  relevance  of  specific 
segments'  earnings,  as  revealed  from  the  preceding  analysis,  were  taking  place 
gradually.  Thus  in  the  pre-1994  period,  earnings  reported  from  America  clearly  has  the 
highest  valuation  as  this  segment's  earnings  coefficient  is  always  larger,  both 
statistically  and  economically,  than  those  of  other  geographical  segments.  The  UK 
coefficient  has  the  next  highest  value,  surpassing  those  of  Asia,  Europe  and  Middle  East 
&  Africa,  yet  statistically  this  difference  is  only  significant  for  the  latter  two  regions. 
The  third-largest  coefficient  relates  to  Asia,  but  its  valuation  superiority  is  statistically 
significant  only  when  compared  to  the  Middle  East  &  Africa.  Finally,  earnings  from 
262 Middle  East  &  Africa  appear  to  have  the  lowest  valuation  of  all  regions  (in  fact  the 
coefficient  is  negative)  and  has  virtually  no  association  with  the  firm  value. 
In  the  middle  period  (1994-1997)  it  is  the  domestic  segment  that  has  the  highest 
earnings  coefficient,  which  is  statistically  larger  than  America's,  Europe's,  Asia's  and 
Middle  East  &  Africa's  coefficients,  at  least  at  the  10%,  5%,  10%  and  1%  level, 
respectively.  America's  earnings  coefficient  has  the  second-highest  value,  but  its 
difference  from  the  Asia's  and  Europe's  coefficients  is  significant  neither  in  economic 
nor  statistical  terms.  Finally,  the  Middle  East  &  Africa  is  the  only  value-irrelevant 
segment,  which  is  similar  to  the  result  from  the  pre-1994  period. 
The  post-1997  period  is  the  most  peculiar  in  terms  of  segment-level  earnings 
valuation.  It  appears  that  none  of  the  segmental  earnings  are  value-relevant  in  their  own 
right  and  no  differential  valuation  exists  between  the  earnings  reported  from  different 
geographical  locations.  Furthermore,  of  all  key  value  drivers  (book  value,  dividends  and 
disaggregated  earnings)  included  in  the  model,  only  dividends  have  statistically 
significant  association  with  value.  The  unusually  low  explanatory  power  of  the  model 
might  be  a  reflection  of  this  fact8ß. 
Summarising  the  results  obtained  from  the  analysis  of  different  periods,  two 
conclusions  might  be  drawn: 
1.  the  disaggregation  of  firm-level  earnings  into  geographical  components  has 
markedly  different  information  content  in  different  periods;  and 
2.  the  relative  valuation  of  operations  reported  from  specific  geographical  regions 
changes  with  time. 
A  conclusion  of  a  more  general  nature  is  that  apart  from  the  time-related 
variability  of  segments'  valuation,  changes  in  other  regression  parameters  are  also 
obvious.  Thus,  (1)  the  explanatory  power  of  the  regressions  steadily  declined  over  the 
88  Further  investigation  of  what  causes  the  observed  phenomenon  of  time-related  deterioration  in  value 
relevance  (or  valuation  role)  of  financial  statement  variables  is  beyond  the  scope  of  my  research. 
263 three  economic  periods;  (2)  the  value  association  of  such  financial  statement  data  as 
firm/segment-level  earnings  and  book  values  declined  over  time;  and  (3)  the  value 
association  of  dividends  evolved  from  being  positive  and  highly  statistically  significant 
in  the  pre-1994  period,  to  value-irrelevant  in  the  middle  period  (1994-1997),  and, 
finally,  to  being  negative  and  statistically  significant  for  the  post-1997  period. 
5.4  ISSUES  OF  ROBUSTNESS  AND  SUMMARY  OF  RESULTS 
The  bulk  of  the  empirical  analysis  in  this  chapter  has  been  carried  out  by  utilising 
the  composite  scale-deflated  financial  statement  and  market  variables.  In  chapter  4I 
argued  that  in  light  of  the  lack  of  consensus  in  the  literature  on  what  financial  variable  is 
the  `best'  scale  proxy,  the  use  of  a  composite  scale  proxy  offers  a  compromise.  This  is 
because  the  composite  scale  proxy,  which  encapsulates  more  than  one  single-variable 
scale  proxy,  diversifies  away  some  of  the  problems  which  arise  when  a  single-variable 
scale  deflator  is  used  for  samples  wherein  firms  differ  across  all  dimensions.  The 
analysis  in  chapter  4  has  demonstrated  empirically  that  (i)  regression  parameters  are 
more  stable  to  the  definition  and  treatment  of  outliers,  and  (ii)  the  deflated  financial  and 
market  variables  have  more  close-to-normal  distributions,  when  the  composite  scale 
proxy  was  used  as  a  deflator.  The  stability  of  regression  parameters  (which  is  best 
achieved  when  the  composite  scale  proxy  is  used)  is  of  key  importance  in  Chapter  5, 
because  the  differential  valuation  of  specific  geographic  segments  is  identified  by 
means  of  comparing  the  values  of  segments'  PBT  coefficients. 
Nevertheless,  to  make  the  analysis  complete  and,  perhaps,  more  comparable  to 
other  studies  in  this  area,  one  might  need  to  cross-check  the  sensitivity  of  the  main 
results  to  the  use  of  alternative  deflators.  This  implies  re-scaling  of  variables  and 
repeating  the  main  regressions/tests  with  the  re-scaled  variables.  Group  Total  Assets, 
one  year  lagged  equity  Market  Value  and,  finally,  group  Sales  are  chosen  as  alternative 
264 deflators.  These  results  are  reported  in  Appendix  5.2  and  are  discussed,  in  brief,  in  the 
sections  that  follow89. 
By  and  large,  the  firm-level  conclusions,  which  are  based  on  general  regression 
characteristics  (or  valuation  properties  of  the  models)  are  similar,  regardless  of  the 
choice  of  the  deflator  (i.  e.,  Composite  scale  proxy,  Total  Assets,  one  year  lagged  equity 
market  value,  and  Sales).  Across  all  deflators,  the  patterns  of  the  time-related  changes  in 
the  combined  value  relevance  of  financial  statement  information  are  qualitatively 
identical.  Thus,  the  explanatory  power  of  regressions  that  have  been  estimated  over 
three  different  time  periods  (pre-1994,1994-1997,  and  1998-2002),  and  two  different 
time  periods  (pre-1996,  and  1996-2002),  have  a  clear  declining  trend  for  all  types  of 
deflators  (see  Table  5.16,  in  Appendix  5.1,  and  Tables  5.16S,  5.16T  and  5.16M,  in 
Appendix  5.2). 
The  explanatory  power  of  most  of  the  TA  and  Sales-scaled  regressions  is  notably 
higher  than  that  of  the  corresponding  lagged  MV-scaled  regressions.  This  result  is  not 
unexpected,  bearing  in  mind  that  the  lag  MV-deflated  model  is  a  quasi  return-earnings 
type  of  specification90.  The  composite  deflated  models  have,  on  average,  somewhat 
lower  explanatory  power  than  the  corresponding  TA  and  Sales  deflated  models,  yet 
have  substantially  higher  explanatory  power  than  that  of  the  lagged  MV-deflated 
models. 
In  addition,  in  terms  of  the  adjusted  R2,  the  relative  performance  of  the  models 
across  differently  partitioned  samples  are  similar  for  all  deflators.  Across  all  deflators, 
the  models  explain  more  of  the  cross-sectional  variation  in  equity  market  value  when  (i) 
firms  trade  at  a  discount  to  book  value,  (ii)  firms  pay  dividends,  (iii)  when  the  reported 
g9  The  numbering  of  the  tables  in  Appendix  5.2  is  identical  to  that  of  the  corresponding  tables  in 
Appendix  5.1,  but  end  with  letters  'S',  when  the  deflator  is Sales,  'MV',  when  the  deflator  is  lagged-MV, 
and  'TA',  when  the  deflator  is  Total  Assets. 
90  This  has  been  discussed  in  more  details  in  Chapter  4 
265 PBTs  are  positive,  and  (iv)  when  observations  relate  to  the  first  half  of  the  sample 
period. 
The  valuation  role  (or  value  relevance)  of  key  value  drivers,  in  the  context  of  the 
employed  model,  appears  to  be  immune  to  the  choice  of  deflator.  In  the  profit-making 
samples,  PBT  is  always  positively  and  statistically  significantly  related  to  value,  and 
appear  to  be  the  key  value  driver.  Negative  PBTs  are,  by  and  large,  value  irrelevant. 
Regardless  of  the  deflator,  when  positive,  the  book  value  of  equity  is,  usually, 
statistically  significantly  and  positively  associated  with  value  in  the  loss-making  sub- 
sample.  In  the  profit-making  samples  this  association  is,  frequently,  negative  and  not 
statistically  significant.  Negative  BV  have  no  valuation  relevance.  Dividends  are  in 
positive  and  statistically  significant  association  with  the  value  of  the  domestic  firms,  but 
have  no  valuation  role  for  geographically  diversified  firms.  Furthermore,  when  the 
entire  sample  period  is  split  into  two  or  three  sub-periods,  across  all  alternatively 
deflated  models,  dividends  have  positive  (negative)  value  association  for  the  period(s) 
covering  the  early-1990s  (late-1990s).  Deflation  by  alternative  scale  proxies  does  not 
impact  on  such  firm-level  conclusions  as: 
"  dividend  paying  firms  are  valued  at  a  discount  relative  to  none-paying  firms 
"  firms  that  trade  at  a  discount  to  equity  book  value  have  lower  valuation  relative  to 
firms  trading  at  a  premium. 
Finally,  the  segment-level  valuation  is  found  to  be  more  sensitive  to  the  choice  of 
deflator.  When  the  firm-level  financial  results  are  disaggregated  into  two  broad 
segments,  domestic  and  foreign,  the  domestic  segment  always  comes  out  as  more 
valuable,  across  all  tested  alternative  deflators  (see  Models  2  and  5  in  Tables  5.10, 
5.10M,  5.10T,  5.10S,  of  Appendix  5.2)91.  When  these  tests  are  repeated  with  the 
aggregate  foreign  operations  being  further  split  into  specific  regions,  the  UK  operations 
91  In  some  tests,  however,  this  difference  is  not  statistically  significant  at  the  5%  level. 
266 come  out  as  the  most  valuable  in  the  composite  scale-deflated  and  the  TA-deflated  tests. 
In  the  majority  of  lagged  MV-deflated  tests  the  most  valued  regions  are  America  and 
the  UK.  In  the  Sales-deflated  tests  the  results  are  less  conclusive  (see  Models  3  and  6  in 
Tables  5.10,5.10M,  5.1OT,  5.1OS)92. 
Similar  deflation-related  low  stability  of  segments'  relative  valuation  can  be 
found,  when  the  segments'  valuation  differential  is  tested  over  different  economic 
periods  (see  Tables  5.17,5.17M,  5.17T,  5.17S). 
By  and  large,  the  deflation-related  instability  of  segments'  relative  valuation  can 
be  attributed  to  several  factors.  Firstly,  because  the  number  of  missing  values  is 
different  for  different  scale  proxies,  the  resulting  deflated  samples  are  not  identical  in 
terms  of  size. 
Secondly,  outliers  are  identified  and  eliminated  by  applying  the  0.5%  cut-off  rule 
to  all  scale-deflated  firm  and  segment-level  variables,  included  in  the  regression.  This, 
in  aggregate,  eliminates  about  3%  of  a  sample.  However,  the  3%  of  observations,  which 
are  treated  as  outliers  in,  for  instance,  the  Sales-deflated  sample,  are  not  the  same 
observations  as  the  3%  of  outlier  observations  in  the  TA-deflated  sample.  In  other 
words,  differently  deflated  samples  are  not  entirely  identical  in  terms  of  the  included 
observations. 
Finally,  the  firm-level  and,  to  a  greater  extent,  segment-level  regression 
parameters  in  Sales  and  lagged  MV-deflated  models  are  substantially  more  sensitive  to 
the  choice  of  outliers'  cut-off  percentage  than  the  results  from  the  composite-scale 
deflated  model.  Results  from  the  composite-scale  deflated  tests  become  sufficiently 
robust  after  the  elimination  of  less  than  0.5%  of  the  top  and  bottom  values  of  each  of  the 
regression  variables.  To  achieve  a  similar  robustness  for  the  single-variable  deflated 
regressions,  at  least  the  1%  or  higher  cut  off  rule  should  be  applied. 
92  In  some  tests,  however,  this  difference  is  not  statistically  significant  at  the  5%  level. 
267 I  consider  (i)  the  robustness  of  the  results  to  the  treatment  of  outliers,  and  (ii)  the 
importance  to  limit  the  loss  of  observations,  as  sufficient  reasons  for  relying  on  the 
results  from  the  composite-deflated  models  when  drawing  conclusions  (see  below) 
about  segments'  relative  valuation  and  value  implication  of  geographic  diversification. 
5.5  CONCLUSIONS 
Results  indicate  that,  overall,  geographically  diversified  firms  are  valued  at  a 
premium  in  relation  to  domestic  firms.  Similar  to  the  findings  by  Garrod  and  Rees 
(1998),  I  find  that  investors  attach  significantly  higher  multiples  to  earnings  reported  by 
diversified  firms.  This  result  persists  both  for  the  `old'  and  `new'  economic  periods.  At 
the  same  time,  a  significantly  higher  and  positive  capitalisation  of  dividends  is  observed 
for  domestic  firms,  while  dividends  appear  neutral  for  the  valuation  of  diversified  f  inns. 
On  the  segmental  level,  when  all  foreign  operations  are  amalgamated  in  one 
generic  foreign  segment  and  compared  with  the  domestic  (UK)  segment,  the  UK-based 
operations  appear  the  most  valuable.  When  the  generic  foreign  segment  is  disaggregated 
into  specific  foreign  segments,  the  UK  operations  no  longer  dominate  segment 
valuation. 
During  the  early  economic  periods  (pre-1994  or  pre-1996)  segmental  profits  from 
America  have  the  highest  capitalisation,  followed  by  the  domestic  (UK)  segment. 
However,  during  a  more  recent  economic  period  (1994-1997)  the  UK  segment  is 
associated  with  the  highest  contribution  to  firm  value.  In  the  most  recent  economic 
period  (1998-2002)  the  earnings  information  reported  from  most  of  the  foreign 
segments  appear  value-irrelevant.  Throughout  all  periods  segmental  operations  (i.  e., 
profits)  from  the  Middle  East  &  Africa  are  associated  with  the  lowest  valuation  and, 
sometimes  have  negative  association  with  the  firm  value.  This  time-related  change  in 
268 the  relative  valuation  of  segments'  operations  possibly  reflects  the  changing  economic 
prospects  of  different  regions  of  the  world. 
In  addition,  one  can  observe  some  sort  of  association  between  the  valuation  of  a 
specific  geographic  segment  and  the  degree  of  popularity  of  that  geographical  region  as 
an  investment  location  for  UK  firms.  Thus,  Middle  East  and  Africa  is  found  to  be  the 
least  contributing  to  the  value  of  the  firm  segment  and  it  is  the  most  rare  investment 
location  for  the  UK  multi-segment  firms.  Asia  is  the  region  with  the  next-lowest  relative 
segmental  valuation  and  popularity  as  investment  location.  Among  foreign  segments 
America  and  Europe  are  associated  with  the  higher  value  contribution  and  are  more 
`popular'  locations  of  foreign  investments  by  UK  multinationals 
By  and  large,  empirical  tests  reported  throughout  the  chapter  suggest  that 
segment-level  accounting  data  communicates  value  relevant  information,  which  is  often 
incremental  to  the  consolidated-level  data. 
93  This  might  be  a  result  of  firms  being  aware  of  the  market's  favorable/unfavorable  valuation  of  specific 
geographical  segments  and  aligning  their  foreign  investment  decisions  accordingly.  It  might  also  be 
possible  that  firms  simply  chose  not  to  disclose  (whenever  possible)  segments  which  are  perceived  by  the 
market  as  value  reducing. 
269 APPENDIX  5.1 
All  regressions  reported  in  Appendix  5.1  are  deflated  by  the  composite 
scale  factor.  Composite  scale  factor  (scale)  =  (MV+TA+Sale)/3. 
All  regressions  reported  in  Appendix  5.1  and  5.2  are  estimated  for 
samples  that  exclude  the  outliers.  Outliers  are  defined  as  the  top 
and/or  bottom  0.5%  of  each  variable  included  in  regression. 
In  the  tables  that  follow  the  following  names  or  acronyms  have  been 
used  to  represent  regression  variable 
Name  used  in 
regression 
Variable  description 
BV  Scale-deflated  Book  value  of  ordinary  equity 
PBT  Scale-deflated  Profit  Before  Tax 
MV  Scale-deflated  Market  Value  of  ordinary  equity 
DIV  Scale-deflated  Dividends  for  ordinary  shareholders 
TA  Total  Assets  of  the  company 
Sales  Group  turnover 
Adj.  ER  Adjustment  term  =  earnings  for  ordinary  shareholders  --  PBT 
Scale  Composite  scale  factor  =  (MV+TA+Sales)/3 
1/Scale;  1/MV; 
1/Sale;  and  1/TA 
Are  the  reciprocals  of  Scale,  one  year  lagged-MV,  Sales,  and  TA, 
respectively. 
PBT*f(size)  An  instrumental  variable  designed  to  capture  firm  size-related  non- 
linearity  of  the  PBT  coefficient.  PBT*f(size  proxy)=PBT*size"(0.2). 
PUK  Scale-deflated  PBT  reported  form  UK  segment 
PNUK  Scale-deflated  PBT  reported  form  non-UK  segment 
PAMER  Scale-deflated  PBT  reported  form  America  segment 
PEU  Scale-deflated  PBT  reported  form  Europe  segment 
PAFR  Scale-deflated  PBT  reported  form  Mid.  East&Africa  segment 
PASIA  Scale-deflated  PBT  reported  form  Asia  segment 
PRIEST  The  difference  between  the  group-level  PBT  and  the  sum  of 
segment-level  PBTs 
PROW  PBT  of  rest  of  the  world  (depending  on  the  context  of  the  test) 
DBV  Interaction  term  for  By,  when  PBT  is  negative 
DDIV  Interaction  term  for  DIV,  when  PBT  is  negative 
DPBT  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBT 
DAdj.  ER  Interaction  term  for  Adj.  ER,  when  PBT  is  negative 
DPBT*F(size)  Interaction  term  for  DPBT*f(size),  when  PBT  is  negative 
DPUK  Interaction  term  for  negative  PUK 
DPNUK  Interaction  term  for  negative  PNUK 
DPAMER  Interaction  term  for  negative  PAMER 
270 DPEU  Interaction  term  for  negative  PEU 
DPAFR  Interaction  term  for  negative  PAFR 
DPASIA  Interaction  term  for  negative  PASIA 
DPREST  Interaction  term  for  negative  PREST 
DPROW  Interaction  term  for  negative  PROW 
1/Scale  dummy  Interaction  term  for  1/scale,  when  PBT  is  negative 
NEGMV  Dummy  variable:  NEGMV=1  if  MV<BV,  otherwise  NEGMV=O. 
NEGMVPBT  Dummy  variable:  NEGPBTMV=1  if  MV<BV  and  PBT<O,  otherwise 
NEGPBTMV=O. 
DUMDIV  Dummy  variable:  DUMDIV=1  if  the  firm  pays  dividends,  otherwise 
DUMDIV=O. 
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ý Table  5.9 
Total  sample 
Diversified  firms  Domestic  firms 
Definitionl'  Definition2* 
dividend  and  only  dividend  and  only  dividend  and  only 
non-dividend  dividend  non-dividend  dividend  non-dividend  dividend 
firms  firms  firms*  firms*  firms  firms 
model  I  model  2  model  3  model  4  models  model  6 
Intercept  0.715  0.684  0.692  0.680  0.562  0.505 
t-ratio  44.846  41.069  33.767  31.694  40.231  36.580 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
dummy  1  0.307  -0.175  0.274  -0.220  0.351  -0.099 
t-ratio  8.603  -3.994  5.779  -4.012  10.265  -2.661 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.008 
dummy  2  -0.504  -0.432  -0.485  -0.427  -0.514  -0.453 
t-ratio  -48.677  -39.663  -33.794  -27.609  -55.453  -48.806 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
dummy  3  -0.654  -0.666  -0.610  -0.682  -0.543  -0.564 
t-ratio  -21.593  -18.282  -14.700  -15.211  -18.724  -21.572 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/scale  297.3  -46.5  706.7  22.4  122.0  46.9 
f-ratio  2.828  -0.464  4.062  0.101  1.730  0.606 
P-value  0.005  0.642  0.000  0.920  0.084  0.545 
1/scale  dummy  97.7  227.7  -137.7  135.6  226.1  891.4 
t-ratio  0.632  0.850  -0.590  0.314  2.586  4.858 
P-value  0.528  0.395  0.555  0.754  0.010  0.000 
BV  0.135  -0.001  0.132  0.007  0.452  0.284 
t-ratio  5.457  -0.020  4.097  0.195  24.238  14.674 
P-value  0.000  0.984  0.000  0.845  0.000  0.000 
DBV  0.539  0.527  0.533  0.528  0.070  0.276 
t-ratio  12.873  8.499  9.747  6.654  1.751  5.617 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.080  0.000 
PBT  2.350  2.758  2.274  2.705  2.044  2.441 
t-ratio  14.101  16.108  10.053  11.337  12.390  14.595 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
DPBT  -2.515  -2.937  -2.518  -2.896  -2.305  -2.095 
t-ratio  -13.417  -14.814  -10.124  -10.450  -11.791  -3.854 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT*f(scale)  0.067  0.053  0.085  0.068  -0.030  -0.022 
t-ratio  5.641  4.491  5.904  4.560  -2.370  -1.789 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.018  0.074 
DPBT'(scale)  -0.022  -0.043  -0.032  -0.056  0.083  -0.028 
t-ratio  -1.332  -2.688  -1.586  -2.443  4.187  -0.420 
P-value  0.183  0.007  0.113  0.015  0.000  0.675 
DIV  -1.151  0.789  -1.355  -0.053  1.737  4.291 
t-ratio  -2.934  1.825  -2.709  -0.097  4.255  9.748 
P-value  0.003  0.068  0.007  0.923  0.000  0.000 
DIV  dummy  -12.414  1.007  -10.475  3.660  -12.158  -1.114 
t-ratio  -11.592  0.902  -7.849  2.516  -10.567  -1.078 
P-value  0.000  0.367  0.000  0.012  0.000  0.281 
Adj.  ER  0.865  0.920  0.986  0.966  -0.032  0.237 
f-ratio  5.598  5.598  5.349  5.045  -0.530  1.801 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.596  0.072 
dAdj.  ER  -0.535  -0.744  -0.769  -0.764  0.184  -0.087 
t-ratio  -2.332  -3.412  -3.161  -3.118  1.175  -0.593 
P-value  0.020  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.240  0.553 
No.  of  cases  9539  7474  5496  4500  8638  6833 
Adj.  R-S  uare  29.60%  32.58%  28.32%  30.35%  31.05%  36.36% 
273 Table  5.9  (continued  from  the  previous  page...  ) 
Profit  firms  only  Loss  firms  only 
diversified  firms  domestic  firms  Diversified  domestic 
dividend  and  only  dividend  and  only 
non-dividend  dividend  non-dividend  dividend  dividend  dividend 
firms  firms  firms  firms  firms  firms 
model?  model8  model9  model  10  model  ll  model  12 
Intercept  0.715  0.684  0.562  0.505  0.509  0.406 
t-ratio  44.846  41.069  40.231  36.580  12.537  11.725 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
dummy  2  -0.504  -0.432  -0.514  -0.453 
t-ratio  -48.677  -39.663  -55.453  -48.806 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
dummy  3  -0.491  -0.465 
t-ratio  -22.173  -16.046 
P-value  0.000  0.000 
1/scale  297.3  -46.5  135.7  47.0  181.1  930.0 
t-ratio  2.828  -0.464  1.827  0.607  0.730  5.592 
P-value  0.005  0.642  0.068  0.544  0.466  0.000 
BV  0.135  -0.001  0.382  0.283  0.526  0.567 
t-ratio  5.457  -0.020  20.034  14.477  9.418  11.814 
P-value  0.000  0.984  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  2.350  2.758  2.161  2.443  -0.179  0.349 
t-ratio  14.101  16.108  12.997  14.589  -1.787  0.674 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.074  0.501 
PBT*f(scale)  0.067  0.053  -0.024  -0.022  0.009  -0.049 
t-ratio  5.641  4.491  -1.896  -1.782  0.848  -0.761 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.058  0.075  0.397  0.447 
DIV  -1.151  0.789  1.998  4.296  1.796  3.101 
t-ratio  -2.934  1.825  4.868  9.742  1.744  3.066 
P-value  0.003  0.068  0.000  0.000  0.081  0.002 
Adj.  ER  0.865  0.920  -0.016  0.238  0.176  0.155 
t-ratio  5.598  5.598  -0.251  1.806  1.229  2.326 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.802  0.071  0.219  0.021 
No.  of  cases  7296  6737  6917  6409  737  424 
Ad'.  R-S  uare  26.42%  28.93%  30.70%  33.53%  31.08%  48.72% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  each  regression 
coefficient. 
dummy  1=1  if  PBT<O  &  MV>BV;  and  dummyl  =0  otherwise 
dummy  2=1  if  PB7>0  &  MV<BV;  and  dummy2  =0  otherwise 
dummy  3=I  if  PBT<0  &  MV<BV;  and  dummy3  =0  otherwise 
*  Definition)  =  when  the  firms  is  considered  geographically  diversified  if  at  least  one  of  the  three 
accounting  items  (PBT,  Sales,  or  NA)  is  reported  for  a  foreign  segment.  Definition2  =  when  the  firm  is 
considered  geographically  diversified  only  when  the  segmental  PBT  is  reported  for  a  foreign  segment. 
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z Table  5.11  Panel  A  (continued  from  the  previous  page...  ) 
Coeff. 
Model  4 
t-ratio  P-value  Coeff. 
Model  5 
t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.629  9.946  0.000  0.298  2.279  0.023 
NEGMV  -0.432  -29.336  0.000  -0.414  -26.073  0.000 
DUMDIV  -0.104  -2.683  0.007  -0.093  -2.401  0.016 
SICI  0.311  5.243  0.000  0.308  4.951  0.000 
SIC2  -0.142  -2.890  0.004  -0.147  -2.811  0.005 
SIC3  0.109  2.353  0.019  0.104  2.108  0.035 
SIC4  0.098  2.149  0.032  0.087  1.782  0.075 
SIC5  0.080  1.623  0.104  0.060  1.148  0.251 
SIC6  0.063  1.302  0.193  0.050  0.974  0.330 
SIC7  0.100  2.064  0.039  0.086  1.658  0.097 
SIC8  -0.006  -0.088  0.930  -0.017  -0.246  0.806 
SIC9  0.279  5.855  0.000  0.266  5.257  0.000 
Y2  0.102  1.205  0.228 
Y3  0.035  0.865  0.387 
Y4  0.021  0.750  0.454 
Y5  0.050  2.199  0.028 
Y6  0.048  2.552  0.011 
Y7  0.053  3.269  0.001 
Y8  0.043  3.022  0.003 
Y9  0.032  2.579  0.010 
Y10  0.035  3.081  0.002 
Y11  0.031  2.947  0.003 
Y12  0.027  2.833  0.005 
Y13  0.027  3.092  0.002 
Y14  0.026  3.120  0.002 
Y15  0.020  2.562  0.010 
Y16  0.020  2.793  0.005 
1/Scale  311.6  1.431  0.152  357.3  1.708  0.088 
BV"  0.064  1.817  0.069  0.061  1.753  0.080 
PBT  2.400  9.573  0.000  2.511  9.992  0.000 
PBT"f(scale)  0.074  4.420  0.000  0.078  4.692  0.000 
DIV  0.664  1.164  0.244  0.707  1.231  0.218 
Ad  .  ER  0.934  4.911  0.000  0.777  3.856  0.000 
No.  of  cases  3795  3795 
Ad  .  R-s  uare  30.01%  32.37% 
All  models  are  estimated  for  samples  that  include  dividend  paying  and  non-dividend  firms.  White 
adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  regression  coefficients. 
Model  1  is  the  most  basic  specification.  Model  2  includes  the  NEGMV  dummy  variable:  NEGMV=1  if 
MV<BV,  and  NEGMV=O,  otherwise.  Model  3  includes  an  additional  dummy  variable  DUMDIV: 
DUMDIV=1  if  firm  pays  dividends,  and  DUMDIV=O,  otherwise. 
SIC1  through  SIC9  are  the  industry  dummy  variables.  A  give  industry  dummy  takes  the  value  of  1,  if  the 
firm's  principal  operations  belong  to  that  industry,  and  zero,  otherwise.  Y2  through  Y16  are  the  yearly 
dummy  variable,  corresponding  to  one  of  the  16  sample-period  years.  A  given  year  dummy  takes  the 
value  of  1  for  observations  related  to  that  year,  and  zero  otherwise. 
Model  4  is  estimated  with  industry  fixed  effects.  Model  5  includes  both  industry  and  yearly  fixed  effects. 
**  Negative  BVs  are  set  to  zero. 
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dFdEý  w  wwý2 Panel  B:  splitting  the  sample  period  into  three  economic  sub-periods 
Coeff. 
pre-1994 
Model  I 
t-ratio  P-value 
1994-1997  (inclusive) 
Model  2 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff. 
post-1997 
Model  3 
t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.767  8.003  0.000  0.593  8.986  0.000  0.942  13.478  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.356  14.383  0.000  -0.390  12.082  0.000  -0.541  22.291  0.000 
DUMDIV  -0.281  -3.376  0.001  -0.094  -1.466  0.143  -0.033  -0.553  0.580 
1/scale  -785.3  -2.409  0.016  736.1  3.007  0.003  778.3  2.217  0.027 
BV**  0.165  2.725  0.006  0.057  0.941  0.347  0.096  1.559  0.119 
PUK  3.725  8.584  0.000  4.657  11.487  0.000  0.546  1.101  0.271 
DPUK  0.328  0.249  0.803  -8.068  -2.202  0.028  -2.058  -1.673  0.094 
PEU  2.337  3.638  0.000  3.592  5.799  0.000  -0.448  -0.602  0.547 
DPEU  0.708  0.244  0.807  6.747  3.305  0.001  1.708  1.172  0.241 
PAMER  4.703  7.570  0.000  3.983  7.065  0.000  0.148  0.238  0.812 
DPAMER  -6.074  -1.865  0.062  -1.444  -0.647  0.518  -6.254  -5.344  0.000 
PASIA  2.852  4.308  0.000  3.562  5.209  0.000  -0.639  -0.762  0.446 
DPASIA  -0.252  -0.121  0.904  -2.441  -0.677  0.498  -0.340  -0.059  0.953 
PAFR  -0.622  -0.668  0.504  0.746  0.827  0.408  -0.946  -1.000  0.317 
DPAFR  19.333  1.513  0.130  121.368  3.000  0.003  20.438  2.393  0.017 
PREST  4.240  7.391  0.000  3.362  6.241  0.000  0.439  0.859  0.390 
PBT'f(scale)  -0.012  -0.494  0.622  0.073  3.126  0.002  0.110  3.447  0.001 
DIV  2.859  3.148  0.002  0.221  0.221  0.825  -3.585  -3.450  0.001 
ADJER  0.764  2.882  0.004  0.899  2.122  0.034  0.485  1.555  0.120 
No.  of  cases  1161  1489  1145 
Adj.  R- 
Square  38.77%  32.76%  21.65% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  regression 
coefficients. 
**  Negative  BVs  are  set  to  zero.  Models  are  estimated  for  profit-making  firm-years  and  without  fixed 
effects. 
Wald  test  of  the  significance  of  valuation  differential  between  two  segments 
Model  I  Modelt  Model  3 
Compared  segments  P-value  P-value  P-value 
UK  vs  Europe  0.007  0.031  0.104 
UK  vs  America  0.038  0.098  0.330 
UK  vs  Asia  0.128  0.075  0.110 
UK  vs 
Mid.  East&Africa  0.000  0.000  0.082 
Europe  vs  America  0.000  0.532  0.424 
Europe  vs  Asia  0.503  0.968  0.840 
Europe  vs 
Mid.  East&Africa  0.001  0.004  0.617 
America  vs  Asia  0.009  0.554  0.329 
America  vs 
Mid.  East&Africa  0.000  0.001  0.237 
Asia  vs 
Mid.  East&Africa  0.001  0.008  0.786 
292 APPENDIX  5.2 
Appendix  5.2  reports  regressions  which  are  scaled  by  alternative  scale- 
proxies. 
Tables  5.10TA,  5.12-5.15TA  and  5.17TA  report  regressions  scaled  by 
Group  Total  Assets. 
Tables  5.  lOSale,  5.12-5.15Sale  and  5.17Sale  report  regressions  scaled 
by  Group  Sales. 
Tables  5.10MV,  5.12-5.15MV  and  5.17MV  report  regressions  scaled  by 
the  one  year  lagged  equity  market  value. 
293 Table  5.10M  (lagged  MV-deflated  model) 
Profit-making  firms 
Dividend  payin  g  and  non-dividend  firms 
Consolidated  level  Intermedi  ate  disaggregation  Fine  disaggregation 
Model  1  Model  2  Model  3 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.815  26.041  0.000  0.793  26.059  0.000  0.809  26.407  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.634  -14.760  0.000  -0.637  -15.037  0.000  -0.634  -13.725  0.000 
1/MV  2267.5  3.352  0.001  2476.9  3.816  0.000  2235.2  3.184  0.001 
BV  0.229  4.496  0.000  0.246  4.967  0.000  0.234  4.498  0.000 
PBT  2.637  7.575  0.000 
PUK  1.841  6.707  0.000  2.758  7.492  0.000 
DPUK  -1.824  -1.485  0.138  -0.969  -0.712  0.476 
PNUK  1.368  4.615  0.000 
DPNUK  0.128  0.090  0.928 
PEU  2.104  4.028  0.000 
DPEU  0.967  0.699  0.484 
PAMER  2.861  5.494  0.000 
DPAMER  -1.141  -0.709  0.478 
PASIA  1.941  3.859  0.000 
DPASIA  -0.666  -0.216  0.829 
PAFR  2.408  1.637  0.102 
DPAFR  2.425  0.238  0.812 
PREST  -1.184  -4.188  0.000  0.411  1.067  0.162  1.411  3.067  0.002 
PBT'f(mv)  -0.004  -0.162  0.871  0.072  4.286  0.000  0.000  -0.012  0.990 
DIV  -0.977  -1.301  0.193  -0.824  -1.071  0.284  -1.116  -1.466  0.143 
ADJER  0.589  1.562  0.118  0.518  1.724  0.085  0.548  1.536  0.124 
No.  of 
cases  3752  3752  3752 
Adj.  R- 
Square  24.5%  24.0%  24.6% 
Wald  test  of  the  significance  of  valuation  differential  between  two  segments 
Compared  Segments 
UK  vs  Non-UK 
UK  vs  Europe 
UK  vs  America 
UK  vs  Asia 
UK  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
Europe  vs  America 
Europe  vs  Asia 
Europe  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
America  vs  Asia 
America  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
Asia  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
Model  2 
p-value 
0.1327 
Model  3 
p-value 
0.129 
0.785 
0.039 
0.819 
0.121 
0.765 
0.845 
0.081 
0.769 
0.779 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  regression 
coefficients. 
294 Table  5.10M  (continued  from  the  previous  page) 
Dividend  paying  firms  only 
Consolidated  level  Intermediate  disaggregatlon  Fine  disaggregation 
Mode14  Model5  Mode16 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.827  29.008  0.000  0.791  27.426  0.000  0.782  26.955  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.618  -14.332  0.000  -0.610  -14.687  0.000  -0.602  -15.022  0.000 
1/MV  1508.7  2.649  0.008  1414.7  2.452  0.014  1373.6  2.317  0.020 
BV  0.253  4.361  0.000  0.240  4.235  0.000  0.263  4.608  0.000 
PBT  2.880  8.280  0.000 
PUK  3.235  9.120  0.000  3.288  9.200  0.000 
DPUK  -1.406  -1.765  0.078  -1.152  -1.532  0.126 
PNUK  2.882  8.261  0.000 
DPNUK  0.600  0.485  0.627 
PEU  3.135  8.862  0.000 
DPEU  0.569  0.451  0.652 
PAMER  3.443  7.383  0.000 
DPAMER  0.397  0.308  0.758 
PASIA  2.505  4.937  0.000 
DPASIA  -2.872  -0.910  0.363 
PAFR  1.430  3.313  0.001 
DPAFR  8.673  1.750  0.080 
PREST  -1.260  1.850  0.083  1.732  4.579  0.000  1.866  4.905  0.000 
PBT'f(mv)  -0.044  -2.576  0.010  -0.016  -0.972  0.331  -0.025  -1.409  0.159 
DIV  0.367  0.499  0.618  -0.636  -0.813  0.416  -0.927  -1.158  0.247 
AMER  1.056  3.990  0.000  1.162  4.554  0.000  1.035  4.077  0.000 
No.  of  cases  3535  3535  3535 
Adj.  R- 
S  uare  23.4%  24.9%  25.3% 
Wald  test  of  the  significance  of  valuation  differential  between  two  segments 
Compared  segments 
UK  vs  Non-UK 
UK  vs  Europe 
UK  vs  America 
UK  vs  Asia 
UK  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
Europe  vs  America 
Europe  vs  Asia 
Europe  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
America  vs  Asia 
America  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
Asia  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
Models 
p-value 
0.1332 
Model6 
P  -value 
0,667 
0.652 
0.061 
0.000 
0.502 
0.216 
0.000 
0.074 
0.000 
0.026 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  regression 
coefficients. 
295 Table  5.10T  (TA-deflated  model) 
Profit-making  firms 
Dividend  paying  and  non-dividend  firms 
Consolidated  level  Intermediate  dlsaggregatlon  Fine  disaggregatlon 
Modell  Mode12  Model3 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.227  5.163  0.000  0.059  1.200  0.230  0.043  0.854  0.393 
NEGMV  -0.436  -12.17  0.000  -0.391  -11.14  0.000  -0.369  -10.495  0.000 
1/TA  2066.8  4.108  0.000  1645.5  3.036  0.002  1713.4  3.356  0.001 
BV  0.177  1.686  0.092  0.226  1.995  0.046  0.255  2.202  0.028 
PBT  8.466  11.612  0.000 
PUK  9.512  12.804  0.000  9.445  12.720  0.000 
DPUK  -17.291  -4.799  0.000  -17.108  -4.665  0.000 
PNUK  7.673  9.304  0.000 
DPNUK  -8.364  -3.455  0.001 
PEU  8.772  7.651  0.000 
DPEU  -7.190  -2.028  0.043 
PAMER  7.687  7.848  0.000 
DPAMER  -8.844  -3.352  0.001 
PASIA  5.995  4.741  0.000 
DPASIA  -16.064  -1.939  0.052 
PAFR  3.319  2.144  0.032 
DPAFR  -11.921  -0.894  0.371 
PREST  5.320  6.131  0.000  4.915  5.971  0.000  4.845  5.777  0.000 
PBT"f(TA)  0.059  1.201  0.230  0.144  2.906  0.004  0.149  2.948  0.003 
DIV  -0.764  -0.486  0.627  -2.174  -1.384  0.166  -2.621  -1.599  0.110 
ADJER  0.663  1.698  0.090  1.019  3.089  0.002  0.955  2.898  0.004 
No.  of  cases  3840  3840  3840 
Adj.  R- 
Square  356%  38.5%  38.8% 
Wald  test  of  the  significance  of  valuation  differential  between  two  segments 
Compared  Segments 
UK  vs  Non-UK 
UK  vs  Europe 
UK  vs  America 
UK  vs  Asia 
UK  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
Europe  vs  America 
Europe  vs  Asia 
Europe  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
America  vs  Asia 
America  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
Asia  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
Model  2 
p-value 
0.0005 
Model3 
-vap  lue 
0.501 
0.014 
0.002 
0.000 
0.384 
0.067 
0.001 
0.175 
0.006 
0.144 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  regression 
coefficients. 
296 Model  5.10T  (continued  from  the  previous  page) 
Dividend  firms  only 
Consolidated  level  Intermediate  di  aggregation  Fine  disaggregation 
Mode14  Model5  Mode16 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.176  3.761  0.000  0.022  0.435  0.664  0.002  0.029  0.977 
NEGMV  -0.352  -10.51  0.000  -0.310  -9.196  0.000  -0.281  -8.365  0.000 
1/TA  301.1  0.515  0.607  281.7  0.479  0.632  23.3  0.039  0.969 
BV  0.046  0.450  0.653  0.114  1.028  0.304  0.148  1.290  0.197 
PBT  8.892  11.127  0.000 
PUK  9.995  12.357  0.000  10.031  12.352  0.000 
DPUK  -8.426  -4.307  0.000  -7.912  -3.990  0.000 
PNUK  8.168  9.026  0.000 
DPNUK  -3.712  -1.357  0.175 
PEU  9.710  7.750  0.000 
DPEU  -6.806  -1.997  0.046 
PAMER  7.879  7.867  0.000 
DPAMER  -3.176  -0.841  0.400 
PASIA  8.075  5.228  0.000 
DPASIA  -20.522  -2.392  0.017 
PAFR  2.199  2.551  0,011 
DPAFR  -30.166  -1.675  0.094 
PREST  4.842  5.512  0.000  4.825  5.394  0.000 
PBT-f(TA)  0.034  0.656  0.512  0.124  2.373  0.018  0.123  2.305  0.021 
DIV  1.842  1.087  0.277  -0.931  -0.531  0.595  -1.327  -0.735  0.462 
AMER  0.682  1.554  0.120  0.709  1.794  0.073  0.681  1.732  0.083 
No.  of  cases  3592  3592  3592 
Adj.  R- 
Square  39.7%  41.8%  42.2% 
Wald  test  of  the  significance  of  valuation  differential  between  two  segments 
Compared  Segments 
UK  vs  Non-UK 
UK  vs  Europe 
UK  vs  America 
UK  vs  Asia 
UK  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
Europe  vs  America 
Europe  vs  Asia 
Europe  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
America  vs  Asia 
America  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
Asia  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
Model  5 
p-value 
0.0008 
Model  6 
p-value 
0.756 
0.002 
0.140 
0.000 
0.146 
0.356 
0.000 
0.890 
0.000 
0.000 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  regression 
coefficients. 
297 Table  5.10S  (Sales-deflated  model) 
Profit-making  firms 
Dividend  paying  and  non-dividend  firms 
Consolidated  level  Intermediate  disaggregation  Fine  disaggregation 
Modell  Model  2  Mode13 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.280  4.259  0.000  0.251  3.900  0.000  0.186  3.175  0.001 
NEGMV  -1.369  -8.165  0.000  -1.366  -8.100  0.000  -1.323  -7.836  0.000 
1/sale  2316.3  1.462  0.144  1503.2  1.098  0.272  101.1  0.153  0.878 
BV  1.609  6.063  0.000  1.571  5.889  0.000  1.606  6.056  0.000 
PBT  8.591  2.946  0.003 
PUK  8.949  2.922  0.003  9.887  3.249  0.001 
DPUK  -13.193  -2.651  0.008  -11.541  -2.310  0.021 
PNUK  7.117  3.052  0.002 
DPNUK  -7.671  -1.134  0.257 
PEU  10.123  4.296  0.000 
DPEU  -50.948  -1.814  0.070 
PAMER  11.341  4.363  0.000 
DPAMER  -5.180  -1.173  0.241 
PASIA  2.030  0.795  0.427 
DPASIA  10.182  0.773  0.440 
PAFR  6.730  1.917  0.055 
DPAFR  -76.041  -7.123  0.000 
PREST  6.041  2.550  0.011  6.899  2.931  0.003 
PBT"f(sale)  -0.025  -0.263  0.792  0.016  0.179  0.858  -0.066  -0.789  0.430 
DIV  -11.70  -2.249  0.024  -11.92  -2.091  0.037  -13.42  -2.261  0.024 
ADJER  4.520  2.009  0.045  4.465  2.103  0.036  3.275  1.765  0.078 
No.  of  cases  3865  3865  3865 
Adj.  R- 
Square  35.3%  35.8%  37.6% 
Wald  test  of  the  significance  of  valuation  differential  between  two  segments 
Compared  Segments 
UK  vs  Non-UK 
UK  vs  Europe 
UK  vs  America 
UK  vs  Asia 
UK  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
Europe  vs  America 
Europe  vs  Asia 
Europe  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
America  vs  Asia 
America  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
Asia  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
Model  2 
p  -value 
0.270 
Model  3 
p-value 
0.919 
0.326 
0.006 
0.122 
0.584 
0.000 
0.255 
0.000 
0.052 
0.190 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  regression 
coefficients. 
298 Table  5.10S  (continued  from  the  previous  page) 
Dividend  firms  only 
Consolidated  level  Intermediate  disaggregation  Fine  disaggregation 
Model4  Model4  Models 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.130  3.063  0.002  0.120  2.736  0.006  -0.001  -0.017  0.987 
NEGMV  -0.938  -7.987  0.000  -0.934  -8.090  0.000  -0.414  -9.303  0.000 
1/sale  336.6  0.203  0.839  174.2  0.104  0.917  4507.2  1.577  0.115 
BV  1.198  5.170  0.000  1.196  5.145  0.000  -0.413  -0.568  0.570 
PBT  6.572  4.465  0.000 
PUK  6.263  4.129  0.000  10.402  7.263  0.000 
DPUK  2.523  0.562  0.574  -7.695  -2.035  0.042 
PNUK  7.973  5.182  0.000 
DPNUK  -5.975  -1.085  0.278 
PEU  15.158  8.098  0.000 
DPEU  -20.930  -2.959  0.003 
PAMER  10.781  5.393  0.000 
DPAMER  0.389  0.042  0.966 
PASIA  14.358  5.618  0.000 
DPASIA  -20.560  -3.242  0.001 
PAFR  3.201  1.437  0.151 
DPAFR  -25.460  -0.275  0.783 
PREST  3.033  2.371  0.018  2.976  1.563  0.118 
PBT'f(sale)  0.017  0.229  0.819  -0.007  -0.094  0.925  -0.027  -0.299  0.765 
DIV  -4.977  -1.611  0.107  -4.333  -1.417  0.157  1.235  0.418  0.676 
ADJER  -1.004  -1.412  0.158  -0.769  -1.121  0.262  1.004  1.237  0.216 
No-of 
cases  3613  3613  3613 
Adj.  R- 
Square  47.1%  47.3%  31.1% 
Wald  test  of  the  significance  of  valuation  differential  between  two  segments 
Compared  Segments 
UK  vs  Non-UK 
UK  vs  Europe 
UK  vs  America 
UK  vs  Asia 
UK  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
Europe  vs  America 
Europe  vs  Asia 
Europe  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
America  vs  Asia 
America  vs  Mid.  East  &  Afica 
Asia  vs  Mid-East  &  Afica 
Mode14 
p-value 
0.022 
Models 
p-value 
0.022 
0.737 
0.110 
0.003 
0.085 
0.775 
0.000 
0.210 
0.002 
0.003 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  regression 
coefficients. 
299 Table  5.12-5.15M  (Lagged  MV-deflated  model) 
UK  vs  EU 
Model  1 
Intercept  1.058 
t-test  8.263 
p-value  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.426 
t-test  -12.354 
p-value  0.000 
DUMDIV  -0.211 
t-test  -1.717 
p-value  0.086 
1IIagMV  1850 
t-test  3.467 
p-value  0.001 
BV  "  0.063 
t-test  2.200 
p-value  0.028 
PUK  3.716 
t-test  8.566 
p-value  0.000 
DPUK  -2.803 
t-test  -2.636 
p-value  0.008 
PEU  2.838 
t-test  6.221 
p-value  0.000 
DPEU  0.082 
t-test  0.058 
p-value  0.954 
PREST'"  2.300 
t-test  5.032 
p-value  0.000 
DPREST  1.172 
t-test  1.712 
p-value  0.087 
PBT'f(mv)  -0.034 
t-test  -1.635 
p-value  0.102 
DIV  1.038 
t-test  1.177 
p-value  0.239 
ADJER  0.757 
t-test  2.514 
p-value  0.012 
No-of  cases  2794 
Adj.  R-Square  19.6% 
Wald  p-value  0.035 
UK  vs  America 
Model  2 
Intercept  1.157 
t-test  8.523 
p-value  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.42 
t-test  -11.85 
p-value  0.000 
DUMDIV  -0.31 
t-test  -2.340 
p-value  0.019 
1/IagMV  2523 
t-test  1.895 
p-value  0.058 
BV*  0.068 
t-test  1.252 
p-value  0.211 
PUK  3.329 
t-test  7.102 
p-value  0.000 
DPUK  0.480 
t-test  0.197 
p-value  0.844 
PAMER  3.206 
t-test  4.560 
p-value  0.000 
DPAMER  -0.48 
t-test  -0.254 
p-value  0.800 
PREST"  1.442 
t-test  2.942 
p-value  0.003 
DPRESTAM  1.329 
t-test  2.015 
p-value  0.044 
PBT"f(mv)  -0.016 
t-test  -0.463 
p-value  0.643 
DIV  0.254 
t-test  0.324 
p-value  0.746 
ADJER  0.251 
t-test  0.629 
p-value  0.530 
2482 
Adj.  R-Square  19.8% 
Wald  p-value  0.771 
UK  vs  Asia 
Model  3 
Intercept  0.959 
t-test  14.321 
p-value  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.388 
t-test  -11.629 
p-value  0.000 
DUMDIV  -0.016 
t-test  -0.222 
p-value  0.824 
1AagMV  210 
t-test  0.583 
p-value  0.560 
BV*  -0.405 
t-test  -2.679 
p-value  0.007 
PUK  2.598 
t-test  6.178 
p-value  0.000 
DPUK  -3.090 
t-test  -3.222 
p-value  0.001 
PASIA  2.539 
t-test  5.968 
p-value  0.000 
DPASIA  -3.313 
t-test  -1.056 
p-value  0.291 
PREST"  1.221 
t-test  3.057 
p-value  0.002 
DPRESTAS  0.363 
t-test  0.525 
p-value  0.600 
PBT*f(mv)  -0.029 
t-test  -1.412 
p-value  0.158 
DIV  1.032 
t-test  0.901 
p-value  0.368 
ADJER  -0.061 
t-test  -0.391 
p-value  0.695 
1195 
Adj.  R-Square  13.3% 
Wald  p-value  0.896 
UK  vs  MId.  East  &  Afr. 
Model  4 
Intercept  0.901 
t-test  5.556 
p-value  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.624 
t-test  -3.501 
p-value  0.001 
DUMDIV  -0.185 
t-test  -1.104 
p-value  0.270 
1/IagMV  3014 
t-test  1.918 
p-value  0.056 
BV*  1.048 
t-test  0.213 
p-value  0.832 
PUK  3.238 
t-test  3.841 
p-value  0.000 
DPUK  -2.113 
t-test  -0.991 
p-value  0.322 
PAFR  3.575 
t-test  1.587 
p-value  0.113 
DPAFR  1.643 
t-test  0.172 
p-value  0.863 
PREST'"  2.985 
t-test  2.608 
p-value  0.009 
DPRESTAF  -1.373 
t-test  -0.881 
p-value  0.379 
PBT'i(mv)  -0.016 
t-test  -0.426 
p-value  0.670 
DIV  3.015 
t-test  2.047 
p-value  0.041 
ADJER  0.830 
t-test  0.482 
p-value  0.630 
468 
Adj.  R-Square  22.8% 
Wald  p-value  0.861 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  regression 
coefficients. 
Samples  include  dividend  paying  and  non-dividend  profit-making  firms,  and  exclude  cases  where  a  given 
foreign  segment  PBT  is  missing. 
*  negative  BVs  are  set  to  zero. 
**  PREST  is  the  difference  between  the  group-level  PBT  and  the  sum  of  the  UK  and  the  given  foreign 
segment's  PBT. 
300 Table  5.12-5.15T  (TA-deflated  model) 
UK  vs  EU 
Model  I 
UK  vs  America 
Model  2 
UK  vs  Asia 
Model  3 
UK  vs  MId.  East  &  Afr. 
Model  4 
Intercept  0.500  Intercept  0.599  Intercept  0.453  Intercept  0.444 
t-ratio  3.598  t-ratio  5.612  t-ratio  4.127  t-ratio  4.261 
p-value  0.000  p-value  0.000  p-value  0.000  p-value  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.323  NEGMV  -0.392  NEGMV  -0.404  NEGMV  -0.370 
1-ratio  -8.692  t-ratio  -11.640  t-ratio  -8.524  t-ratio  -6.302 
p-value  0.000  p-value  0.000  p-value  0.000  p-value  0.000 
DUMDIV  -0.409  DUMDIV  -0.426  DUMDIV  -0.236  DUMDIV  -0.076 
t-ratio  -3.167  t-ratio  -3.903  t-ratio  -2.373  t-ratio  -0.633 
p-value  0.002  p-value  0.000  p-value  0.018  p-value  0.527 
1/TA  -372.76  1/TA  3034.47  1/TA  496.38  1/TA  1136.52 
t-ratio  -0.704  t-ratio  3.116  t-ratio  0.626  t-ratio  3.018 
p-value  0.481  p-value  0.002  p-value  0.531  p-value  0.003 
BV'  0.022  BV'  -0.292  BV'  -0.771  BV*  -4.674 
t-ratio  0.076  t-ratio  -0.992  t-ratio  -0.949  t-ratio  -0.644 
p-value  0.939  p-value  0.321  p-value  0.343  p-value  0.520 
PUK  9.497  PUK  8.513  PUK  9.977  PUK  7.430 
t-ratio  10.629  t-ratio  9.700  t-ratio  9.532  t-ratio  4.104 
p-value  0.000  p-value  0.000  p-value  0.000  p-value  0.000 
DPUK  -17.99  DPUK  -20.53  DPUK  -10.10  DPUK  -14.68 
t-ratio  -3.756  t-ratio  -3.677  t-ratio  -3.487  t-ratio  -2.406 
p-value  0.000  p-value  0.000  p-value  0.000  p-value  0.017 
PEU  8.454  PAMER  7.319  PASIA  5.970  PAFR  3.171 
t-ratio  6.511  t-ratio  6.778  1-ratio  3.594  t-ratio  1.388 
p-value  0.000  p-value  0.000  p-value  0.000  p-value  0.166 
DPEU  -8.087  DPAMER  -7.073  DPASIA  -14.209  DPAFR  -7.535 
t-ratio  -2.115  t-ratio  -2.851  t-ratio  -1.705  t-ratio  -0.586 
p-value  0.034  p-value  0.004  p-value  0.088  p-value  0.558 
PREST  **  3.340  PREST  **  4.595  PREST  "  4.405  PREST  **  2.289 
t-ratio  2.821  t-ratio  4.098  t-ratio  2.954  t-ratio  1.562 
p-value  0.005  p-value  0.000  p-value  0.003  p-value  0.119 
DPREST  4.151  DPREST  4.247  DPREST  5.690  DPREST  0.221 
t-ratio  3.031  t-ratio  3.362  t-ratio  3.106  t-ratio  0.098 
p-value  0.002  p-value  0.001  p-value  0.002  p-value  0.922 
PBT'f(TA)  0.217  PBT*f(TA)  0.102  PBT'f(TA)  0.064  PBT'f(TA)  0.144 
t-ratio  3.555  t-ratio  1.855  t-ratio  0.791  t-ratio  2.245 
p-value  0.000  p-value  0.064  p-value  0.429  p-value  0.025 
DIV  -0.525  DIV  3.391  DIV  2.846  DIV  -3.890 
t-ratio  -0.264  t-ratio  1.622  t-ratio  1.357  t-ratio  -1.142 
p-value  0.792  p-value  0.105  p-value  0.175  p-value  0.254 
Adj.  ER  0.537  Adj.  ER  1.003  Adj.  ER  -0.199  Adj.  ER  0.930 
t-ratio  1.238  t-ratio  2.320  t-ratio  -0.406  t-ratio  0.328 
p-value  0.216  p-value  0.020  p-value  0.685  p-value  0.743 
No.  of  cases  2863  2512  1220  477 
Adj.  R-  Adj.  R-  Adj.  R- 
Adj.  R-Square  39.3%  Square  41.2%  Square  35.3%  Square  45.4% 
Wald  p-  Wald  p-  Wald  p- 
Wald  -value  0.3658  value  0.0976  value  0.0069  value  0.0143 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  regression 
coefficients.  Samples  include  dividend  paying  and  non-dividend  profit-making  firms,  and  exclude  cases 
where  a  given  foreign  segment  PBT  is  missing. 
*  negative  BVs  are  set  to  zero. 
**  PREST  is  the  difference  between  the  group-level  PBT  and  the  sum  of  the  UK  and  the  given  foreign 
segment's  PBT. 
301 Table  5.12-5.15S  (Sales-deflated  model) 
UK  vs  EU 
Model  I 
UK  vs  America 
Model  2 
UK  vs  Asia 
Model  3 
UK  vs  MId.  East  &  Afr. 
Model  4 
Intercept  1.630  Intercept  1.247  Intercept  1.332  Intercept  0.372 
t-ratio  2.516  t-ratio  2.986  t-ratio  1.365  t-ratio  2.017 
p-value  0.012  p-value  0.003  p-value  0.172  p-value  0.044 
NEGMV  -0.795  NEGMV  -0.579  NEGMV  -0.677  NEGMV  -0.352 
t-ratio  -5.471  t-ratio  -9.950  t-ratio  -5.179  t-ratio  -4.506 
p-value  0.000  p-value  0.000  p-value  0.000  p-value  0.000 
DUMDIV  -1.640  DUMDIV  -1.091  DUMDIV  -1.126  DUMDIV  -0.305 
t-ratio  -2.489  t-ratio  -2.692  t-ratio  -1.124  t-ratio  -1.377 
p-value  0.013  p-value  0.007  p-value  0.261  p-value  0.169 
1/Sales  3527.7  1/Sales  4412.2  1/Sales  9597.7  1/Sales  935.3 
t-ratio  1.188  t-ratio  2.095  t-ratio  1.190  t-ratio  1.972 
p-value  0.235  p-value  0.036  p-value  0.234  p-value  0.049 
BV*  0.560  BV  "  0.084  BV  "  -4.570  BV*  -20.21 
t-ratio  0.721  t-ratio  0.129  t-ratio  -1.908  t-ratio  -1.612 
p-value  0.471  p-value  0.898  p-value  0.056  p-value  0.108 
PUK  22.317  PUK  10.982  PUK  11.917  PUK  1.575 
t-ratio  3.649  t-ratio  4.587  t-ratio  1.985  t-ratio  0.216 
p-value  0.000  p-value  0.000  p-value  0.047  p-value  0.829 
DPUK  -14.84  DPUK  -23.74  DPUK  -1.61  DPUK  -12.58 
t-ratio  -1.989  t-ratio  -2.517  t-ratio  -0.182  t-ratio  -1.720 
p-value  0.047  p-value  0.012  p-value  0.856  p-value  0.086 
PEU  20.563  PAMER  12.553  PASIA  10.399  PAFR  -0.425 
t-ratio  5.661  t-ratio  4.720  t-ratio  2.755  1-ratio  -0.093 
p-value  0.000  p-value  0.000  p-value  0.006  p-value  0.926 
DPEU  -65.58  DPAMER  -12.20  DPASIA  -0.76  DPAFR  -24.92 
t-ratio  -1.580  t-ratio  -4.365  t-ratio  -0.058  t-ratio  -0.629 
p-value  0.114  p-value  0.000  p-value  0.953  p-value  0.530 
PREST"  10.966  PREST'"  4.652  PREST"  5.291  PREST'"  -6.943 
t-ratio  2.760  t-ratio  1.819  t-ratio  1.091  t-ratio  -0.610 
p-value  0.006  p-value  0.069  p-value  0.275  p-value  0.542 
DPRESTEU  11.173  DPRESTAM  5.398  DPRESTAS  4.895  DPRESTAF  8.389 
t-ratio  1.881  t-ratio  2.129  t-ratio  0.778  t-ratio  0.868 
p-value  0.060  p-value  0.033  p-value  0.436  p-value  0.386 
PBT'f(sale)  -0.119  PBT*f(sale)  -0.029  PBT'f(sale)  0.020  PBT*f(sale)  0.346 
t-ratio  -0.791  t-ratio  -0.290  t-ratio  0.093  t-ratio  1.099 
p-value  0.429  p-value  0.772  p-value  0.926  p-value  0.272 
DIV  -10.606  DIV  2.754  DIV  4.122  DIV  11.166 
t-ratio  -1.621  t-ratio  0.793  t-ratio  0.719  t-ratio  1.174 
p-value  0.105  p-value  0.428  p-value  0.472  p-value  0.241 
ADJER  7.191  ADJER  1.925  ADJER  3.892  ADJER  -8.010 
t-ratio  2.094  t-ratio  0.958  t-ratlo  1.060  t-ratio  -1.126 
p-value  0.036  p-value  0.338  p-value  0.289  p-value  0.261 
No.  of  cases  2897  2541  1207  478 
Adj.  R-Square  21.0%  28.5%  16.6%  40.0% 
Wald  p-value  0.690  0.216  0.756  0.572 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  regression 
coefficients.  Samples  include  dividend  paying  and  non-dividend  profit-making  firms,  and  exclude  cases 
where  a  given  foreign  segment  PBT  is  missing. 
*  negative  BVs  are  set  to  zero. 
**  PREST  is  the  difference  between  the  group-level  PBT  and  the  sum  of  the  UK  and  the  given  foreign 
segment's  PBT. 
302 Table  5.17M  (lagged  MV-deflated  model) 
Panel  A:  The  sample  period  is  split  into  two  sub-periods  (pre-1996  and  post-1995) 
Old  economy  period  (I.  e.,  before  New  economy  period  (I.  e.,  1996 
1996)  onwards) 
Model  I  Model  2 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff,  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.827  6.502  0.000  0.972  10.880  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.573  -14.083  0.000  -0.775  -11.650  0.000 
DUMDIV  -0.213  -1.710  0.087  -0.040  -0.441  0.659 
1/MV  2066.7  2.467  0.014  1268.2  2.818  0.005 
BV"  0.201  4.487  0.000  0.415  5.274  0.000 
PUK  3.930  8.649  0.000  1.851  4.992  0.000 
DPUK  1.750  1.028  0.304  -2.393  -1.833  0.067 
PEU  3.138  5.172  0.000  2.113  4.787  0.000 
DPEU  0.637  0.336  0.737  0.855  0.560  0.576 
PAMER  4.657  6.060  0.000  1.933  4.111  0.000 
DPAMER  -0.882  -0.649  0.517  -1.172  -0.557  0.577 
PASTA  2.996  4.229  0.000  0.981  1.453  0.146 
DPASIA  -1.900  -1.040  0.298  -0.719  -0.185  0.853 
PAFR  1.112  1.834  0.067  3.871  1.757  0.079 
DPAFR  1.002  0.094  0.925  -9.550  -0.761  0.447 
PREST  2.315  3.832  0.000  1.453  3.638  0.000 
PBT'f(mv)  -0.019  -0.507  0.612  -0.007  -0.309  0.757 
DIV  0.732  0.783  0.433  -2.761  -2.631  0.009 
ADJER  0.094  0.227  0.821  1.129  4.794  0.000 
No.  of  cases  2099  2175 
Ade  . 
R-Square  36.9%  19.9% 
Wald  test  of  the  significance  of  valuation  differential  between  two  segments 
Model  I  Model  2 
Compared  segments  P-value  P-value 
UK  vs  Europe  0.083  0.468 
UK  vs  America  0.223  0.812 
UK  vs  Asia  0.099  0.128 
UK  vs  Mid.  East  &  Africa  0.000  0.357 
Europe  vs  America  0.011  0.700 
Europe  vs  Asia  0.832  0.073 
Europe  vs  Mid.  East  & 
Africa  0.001  0.436 
America  vs  Asia  0.010  0.118 
America  vs  Mid.  East  & 
Africa  0.000  0.372 
Asia  vs  Mid.  East  &  Africa  0.005  0.235 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  regression 
coefficients 
**  negative  BVs  are  set  to  zero. 
303 Panel  B:  splitting  the  sample  period  into  three  economic  sub-periods 
Pre-1994 
Model  I 
Intercept 
NEGMV 
DUMDIV 
1/MV 
BV" 
PUK 
DPUK 
PEU 
DPEU 
PAMER 
DPAMER 
PASTA 
DPASIA 
PAFR 
DPAFR 
PREST 
PBT'f(mv) 
DIV 
ADJER 
No.  of  cases 
Adj.  R- 
Square 
CoeH.  t-ratio 
0.854  4.092 
-0.584  -11.367 
-0.273  -1.352 
2511.7  2.479 
0.179  3.441 
3.713  6.138 
-2.035  -1.649 
2.096  2.516 
2.268  0.973 
4.520  4.687 
-1.022  -0.474 
2.798  3.958 
1.783  0.575 
0.640  0.863 
-11.003  -0.468 
1.739  2.363 
0.000  0.005 
1.657  1.659 
0.293  0.974 
1154 
38.0% 
P" 
value 
0.000 
0.000 
0.176 
0.013 
0.001 
0.000 
0.099 
0.012 
0.330 
0.000 
0.635 
0.000 
0.565 
0.388 
0.640 
0.018 
0.996 
0.097 
0.330 
1994-1997  (Inclusive) 
Model  2 
P- 
Coeff.  t-ratlo  value 
0.946  8.635  0.000 
-0.651  -6.779  0.000 
-0.168  -1.513  0.130 
2045.7  2.072  0.038 
0.267  3.373  0.001 
3.049  5.239  0.000 
3.879  2.205  0.027 
2.921  3.831  0.000 
1.200  0.522  0.602 
3.420  5.166  0.000 
-2.957  -1.059  0.289 
1.624  1.718  0.086 
1.526  0.623  0.533 
6.065  1.925  0.054 
9.481  1.940  0.052 
2.441  4.067  0.000 
0.001  0.023  0.982 
-0.473  -0.289  0.772 
1.744  2.761  0.006 
1454 
28.2% 
Post-1997 
Model  3 
P- 
CoeN.  t-ratio  value 
0.900  8.008  0.000 
-0.722  -10.635  0.000 
0.036  0.320  0.749 
578.6  1.350  0.177 
0.443  4.659  0.000 
1.610  2.776  0.006 
-3.343  -2.740  0.006 
1.474  1.936  0.053 
-0.269  -0.129  0.897 
1.345  2.147  0.032 
-1.887  -0.848  0.396 
1.323  1.888  0.059 
-5.290  -1.282  0.200 
0.428  0.706  0.480 
-12.623  -0.669  0.503 
1.005  1.920  0.055 
-0.003  -0.087  0.930 
-2.581  -1.959  0.050 
0.967  3.172  0.002 
1144 
17.6% 
Models  are  estimated  for  profit-making  firm-years  and  without  fixed  effects. 
Wald  test  of  the  significance  of  valuation  differential  between  two  segments 
Modell  Model  2  Model  3 
Compared  segments  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value 
UK  vs  Europe  0.026  0.825  0.846 
UK  vs  America  0.313  0.470  0.536 
UK  vs  Asia  0.120  0.047  0.620 
UK  vs  Mid.  East&Africa  0.000  0.366  0.015 
Europe  vs  America  0.005  0.482  0.858 
Europe  vs  Asia  0.413  0.130  0.849 
Europe  vs  Mid.  East&Africa  0.079  0.367  0.137 
America  vs  Asia  0.066  0.021  0.975 
America  vs  Mid.  East&Africa  0.000  0.422  0.094 
Asia  vs  Mid.  East&Africa  0.002  0.216  0.184 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  regression 
coefficients. 
**  negative  BVs  are  set  to  zero. 
304 Table  5.17T  (TA-deflated  model) 
Panel  A:  The  sample  period  is  split  into  two  sub-periods  (pre-1996  and  post-1995 
Old  economy  period  (i.  e.,  before 
1996) 
Model  I" 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
New  economy  period  (i.  e.,  1996 
onwards) 
Model  2* 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.531  6.425  0.000  0.551  4.132  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.275  -9.284  0.000  -0.476  -10.695  0.000 
DUMDIV  -0.432  -5.346  0.000  -0.373  -2.935  0.003 
1/TA  1788.3  3.159  0.002  2649.1  2.804  0.005 
BV""  0.197  0.803  0.422  -0.731  -1.543  0.123 
PUK  7.841  14.288  0.000  9.545  8.580  0.000 
DPUK  1.416  0.434  0.665  -17.350  -4.181  0.000 
PEU  6.893  10.157  0.000  8.960  6.904  0.000 
DPEU  -2.159  -0.526  0.599  -1.717  -0.457  0,647 
PAMER  7.841  10.090  0.000  7.342  5.284  0.000 
DPAMER  -11.547  -2.509  0.012  -6.307  -1.994  0.046 
PASIA  9.789  5.939  0.000  4.000  2.488  0.013 
DPASIA  -8.944  -2.116  0.034  -11.115  -1.022  0.307 
PAFR  2.994  2.393  0.017  2.491  1.350  0.177 
DPAFR  -15.467  -2.946  0.003  18.775  1.003  0.316 
PREST  7.927  8.783  0.000  3.355  3.125  0.002 
PB1'f(ta)  0.015  0.410  0.682  0.228  3.114  0.002 
DIV  5.679  4.323  0.000  -4.953  -1.850  0.064 
ADJER  0.385  1.128  0.259  0.743  1.297  0.195 
No.  of  cases  2146  2228 
Ad 
. 
R-S  uare  56.6%  31.7% 
Wald  test  of  the  significance  of  valuation  differential  between  two  segments 
Model  I 
Compared  segments  P-value 
UK  vs  Europe  0.040 
UK  vs  America  0.999 
UK  vs  Asia  0.195 
UK  vs  Mid.  East  &  Africa  0.000 
Europe  vs  America  0.173 
Europe  vs  Asia  0.073 
Europe  vs  Mid.  East  &  Africa  0.001 
America  vs  Asia  0.224 
America  vs  Mid.  East  &  Africa  0.000 
Asia  vs  Mid.  East  &  Africa  0.001 
Model  2 
P-value 
0.529 
0.036 
0.000 
0.000 
0.228 
0.004 
0.000 
0.042 
0.010 
0.456 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  regression 
coefficients. 
**  negative  BVs  are  set  to  zero. 
305 Panel  B:  splitting  the  sample  period  into  three  economic  sub-periods 
Coeff. 
Pre-1994 
Model  1 
t-ratio 
P- 
value 
1994-1997  (Inclusive) 
Model  2 
P- 
Coeff.  t-ratio  value  Coeff. 
Post-1997 
Model  3 
t-ratio 
P- 
value 
Intercept  0.573  4.815  0.000  0.411  3.017  0.003  0.401  1.966  0.049 
NEGMV  -0.284  -7.438  0.000  -0.287  -6.460  0.000  -0.460  -7.010  0.000 
DUMDIV  -0.451  -4.000  0.000  -0.358  -2.691  0.007  -0.221  -1.217  0.224 
1iTA  1939.2  1.299  0.194  719.2  1.582  0.114  1597.6  2.236  0.025 
BV"  0.199  0.515  0.607  0.267  1.487  0.137  -1.729  -2.354  0.019 
PUK  7.200  8.121  0.000  10.723  12.836  0.000  9.354  5.154  0.000 
DPUK  -2.233  -0.872  0.383  -25.53  -4.570  0.000  -9.673  -2.555  0.011 
PEU  6.052  4.326  0.000  8.088  9.538  0.000  11.265  3.728  0.000 
DPEU  -6.866  -1.795  0.073  3.789  0.860  0.390  -11.83  -1.673  0.094 
PAMER  8.042  6.888  0.000  9.143  8.112  0.000  5.476  2.546  0.011 
DPAMER  -19.68  -2.245  0.025  -5.087  -1.736  0.083  -6.303  -1.670  0.095 
PASTA  5.507  4.353  0.000  7.447  3.606  0.000  5.067  1.841  0.066 
DPASIA  0.528  0.120  0.905  -8.009  -1.229  0.219  -32.83  -1.273  0.203 
PAFR  2.482  1.448  0.148  5.304  2.153  0.031  3.459  2.147  0.032 
DPAFR  -33.11  -1.107  0.268  -10.10  -1.510  0.131  -9.349  -0.297  0.766 
PREST  6.068  5.105  0.000  7.110  7.237  0.000  3.162  1.733  0.083 
PBT"f(ta)  0.017  0.304  0.761  0.030  0.647  0.518  0.283  2.509  0.012 
DIV  4.378  2.850  0.004  0.724  0.386  0.699  -5.700  -1.392  0.164 
ADJER  0.336  0.993  0.321  0.108  0.123  0.902  1.240  1.664  0.096 
No.  of  cases  1178  1488  1174 
Ad'.  R-S  uare  52.8%  55.5%  29.0% 
Wald  test  of  the  significance  of  valuation  differential  between  two  segments 
Model  I 
Compare  segments  P-value 
UK  vs  Europe  0.232 
UK  vs  America  0.269 
UK  vs  Asia  0.070 
UK  vs  Mid.  East  &  Africa  0.003 
Europe  vs  America  0.082 
Europe  vs  Asia  0.697 
Europe  vs  Mid.  East  & 
Model  2 
P-value 
0.001 
0.085 
0.084 
0.024 
0.347 
0.740 
Model  3 
P-value 
0.450 
0.013 
0.077 
0.000 
0.056 
0.085 
Africa  0.041  0.249  0.001 
America  vs  Asia  0.020  0.424  0.874 
America  vs  Mid.  East  & 
Africa  0.001  0.133  0.196 
Asia  vs  Mid.  East  &  Africa  0.126  0.481  0.499 
UK  vs  Europe  0.007  0.014  0.672 
UK  vs  America  0.003  0.095  0.067 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  regression 
coefficients. 
**  negative  BVs  are  set  to  zero. 
306 Table  5.17S  (Sales-deflated  model) 
Panel  A:  The  sample  period  is  split  into  two  sub-periods  (pre-1996  and  post-1995 
Old  economy  period  (i.  e.,  before 
1996) 
Model  I" 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
New  economy  period  (i.  e.,  1996 
onwards) 
Model  2" 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.572  3.893  0.000  1.471  2.789  0.005 
NEGMV  -0.363  -8.391  0.000  -0.938  -6.688  0.000 
DUMDIV  -0.533  -3.752  0.000  -1.627  -2.947  0.003 
1/sale  2524.3  5.056  0.000  4198.2  1.510  0.131 
BV"  0.870  3.014  0.003  -0.553  -0.428  0.669 
PUK  9.738  4.554  0.000  25.759  4.747  0.000 
DPUK  1.253  0.330  0.742  -16.633  -2.348  0.019 
PEU  10.500  4.426  0.000  30.852  5.494  0.000 
DPEU  -34.424  -2.181  0.029  -56.311  -1.714  0.086 
PAMER  9.964  4.259  0.000  25.607  5.351  0.000 
DPAMER  -33.833  -2.971  0.003  -2.236  -0.371  0.710 
PASIA  12.656  4.792  0.000  18.023  3.535  0.000 
DPASIA  -13.408  -3.180  0.001  2.368  0.215  0.830 
PAFR  -2.206  -0.803  0.422  10.321  1.114  0.265 
DPAFR  -5.618  -1.472  0.141  12.444  0.313  0.754 
PREST  7.111  2.934  0.003  16.481  3.710  0.000 
PBT'f(sale)  -0.080  -1.558  0.119  -0.395  -2.296  0.022 
DIV  6.550  1.975  0.048  -13.834  -1.832  0.067 
ADJER  3.315  1.089  0.276  7.536  2.212  0.027 
No.  of  cases  2165  2232 
Adi.  R-S  uare  55.4%  25.7% 
Wald  test  of  the  significance  of  valuation  differential  between  two  segments 
Model  I 
Compared  segments  P-Value 
UK  vs  Europe  0.470 
UK  vs  America  0.753 
UK  vs  Asia  0.023 
UK  vs  Mid.  East  &  Africa  0.001 
Europe  vs  America  0.669 
Europe  vs  Asia  0.190 
Europe  vs  Mid.  East  &  Africa  0.001 
America  vs  Asia  0.046 
America  vs  Mid.  East  &  Africa  0.002 
Asia  vs  Mid.  East  &  Africa  0.000 
Model  2 
P-value 
0.286 
0.954 
0.107 
0.081 
0.293 
0.016 
0.037 
0.101 
0.083 
0.444 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  regression 
coefficients 
**  negative  BVs  are  set  to  zero. 
307 Panel  B:  splitting  the  sample  period  Into  three  economic  sub-periods 
Coeff. 
Pre-1994 
Model  I 
t-ratio  -value 
1994-1997(inclusive) 
Model  2 
Coeff.  t-ratio  -value  Coeff. 
Post-1997 
Model  3 
t-ratio  -value 
Intercept  0.610  2.042  0.041  0.654  2.200  0.028  1.867  2.040  0.041 
NEGMV  -0.372  -5.799  0.000  -0.583  -4.264  0.000  -1.058  -4.896  0.000 
DUMDIV  -0.656  -2.283  0.022  -0.751  -2.220  0.026  -1.714  -1.871  0.061 
1/sale  1521.51  0.540  0.589  1989.00  1.985  0.047  1329.84  0.477  0.634 
BV"  1.182  2.577  0.010  1.726  2.688  0.007  -1.869  -1.110  0.267 
PUK  11.414  3.426  0.001  22.663  3.571  0.000  22.834  2.535  0.011 
DPUK  -4.677  -1.364  0.173  -2.820  -0.322  0.747  -18.41  -2.676  0.007 
PEU  16.607  3.549  0.000  28.289  4.529  0.000  16.979  3.711  0.000 
DPEU  -76.84  -1.503  0.133  -5.506  -0.552  0.581  -67,74  -1.366  0.172 
PAMER  12.958  3.526  0.000  24.643  3.942  0.000  20.590  3.266  0.001 
DPAMER  -44.40  -2.951  0.003  -14.38  -0.881  0.378  -1.185  -0.137  0.891 
PASIA  15.505  4.543  0.000  27.534  3.297  0.001  6.924  1.937  0.053 
DPASIA  -12.31  -0.908  0.364  -24.251  -2.910  0.004  3.474  0.262  0.794 
PAFR  5.512  1.037  0.300  11.476  1.448  0.148  18.253  2.740  0.006 
DPAFR  -22.92  -0.226  0.821  15.736  0.172  0.863  -35.66  -1.020  0.308 
PREST  7.382  1.942  0.052  15.910  3.087  0.002  14.068  1.896  0.058 
PBT'f(sale)  -0.208  -1.747  0.081  -0.483  -3.132  0.002  -0.238  -0.860  0.390 
DIV  7.319  1.670  0.095  -11.57  -1.057  0.290  .  13.58  -1.361  0.173 
ADJER  5.710  1.690  0.091  5.190  1.016  0.310  5.961  1.561  0.118 
No.  of  cases  1186  1493  1186 
Adj.  R- 
Square  56.8%  32.8%  18.3% 
Wald  test  of  the  significance  of  valuation  differential  between  two  segments 
Model  I 
Compared  segments  p-value 
UK  vs  Europe  0.035 
UK  vs  America  0.109 
UK  vs  Asia  0.005 
UK  vs  Mid.  East&Africa  0.033 
Europe  vs  America  0.153 
Europe  vs  Asia  0.681 
Europe  vs 
Mid.  East&Africa  0.000 
America  vs  Asia  0.144 
America  vs 
Mid.  East&Africa  0.007 
Asia  vs 
Mid.  East&Africa  0.003 
Model  2 
p-value 
0.199 
0.490 
0.446 
0.020 
0.459 
0.891 
0.021  0.781 
0.665  0.007 
0.014  0.672 
0.095  0.067 
Model  3 
p-value 
0.367 
0.573 
0.033 
0.521 
0.428 
0.016 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  regression 
coefficients. 
All  models  are  estimated  for  profit-making  firm-years  and  without  fixed  effects. 
**  negative  BVs  are  set  to  zero. 
308 CHAPTER  6 
VALUATION  OF  LINE-OF-BUSINESS  SEGMENT 
6.1.  INTRODUCTION 
In  this  chapter  I  extend  the  analysis  of  Chapter  5  by  investigating  the  value 
relevance  of  line-of-business  segment  information  disclosed  by  already  geographically 
diversified  multi-segment  firms.  More  specifically,  the  empirical  investigation  of  this 
chapter  addresses  the  following  questions: 
"  whether  the  basic  accounting  information  is  differentially  associated  to  the  firm 
value  across  two  categories  of  multi-segment  firms:  firms  that  disclose  geographic 
segments  only  vs.  those  that  simultaneously  disclose  geographic  and  line-of-business 
information; 
"  whether  specific  industrial  segments  of  firms  operating  in  more  than  one  line-of- 
business  are  differentially  association  with  the  value  of  the  firm,  that  is,  have 
differential  value  contributions. 
It  is  important  to  emphasise  that  this  chapter  specifically  deals  with  firms  which 
are  diversified  across  both  geographic  and  industrial  dimensions.  This  approach,  to 
some  extent,  facilitates  the  cross-examination  of  the  valuation  effects  associated  with 
both  types  of  corporate  diversification. 
The'  chapter  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  6.2  discusses  the  process  of  data 
collection  and  methods  used  for  classifying  the  reported  business  segments  into  specific 
industries/economic  sectors.  It  also  analyses  the  business  segment-level  descriptive 
statistics.  Section  6.3  reports,  describes  and  analyses  various  business  segment-level 
tests  and  results.  Section  6.4  provides  further  evidence  on  the  robustness  of  the 
empirical  results,  and  summarises  the  main  findings  of  this  chapter. 
309 6.2.  DATA  AND  DESCRIPTIVE  ANALYSIS 
6.2.1  Data  Collection  and  Segment  Identification  Issues 
To  identify  industrially  multi-segment  firms,  I  follow  the  approach  adopted  in 
Chapter  5.  That  is,  the  firm's  disclosure  or  non-disclosures  of  segment-level  accounting 
numbers,  contained  in  the  financial  statements,  is  used  to  identify  whether  the  firm  is 
diversified  industrially  and,  if  yes,  whether  it  is  diversified  into  specific  lines  of 
business. 
Until  June  1990  segment  disclosure  requirements  in  the  UK  were  governed  by  the 
Companies  Act  1985,  where  companies  were  only  required  to  disclose  turnovers  by  (a) 
Class  of  business  and  (b)  Geographical  market.  Thereafter,  the  Act  was  superseded  by 
SSAP  25,  which  adds  the  requirement  to  disclose  both  Profit/Loss  before  tax  and  Net 
Assets  by  Class  of  business  and  Geographical  market. 
Similar  to  the  analysis  in  Chapter  5,  in  this  chapter  I  identify  the  line-of-business 
segment  reporting  firms  on  the  basis  of  the  availability  or  disclosure  of  the  segment- 
level  accounting  data,  specifically  the  PBTs.  Before  proceeding  to  the  analysis  of 
descriptive  statistics,  it  is  necessary  to  summarise  the  process  of  data  collection,  as  it 
required  considerable  manual  work  and  investigative  efforts. 
Several  technical  problems  have  been  encountered  during  the  collection  and 
sorting  of  data  on  firms'  business  segments. 
First  of  all,  unlike  geographic  segment  data,  line-of-business  segment  information 
for  the  UK  firms  is  not  readily  available,  in  the  required  electronic  format,  from  Extel 
Company  Analysis  database.  Therefore,  the  required  information  is  collated  manually 
from  the  sample  companies'  financial  reports  contained  in  the  Extel  Company  Analysis 
database. 
Secondly,  similar  to  the  situation  with  geographic  segment  disclosures,  when 
disclosing  the  line-of-business  segments,  the  reported  accounting  information  is  often 
310 incomplete.  Only  rarely  do  firms  simultaneously  report  all  three  accounting  data  items 
required  by  SSAP  25  (i.  e.,  PBT,  NA  and  Sales)  for  each  disclosed  line-of-business 
segment  and  year  when  financial  statements  are  available  in  Extel.  This  incomplete 
segment  information  might  present  a  problem  when  determining  which  firms  should  be 
categorised  as  industrially  diversified.  This  problem  arises  when  line-of-business  PBTs 
are  not  reported  for  a  given  firm-year  but  other  segment-level  accounting  data,  such  as 
NAs  and  Sales,  are  reported94.  Because  of  missing  segmental  PBTs  such  firm-years  are 
excluded  from  the  analysis.  In  other  words,  only  firm-years  with  available  segmental 
PBTs  are  included  in  the  sample.  Hence,  firm-years  with  missing  segmental  PBTs,  yet 
available  NAs  and/or  Sales,  are  implicitly  considered  as  not  diversified9s 
In  the  process  of  data  collection  it  became  clear  that  firms  are  often  inconsistent  in 
grouping  and  reporting  their  line-of-business  segmental  operations.  For  example,  on  a 
number  of  occasions  the  line-of-business  segment  reports  include  geographic  regions  as 
specific  line-of-business96.  These  firm-years  are  excluded  from  the  sample  because 
geographical  segment  valuation  was  the  subject  of  Chapter  5  and  the  present  chapter 
specifically  focuses  on  the  industrial  segments. 
Another  problem  that  complicates  line-of-business  data  collection,  categorisation 
and  subsequent  empirical  analysis,  is  the  idiosyncrasy  across  the  sample  firms  in  terms 
of  line-of-business  segment  identification.  Different  firms  categorise  and  report  their 
line-of-business  operations  in  different  ways.  In  a  way,  this  flexibility  or  discretion  to 
define  and  report  business  segments  is  implied  in  SSAP  25.  Thus,  in  reporting  line-of- 
business  accounting  data,  some  450  geographically  diversified  firms  use  more  than  800 
different  line-of-business  segment  names/labels.  Typically,  these  segment  names/labels 
9a  The  source  of  this  problem  -  whether  it  is  due  to  firms  submitting  incomplete  segmental  reports  or 
whether  it  is  due  to  inaccuracies/errors  in  the  Extel  database  -  is  unknown. 
95  This  assumption  is  restrictive  but  necessary  because  in  the  employed  regression  model  value 
contributions  associated  with  specific  business  segments  are  inferred  from  the  values  of  the  segments' 
PBT  coefficient. 
96  This  might  happen  when  the  firm  groups  all  its  operations  (albeit  from  different  lines-of-business) 
performed  in  a  foreign  location  into  one  business  unit  and  report  it  as  a  geographical  unit. 
311 themselves  do  not  convey  information  sufficient  for  categorising  these  segments  into 
specific  economic  sectors  or  industries. 
The  categorisation  of  line-of-business  operations  into  specific  economic  sectors  is 
necessary  for  the  subsequent  empirical  analysis  of  segment  valuation.  Industrial 
affiliation  of  a  reported  line-of-business  can  be  identified  only  by  examining  individual 
companies'  annual  reports.  Therefore,  to  identify  the  nature  of  each  reported  line-of- 
business  segment,  I  analyse  the  content  of  the  textual  information  contained  in  various 
sections  of  the  firms'  annual  reports  (e.  g.,  chairman's  statements,  operations'  review, 
etc.  ).  Annual  reports  are  accessed  online,  using  the  firms'  official  web  sites.  If  this 
information  is  not  available  online,  I  access  the  brief  summaries  of  firms'  operations 
reported  by  such  online  business  information  sources  as 
http:  //briefings.  ft.  com/company/,  www.  business.  com,  www.  corporateinformation.  com, 
etc. 
The  content  analysis  of  business  disclosures  of  the  sample  firms  suggests  that 
firms  can  be  categorised  into  several  categories,  depending  on  the  segment  disclosure 
styles.  Within  the  first  category  are  the  firms  whose  business  segments  reflect 
operations  that  relate  to  different  industries  or  economic  sectors.  In  this  case  it  could  be 
said  that  the  firm  is  industrially  diversified. 
In  the  second  category  are  the  firms  whose  business  segments  are  organised  and 
reported  to  reflect  specific  product  lines  within  a  single  industry  or  economic  sector.  In 
this  case,  the  firm  can  not  be  considered  industrially  diversified.  In  the  third  category 
are  the  firms  whose  all  lines-of-business  relate  to  the  same  industry,  yet  cater  to 
different  segments  of  the  product/services  market  or  types  of  customers.  That  is,  the 
line-of-business  segments  might  be  organised  by  type  of  customers  being  served.  There 
are  also  firms  whose  line-of-business  segment  reporting  style  is  a  combination  of  the 
previously  listed  categories. 
312 It  is  obvious  that  when  dealing  with  the  second  and  third  categories,  there  are 
virtually  unlimited  number  of  possible  types/names  of  line-of-business  segments.  In 
practice,  this  considerably  complicates  the  categorisation  of  the  plethora  of  line-of- 
business  segments  (reported  by  the  cross-section  of  firms)  into  a  few  distinct  and 
mutually  exclusive  specific  lines-of-business.  This  problem  becomes  particularly 
difficult  given  that  the  emphasis  of  this  chapter  is  on  the  relative  valuation  of  operations 
associated  with  specific  economic  sectors.  Recall  that  the  primary  objective  of  this 
chapter  is  to  examine  the  market's  perception  of  the  relative  value  contributions 
associated  with  specific  line-of-business  operations  of  (geographically  diversified) 
firms,  and  more  specifically,  with  operations  from  specific  industries/economic  sectors. 
Another  technical  problem  is  that  the  financial  statement  numbers  reported  in  the 
Extel  files  occasionally  have  different  scaling  within  the  cross-section  of  sample  firms 
or  even  within  a  single  firm.  For  example,  for  one  finm  the  financial  numbers  might  be 
reported  in  GBP  millions,  while  for  another  firm  these  numbers  might  be  stated  in 
thousands.  Similar  scaling  problems  often  exist  within  a  single  firm  across  different 
years.  When  such  cases  were  identified  rescaling  was  performed. 
The  analysis  of  segment  reports  and  the  textual  information  in  the  annual  reports 
of  the  sample  firms  revealed  that  many  companies  frequently  changed  their  reported 
lines-of-business  over  the  sample  period.  These  changes  usually  took  place  in  three 
ways: 
1.  changes  in  the  number  of  reported  line-of-business  segments  over  a  period  of 
several  years; 
2.  changes  in  the  names  of  the  previously  reported  line-of-business  segments; 
and/or, 
3.  changes  in  the  composition  of  the  firm's  line-of-business  segment  reports. 
313 The  first  case  usually  relates  to  situations  where  the  firm  enters  into  new  line-of- 
business  (through  organic  growth,  acquisitions,  mergers,  etc.  )  or  stops  operating  in 
some  of  its  previously  reported  lines-of-business.  This  type  of  segment  reporting  change 
does  not  complicate  the  data  collection  and  segment  identification  process. 
Some  segment  identification  problems  arise  in  the  second  case,  where  firms 
change  the  names/labels  of  specific  line-of-business  operations.  The  difficulty  is  that 
without  analysing  the  content  of  the  firm's  annual  reports,  it  is  not  possible  to  conclude 
whether  the  reporting  of  a  new  line-of-business  reflects  the  emergence  of  new  area  of 
operations  within  the  firm,  or  is  simply  a  result  of  the  alteration  of  the  previously 
existing  segment's  name.  Non-availability,  for  a  number  of  sample  firms,  of  annual 
reports  from  earlier  years  of  the  sample  period  adds  to  the  problem  of  tracing  the  name 
changes  and,  in  general,  of  segment  identification. 
The  third  case  is,  perhaps,  the  most  complicated  of  the  three.  It  reflects  the 
reorganisation  and  revision  (by  the  firm's  management)  of  how  the  information  about 
the  firm's  segment-level  operations  is  disclosed  by  the  firm.  Here  the  firm  might  split  a 
previously  reported  single  segment  into  two  new  reported  segments.  For  example,  a 
single  reported  segment  'Precision  Engineering  &  Electronic  Systems'  can  be  reported 
as  such  for  some  years,  and  then  be  split  and  reported  as  two  different  segments. 
Similarly,  two  previously  separately  reported  segments  might  then  be  agglomerated  and 
reported  under  one  heading.  The  latter  might  complicate  the  classification  of  the  new 
segment  within  a  particular  industry/line  of  business  if,  for  example,  the  initial  two 
segments  belonged  to  two  completely  different  economic  sectors/industries.  Note,  that 
the  physical  structure  of  the  firm's  operations  remains  unchanged.  Yet  again,  in  all  these 
cases  the  process  of  segment  identification  and  classification  requires  analysing  the 
content  of  the  firm's  annual  reports  for  each  year  when  there  was  a  structural  change  in 
the  segmental  report. 
314 Having  examined  some  of  the  major  difficulties  associated  with  the  use  of  the 
line-of-business  segments'  reports,  it  is  also  necessary  to  touch  upon  the  procedures  of 
segment  categorisation  by  economic  sectors. 
After  collecting  the  raw  line-of-business  segmental  data,  I  examine  the  nature  of 
business  involvement  of  a  specific  segment  within  each  firm  and  match  the  names  of 
segments  with  the  'best-fitting'  economic  sectors.  For  this  purpose  I  use  two  alternative 
economic  sector  classification  systems:  (1)  the  Financial  Time  Stock  Exchange  Global 
Classification  System  (UK  FTSE  GCS),  and  (2)  the  United  States  Standard  Industrial 
Classification  codes  (US SIC)97.  The  systems  have  somewhat  different  organisation,  yet 
have  been  equally  widely  used  in  the  international  capital  markets.  Therefore,  for  the 
reasons  of  completeness  of  this  study,  in  the  empirical  analysis  sections  of  this  chapter  I 
will  be  reporting  segment  valuation  results  based  on  two  alternative  systems  of 
segments'  industrial  classification.  Regardless  of  the  choice  of  the  system,  the  process 
of  segment  classification  by  economic  sectors  bears  a  considerable  degree  of  discretion, 
as  in  many  cases  it  is  not  possible  to  relate  the  firm's  specific  segment  to  a  particular 
industry.  To  attach  the  firm's  segment  to  an  industry  and  minimise  the  subjectivity  of 
judgment  I  refer,  as  a  starting  point,  to  the  firm's  primary  and  secondary  industry 
information  contained  in  the  Extel  database. 
For  many  firm-years  the  names  of  some  business  segment,  used  by  the  firm, 
appear  to  match  the  name  of  the  entire  firm's  industry  group.  In  this  straightforward 
case  the  content  analysis  of  the  firm's  annual  reports  becomes  unnecessary  and  the 
segment  is  simply  considered  to  belong  to  the  economic  sector  of  the  entire  firm.  For 
example,  if  the  entire  firm  belongs  to  the  'Beverages'  economic  sector,  and  one  of  its 
reported  business  segments  is  labelled  as  'Brewers',  then  that  segment  will  be  classified 
into  the  'Beverages'  economic  sector.  However,  if  another  segment  of  the  same  firm  is 
97  The  detailed  structures  of  FTSE  and  SIC  systems  are  presented  in  the  relevant  empirical  analysis 
sections  of  the  chapter. 
315 labels  as  'Restaurants  and  Pubs',  it  is  necessary  to  cross-check  its  business  substance 
with  the  annual  report,  because  this  business  segment  might  better  relate  to  the  'Leisure 
and  Hotels'  economic  sector,  which  is  different  from  the  'Beverages'  economic  sector. 
In  many  cases  the  cross-checks  with  annual  reports  are  also  necessary  when  the  name  of 
one  segment  matches  the  name  of  some  specific  economic  sector,  yet  the  firm  belongs 
to  another  economic  sector.  For  example,  the  segment  name  'Transport',  reported  by  an 
'Automobiles  and  Parts'  economic  sector  firm  perfectly  matches  the  name  of  the 
economic  sector  'Transport'.  Yet  in  reality,  the  segment  name  'Transport'  could  mean 
the  manufacturing  of  vehicles  and,  therefore,  should  be  categorised  into  the 
'Automobiles  and  Parts'  economic  sector.  In  such  cases,  only  the  content  analysis  of 
relevant  sections  of  the  firm's  annual  reports  would  shed  light  on  the  true  industrial 
affiliation/belonging  of  a  segment. 
6.2.2  Segment  Industrial  Classification  and  disclosure  characteristics 
As  was  previously  mentioned,  for  the  completeness  of  analyses,  in  the  empirical 
sections  of  this  chapter  two  alternative  systems  of  industry/economic  sector 
classification  (UK  FTSE  GCS  and  US  SIC  codes)  are  used  to  identify  the  industrial 
affiliation  of  a  given  business  segment.  Both  systems  have  unique  structural 
peculiarities  that  would  impact  upon  the  (pattern  of)  industrial  distribution  of  the 
sample's  line-of-business  segments  and  the  interpretation  of  segments'  valuation 
results.  The  following  two  sub-sections  examine  both  systems  in  more  detail. 
316 6.2.2.1  The  US  Standard  Industrial  Classification  System  and  segment  disclosure 
statistics 
The  US  Standard  Industrial  Classification  system  consists  of  nine  primary 
divisions,  where  each  division  has  its  unique  one-digit  SIC  code98.  Furthermore,  each 
division  includes  several  major  groups  with  a  two-digit  SIC  code  attached  to  each 
group.  There  are  more  than  70  two-digit  SIC  major  groups/industries.  This  hierarchy 
extends  up  to  the  four-digit  codes  level.  The  analysis  would  have  certainly  benefited  if  it 
was  possible  to  use  the  finest  level  (i.  e.,  four-digit)  SIC  codes.  However,  in  the  context 
of  the  model  and  test  design  employed  in  this  study,  and  in  light  of  the  insufficient 
number  of  segments  associated  with  the  two-digit  SIC  groups,  it  is  not  feasible  to  take 
the  empirical  analysis  beyond  the  one-digit  SIC  codes.  The  primary  one-digit  SIC 
divisions  are: 
A.  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing 
B.  Mining 
C.  Construction 
D.  Manufacturing 
E.  Transportation,  Communications,  Electric,  Gas,  and  Sanitary  Services 
F.  Wholesale  Trade 
G.  Retail  Trade 
H.  Finance,  Insurance  and  Real  Estate 
I.  Services 
The  composition  of  these  primary  divisions,  in  terms  of  the  number  of  two-digit 
industries,  varies  considerably.  Divisions  A,  B,  C  and  F  have  the  smallest  numbers  (i.  e., 
five  or  less)  of  two-digit  industries,  while  the  division  D  is  the  largest  and  includes  20 
9s  Details  of  the  structure  of  the  SIC  system  can  be  found  on  the  official  web  site  of  the  U.  S.  Department 
of  Labour  (see:  http:  //www.  osha.  gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.  html). 
317 two-digit  manufacturing  industries.  It  is,  therefore,  not  surprising  that  the  majority  of 
the  sample  fine'  business  segments  belong  to  the  Manufacturing  division. 
To  be  included  in  the  sample,  the  geographically  diversified  firm  must  report  at 
least  one  specific  business  segment  for  a  given  year.  Some  2,169  geographically 
diversified  firm-years  meet  this  requirement  and  report  6,342  specific  business 
segments  in  total,  suggesting  that  on  average  2.9  (6342/2169=2.92)  segments  are 
reported  for  each  firm-year99.  In  other  words,  an  average  sample  firm  operates  in  three 
lines-of-business. 
However,  further  analysis  of  the  industrial  affiliations  of  these  segments,  based  on 
the  one-digit  SIC  codes,  reveals  that  firms  are  much  more  focused.  This  is  because, 
although  being  reported  under  different  headings,  the  majority  of  business  segments 
reported  by  a  fine-year  often  belong  to  the  same  one-digit  SIC  code.  In  many  instances 
all  business  segments  reported  by  a  firm-year  belong  to  one  SIC  one-digit  industry 
code.  In  other  words,  the  firm  might  report  different  line-of-business  segments  and  be 
considered  industrially  diversified  under  the  two  or  three-digit  SIC  codes,  yet  remain 
industrially  focused  in  terms  of  the  one-digit  SIC  codes. 
As  was  mentioned  earlier  in  this  chapter,  data  problems  and  the  test  design  limit 
the  level  of  SIC  codes  that  could  be  used  to  categorise  the  segments.  Therefore,  I 
amalgamate  different  business  segments  when  they  belong  to  the  same  one-digit  SIC 
code.  This  results  in  3096  one-digit  SIC  segments  being  identified  within  the  sample  of 
2013  firm-years,  making  firms  look  substantially  less  diversified.  That  is,  firms  on 
average,  report  1.54  (3295/2169=1.54)  segments  in  any  year. 
Table  6.1  reveals  further  particulars  of  in-sample  segment  disclosures. 
99  Of  these  6342  segments,  I  was  not  able  to  identify  either  two-  or  one-digit  SIC  industry  codes  for  some 
150  business  segments. 
318 Table  6.1 
Panel  A.  Frequency  of  segment  types  reported  In  each  year 
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1991  0  0  0  2  0  2  3  1  1  9 
1992  0  1  2  10  2  5  2  1  5  28 
1993  1  1  5  26  4  12  6  3  12  70 
1994  5  5  21  153  29  48  24  32  63  380 
1995  6  5  21  201  44  63  37  35  84  496 
1996  6  5  20  201  41  56  35  38  85  487 
1997  6  9  20  200  44  52  34  35  97  497 
1998  5  8  19  185  42  51  41  29  91  471 
1999  6  7  21  162  40  43  40  31  95  445 
2000  1  3  11  70  25  18  25  13  47  213 
Total  36  44  140  1210  271  350  247  218  580  3096 
*  Numbers  are  based  on  the  primary  sample  which  does  not  exclude  the  outliers. 
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FTSE  0  0  0  0  73  5  109  38  20  63  308 
FTSE  1  0  44  90  237  19  41  4  60  50  545 
FTSE  2  0  0  33  478  26  48  1  28  41  655 
FTSE  3  0  0  0  112  0  15  11  0  6  144 
FTSE  4  36  0  7  123  12  68  26  12  7  291 
FTSE  5  0  0  10  165  161  62  156  75  325  954 
FTSE  6  0  0  0  1  5  2  11  6  3  28 
FTSE  7  0  0  0  0  41  5  0  13  6  65 
FTSE  8^  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
FTSE  9  0  0  0  21  2  0  0  4  79  106 
Total  36  44  140  1210  271  350  247  218  580  3096 
*  Numbers  are  based  on  the  primary  sample  which  does  not  exclude  the  outliers. 
**  FTSE  GCS  is  used  as  the  basis  for  firms'  classified  into  industries.  FTSE  0-  Resources;  FTSE  I- 
Basic  Industries;  FTSE  2=  General  Industrials;  FTSE  3=  Cyclical  Consumer  Goods;  FTSE  4-  Non- 
Cyclical  Consumer  Goods;  FTSE  5=  Cyclical  Services;  FTSE  6-  Non-Cyclical  Services;  FTSE  7- 
Utilities;  FTSE  8  Financials;  FTSE  9=  Information  Technology. 
A  There  are  no  observations  in  this  sector,  because  the  FTSE-based  financial  firms  are  not  included  in  the 
sample. 
319 The  table  shows  that  nearly  39%  of  all  reported  business  segments  operate  in  the 
Manufacturing  industries.  The  next  most  frequently  reported  industry  of  segments' 
operations  is  Services  (18.7%).  This  is  in  sharp  contrast  with  Mining,  and  Agriculture, 
Forestry  and  Fishing  industries  with  less  than  1.5%  of  segments  operating  in  these 
sectors.  This  uneven  distribution  of  segment's  industrial  affiliation  is,  however,  not 
inconsistent  with  the  industrial  distribution  of  the  sample  firms  (see  Chapter  4  for 
details). 
The  yearly  break-down  of  segment  reporting  frequencies  in  Panel  A  of  Table  6.1 
reveals  the  non-static  pattern  of  segment  disclosures.  From  1991  through  1995,  in  each 
consecutive  year  there  were  more  reported  segments  across  all  lines-of-business.  Using 
the  available  data  it  is  difficult  to  identify  the  cause  of  this  growth.  It  is  possible  that 
firms  had  been  gradually  or,  for  some  reason,  reluctantly  reacting  to  the  adoption  in  year 
1991  of  a  new  segment  reporting  standard  (SSAP  25).  The  cause,  however,  might  also 
be  of  a  technical  origin,  reflecting  the  compilation  of  data  by  Extel  Company  Analysis. 
The  pattern  would  also  be  consistent  with  a  conjecture  that  firms  were  increasing  the 
level  of  industrial  diversification  in  the  first  half  of  the  1990s,  hence,  more  reported 
segments.  It  is,  however,  difficult  to  defend  this  hypothesis  as  the  numbers  reported  in 
Panels  A  and  C  of  Table  6.2  (see  Section  6.2.2.2  below)  indicate  that  the  level  of 
industrial  diversification  had  been  decreasing. 
Panel  B  of  Table  6.1  provides  further  insight  into  the  relationships  between  the 
reported  segments  and  the  principal  industry  of  the  segment  reported  firm.  Because 
firms'  industries  are  identified  using  the  FTSE  GCS  system  and  the  segments' 
industries  are  based  on  the  SIC  system,  Panel  B  also  provides  some  indication  of  the 
level  of  association  between  these  two  industry  classification  systems. 
The  reported  patterns  indicate  that  there  is  little  relation  between  the  firms' 
principal  industry  and  the  types  of  business  segments  these  firms  report.  For  example,  it 
320 is  not  unusual  for  firms  with  principal  operations  in  the  `Basic  Industries'  sector  to 
report  segments  in  such  sectors  as  'Mining',  'Construction',  'Manufacturing', 
'Finance',  'Services',  'Wholesale  Trade',  etc.  Similar  spread  of  segment-level 
industries  is  observed  when  the  firm's  principal  operations  are  in  the  'Non-Cyclical 
Consumer  Goods'  industry.  Perhaps,  the  most  focused  are  the  firms  with  principal 
operations  in  the  'IT'  and  'Utilities'  sectors.  Such  firms  report  segments  from  only  four 
different  industries.  It  is  also  noteworthy  that  the  `Utilities'  sector  firms  do  not  operate 
in  the  most  frequently  reported  segment  industry,  Manufacturing. 
Despite  this  wide  segment-level  industry  spread  of  firms  operating  in  a  given 
principal  industry,  one  could  still  identify  one  dominant  segment  for  each  firm-industry. 
Principal  industry  of  the  firm  Dominant  segment-level  industry 
Resources  Wholesale  Trade 
Basic  Industries  Manufacturing 
General  Industrials  Manufacturing 
Cyclical  Consumer  Goods  Manufacturing 
Non-Cyclical  Consumer  Goods  Manufacturing 
Cyclical  Services  Services 
Non-Cyclical  Services  Retail  Trade 
Utilities  Transportation,  Communications,  Electric, 
Gas  &  Sanitary  Services 
Financials 
Information  Technology  Services 
The  above  revealed  associations  between  the  two  systems  of  industrial 
classification  might  provide  a  benchmark  for  comparing  the  segmental  relative 
valuation  results  reported  in  Section  3.2  with  those  reported  in  Section  3.3. 
321 6.2.2.2  The  FTSE  Global  Classification  System  and  segment  disclosure  statistics 
Similar  to  the  US  SIC  system,  the  UK  FTSE  Global  Classification  System  also  has 
a  hierarchical  structure  and  includes  ten  basic  economic  groups,  37  sectors  and  about 
100  sub-sectors1oo 
To  investigate  the  value  contributions  associated  with  business  segments  operating 
in  specific  economic  sectors  each  reported  business  segment  needs  to  be  categorised 
according  to  the  FTSE  economic  groups.  The  empirical  analysis  would  have  certainly 
benefited  if  it  was  possible  to  go  beyond  the  ten  economic  groups  and  use  finer 
categorisation,  such  as  economic  sectors  and  sub-sectors.  This,  however,  is  unfeasible, 
taking  into  account  the  problem  of  limited  data  and  the  test  design.  The  ten  basic 
economic  groups  comprising  the  FTSE  GCS  system  are: 
0  Resources 
1  Basic  Industries 
2  General  Industries 
3  Cyclical  Consumer  Goods 
4  Non-Cyclical  Consumer  Goods 
5  Cyclical  Services 
6  Non-Cyclical  Services 
7  Utilities 
8  Financials 
9  IT 
To  be  included  in  the  sample  the  firm-year  must  report  at  least  one  business 
segment  per  reported  year.  There  are  2,176  such  firm-years.  Because  of  missing  firm- 
level  data,  some  189  firm-years  are  eliminated,  reducing  the  sample  to  1987 
observations.  Analogous  to  the  approach  used  in  SIC-based  analysis,  for  a  given  firm- 
100  Details  of  the  structure  of  the  FTSE  Global  Classification  System  can  be  found  on  the  official  web  site 
of  FTSE  Group  (see:  http:  //www. ftse.  com). 
322 year  I  amalgamate  separately  reported  business  segments  that  belong  to  the  same  FTSE 
GCS  economic  groups.  This  results  in  3,036  FTSE-based  segments,  making  the  average 
number  of  segments  per  firm-year  equal  to  1.53  (i.  e.,  3036/1987=1.53).  This  number  is 
virtually  identical  to  that  obtained  when  the  SIC  codes  were  used  and  indicates  that 
sample  firms  have,  on  average,  low  level  of  industrial  diversification. 
Table  6.2 
Panel  A.  Frequency  of  segment  types  reported  In  each  year 
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2000  3  18  32  13  13  55  7  5  14  12  17  7  , 
Total  41  489  646  238  318  868  46  63  229  98  303  6 
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FTSE  0  32  7  4  0  4  6  0  1  3  0  57 
FTSE  1  14  320  45  13  20  56  0  8  49  0  525 
FTSE  2  0  120  463  72  37  79  3  3  25  4  806 
FTSE  3  0  0  35  115  4  18  0  0  3  4  179 
FTSE  4  0  16  21  12  181  52  16  0  9  3  310 
FTSE  5  0  33  46  21  63  630  12  9  109  28  951 
FTSE  6  0  0  0  0  1  0  11  0  5  0  17 
FTS  E7  0  0  12  0  0  5  3  41  14  1  76 
FTSE  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
FTSE  9  0  0  18  0  0  2  3  0  14  67  104 
Total  46  496  644  233  310  848  48  62  231  107  3025 
323 Table  6.2  (continued  from  the  previous  page) 
Panel  C.  Yearly  and  Industrial  structure  of  the  sample  firms* 
The  principal  FTSE  GCS  Industries  of  the  sample  firms 
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*  Numbers  are  based  on  the  primary  sample  which  does  not  exclude  the  outliers.  **  FTSE  GCS  is  used  as 
the  basis  for  firms'  classified  into  industries.  FTSE  0=  Resources;  FTSE  I=  Basic  Industries;  FTSE  2= 
General  Industrials;  FTSE  3=  Cyclical  Consumer  Goods;  FTSE  4-  Non-Cyclical  Consumer  Goods; 
FTSE  5=  Cyclical  Services;  FTSE  6=  Non-Cyclical  Services;  FTSE  7=  Utilities;  FTSE  8  Financials; 
FTSE  9=  Information  Technology. 
Panels  A  and  B  of  Table  6.2  reveal  that  patterns  of  uneven  distribution  of 
segments'  industrial  affiliation  are  similar  yet  less  pronounced  than  those  reported  in 
Pales  A  and  B  of  Table  6.1.  The  two  most  frequently  reported  business  segments  relate 
to  'Cyclical  Services'  and  'General  Industrials'  industries  and  account  for  29%  and 
21%  of  all  reported  segments,  respectively.  In  contrast,  less  than  2%  of  segments 
operate  in  such  industries  as  'Resources',  'Utilities'  and  'Non-Cyclical  Services'.  This 
uneven  distribution  of  segment's  industrial  affiliation  is,  however,  consistent  with  the 
industrial  distribution  of  the  sample  firms  (see  Panel  C  of  Table  6.2). 
Yearly  distributions  of  segments  reported  in  Panel  A  of  Table  6.1  show  identical 
patterns  to  those  found  in  Panel  A  of  Table  6.2.  That  is,  across  all  FTSE  GCG 
industries  the  numbers  of  disclosed  segments  were  growing  up  until  1995,  and  largely 
remained  unchanged  in  the  following  years.  Possible  explanations  for  this  pattern  have 
already  been  discussed  in  Section  6.2.2.1  of  this  chapter. 
324 Panel  B  of  Table  6.2  provides  further  details  on  the  relationships  between  the 
industrial  affiliation  of  reported  segments  and  the  principal  industry  of  the  segment 
reporting  firm.  Because  both  the  firms  and  reported  segments  are  classified  using  the 
FTSE  GCS  system,  one  might  expect  close  association  between  the  firm's  principal 
industry  and  the  most  frequently  reported  industry  for  its  segments.  Indeed,  between 
55%  to  66%  of  segments,  reported  by  a  firm  with  principal  activities  in  a  given  industry, 
belong  to  that  industry101.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  for  the  majority  of  firms' 
principal  industries  the  remaining  45%  to  34  %  of  reported  segments  are  relatively  well 
spread  between  the  remaining  industries.  That  is,  there  are  no  obvious  relationships 
between  the  principal  industry  of  firms  and  non-principal  industry  segments  reported  by 
firm. 
6.2.3  Variables'  Descriptive  Statistics 
This  section  deals  with  the  descriptive  statistics  of  business  segments'  PBTs, 
based  on  the  final  samples  used  in  the  subsequent  regression  analysis  sections  of  this 
chapter.  All  statistics,  therefore,  are  computed  for  segment-level  PBT  variables  which 
have  been  scale-deflated  (by  the  composite  scale  proxy)  and  trimmed  to  exclude  the 
outliers  (i.  e.,  top  and  bottom  0.5%  of  each  regression  variable).  In  the  table  that  follows 
the  descriptive  statistics  are  computed  separately  for  positive  and  negative  segment- 
level  PBTs.  This  is  to  allow  comparability  between  different  industrial  segments  that 
report  profits  (or  losses).  To  expose  the  relationships  between  the  firm-level  and 
segment-level  negative  earnings,  all  descriptives  are  computed  for  two  samples:  the 
total  sample  and  the  sub-sample  that  excluded  observations  with  firm-level  losses  (see 
Table  6.3  in  Appendix  6.1). 
101  For  example,  there  are  in  total  57  business  segments  reported  by  the  Resources  sector  firms.  Of  this 
number,  32  segments  (i.  e.,  56%)  operate  in  the  Resources  sector  and  the  remaining  25  segments  (i.  e., 
44%)  operate  in  other  industries  (see  Panel  B  of  Table  6.2). 
325 Because  all  segmental  PBTs  are  scale-deflated  (and  the  scale  proxy  is  computed  as 
the  average  of  equity  market  value,  total  assets  and  sales)  the  means  and  medians 
provide  some  measure  of  the  average  size  of  a  specific  industry  segment  relative  to 
other  industry  segments.  In  the  Panel  A  of  Table  6.3  (Appendix  6.1)  segments' 
industries  are  based  on  the  FTSE  industry  classification  system.  The  comparison  of  the 
median  and  mean  values  across  segments  suggests  that  earnings  reported  from  segments 
in  the  'Non-Cyclical  Services'  account  for  a  bigger  share  of  firms'  total  earnings  than 
those  of  any  other  segment,  while  'Utilities'  and  'Financials'  industries  are  associated 
with  the  smallest  segments. 
In  the  Panel  B  of  Table  6.3  (Appendix  6.1)  segments'  industries  are  based  on  the 
US  SIC  one-digit  codes.  Segments  operating  in  'Mining'  and  'Manufacturing' 
industries  are  the  largest  while  those  associated  with  'Agriculture,  Forestry  and 
Fishing',  'Finance,  Insurance  and  Real  Estate'  and  'Transportation,  Communications, 
etc.  'are  the  smallest  segments. 
Among  the  important  segment-level  PBT  characteristics  is  the  frequency  of 
reported  negative  segmental  PBTs.  When  compared  across  lines-of-business  it  provides 
a  simple  measure  of  relative  successfulness  of  specific  segmental  operations.  It  might 
also  provide  some  insight  into  the  interpretation  of  segments'  relative  valuation  results, 
reported  in  the  empirical  sections  of  this  chapter. 
Information  presented  in  Table  6.4  reveals  that  segments  differ  substantially  in 
terms  of  frequency  of  reporting  negative  results.  In  as  much  as  32%,  20%  and  13%  of 
cases,  segments  operating  in  'Resources',  'Information  Technology'  and  'Financial' 
sectors,  respectively,  report  losses.  This  contrasts  with  percentages  which  are  below  9% 
for  the  remaining  seven  out  ten  FTSE-based  industries  (see  upper  panel  of  Table  6.4). 
326 Similar  divergences  are  found  across  the  US  SIC-based  business  segments.  Thus, 
42%  of  segment-firm-years  operating  in  the  `Mining'  industry  report  losses,  while  for 
the  remaining  eight  segments  this  percentage  does  not  exceed  12.5%. 
Table  6.4 
Industry  of 
the 
segment 
FTSE  0 
FTSE1 
FTSE  2 
FTSE  3 
FTSE  4 
FTSE  5 
FTSE  6 
FTSE  7 
FTSE  8 
FTSE  9 
SIC  A 
SIC  B 
SIC  C 
SIC  D 
SIC  E 
SIC  F 
SIC  G 
SIC  H 
SIC  I 
Segments  classified  on  the  basis  of  FTSE  GCS 
Total  sample' 
Number  of 
positive 
segmental 
PBTs 
Segments  classified  on  the  basis  of  US  SIC  codes 
Number  of 
positive 
segmental 
PBTs 
Number  of 
negative 
segmental 
PBTs 
%  Of 
negative 
PBTs  In 
total 
23  11  32.35%  23  3  11.54% 
461  23  4.75%  424  10  2.30% 
584  41  6.56%  529  14  2.58% 
217  15  6.47%  193  5  2.53% 
288  18  5.88%  262  5  1.87% 
787  55  6.53%  728  18  2.41% 
44  4  8.33%  44  3  6.38% 
59  2  3.28%  56  2  3.45% 
196  29  12.89%  179  23  11.39% 
78  19  19.59%  67  7  9.46% 
30 
19 
119 
1104 
243 
311 
210 
182 
479 
Number  of 
negative 
segmental 
PBTs 
%  of 
negative 
PBTs  in 
total 
Profit-making  firm-years 
0 
4 
7 
18 
7 
15 
9 
12 
23 
2 
14 
17 
64 
16 
29 
27 
20 
65 
6.25%  28 
42.42%  18 
12.50%  111 
5.48%  1002 
6.18%  232 
8.53%  277 
11.39%  198 
9.90%  166 
11.95%  423 
0.00% 
18.18% 
5.93% 
1.76% 
2.93% 
5.14% 
4.35% 
6.74% 
5.16% 
*  Based  on  final  samples  used  in  regression  analysis  and  exclude  outliers  (i.  e.,  top  and  bottom  0.5%  of 
each  firm  or segment-level  variable). 
The  majority  of  regression  results  reported  in  Section  6.3  of  this  chapter  relate  to 
samples  that  exclude  firm-level  loss-making  firms.  Therefore  Table  6.4  additionally 
reports  frequencies  of  segmental  losses  for  samples  that  exclude  observations  with  firm- 
level  losses.  As  one  might  expect,  the  frequency  of  segmental  losses  is  substantially 
lower  across  all  segments.  These  results  suggest  that,  as  one  would  expect,  the 
percentages  of  segment-level  losses  are  considerably  lower  in  the  sample  that  only 
includes  profit-making  firms.  In  relative  terms,  nevertheless,  segments  that  have  higher 
327 frequency  of  losses  in  the  full  sample  have  higher  frequency  of  losses  in  the  new  sample 
as  well. 
6.3.  ANALYSIS  OF  SEGMENTS'  VALUATION  AND  LINE-OF-BUSINESS 
DIVERSIFICATION 
6.3.1  Firm-level  empirical  results 
To  assess  the  relative  value  contributions  associated  with  specific  business 
segments,  I  follow  the  methodology  used  in  the  Chapter  5,  and  measure  the  relative 
valuation  of  business  segments  by  comparing  the  values  of  regression-estimated 
segmental  earnings  coefficients. 
It  should  be  reminded  that  the  working  sample  in  this  chapter  is  smaller  than  that 
of  Chapter  5  because  it  only  includes  firm-years  that  are  diversified  across  geographic 
and  business  dimensions  (i.  e.,  simultaneously  report  geographic  and  business  segment 
data).  Restricting  the  sample  to  firms  which  are  diversified  across  both  geographic  and 
industrial  dimensions  would  reflect  the  combined  valuation  effects,  associated  with  both 
types  of  corporate  diversification.  There  also  exists  another  (technical)  reason  for 
restricting  the  sample  to  firm-years  which  are  diversified  across  both  dimensions.  The 
line-of-business  data  are  primarily  collected  and  compiled  manually.  Given  the  time 
constraints  of  my  research,  it  would  not  be  possible  to  collect  and  compile  the  required 
data  for  the  entire  (initial)  sample.  The  sample  size  might  vary,  depending  on  the  choice 
of  economic  sector  classification  system  (FTSE  GCS  vs.  UK  SIC). 
To  alleviate  the  scale-related  problems  discussed  in  Chapter  3,  all  OLS  regressions 
are  estimated  in  a  scale-deflated  form  and  after  the  outliers  are  eliminated102.  The 
elimination  of  outliers  reduces  the  sample  to  1919  f  irm-years. 
102  The  primary  deflator  used  in  this  study  is  a  composite  size  proxy,  computed  as  follows: 
deflator=(MV+TA+Sales)/3.  Outliers  are  defined  as  top  and  bottom  0.5%  of  observations  for  each  scale- 
deflated  variable  included  in  the  regression.  Results  of  the  robustness  checks,  with  alternative  scale 
deflators,  are  reported  in  Section  6.4. 
328 The  analyses  in  Chapters  4  and  5  reveal  that  a  number  of  contexts  and  factors  can 
affect  regression  results  and,  hence,  segment  valuation  inferences.  Of  such  factors  and 
contexts,  that  need  to  be  taken  into  account  when  running  regressions  in  this  chapter, 
are: 
"  the  sign  of  firm-level  and  segment-level  earnings; 
"  the  dividend  paying  status  of  the  firm; 
"  the  premium/discount  of  the  market  value  of  the  firm  relative  to  the  book 
value;  and 
"  industry  and  yearly  effects. 
In  regressions  that  test  value  relevance  and  valuation  of  business  segments,  I  do 
not  control  for  specific  characteristics  of  geographical  diversification  of  firms,  because: 
1.  all  firms  included  in  this  analysis  are,  by  definition,  geographically  diversified; 
and,  more  importantly, 
2.  firms  do  not  report  business  vs.  geographic  segment  information  in  a  matrix 
format. 
Before  addressing  the  core  issue  of  this  chapter,  the  valuation  of  specific  business 
segments,  I  start  off  with  the  basic  firm-level  model  and  investigate  two  issues:  the 
influence  of  the  above  listed  contexts  on  the  firm-level  regression  parameters,  and  the 
incremental  information  content  of  the  business  segment  disclosures. 
Table  6.5  (see  Appendix  6.1)  reports  the  basic  regression  results  for  alternatively 
defined  samples.  Model  1  is  estimated  for  the  entire  sample  and  does  not  control  for  any 
of  the  above  listed  effects.  Although  the  estimated  coefficient  of  three  basic  value 
drivers  (PBT,  BV  and  Div)  are  all  statistically  significant  at  least  at  the  5%  level,  the 
PBT  coefficient  has  an  unexpected  (negative)  sign  and  the  regression  explanatory  power 
is  relatively  low,  at  15.6%.  To  isolate  the  effect  of  losses,  Model  2  is  estimated  for 
profit-making  firms  only.  In  this  model  the  PBT  has  the  expected  sign  and  is  highly 
329 statistically  significant.  The  explanatory  power  of  this  model  is  21.6%,  substantially 
higher  than  in  Model  1.  Model  3  is  estimated  for  profit-making  firms  but  excludes  the 
non-dividend  paying  firms.  Model  3  and  Model  2  have  similar  regression  coefficients 
for  all  key  value  drivers  yet  the  latter  has  somewhat  higher  explanatory  power  (23.3%). 
Model  4  and  5  are  estimated  to  assess  the  performance  of  the  basic  valuation 
model  when  the  firms  report  negative  consolidated  results.  None  of  these  regressions 
appear  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level  and  none  of  the  key  valuation  factors' 
coefficients  are  statistically  significant  at  the  5%  level.  Furthermore,  Model  5  is  not 
statistically  significant  even  at  the  10%  level.  The  conclusion,  therefore,  is  that  in  the 
given  sample,  the  employed  basic  valuation  model  fails  to  explain  even  a  fraction  of  the 
cross-sectional  variation  of  the  market  value  of  equity  when  firms  report  firm-level 
losses.  Therefore,  the  analysis  that  follows  will  primarily  relate  to  profit-making  firms, 
unless  otherwise  specified. 
Table  6.6  (see  Appendix  6.1)  reports  the  results  of  regressions  (estimated  for 
profit-making  firms)  which  are  being  gradually  appended  with  dummies  to  control  for 
the  market  value  premium/discount,  fixed  yearly  and  industry  effects. 
Models  1  and  2  in  Table  6.6  are  the  extensions  of  Models  2  and  3  of  Table  6.5,  in 
the  sense  that  they  include  the  market  value  premium/discount  dummy.  Consistent  with 
previous  results  reported  in  Chapter  5,  the  premium/discount  dummy  coefficient  is 
highly  statistically  significant,  has  a  negative  value,  yet  does  not  affect  the  PBT 
coefficients.  Furthermore,  similar  to  previous  findings,  the  inclusion  of  this  dummy 
improves  the  explanatory  power  of  the  regressions  by  about  5%  points.  The 
interpretation  of  this  result  is  the  same  as  in  Chapter  5:  firms  that  trade  at  a  discount  to 
book  value  have,  on  average,  lower  valuation  than  firms  trading  at  a  premium. 
Models  3  and  4  of  Table  6.6  are  estimated  with  industry  dummies.  Although  six 
out  of  eight  yearly  dummies  are  not  statistically  significant,  they,  nevertheless,  notably 
330 improve  the  explanatory  power  of  the  regressions  (by  about  7%  points).  In  these  models 
the  values  of  PBT,  Div  and  BV  value  association  coefficients  are  slightly  different  from 
those  in  models  1  and  2,  yet  the  qualitative  inferences  remain  unchanged. 
Finally,  the  inclusion  of  yearly  dummies  alone  or  in  conjunction  with  the  market 
premium  and  industry  dummies  (as  in  models  5  and  6  of  Table  6.6)  has  no  impact 
either  on  the  explanatory  power  of  the  regressions,  or  the  estimated  coefficients.  This  is 
despite  the  statistical  significance  (at  the  5%  level)  of  5  out  of  9  yearly  dummies. 
Therefore,  I  do  not  employ  yearly  dummies  in  the  segment-level  tests  reported  later  in 
this  chapter. 
The  examination  of  results  in  Table  6.6  and  Table  6.5  (models  2  and  3)  reveals 
commonalities  with  results  reported  in  similar  tests  of  Chapter  5.  These  include: 
"  in  the  context  of  the  employed  model,  firms  trading  at  a  discount  to  book 
value  have  lower  cross-sectional  relative  valuation  than  firms  trading  at  a  premium; 
"  in  profit-making  firms  the  BV  is  negatively  (yet  not  always  statistically 
significantly)  associated  with  the  firm  value; 
"  regardless  of  the  number  of  dummies  included,  the  PBT  always  has 
positive  and  statistically  significant  association  with  value,  and  its  coefficient  is 
always  higher  for  the  dividend-paying  firms; 
"  dividends  are  also  positively  associated  with  value,  and  have  higher 
valuation  coefficient  in  regressions  that  exclude  non-dividend  firm-years; 
"  robust  statistical  significance  and  positive  sign  of  the  PBTS  coefficient, 
throughout  all  relevant  models  reported  in  Chapters  5  and  6,  indicates  that  the  PBT 
value  association  coefficient  is  not  a  cross-scale  constant,  but  rather  is  positively 
correlated  with  the  scale  of  the  firm; 
331 "  finally,  in  all  tests  the  explanatory  power  of  models  that  exclude  non- 
dividend  firm-years  is  marginally  yet  persistently  higher  than  in  models  that  do  not 
exclude  such  firm-years. 
6.3.2  Segmental  Valuation  using  FTSE  GCS 
In  the  previous  section  I  examined  general  characteristics  of  the  model's 
performance  when  the  consolidated  data  were  used.  In  this  section  I  examine  the 
performance  of  the  model  and  the  issue  of  relative  valuation  of  specific  line-of-business 
operations  associated  with  specific  FTSE  GCS  economic  groups.  To  do  this  I  use  two 
alternative,  yet  complementary,  test  designs.  In  the  first  instance  the  firm-level  PBT  of 
the  basic  valuation  model  is  replaced  with  its  segment-level  PBT  components.  In  the 
second  type  of  test  design,  the  firm-level  model  is  amended  with  segment-level  PBT 
components.  These  methods  are  complementary  in  the  sense  that  they  help  address 
different  technical  problems  associated  with  regression  estimation  process. 
Simple  disaggregation  of  the  firm-level  earnings  into  segmental  counterparts 
maintains  the  equivalence  of  the  disaggregated  and  the  firm-level  models.  However, 
because  of  the  low  quality  of  the  business  segment  data  (either  due  to  inconsistencies  in 
the  segment  reporting  practices  of  the  UK  firms,  which  might  reflect  inadequacy  of  the 
segment  reporting  requirements  contained  SSAP  25,  or  flaws  and  errors  in  the  Extel 
database,  or  the  impossibility  to  correctly  identify  the  industrial  characteristic  of  a 
specific  business  segment),  in  a  substantial  proportion  of  the  sample  the  sum  of 
segmental  PBTs,  in  a  given  firm  year,  deviates  considerably  from  the  firm-level  PBT. 
Furthermore,  more  often  than  not  these  deviations  are  very  large  and  could  not  be 
merely  attributed  to  such  specific  non-segmental  components  of  the  firm-level  PBTs  as 
PBT  from  discontinued  operations,  or  other  items.  This  results  in  a  situation  where  the 
residual  (non-segment)  component  of  the  firm-level  PBT  often  accounts  for  a  larger 
332 share  of  the  firm-level  PBT  than  do  all  business  segments  taken  together,  which  affects 
the  robustness  of  segment-level  PBT  coefficients. 
In  the  alternative  test  the  basic  model  is  appended  with  segment  level  PBTs.  Isere, 
the  model  specification  is: 
my  =  a0,,  +a,,,,,  *  (l  I  s)  +  a,  *  by  +  a2  *  pbt  +  b,  *  pbt,  +  a3  *  pbt  *f  (size)  +  a4  *  div  +u 
where  pbt;  is  the  profit  before  tax,  reported  from  segment  i. 
The  shortcoming  of  this  approach  is  the  departure  of  the  appended  model  from 
the  basic  theoretical  model.  The  good  news,  however,  is  that  it  is  no  longer  necessary  to 
include  in  the  regression  the  non-segment  component  of  the  firm-level  PBT.  Inferences 
regarding  the  relative  valuation  of  specific  segments  can  be  drawn  either  by  comparing 
the  coefficients  of  segmental  PBTs  added  to  the  regression  or  by  comparing  a  given 
segment's  PBT  coefficient  with  the  firm-level  PBT  coefficient.  Furthermore,  the  latter 
could  also  reveal  how  the  capitalisation  of  a  specific  segment's  earnings  compares  to 
the  cross-sectionally  average  capitalisation  of  earnings  of  the  sample  firms. 
6.3.2.1  Test  results  based  on  disaggregation 
I  start  off  with  models  1  and  2,  reported  in  Table  6.6  (Appendix  6.1),  and  replace 
the  firm-level  PBT  with  its  business  segment-level  components.  Table  6.7  (Appendix 
6.1)  reports  the  results  from  segment-disaggregated  models.  In  Model  1  of  Table  6.7,  a 
disaggregated  version  of  Model  1  of  Table  6.6,  the  firm-level  PBT  is  replaced  by  ten 
segment-level  components.  This  simple  disaggregation  improves  the  explanatory  power 
of  the  regression  by  a  notable  6  percentage  points,  suggesting  that  business  segment 
reporting  has  incremental  value  relevance.  Although  all  ten  segmental  PBT  coefficients 
have  the  expected  (positive)  sign,  only  four  of  them  are  statistically  significant.  Of  all 
segments,  the  PBT9  has  the  highest  valuation  coefficient,  which  is  statistically  larger 
than  all  other  statistically  significant  segmental  coefficients.  In  other  words,  segments 
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'Cyclical  Services'  economic  sector  is  the  next  most  valuable  line-of-business,  followed 
by  the  'General  Industries'  line-of-business. 
Model  1  does  not  control  for  the  possibility  that  some  of  the  segmental  PBTs 
might  be  negative.  It  is  often  the  case  that  firms  report  positive  consolidated  financial 
results,  yet  on  the  segmental  level  they  might  report  losses  for  a  specific  segment.  From 
the  firm-level  analysis  in  Chapter  4  and  geographic  segment-level  analysis  in  Chapter  5, 
it  is  known  that  the  market  attaches  different  values  to  positive  and  negative  earnings. 
Therefore,  to  allow  for  non-linearities  in  the  line-of-business  segment  PBT  coefficients, 
the  model  is  appended  with  ten  interaction  terms,  corresponding  to  the  ten  segments. 
Results  are  reported  in  Model  2  of  Table  6.7  and  suggest  that  neither  the  segmental 
PBT  coefficients  nor  the  remaining  value  drivers'  coefficients  are  affected.  This  is 
because  the  number  of  negative  segmental  PBTs  per  reported  segment  is  very  small  and 
does  not  influence  the  segmental  PBT  coefficients.  Table  6.8  (see  below)  shows  the 
frequency  of  firm-years  with  positive  and  negative  segmental  PBTs,  by  segments' 
economic  sector,  in  the  profit-making  sample. 
These  small  numbers  of  negative  segmental  PBTs  also  explain  the  incongruity  of 
the  regression  estimated  interaction  terms'  coefficients  103. 
Models  3  and  4  of  Table  6.7  repeat  Models  I  and  2,  respectively,  and  are 
estimated  for  the  dividend-paying  sub-sample.  The  values  of  the  estimated  segmental 
PBT  coefficients  are  higher  than  in  Models  1  and  2,  yet  all  previous  qualitative 
inferences  remain  unaffected'  04 
103  Statistically,  for  most  of  the  lines-of-business,  there  are  not  enough  negative  segmental  PBT  data 
points  to  allow  robust  estimation  of  the  interaction  terms'  coefficients. 
04  Models  I  and  3  have  also  been  re-estimated  with  negative  segmental  PBTs  set  to  zero.  This,  however, 
did  not  change  the  results. 
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Single-industry  and  Multi-industry  Multi-industry  firm-years  only  * 
firm-years 
Economic  Total  **  Positive  Negative  Total  Positive  Negative 
sectors  segmental  segmental  segmental  segmental 
PBTs  PBTs  PBTs  PBTs 
0.  Resources  26  23  3  21  19  2 
1.  Basic  434  424  10  276  269  7  Industries 
2.  General  543  529  14  355  341  14 
Industries 
3.  Cyclical 
Consumer  198  193  5  133  128  5 
Goods 
4.  Non-Cyclical 
Consumer  267  262  5  181  176  5 
Goods 
5.  Cyclical  746  728  18  367  350  17 
Services 
6.  Non-Cyclical  47  44  3  36  33  3 
Services 
7.  Utilities  58  56  2  41  39  2 
8.  Financials  202  179  23  196  173  23 
9.  IT  74  67  7  44  38  6 
*  Single-industry  firms  are  those  that  report  multiple  business  segments,  yet  all  business  segments  are  in 
one  industry.  Multi-industry  firms  are  those  multi-segment  firms  whose  reported  segments  operate  in 
different  industries. 
**  Total  numbers  are  lower  than  those  reported  in  Table  6.3  because  they  exclude  outliers  and  reflect 
only  the  firm-years  that  report  firm-level  positive  earnings. 
The  observed  low  statistical  significance  of  segmental  PBTs  might  be  due  to 
several  reasons.  On  a  technical  level,  the  relatively  small  number  of  non-zero  data 
points  per  line-of-business  combined  with  the  large  number  of  regression  coefficients 
being  estimated  precludes  robust  estimation  of  the  PBT  coefficients.  On  an  economic 
level,  the  lack  of  statistically  significant  value  association  of  segmental  profits  might 
indicate  that  the  market  does  not  value  earnings  information  from  specific  lines-of- 
business,  suggesting  that  this  information  is,  in  general,  of  low  quality  and  unreliable. 
Because  this  information  is  produced  (disclosed)  in  accordance  with  SSAP25's  segment 
reporting  requirements,  one  might  conclude  that  SSAP25  is  not  adequate,  as  far  as  the 
value  relevance  of  business  segment  information  is  concerned.  An  alternative 
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FTSE  GCS  economic  classification  system,  used  for  classifying  business  operations  by 
economic  sectors,  fails  to  categorise  operations  in  economically  distinguishable 
categories.  However,  even  this  point  can  be  related  back  to  the  issue  of  inadequacy  of 
SSAP25.  This  is  because  SSAP25  does  not  require  companies  to  disclose  specific 
(FTSE,  SIC-based  or  any  other  classification  system-based)  economic  sectors/industries 
in  which  the  reported  business  segments  belong. 
The  examination  of  the  economic  substance  of  the  ten  FTSE  GCS  economic 
groups  (i.  e.,  industries  making  up  a  given  economic  group)  does  not  reveal  much  of  the 
logic  of  the  composition  of  the  economic  groups.  Some  economic  groups,  for  example, 
include  under  the  same  umbrella  functionally  dissimilar  industries,  while  some 
functionally  similar  operations  are  classified  into  different  economic  groups.  For 
example,  the  'Non-Cyclical  Consumer  Goods'  economic  group  encapsulates  such 
completely  different,  in  economic  substance,  sub-sectors/industries  as  'Brewers'  and 
'Health  Maintenance  Organisations',  and  'Non-Cyclical  Services'  group  is  comprised 
of  two  dissimilar  sectors:  'Food  and  Drug  Retailers',  and  'Telecommunication 
Services'.  On  the  other  hand,  such  (operationally  and  economically)  closely  related 
industries  as  'Telecommunication  Services'  and  'Internet  and  Computer  Services'  are 
categorised  into  'Non-Cyclical  Services'  and  'IT'  economic  groups  respectively. 
Therefore,  it  might  be  difficult  to  substantiate  the  regression-estimated  segmental  PBT 
coefficients. 
Because  the  primary  objective  of  my  study  is  the  identification  of  value 
contributions  associated  with  segments  operating  in  specific  lines-of-business,  it  might 
be  useful  to  agglomerate  some  of  the  FTSE  GCS  economic  groups  into  larger  sectors, 
based  on  the  similarity  of  the  economic  substance  of  industries  included  in  a  given 
economic  group.  The  term  'similarity  of  economic  substance'  entails  subjective 
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different  lines-of-business  is  inferred  from  the  closeness  of  definitions  and  descriptions 
of  the  economic  sectors  and  sub-sectors  comprising  each  of  the  10  major  FTSE  GCS 
economic  groups.  Results  reported  in  the  sections  that  follow  reflect  several  alternative 
agglomerations  (where  several  initial  economic  groups  are  agglomerated  into  larger 
sectors). 
Based  on  the  similarity  of  definitions  of  economic  activities,  I  agglomerate  the 
least  technologically  advanced  `traditional'  industries,  that  is,  'Basic  Industries', 
'Resources'  and  'Utilities',  into  one  sector.  Respectively,  the  PBTs  of  these  three  lines- 
of-business  (i.  e.,  PBTO,  PBT1  and  PBT7)  are  agglomerated  into  one  PBT  item, 
PBT017.  Similarly,  'Cyclical  Consumer  Goods'  and  'Non-Cyclical  Consumer  Goods' 
are  combined  into  one  segment  which  appears  in  regressions  as  PBT34.  The  most 
technologically  advanced  `new'  industries,  'Non-Cyclical  Services'  and  'IT',  are  also 
agglomerated  into  one  segment,  PBT69.  This  reduces  the  number  of  economic  sectors 
to  six. 
The  Table  6.9  (Appendix  6.1)  reports  regression  results  with  agglomerated 
segments.  All  four  regressions  reported  in  Table  6.9  are  in  agreement  with  those 
reported  earlier,  confirming  the  previous  findings  that  specific  lines-of-business  have 
different  relative  valuation.  Segments  operating  in  the  'traditional'  industries  (i.  e., 
represented  by  PBT017)  have  the  lowest  association  with  the  equity  market  value,  and 
hence  could  be  thought  of  as  being  perceived  by  the  market  as  having  the  lowest 
relative  contribution  to  the  value  of  the  firm.  In  fact,  the  PBT017  coefficient  is  only 
significant  at  the  1%  level  in  samples  that  exclude  non-dividend  firms  (Models  3  and  4). 
In  Model  2,  estimated  for  the  sample  that  includes  non-dividend  firms,  the  PBT017 
coefficient  is  significant  only  at  the  10%  level. 
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financial  sector.  In  relative  terms  the  financial  segments  have  statistically 
indistinguishable  valuation  from  that  of  segments  operating  in  the  `traditional' 
industries.  In  other  words,  the  financial  operations  are  at  the  bottom  of  the  line-of- 
business  segment  valuation  ranking.  It  should  be  noted,  that  because  the  FTSE  GCS- 
based  financial  firms  are  excluded  from  the  sample,  this  result  is  representative  of 
financial  segments  of  the  non-financial  firms  only. 
The  PBT  coefficient  related  to  segments  operating  in  'Cyclical'  and  'Non-Cyclical 
Consumer  Goods'  sectors  is  statistically  significant  (at  the  1%  level)  yet  its  value  is  the 
second-lowest. 
Segments  operating  in  the  'General  Industries'  economic  group  are  in  the  middle 
of  the  valuation  ranking,  and  this  result  is  robust  to  different  samplings.  The  second 
most  valued  segmental  operations  belong  to  the  'Cyclical  Services'  economic  group. 
This  group  encompasses  such  sector  firms  as  General  Retailers,  Leisure  and  Hotel 
companies,  Media  and  Entertainment  firms  and  support  services.  Finally,  the  most 
valuable  segment  operations  are  those  related  to  the  Iii-Tech  economic  group,  which  is 
an  agglomeration  of  such  economic  sub-sectors  as  Telecommunication  Services,  IT 
Hardware  and  Software,  and  Food  and  Drug  retailers. 
The  results  of  the  Wald  tests,  which  are  used  to  test  the  pair-wise  restriction  of  the 
equality  of  two  specific  segments'  PBT  coefficients,  indicate  that  all  segments  are 
perceived  to  have  value  contributions  which  are  statistically  different  from  each  other. 
Based  on  the  empirical  results,  specific  lines-of-business  can  be  arranged  in  the 
order  from  the  least  to  most  valuable  as  follows: 
1.  Traditional  Industries  (include:  'Basic  Industries',  'Resources'  and  'Utilities'); 
2.  Finance-related  lines-of-business; 
3.  'Cyclical'  and  'Non-Cyclical  Consumer  Goods  ; 
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5.  'Cyclical  Services'  (include:  General  Retailers,  Leisure  and  Hotels,  Media  and 
Entertainment  and  Support  services); 
6.  Hi-Tech  group  (includes:  Telecommunication  Services,  IT  Hardware  and 
Software,  Food  and  Drug  Retailers). 
Summarising  the  above  results  of  segments'  relative  valuation,  one  could  reach  a 
general  conclusion  that  the  services  and  technologically  highly  advanced  new  sector 
segments  are  perceived  by  the  market  as  contributing  more  value  than  segments 
operating  in  traditional  or  low-tech  industries.  One  rather  contra-intuitive  finding  is  the 
low  relative  valuation  of  segments  operating  in  the  financial  sectors. 
Similar  to  the  findings  of  the  geographic  segment  analysis,  reported  in  Chapter  5, 
the  evidence  of  differential  valuation  role  played  by  dividends  in  the  firm-level  and 
disaggregated  models  is  also  found  in  the  present  chapter,  where  the  line-of-business 
disaggregation  is  analysed.  It  appears  that  dividends  have  incremental  information 
content  (and  are  positively  related  to  value)  when  the  model  is  presented  on  the  firm- 
level.  However,  when  earnings  are  disaggregated  into  their  constituent  geographic  or 
line-of-business  components,  the  dividends  coefficient  looses  its  statistical  significance. 
This  implies  that  segment-disaggregated  earnings  present  a  better  summary  of  value- 
relevant  information,  substituting  the  information  conveyed  by  dividends. 
Finally,  the  comparison  of  the  Adjusted  R2  across  Models  1  and  2  (of  Table  6.6), 
Models  1  through  4  (of  Table  6.7)  and  Models  1  through  4  (of  Table  6.9)  suggests  that 
disaggregation  of  the  firm-level  data  into  business  segment  components  has  information 
content  and  improves  the  explanatory  power  of  the  regressions  by  5  to  7  percentage 
'os  points 
105  Similar  results  on  the  information  content  of  disaggregation  are  obtained  in  the  alternatively  scaled 
regressions  (see  Tables  6.6TA  and  6.7TA  in  Appendix  6.2). 
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specific  lines-of-business,  is  value  relevant  and  has  differential  pricing. 
6.3.2.2  Test  results  based  on  appending  the  model 
The  relative  value  contributions  of  segments  operating  in  specific  industries  are 
inferred  by  comparing  segments'  PBT  coefficients  with  the  cross-sectional  average 
value  of  the  firm-level  PBT  coefficient.  This  is  because  the  PBT  coefficient  in  the  firm- 
level  regression  reflects  the  cross-sectionally  average  capitalisation  of  firm-level  PBTs. 
If  the  market  attaches  differential  valuation  (and,  hence,  capitalisation)  to  a  specific 
segment's  PBT,  compared  to  the  cross-sectional  value  of  the  firm-level  PBT,  then  the 
PBT  coefficients  of  the  line-of-business  segments,  added  into  the  regression,  should  be 
statistically  different  from  zero.  A  positive  (negative)  industrial  PBT  coefficient  would 
indicate  that  PBT  from  that  industry  has  higher  (lower)  capitalisation  than  the  cross- 
sectional  average  PBT  coefficient.  Furthermore,  relative  valuation  of  given  two  lines-of- 
business  could  be  inferred  by  testing  the  statistical  significance  of  the  divergence  of 
their  PBT  coefficients. 
Table  6.10  through  6.12  (see  Appendix  6.1)  summarise  the  results.  Tests  in 
Tables  6.10  and  6.11,  which  are  based  on  the  appending  of  the  firm-level  model  with 
just  one  segment's  PBT,  are  identical  in  all  respects  except  that  regressions  in  Table 
6.11  are  estimated  for  samples  that  exclude  firm-years  where  all  reported  segments 
operate  in  a  single  industry.  Results  in  Tables  6.10  and  6.11  provide  strong  evidence 
that  profits  reported  from  segments  operating  in  the  'Basic  Industries'  ('IT)  sector  have 
substantially  lower  (higher)  capitalisation  than  the  in-sample  (cross-sectional  average) 
capitalisation  of  the  firm-level  profits. 
Differential  valuation  of  different  industrial  segments  could  also  be  tested  more 
directly,  by  simultaneously  including  all  ten  segments'  PBTs  into  the  basic  model  and 
340 employing  the  Wald  test  for  testing  the  equality  of  all  possible  pairs  of  segmental  PBT 
coefficients.  Panel  A  of  Table  6.12  reports  the  test  results  for  two  samples  of  firm- 
years:  firm-years  whose  all  reported  business  segments  belong  to  a  single  industry;  and 
firm-years  that  report  segments  from  at  least  two  different  industries.  These  results  do 
not  change  any  of  the  previous  conclusions:  different  business  segment  operations  have 
differential  valuation,  and  the  'IT'  ('Basic  Industries)  sector  is  perceived  to  be 
substantially  more  (less)  valuable  then  all  remaining  business  operations. 
Although  some  of  the  remaining  eight  segments'  PBT  multipliers  are  statistically 
different  from  one  another  and  relative  to  the  firm-level  earnings'  multiplier,  the 
inferences  are  less  robust.  If  one  begins  the  analysis  with  an  a  priori  belief  that  the 
FTSE  GCS  classification  system  adequately  classifies  business  operations  into 
industries/sectors  which  are  materially  distinguishable  from  one  another  in  terms  of 
perceived  risks,  returns,  growth  opportunities,  cyclicality  and,  hence,  valuation-wise 
then  the  failure  to  identify  valuation  differentials  across  many  lines-of-business  might 
suggest  the  opposite.  However,  this  might  also  be  due  to  relatively  small  number  of  data 
points  per  industrial  segment.  In  either  case,  one  is  likely  to  obtain  better  robustness  by 
agglomerating  some  of  the  qualitatively  similar  industrial  operations.  Therefore  I 
agglomerate  some  of  the  segments,  as  described  in  the  Section  6.3.2.1,  and  repeat  the 
tests. 
Panel  B  of  Table  6.12  report  regression  and  Wald  test  results.  As  was  expected, 
these  results  are  more  robust,  with  regards  to  the  relative  valuation  of  segmental 
operations,  and  are  nearly  identical  to  those  obtained  from  the  disaggregated  mode  test 
design  (see  Section  6.3.2.1).  The  relative  valuation  of  business  operations  by  FTSE 
GCS  economic  sectors  can  be  summarised  as  follows  (in  the  order  from  the  least  to  the 
most  valuable  sector): 
1.  'Resources';  'Basic  Industries';  'Utilities'. 
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3.  'General  Industrials  ;  'Non-Cyclical  Services';  'Financials'. 
4.  'IT'  and  'Cyclical  Services'. 
With  regard  to  relative  pricing  of  specific  lines-of-business,  results  in  Tables  6.10 
through  6.12  reconfirm  previous  conclusions,  where  model-disaggregation  test  design 
was  used.  Furthermore,  the  comparison  of  the  Adjusted  R2  across  Models  I  and  2  (of 
Table  6.6)  and  Models  I  through  11  (of  Table  6.10)  suggests  that  earnings  information 
related  to  different  lines-of-business  segments  have  differential  information  content. 
That  is,  the  inclusion  of  a  specific  business  segment's  earnings,  into  the  firm-level 
regression,  has  differential  impact  on  the  Adjusted  R2.  For  the  majority  of  business 
segments,  this  impact  is  minuscule  and  often  statistically  insignificant,  while  for 
segments  operating  in  the  IT  or  Cyclical  Services  sectors,  this  impact  is  large  and 
statistically  significant. 
6.3.3  Segmental  Valuation  using  the  US  SIC  codes 
In  this  section  I  examine  the  relative  valuation  of  firms'  line-of-business 
operations  associated  with  specific  industries,  based  on  the  US  Standard  Industrial 
Classification  codes.  Methodologically  this  task  is  addressed  in  a  similar  way  as  in  the 
Section  6.3.2,  where  two  complementary  empirical  test  designs  where  used.  That  is,  in 
the  first  type  of  test  design  the  firm-level  financial  result  is  disaggregated  into  the 
constituent  business  segment-level  components.  The  second  type  of  test  design  entails 
appending  the  firm-level  model  with  segmental  PBTs. 
6.3.3.1  Test  results  based  on  disaggregation 
Table  6.7  (Appendix  6.1)  reports  the  results  from  segment-disaggregated  models 
using  the  first  type  of  test  design.  In  Models  1  and  3  of  Table  6.13  (Appendix  6.1), 
342 which  are  the  disaggregated  versions  of  Models  1  and  3  of  Table  6.7,  the  firm-level 
PBT  is  replaced  by  ten  segment-level  components.  This  simple  disaggregation  improves 
the  explanatory  power  of  the  regressions  by  a  statistically  significant  4  percentage  point, 
suggesting  that  information  conveyed  by  specific  segments'  reported  earnings  is  of 
incremental  value  relevance.  Unlike  the  results  where  segments  were  classified  using 
the  FTSE  GCS  (see  Table  6.7  in  Appendix  6.1),  here  all  ten  segmental  PBT 
coefficients  are  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level  and  have  the  expected  (positive) 
sign. 
To  purge  the  estimated  segments'  coefficients  from  the  dampening  effect  of 
differential  (i.  e.,  lower)  valuation  of  segment-level  losses,  Models  1  and  3  of  Table  6.13 
need  to  be  appended  with  ten  interaction  terms  corresponding  to  the  negative  segmental 
PBTs106  In  the  appended  Models  2  and  4,  the  coefficients  of  segment-level  positive 
earnings  are,  as  expected,  slightly  higher  than  in  Models  1  and  3  and  have  yet  higher 
level  of  statistical  significance.  Five  out  of  ten  interaction  terms  come  with  theoretically 
expected  negative  coefficients  and  the  rest  are  positive.  However,  due  to  insufficient 
numbers  of  cases  with  segment-level  losses  reported  per  line-of-business,  most  of  the 
interaction  terms  are  not  statistically  significant,  their  signs  lack  robustness107  and, 
therefore  could,  by  and  large,  be  disregarded  in  the  process  of  analysis. 
I  use  the  Wald  test  to  assess  the  statistical  significance  of  the  differential  between 
the  PBT  coefficients  of  any  two  segments.  Because  there  are  ten  lines-of-business  in 
total,  there  would  be  45  pair-wise  combinations  of  segments.  Wald  test  results  are 
reported  below  the  corresponding  tables  in  Appendix  6.1. 
Despite  the  sample  and  specification  differences  associated  with  Models  I  through 
4  of  Table  6.13,  the  results  of  specific  segments'  relative  valuations  are  statistically 
106  The  interaction  term  assumes  the  value  of  0  if  the  segment's  PBT  is  positive,  and  the  value  of  the 
segment's  PBT  otherwise. 
10  Nine  out  of  ten  interaction  terms  have  less  than  16  non-zero  observations,  which  is  less  than  the 
number  of  regression  parameters  (28  in  total)  that  have  to  be  estimated! 
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Forestry  and  Fishing'  and  'Mining'  industries)  the  results  shall  not  be  taken  at  face 
value.  This  is  because  the  number  of  non-zero  data  points  for  these  segments  barely 
exceeds  the  number  of  regression  estimated  coefficients. 
The  examination  of  other  segments'  results  reveals  the  following  relations. 
Segments  operating  in  the  'Services'  industry  are  statistically  more  valuable  than  all 
remaining  segments.  The  next  two  most  valuable  and  valuation-wise  indistinguishable 
segment  industries  are  'Finance,  Insurance  and  Real  Estate'  and  'Transportation, 
Communications,  Electric,  Gas  and  Sanitary  Services'.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  latter 
industry  is  essentially  a  services  sector.  In  light  of  the  top  valuation  of  the  other  services 
industry  'Services',  one  might  conclude  that,  in  general,  segments  operating  in  services 
sectors  are  perceived  as  contributing  more  to  the  value  of  the  firm. 
'Manufacturing'  is  the  third  most  valued  line-of-business.  Segments  operating  in 
'Wholesale  Trade'  and  'Retail  Trade'  have  statistically  identical  valuation  and  are 
valued  below  those  operating  in  the  'Manufacturing'  industry.  This  difference, 
however,  is  not  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level.  Finally,  segments  in 
'Construction'  have  the  lowest  valuation  of  all  sectors  and,  according  to  the  Wald  test's 
p-values,  in  all  cases  these  differentials  are  statistically  significant  at  least  at  the  1% 
level. 
On  the  whole,  the  above  results  suggest  the  following  order  for  the  line-of- 
business  relative  valuation: 
Economic  sectors  based  on  the  US  SIC  system. 
Most  valued:  "  Services; 
"  Transportation,  Communications,  Electric,  Gas  and 
Sanitary  Services; 
"  Finance,  Insurance  and  Real  Estate. 
Medium  valued:  "  Manufacturing 
"  Retail  Trade 
"  Wholesale  Trade 
Least  valued:  "  Construction 
Inconclusive:  "  Agriculture,  Forestry,  and  Fishin  ;  Mining 
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Methodologically  this  section  replicates  the  analysis  presented  in  Section  6.3.2.2 
by  using  an  alternative  to  FTSE  GCS  system  of  industry  categorisation  -  the  US  SIC 
codes. 
Test  results  are  reported  in  Tables  6.14  through  6.16  (see  Appendix  6.1).  Tests  in 
Table  6.14  are  based  on  the  sample  of  multi-segment  firms  irrespective  of  whether 
these  segments  belong  to  a  single  one-digit  SIC  code  or  come  from  different  one-digit 
SIC  codes.  Table  6.15  repeats  these  tests  for  a  sub-sample  of  firms  that  operate 
segments  in  at  least  two  different  one-digit  SIC  code  industries.  Models  2  through  10,  in 
Tables  6.14  and  6.15,  are  the  basic  firm-level  models  which  are  being  appended  with 
one  segmental  PBT  at  a  time,  while  the  firm-level  model  in  Table  6.16  is  appended 
with  all  segmental  PBTs.  This  is  done  to  evaluate  the  robustness  of  results. 
Segment  valuation  results  are  consistent  across  the  tests  reported  in  Tables  6.14 
through  6.16  and,  in  general,  are  qualitatively  identical  to  those  where  model- 
disaggregation  approach  was  used  (Section  6.3.3.1).  Drawing  on  the  results  from  the 
Wald  tests,  it  is  possible  to  conclude  that  segments  operating  in  'Agriculture,  Forestry 
and  Fishing'  and  'Construction'  are  perceived  by  the  market  as  the  least  value-creating, 
while  the  most  valuable  segment  operations  are  associated  with  'Services  ;  and 
'Transportation,  Communication,  Electric,  Gas,  and  Sanitary  Services'  industries. 
'Manufacturing',  'Retail'  and  'Wholesale  Trade'  industry  segments  are  in  the  middle 
range  of  valuation. 
It  shall  be  noted  that  the  number  of  non-zero  observations  from  segments 
operating  in  three  basic  industries  ('Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing  ;  Construction; 
and,  particularly,  'Mining)  is  insufficient  (see  Tables  6.17)  for  generating  reliable 
segmental  PBT  coefficients.  Therefore,  based  on  the  prior  tests  that  did  not  reveal 
significant  differences  across  the  parameters  of  these  economic  sectors  (particularly 
345 between  the  'Construction'  and  'Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fishing'),  I  agglomerate 
these  segments  and  re-run  the  test.  The  statistically  highly  significant  and  negative  value 
of  the  PBT  coefficient  corresponding  to  the  new  agglomerated  segment  (see  Table 
6.18)  indicates  that  it  has  lower  capitalisation  relative  to  that  of  the  cross-sectional 
average  firm-level  PBT.  This  result  along  with  the  fact  that  relative  valuation  of  the 
remaining  segments  is  unaffected  reassures  previous  conclusions  on  segments'  relative 
valuation. 
Finally,  to  assess  the  impact  on  the  segments'  relative  valuation  of  such  firm- 
specific  contexts  as  the  profitability  of  the  firm  (profit-making  vs.  loss-making)  or  the 
dividend-paying  status  of  the  firm,  I  re-run  all  above  tests  for  differently  partitioned 
sub-samples  and,  where  necessary,  with  the  model  being  appended  with  dummies  and 
interaction  terms.  Results  (not  reported)  indicated  that  virtually  none  of  the  segment 
valuation  relationships  are  affected  by  contexts.  Segments  that  have  previously  been 
identified  as  the  most  (least)  `valuable'  remain  as  such  regardless  of  whether  the  firm  is 
incurring  losses  or  reporting  positive  profits  on  the  consolidated  level,  or  whether  it 
pays  dividends  or  not. 
Analyses  in  Section  6.3.3  demonstrate  that,  by  and  large,  the  results  and 
conclusions  remain  robust  to  various  test  specifications.  Furthermore,  the  conclusions 
with  regard  to  differential  valuation  of  specific  business  segments  show  notable 
compatibility  between  the  two  alternative  systems  of  industrial  classification  (SIC  vs. 
FTSE  GCS).  In  addition,  similar  to  conclusions  drawn  from  the  FTSE-based  tests,  the 
SIC-based  results  indicated  that  the  earnings  information  related  to  different  lines-of- 
business  segments  have  differential  information  content.  That  is,  the  inclusion  of  a 
specific  business  segment's  earnings,  into  the  firm-level  regression,  has  differential 
impact  on  the  Adjusted  R2.  This  impact  is  large  and  statistically  significant  for  segments 
346 operating  in  the  Services  related  industries,  while  for  the  majority  of  other  lines-of- 
business,  this  impact  is  small  and  often  statistically  insignificant. 
6.4  ISSUES  OF  ROBUSTNESS,  AND  THE  SUMMARY  OF  RESULTS 
In  this  section  I  summarise  the  obtained  empirical  results  and  examine  the  issue  of 
their  robustness  to  the  use  of  alternative  deflators. 
The  sample  of  business-segment  reporting  firms,  used  in  this  chapter,  is 
substantially  smaller  than  the  entire  sample,  which  has  been  used  in  Chapter  4  for  the 
consolidated-level  analysis.  Nevertheless,  the  key  firm-level  test  results,  such  as  the 
pricing  of  the  firm-level  earnings,  book  values  and  dividends,  as  well  as  the  valuation 
implications  of  specific  contexts,  remain  unchanged  across  both  samples.  Therefore,  I 
do  not  re-cite  them  in  this  section,  but  proceed  with  providing  the  summary  of  the 
business  segment-level  valuation  results. 
There  is  considerable  variation  of  the  value  relevance  of  segmental  earnings 
among  business  segments  operating  in  different  industries.  It  is  somewhat  difficult  to 
summarise  the  conclusions  on  the  relative  valuation  of  specific  line-of-business 
segments,  because  two  different  industry  classification  systems  (SIC  and  FTSE  GCS) 
have  been  used  to  categorise  business  segments'  operations.  Correspondingly,  two  sets 
of  tests  have  been  performed. 
Nevertheless,  when  the  content  of  a  specific  industry  in  the  SIC  system  is 
qualitatively  similar  to  the  content  of  an  industry  in  the  FTSE  GCS  system,  the  segment 
valuation  results  seem  to  lead  to  similar  conclusions.  For  example,  segments  operating 
in  the  SIC's  services-related  industries,  and  segments  operating  in  the  FTSE  GCS's 
services-related  industries,  have  similar  value  relevance  and  relative  valuation. 
In  all  tests,  profits  reported  by  segments  operating  in  the  IT  sector  have  the  highest 
pricing.  In  addition,  the  IT  segmental  profit  coefficient  is  always  positive  and  has  the 
347 highest  level  of  statistical  significance.  This  indicates  that  investors  perceive  the  IT 
segmental  information  as  being  highly  value  relevant.  Segmental  profits,  associated 
with  the  services-related  operations,  have  the  second-highest  pricing  and  value 
relevance,  after  the  IT  sector. 
Segments  operating  in  the  `old'  or  less  knowledge-intensive  sectors,  such  as 
Mining,  Basic  Industries  (e.  g.,  construction  and  building  materials;  chemicals;  steel  and 
other  metals;  forestry  and  paper),  and  Utilities,  are  associated  with  the  lowest  relative 
contribution  to  the  equity  market  value  of  the  firm. 
Somewhat  surprising  is  the  result  related  to  the  pricing  of  profits,  reported  from 
the  financial  sector  segments.  The  valuation  of  financial  segments  is  statistically 
indistinguishable  from  segments  operating  in  the  `old'  industries.  In  other  words,  the 
financial  segments'  operations  appear  to  be  at  the  bottom  of  the  line-of-business 
segment  valuation  ranking. 
Segments  operating  in  the  remaining  economic  sectors  (such  as  General 
Industrials  and  Cyclical  and  Non-Cyclical  Goods)  are  in  the  middle  range  of  relative 
valuation. 
Another  interesting  finding  relates  to  contextual  pricing  of  dividends.  Dividends 
are  positively  priced  and  have  incremental  information  content  in  the  firm-level  model. 
However,  when  earnings  are  disaggregated  into  segmental  elements,  the  dividends 
coefficient  loses  its  statistical  significance.  This  implies  the  segment-disaggregated 
earnings  represent  a  better  summary  of  value-relevant  information,  substituting  the 
information  contained  in  dividends. 
The  above  summarised  results  are  found  to  be  robust  to  alternative  model 
specifications,  with  regard  to  definition  of  scale.  Appendix  6.2  reports  tests  results 
where  models  are  deflated  by  alternative  scale  proxies:  Group  Total  Assets;  Group 
Sales;  and,  One  year  lagged  market  capitalisation. 
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Appendix  6.2,  are  qualitatively  similar  to  those  that  are  based  on  the  composite 
deflated-models.  Although  such  general  regression  parameters,  as  the  adjusted  R- 
Square,  the  magnitude  of  earnings,  dividends  and  book  value  coefficients  are  influenced 
by  the  choice  of  the  deflator  (which,  nevertheless,  conforms  with  the  previous  findings 
of  Chapter  4),  the  relative  pricing  of  the  specific  line-of-business  segments  remains 
remarkably  robust  across  all  deflators.  More  specifically,  regardless  of  the  choice  of  a 
deflator,  the  segments  which  are  classified  (according  to  either  the  SIC  or  FTSE  GSC 
system)  into  the  services-related  or  knowledge-intensive  sectors,  have  the  statistically 
highest  valuation.  In  addition,  earnings  reported  from  these  segments  have  the  highest 
value  relevance  (information  content),  as  is  indicated  by  the  impact  their  inclusion  has 
on  the  explanatory  power  of  the  regression.  In  the  similar  way,  segments  operating  in 
the  low-tech  `old'  industries  have  the  lowest  valuation  and  value  association. 
The  fact  that  segmental  earnings  information  has  very  marginal  value  relevance 
for  the  majority  of  lines-of-business  (either  in  terms  of  FTSE  GCS  or  SIC  system), 
seems  to  suggest  that  either  the  business  segment  reporting  requirements  in  the  UK  (i.  e., 
SSAP25)  are  not  entirely  adequate  or,  indeed,  investors  do  not  price  differentially  the 
business  segments  which  have  different  industrial  characteristics. 
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All  regressions  reported  in  Appendix  6.1  are  deflated  by  the  composite 
scale  factor.  Composite  scale  factor  (scale)  =  (MV+TA+Sale)/3. 
All  regressions  reported  in  Appendix  6.1  and  6.2  are  estimated  for 
samples  that  exclude  the  outliers.  Outliers  are  defined  as  the  top 
and/or  bottom  0.5%  of  each  variable  included  in  regression. 
In  the  tables  that  follow  the  following  names  or  acronyms  have  been 
used  to  represent  regression  variable 
Name  used  in 
regression 
Variable  description 
1.  Consolidated  firm-level  variables 
BV  Scaled  Book  value  of  ordinary  equity 
PBT  Scaled  Profit  Before  Tax 
MV  Scaled  Market  Value  of  ordinary  equity 
DIV  Scaled  Dividends  for  ordinary  shareholders 
TA  Total  Assets  of  the  company 
Sales  Group  turnover 
Adj.  ER  Adjustment  term  =  earnings  for  ordinary  shareholders  --  PBT 
Scale  Composite  scale  factor  =  (MV+TA+Sales)/3 
PBT*f(size)  An  instrumental  variable  designed  to  capture  firm  size-related  non- 
linearity  of  the  PBT  coefficient.  PBT*f(size  proxy)=PBT*size"(0.2). 
DBV  Interaction  term  for  By,  when  PBT  is  negative 
DDIV  Interaction  term  for  DIV,  when  PBT  is  negative 
DPBT  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBT 
DAdj.  ER  Interaction  term  for  Adj.  ER,  when  PBT  is  negative 
DPBT*F(size)  Interaction  term  for  DPBT*f(size),  when  PBT  is  negative 
1/Scale;  1/MV; 
1/Sale;  and  1/TA 
Are  the  reciprocals  of  Scale,  one  year  lagged-MV,  Sales,  and  TA, 
respectively. 
D  1/Scale  Interaction  term  for  1/scale,  when  PBT  is  negative 
2.  Segment-level  variables:  segments'  industrial  affiliation  Is 
classified  according  to  the  FTSE  economic  sector 
classification  system 
PBTO  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  in  Resources  economic  sector 
PBT1  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  In  Basic  Industries  economic 
sector 
PBT2  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  in  General  Industries 
economic  sector 
PBT3  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  In  Cyclical  Consumer  Goods 
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PBT4  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  In  Non-Cyclical  Consumer 
Goods  economic  sector 
PBT5  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  in  Cyclical  Services  economic 
sector 
PBT6  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  in  Non-Cyclical  Services 
economic  sector 
PBT7  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  in  Utilities  economic  sector 
PBT8  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  in  Financials  economic  sector 
PBT9  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  in  Information  Technology 
economic  sector 
PBT017  =PBTO+PBT1+PBT7 
PBT34  =PBT3+PBT4 
PBT69  =PBT6+PBT9 
DPBTO  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBTO 
DPBT1  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBT1 
DPBT2  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBT2 
DPBT3  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBT3 
DPBT4  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBT4 
DPBT5  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBT5 
DPBT6  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBT6 
DPBT7  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBT7 
DPBT8  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBT8 
DPBT9  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBT9 
DPBT017  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBT017 
DPBT34  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBT34 
DPBT69  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBT69 
PREST  The  difference  between  the  group-level  PBT  and  the  sum  of 
segment-level  PBTs 
DPREST  Interaction  term  for  negative  PREST 
3.  Segment-level  variables:  segments'  Industrial  affiliation  Is 
classified  according  to  the  SIC  Industry  classification  system 
PBTA  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  in  Agriculture,  Forestry  and 
Fishing 
PBTB  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  in  Mining 
PBTC  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  in  Construction 
PBTD  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  in  Manufacturing  of  basic 
goods 
PBTDA  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  in  Manufacturing  of  complex 
goods 
PBTE  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  in  Transportation, 
Communications,  Electric,  Gas  and  Sanitary  Services 
PBTF  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  in  Wholesale  Trade 
PBTG  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  In  Retail  Trade 
PBTH  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  In  Finance,  Insurance  and 
Real  Estate 
PBTI  Scaled  PBT  reported  form  segments  In  Services 
PBTABC  =  PBTA  +  PBTB  +  PBTC 
PBTD1  =PBTD  +  PBTDa 
351 DPBTA  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBTA 
DPBTB  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBTB 
DPBTC  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBTC 
DPBTD  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBTD 
DPBTDA  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBTDA 
DPBTE  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBTE 
DPBTF  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBTF 
DPBTG  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBTG 
DPBTH  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBTH 
DPBTI  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBTI 
DPBTABC  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBTABC 
DPBTD1  Interaction  term  for  negative  PBTD1 
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Panel  A.  Segments'  industries  are  based  on  the  FTSE  GCS 
Total  sample:  Positive  segment-level  PBTs 
ON  cti  Yb  tp  f.  co  Ch 
Industry 
ti  ýýýý 
LL 
Mean 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
No.  of 
cases 
0.476  0.445  0.460  0.480  0.439  0.441  0.554  0.268  0.375  0.437 
0.434  0.384  0.419  0.464  0.422  0.387  0.519  0.168  0.289  0.374 
0.267  0.276  0.283  0.253  0.267  0.283  0.249  0.187  0.248  0.283 
0.120  0.111  0.111  0.111  0.111  0.111  0.135  0.112  0.112  0.113 
0.954  0.997  0.999  0.979  0.999  1.000  0.925  0.811  0.995  0.977 
23  461  584  217  288  787  44  59  196  78 
Total  sample:  Negative  segment-level  PBTs 
(14  cv)  v  to  co  N  co  0) 
ýýý  LU  ýý 
ýýý 
Mean  -0.408  -0.401  -0.417  -0.390  -0.266  -0.380  -0.301  -0.353  -0.406  -0.429 
Median  -0.399  -0.272  -0.325  -0.252  -0.219  -0.324  -0.256  -0.353  -0.334  -0.241 
Standard  0.235  0.286  0.275  0.281  0.156  0.209  0.202  0.277  0.257  0.340 
Deviation 
Minimum  -0.915  -0.967  -0.984  -0.992  -0.688  -0.849  -0.553  -0.549  -0.995  -0.988 
Maximum  -0.120  -0.112  -0.111  -0.115  -0.119  -0.118  -0.137  -0.157  -0.114  -0.117 
No.  of  11  23  41  15  18  55  42  29  19 
cases 
Profit-making  firm-years  sub-sample:  Positive  segment-level  PBTs 
>.  O  ý.  NMahO^  Co  O 
.  7?  ýýýýýýh  ti 
c  LL  Li  l~L  t~L  LL  LL 
fLL  LL 
Mean  0.476  0.446  0.459  0.479  0.432  0.441  0.554  0.259  0.379  0.442 
Median  0.434  0.385  0.420  0.462  0.403  0.384  0.519  0.165  0.294  0.389 
Standard  0.267  0.277  0.286  0.257  0.267  0.284  0.249  0.188  0.251  0.277 
Deviation 
Minimum  0.120  0.111  0.111  0.111  0.111  0.111  0.135  0.112  0.112  0.113 
Maximum  0.954  0.997  0.999  0.979  0.999  1.000  0.925  0.811  0.995  0.977 
No.  of  23  424  529  193  262  728  44  56  179  67 
cases 
Profit-making  firm-years  sub-sample:  Negative  segment-level  PBTs 
ýwww  Cl)  wwwwww 
_ýýýuýýýýýý 
Mean  -0.270  -0.500  -0.352  -0.375  -0.290  -0.320  -0.216  -0.353  -0.417  -0.336 
Median  -0.248  -0.531  -0.327  -0.252  -0.240  -0.284  -0.139  -0.353  -0.336  -0.141 
Standard  0.144  0.321  0.221  0.349  0.181  0.168  0.136  0.277  0.258  0.331 
Deviation 
Minimum  -0.424  -0.967  -0.919  -0.992  -0.572  -0.648  -0.373  -0.549  -0.995  -0.968 
Maximum  -0.138  -0.122  -0.111  -0.142  -0.119  -0.118  -0.137  -0.157  -0.114  -0.126 
No.  of  3  10  14  55  18  32  23  7 
cases 
353 Panel  B.  Segments'  industries  are  based  on  the  US  SIC  codes 
Total  sample:  Positive  segment-level  PBTs 
Industry  SIC  A  SIC  B  SIC  C  SIC  D  SIC  E  SIC  F  SIC  G  SIC  H  SIC  I 
Mean  0.355  0.607  0.372  0.500  0.352  0.401  0.402  0,337  0,386 
Median  0.331  0.686  0.352  0.423  0.252  0.339  0.355  0.268  0.330 
Standard 
Deviation  0.259  0.280  0.240  0.365  0.258  0.269  0.273  0.259  0.266 
Minimum  0.000  0.132  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Maximum  0.947  0.991  0.954  1.935  0.960  0.987  0.977  0.995  0.988 
No.  of 
cases*  30  19  119  1104  243  311  210  182  479 
Total  sample:  Negative  segment-level  PBTs 
Industry  SIC  A  SIC  B  SIC  C  SIC  D  SIC  E  SIC  F  SIC  G  SIC  H  SIC  I 
Mean  -0.199  -0.309  -0.359  -0.370  -0.382  -0.290  -0.372  -0.278  -0.333 
Median  -0.199  -0.256  -0.247  -0.304  -0.280  -0.236  -0.269  -0.230  -0.233 
Standard 
Deviation  0.281  0.245  0.291  0.252  0.302  0.210  0.279  0.236  0.267 
Minimum  -0.398  -0.799  -0.933  -0.967  -0.962  -0.688  -0.993  -0.876  -0.992 
Maximum  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
No.  of 
cases  2  14  17  64  16  29  27  20  65 
Profit-making  firm-years  sub-sample:  Positive  segment-level  PBTs 
Industry  SIC  A  SIC  B  SIC  C  SIC  D  SIC  E  SIC  F  SIC  G  SIC  H  SIC  I 
Mean  0.338  0.627  0.374  0.503  0.359  0.393  0.407  0.343  0.384 
Median  0.255  0.702  0.352  0.421  0.254  0.328  0.355  0.274  0.313 
Standard 
Deviation  0.255  0.275  0.238  0.372  0.259  0.269  0.274  0.260  0.268 
Minimum  0.000  0.132  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Maximum  0.947  0.991  0.954  1.935  0.960  0.982  0.977  0.995  0.988 
No.  of 
cases  28  18  111  1002  232  277  198  166  423 
Profit-making  firm-years  sub-sample:  Negative  segment-level  PBTs 
Industry  SIC  A  SIC  B  SIC  C  SIC  D  SIC  E  SIC  F  SIC  G  SIC  H  SIC  I 
Mean  -0.241  -0.255  -0.385  -0.371  -0.226  -0.276  -0.203  -0.357 
Median  -  -0.200  -0.179  -0.338  -0.248  -0.172  -0.224  -0.159  -0.225 
Standard  0.132  0.309  0.251  0.317  0.202  0.273  0.185  0.308 
Deviation 
Minimum  -0.424  -0.933  -0.967  -0.962  -0.688  -0.669  -0.594  -0.992 
Maximum  -  -0.138  0.000  0.000  -0.116  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
No.  of  cases  -47  18  7  15  9  12  23 
The  number  of  observations  varies  across  specific  business  segments  because  only  segments  with  non- 
zero  PBTs  are  included  in  computations  (i.  e.  missing  segmental  PBTs  are  NOT  treated  as  zeros). 
354 Tables  6.5  through  6.12  report  regressions  where  the  FTSE  GCS 
industry  classification  system  has  been  used  for  categorising  business 
segment  operations 
Table  6.5 
All  firms  Profit-making  firms  Loss-making  firms 
Div  &  non-  Dividend  Div  &  non-  Dividend 
div.  firms  firms  only  div.  firms  firms  only 
Model  I  Model  2  Model  3  Model  4  Models 
Intercept  0.781  0.661  0.674  0.668  0.699 
t-ratio  25.287  19.023  18.769  7.874  6.237 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/Scale  0.897  0.894  0.143  0.932  1.567 
t-ratio  3.140  1.815  0.349  2.011  1.733 
P-value  0.002  0.070  0.727  0.045  0.085 
BV  -0.292  -0.382  -0.448  0.192  -0.296 
t-ratio  -6.113  -8.037  -9.515  1.402  -1.640 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.162  0.103 
PBT  -0.521  1.853  2.153  0.331  1.519 
t-ratio  -2.336  4.733  5.855  0.618  2.546 
P-value  0.019  0.000  0.000  0.537  0.012 
PBT'f(scale)  0.660  0.646  0.578  0.000  -0.375 
t-ratio  8.696  7.120  6.777  0.001  -2.127 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.999  0.035 
DIV  3.122  2.017  2.454  -3.826  1.429 
t-ratio  3.780  2.394  2.748  -1.937  0.609 
P-value  0.000  0.017  0.006  0.054  0.544 
Adj.  ER  0.137  1.037  1.117  -0.021  -0.533 
t-ratio  0.278  2.915  3.332  -0.030  -0.455 
P-value  0.781  0.004  0.001  0.976  0.650 
No.  of  cases  1919  1676  1619  244  144 
Adj.  R-S  uare  156%  21.6%  23.3%  2.8%  "  0.2%  "' 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  each  regression 
coefficient. 
*  R-square  is  significant  only  at  5%  level 
**  R-square  is  not  significant  at  10%  level 
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Profit-making  firms 
Basic  model 
Modell 
PBT  seg  xa 
PBTO 
Mode12 
PBT  seg  x  
PBT1 
Mode13 
PBT  seg  xw 
PBT2 
Mode14 
PBT  seg  x  
PBT3 
ModelS 
Intercept  0.647  0.645  0.653  0.648  0.656 
t-ratio  19.183  19.232  19.505  18.834  19.175 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.358  -0.354  -0.365  -0.358  -0.356 
t-ratio  -15.368  -15.595  -15.836  -15.361  -15.396 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/Scale  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9 
t-ratio  1.912  1.810  1.793  1.913  1.865 
p-value  0.056  0.070  0.073  0.056  0.062 
BV  -0.113  -0.127  -0.081  -0.113  -0.118 
t-ratio  -2.074  -2.365  -1.535  -2.037  -2.174 
p-value  0.038  0.018  0.125  0.042  0.030 
PBT  1.834  1.877  1.897  1.823  1.846 
t-ratio  4.963  5.046  5.196  4.839  4.998 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  -  -0.420  -1.658  0.002  -1.330 
t-ratio  -  -0.579  -9.108  0.010  -4.891 
p-value  -  0.563  0.000  0.992  0.000 
DPBT  seg  x  -  -53.305  7.655  1.774  1.805 
t-ratio  -  -3.553  1.075  1.005  0.163 
p-value  -  0.000  0.282  0.315  0.871 
PBT"f(scale)  0.575  0.578  0.574  0.574  0.556 
t-ratio  6.507  6.426  6.558  6.414  6.284 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
DIV  1.073  1.142  1.268  1.074  1.299 
t-ratio  1.314  1.415  1.583  1.306  1.602 
p-value  0.189  0.157  0.113  0.192  0.109 
Adj.  ER  0.985  0.989  0.957  0.981  0.982 
t-ratio  3.116  3.098  3.160  3.096  3.128 
p-value  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
No.  of  cases  1676  1676  1676  1676  1676 
Adj.  R-S  uare  26.92%  27.66%  28.73%  26.85%  27.30% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  each  regression 
coefficient. 
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PBTsegx= 
PBT4 
ModeI6 
PBTsegx  
PBT5 
Modell 
PBTsegxa 
PBT6 
Mode18 
PBTsegxm 
PBT7 
Model9 
PBTsog  x  
PBT8 
Modell0 
PBTsegx  
PBT9 
Modo111 
Intercept  0.647  0.618  0.647  0.644  0.648  0.625 
t-ratio  19.170  18.192  19.119  18.482  19.097  19.346 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.358  -0.358  -0.359  -0.357  -0.359  -0.351 
t-ratio  -15.318  -15.656  -15.453  -15.332  -15.337  -15.580 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/Scale  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9 
t-ratio  1.916  1.712  1.930  1.918  1.916  1.878 
p-value  0.055  0.087  0.054  0.055  0.055  0.060 
BV  -0.113  -0.083  -0.111  -0.106  -0.110  -0.090 
t-ratio  -2.080  -1.600  -2.036  -1.862  -1.987  -1.716 
p-value  0.038  0.110  0.042  0.063  0.047  0.086 
PBT  1.825  1.378  1.776  1.815  1.827  1.533 
t-ratio  4.937  3.736  4.741  4.892  4.940  4.110 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  -0.114  1.459  -0.690  -0.301  -0.321  3.360 
t-ratio  -0.391  7.383  -0.822  -1.118  -0.732  4.185 
p-value  0.696  0.000  0.411  0.264  0.464  0.000 
DPBT  seg  x  -2.230  -3.675  98.180  3.534  12.363  -6.544 
t-ratio  -0.046  -1.004  7.095  1.288  0.907  -2.316 
p-value  0.963  0.315  0.000  0.198  0.364  0.021 
PBT'f(scale)  0.578  0.635  0.593  0.583  0.577  0.618 
t-ratio  6.539  7.340  6.486  6.483  6.485  6.984 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
DIV  1.096  0.879  1.101  1.113  1.043  1.741 
t-ratio  1.336  1.122  1.338  1.357  1.278  2.136 
p-value  0.181  0.262  0.181  0.175  0.201  0.033 
Adj.  ER  0.984  1.039  1.001  0.998  0.992  1.043 
t-ratio  3.101  3.773  3.182  3.175  3.151  3.545 
p-value  0.002  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.000 
No.  of  cases  1676  1676  1676  1676  1676  1676 
Adj.  R- 
S  uare  26.84%  29.75%  26.92%  26.85%  26.89%  29.11% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  each  regression 
coefficient. 
361 Table  6.11 
Profit-making  firms 
basic  model 
Modell 
PBT  seg  x  
PBTO 
Mode12 
PBT  seg  xw 
PBT1 
Mode13 
PBT  seg  x  
PBT2 
Model4 
PBT  seg  x  
PBT3 
Model5 
Intercept  0.558  0.558  0.597  0.560  0.558 
t-ratio  12.874  12.785  13.472  12.416  12.628 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.381  -0.381  -0.359  -0.381  -0.380 
t-ratio  -12.532  -12.522  -11.841  -12.593  -12.500 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/Scale  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.4 
t-ratio  1.766  1.765  1.272  1.736  1.760 
p-value  0.077  0.078  0.203  0.083  0.078 
BV  0.060  0.062  0.036  0.059  0.059 
t-ratio  0.852  0.860  0.519  0.827  0.832 
p-value  0.394  0.390  0.604  0.408  0.405 
PBT  2.044  2.039  2.384  2.061  2.053 
t-ratio  4.231  4.216  5.134  4.205  4.229 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  0.000  -0.021  -0.241  -0.013  -0.004 
t-ratio  0.000  -0.239  -6.181  -0.356  -0.088 
p-value  0.000  0.811  0.000  0.722  0.930 
DPBT  seg  x  0.000  -0.011  0.602  -0.008  -0.083 
t-ratio  0.000  -0.072  7.048  -0.076  -0.784 
p-value  0.000  0.942  0.000  0.939  0.433 
PBT'f(scale)  0.377  0.378  0.302  0.373  0.375 
t-ratio  3.971  3.989  3.244  3.875  3.929 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000 
DIV  1.993  1.991  2.278  2.046  2.012 
t-ratio  1.671  1.661  1.979  1.695  1.675 
p-value  0.095  0.097  0.048  0.090  0.094 
Adj.  ER  0.808  0.803  1.002  0.812  0.814 
t-ratio  1.215  1.201  1.521  1.218  1.228 
-value  0.224  0.230  0.128  0.223  0.220 
No.  of  cases  708 
Adj.  R- 
S  uare  33.64% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  each  regression 
coefficient. 
362 Table  6.11  (continued  from  the  previous  page...  ) 
PBT  seg  x  
PBT4 
ModeI6 
PBT  seg  x  
PBT5 
Mode17 
PBT  seg  x  
PBT6 
ModelB 
PBT  seg  x  
PBTT 
Mode19 
PBT  seg  x  
PBT8 
Mode110 
PBT  seg  x  
PBT9 
Modelli 
Intercept  0.562  0.556  0.552  0.557  0.547  0.525 
t-ratio  12.892  11.998  12.862  12.818  12.355  13.010 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.378  -0.380  -0.380  -0.383  -0.381  -0.361 
t-ratio  -12.318  -12.379  -12.516  -12.352  -12.472  -12.549 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/Scale  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  -0.2 
t-ratio  1.765  1.767  1.726  1.761  1.982  -0.452 
p-value  0.078  0.077  0.084  0.078  0.048  0.651 
BV  0.062  0.060  0.059  0.066  0.057  0.090 
t-ratio  0.881  0.854  0.839  0.907  0.808  1.404 
p-value  0.378  0.393  0.401  0.365  0.419  0.160 
PBT  2.017  2.045  2.151  2.046  2.081  1.844 
t-ratio  4.189  4.235  4.461  4.225  4.346  3.880 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  -0.052  0.004  0.171  -0.106  0.049  0.733 
t-ratio  -1.178  0.107  1.521  -0.754  0.872  4.250 
p-value  0.239  0.915  0.128  0.451  0.383  0.000 
DPBT  seg  x  0.173  -0.024  0.701  0.103  -0.261  -0.696 
t-ratio  0.772  -0.141  3.892  0.526  -1.550  -2.294 
p-value  0.440  0.888  0.000  0.599  0.121  0.022 
PBT'f(scale)  0.385  0.377  0.342  0.380  0.368  0.387 
t-ratio  4.069  3.963  3.514  3.965  3.900  4.127 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
DIV  1.984  2.010  2.266  1.983  2.140  2.735 
t-ratio  1.665  1.659  1.889  1.665  1.783  2.443 
p-value  0.096  0.097  0.059  0.096  0.075  0.015 
Adj.  ER  0.774  0.810  0.913  0.824  0.794  0.759 
t-ratio  1.147  1.217  1.447  1.240  1.191  1.168 
-value  0.251  0.223  0.148  0.215  0.234  0.243 
No.  of  cases 
Adj.  R- 
S  uare 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  each  regression 
coefficient. 
*  Samples  include  only  multi-industry  firms  (i.  e.,  when  firms  report  segments  from  different  industries). 
363 Table  6.12 
Profit-making  firms 
Panel  A 
Single  and  multi-Industry  firms  Only  multi-Industry  firms* 
Model  I  Model  2 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.681  18.342  0.000  0.584  10.370  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.339  -15.160  0.000  -0.343  -11.511  0.000 
1/Scale  0.438  0.862  0.389  -0.264  -0.851  0.395 
BV  -0.054  -1.070  0.284  0.067  1.010  0.312 
PBT  1.391  3.877  0.000  2.244  4.864  0.000 
PBTO  -0.004  -0.044  0.965  0.033  0.430  0.667 
PBT1  -0.296  -10.289  0.000  -0.247  -5.317  0.000 
PBT2  -0.092  -3.525  0.000  -0.009  -0.230  0.818 
PBT3  -0.166  -4.666  0.000  -0.057  -1.079  0.281 
PBT4  -0.112  -2.558  0.011  -0.095  -1.897  0.058 
PBT5  -0.028  -0.841  0.401  -0.039  -0.811  0.418 
PBT6  -0.136  -1.391  0.164  0.113  0.883  0.377 
PBT7  -0.273  -1.961  0.050  -0.177  -1.243  0.214 
PBT8  -0.079  -1.494  0.135  -0.008  -0.132  0.895 
PBT9  0.767  5.503  0.000  0.628  3.629  0.000 
DPBTO  -1.389  -0.837  0.402  -0.060  -0.315  0.752 
DPBT1  0.555  4.024  0.000  0.600  6.000  0.000 
DPBT2  0.202  2.070  0.038  0.021  0.194  0.846 
DPBT3  -0.046  -0.424  0.671  -0.110  -0.799  0.424 
DPBT4  0.223  1.080  0.280  0.353  1.256  0.209 
DPBT5  0.156  1.274  0.203  0.035  0.212  0.832 
DPBT6  1.381  6.187  0.000  0.958  4.205  0.000 
DPBT7  0.479  2.537  0.011  0.377  1.799  0.072 
DPBT8  0.020  0.110  0.912  -0.101  -0.502  0.616 
DPBT9  -0.659  -2.372  0.018  -0.514  -1.829  0.067 
PBT*f(scale)  0.619  6.905  0.000  0.302  3.151  0.002 
DIV  2.455  3.218  0.001  3.307  2.992  0.003 
Ad'.  ER  0.987  3.709  0.000  1.019  1.607  0.108 
No.  of  cases  1676  731 
Adj.  R-S  uare  33.88%  39.24% 
*  Samples  include  only  multi-industry  firms  (i.  e.,  when  firms  report  segments  from  different  industries). 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  the  regression 
coefficients. 
364 Wald  test  of  the  significance  of  valuation  differential  between  each  pair  of  specific 
segments  Included  In  Model  I  and  Model  I 
Modell  Model2 
Compared  segments  p-value  p-value 
PBTO  vs  PBTI  0.001  0.002 
PBTO  vs  PBT2  0.285  0.591 
PBTO  vs  PBT3  0.060  0.306 
PBTO  vs  PBT4  0.230  0.137 
PBTO  vs  PBT5  0.771  0.384 
PBTO  vs  PBT6  0.285  0.587 
PBTO  vs  PBT7  0.087  0.177 
PBTO  vs  PBT8  0.421  0.646 
PBTO  vs  PBT9  0.000  0.001 
PBT1  vs  PBT2  0.000  0.000 
PBT1  vs  PBT3  0.001  0.001 
PBTI  vs  PBT4  0.000  0.007 
PBT1  vs  PBT5  0.000  0.000 
PBTI  vs  PBT6  0.105  0.007 
PBT1  vs  PBT7  0.871  0.631 
PBT1  vs  PBT8  0.000  0.000 
PBTI  vs  PBT9  0.000  0.000 
PBT2  vs  PBT3  0.069  0.428 
PBT2  vs  PBT4  0.676  0.096 
PBT2  vs  PBT5  0.082  0.541 
PBT2  vs  PBT6  0.655  0.361 
PBT2  vs  PBT7  0.196  0.244 
PBT2  vs  PBT8  0.822  0.984 
PBT2  vs  PBT9  0.000  0.000 
PBT3  vs  PBT4  0.287  0.516 
PBT3  vs  PBT5  0.001  0.759 
PBT3  vs  PBT6  0.768  0.216 
PBT3  vs  PBT7  0.447  0.418 
PBT3  vs  PBT8  0.148  0.468 
PBT3  vs  PBT9  0.000  0.000 
PBT4  vs  PBT5  0.130  0.373 
PBT4  vs  PBT6  0.824  0.150 
PBT4  vs  PBT7  0.257  0.570 
PBT4  vs  PBT8  0.626  0.192 
PBT4  vs  PBT9  0.000  0.000 
PBT5  vs  PBT6  0.275  0.253 
PBT5  vs  PBT7  0.085  0.356 
PBT5  vs  PBT8  0.414  0.648 
PBT5  vs  PBT9  0.000  0.000 
PBT6  vs  PBT7  0.407  0.124 
PBT6  vs  PBT8  0.605  0.405 
PBT6  vs  PBT9  0.000  0.018 
PBT7  vs  PBT8  0.201  0.274 
PBT7  vs  PBT9  0.000  0.000 
PBT8  vs  PBT9  0.000  0.001 
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Panel  B  (some  of  the  business  segments  are  agglomerated) 
Single  and  multi-industry  firms  Only  multi-industry  flrms" 
Model  1  Model  2 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.699  18.447  0.000  0.619  10.615  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.342  -14.781  0.000  -0.352  -11.394  0.000 
1/Scale  0.646  1.357  0.175  0.011  0.038  0.969 
BV  -0.070  -1.380  0.168  0.058  0.868  0.385 
PBT  1.610  4.448  0.000  2.364  4.852  0.000 
PBT017  -0.283  -9.975  0.000  -0.271  -5.956  0.000 
PBT2  -0.097  -3.668  0.000  -0.027  -0.674  0.500 
PBT34  -0.170  -5.226  0.000  -0.137  -3.045  0.002 
PBT5  -0.040  -1.218  0.223  -0.071  -1.485  0.138 
PBT69  0.353  3.587  0.000  0.331  3.027  0.002 
PBT8  -0.097  -1.904  0.057  -0.045  -0.744  0.457 
DPBT017  0.446  2.820  0.005  0.622  6.220  0.000 
DPBT2  0.114  1.143  0.253  -0.018  -0.162  0.871 
DPBT34  0.260  0.880  0.379  0.192  0.697  0.486 
DPBT5  0.199  1.526  0.127  0.142  0.831  0.406 
DPBT69  -0.121  -0.513  0.608  -0.079  -0.360  0.719 
DPBT8  0.106  0.540  0.589  0.001  0.006  0.995 
PBT'f(scale)  0.547  6.209  0.000  0.248  2.296  0.022 
DIV  2.237  2.892  0.004  3.141  2.657  0.008 
Adj.  ER  0.970  3.680  0.000  0.548  0.742  0.458 
No.  of  cases  1673  708 
Adj.  R-S  uare  31.83%  39.07% 
*  Samples  include  only  multi-industry  firms  (i.  e.,  when  firms  report  segments  from  different  industries). 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  the  regression 
coefficients. 
Wald  test  of  the  significance  of  valuation  differential  between  each  pair  of  specific 
segments  Included  In  Model  I  and  Model  2 
Modell  Model2 
Compared  segments  p-value  p-value 
PBT017  vs  PBT2  0.000  0.000 
PBT017  vs  PBT34  0.002  0.007 
PBT017  vs  PBT5  0.000  0.000 
PBT017  vs  PBT69  0.000  0.000 
PBT017  vs  PBT8  0.001  0.001 
PBT2  vs  PBT34  0.059  0.026 
PBT2  vs  PBT5  0.113  0.341 
PBT2  vs  PBT69  0.000  0.002 
PBT2  vs  PBT8  0.997  0.757 
PBT34  vs  PBT5  0.003  0.239 
PBT34  vs  PBT69  0.000  0.000 
PBT34  vs  PBT8  0.207  0.134 
PBT5  vs  PBT69  0.000  0.001 
PBT5  vs  PBT8  0.342  0.686 
PBT69  vs  PBT8  0.000  0.004 
366 Tables  6.13  through  6.18  report  regressions  where  the  SIC  system  has 
been  used  for  categorising  business  segment  operations. 
Table  6.13 
Profit-making  firms 
Dividend  &  non-Div  firms 
Controlling  for  segment-level  losses 
Model  1  Model  2 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.635  18.303  0.000  0.650  18.181  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.367  -15.563  0.000  -0.362  -15.461  0.000 
1/Scale  1148.540  2.122  0.034  977.222  1.743  0.081 
BV  -0.095  -1.764  0.078  -0.116  -2.151  0.032 
PBTA  1.863  4.891  0.000  1.910  4.931  0.000 
PBTB  2.087  5.399  0.000  2.200  5.704  0.000 
PBTC  1.477  3.939  0.000  1.501  3.939  0.000 
PBTD  1.903  5.041  0.000  1.943  5.072  0.000 
PBTDA  1.887  5.034  0.000  1.928  5.075  0.000 
PBTE  1.991  5.188  0.000  2.032  5.222  0.000 
PBTF  1.784  4.712  0.000  1.818  4.736  0.000 
PBTG  1.842  4.731  0.000  1.897  4.807  0.000 
PBTH  1.991  5.088  0.000  1.991  5.040  0.000 
PBTI  2.162  5.787  0.000  2.202  5.811  0.000 
PREST  1.974  5.279  0.000  2.015  5.316  0.000 
DPBTA  *  0.000  ...  ...  0.000  ...  ... 
DPBTB  -4.575  -3.068  0.002 
DPBTC  1.027  1.852  0.064 
DPBTD  0.339  1.992  0.046 
DPBTDA  0.363  1.575  0.115 
DPBTE  -0.140  -0.394  0.694 
DPBTF  0.689  1.941  0.052 
DPBTG  -0.846  -9.262  0.000 
DPBTH  -0.221  -0.324  0.746 
DPBTI  -0.533  -1.271  0.204 
PBT"f(scale)  0.144  6.009  0.000  0.140  5.830  0.000 
DIV  0.188  2.942  0.003  0.175  2.773  0.006 
Adj.  ER  1.060  3.669  0.000  1.067  3.717  0.000 
No.  of  cases  1661  1661 
Adj.  R-S  uare  30.20%  30.91% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  the  regression 
coefficients. 
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Dividend  firms  onl 
Controlling  for  segment-level  losses 
Model  3  Model  4 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.655  17.946  0.000  0.672  17.997  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.353  -15.316  0.000  -0.347  -15.145  0.000 
1/Scale  490.282  1.573  0.116  16.899  0.046  0.963 
BV  -0.198  -3.818  0.000  -0.221  -4.342  0.000 
PBTA  2.244  6.499  0.000  2.375  6.846  0.000 
PBTB  2.598  7.359  0.000  2.809  8.206  0.000 
PBTC  1.920  5.528  0.000  2.017  5.767  0.000 
PBTD  2.384  6.866  0.000  2.503  7.183  0.000 
PBTDA  2.361  6.847  0.000  2.482  7.174  0.000 
PBTE  2.474  6.987  0.000  2.596  7.314  0.000 
PBTF  2.266  6.503  0.000  2.385  6.823  0.000 
PBTG  2.302  6.391  0.000  2.426  6.711  0.000 
PBTH  2.567  7.267  0.000  2.634  7.402  0.000 
PBTI  2.612  7.625  0.000  2.732  7.950  0.000 
PREST  2.440  7.120  0.000  2.562  7.445  0.000 
DPBTA  "  0.000  ...  ...  0.000  ... 
DPBTB  -5.472  -5.322  0.000 
DPBTC  1.484  4.755  0.000 
DPBTD  0.257  1.475  0.140 
DPBTDA  0.339  1.190  0.234 
DPBTE  -0.161  -0.428  0.668 
DPBTF  0.430  1.294  0.196 
DPBTG  -0.741  -2.887  0.004 
DPBTH  0.406  1.136  0.256 
DPBTI  -0.390  -0.754  0.451 
PBT-f(scale)  0.125  5.714  0.000  0.117  5.304  0.000 
DIV  0.201  2.922  0.003  0.189  2.768  0.006 
Ad'  ER  1.234  4.915  0.000  1.246  5.021  0.000 
No.  of  cases  1593  1593 
Ad.  R-S  uare  31.61%  32.50% 
*  Only  only  positive  PBTO  are  reported  from  this  segment. 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  the  regression 
coefficients. 
368 Table  6.14 
Profit-making  firms 
Basic  model 
Modell 
PBT  seg  xw 
PBTA 
Model  2 
PBT  seg  xa 
PBTB 
Model  3 
PBT  seg  xa 
PBTC 
Model  4 
PBT  seg  x  
PBTD1 
Model  5 
Intercept  0.611  0.611  0.611  0.618  0.638 
t-ratio  19.363  19.378  19.075  19.560  18.680 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.374  -0.371  -0.373  -0.357  -0.379 
t-ratio  -15.957  -15.576  -16.039  -14.841  -16.180 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
I  /Scale  1343.5  1336.2  1281.8  1293.3  1294.1 
t-ratio  2.393  2.377  2.251  2.298  2.333 
p-value  0.017  0.017  0.024  0.022  0.020 
BV  -0.104  -0.103  -0.111  -0.108  -0.103 
t-ratio  -1.933  -1.915  -2.062  -2.012  -1.928 
p-value  0.053  0.056  0.039  0.044  0.054 
PBT  1.985  1.993  2.014  2.082  2.033 
t-ratio  5.437  5.444  5.489  5.679  5.601 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  -  -0.108  0.076  -0.435  -0.079 
t-ratio  -  -0.911  1.023  -7.228  -3.797 
p-value  -  0.363  0.306  0.000  0.000 
DPBT  seg  x  -  -  -1.584  0.480  0.406 
t-ratio  -  -  -1.047  3.067  2.604 
p-value  -  -  0.295  0.002  0.009 
PBT'f(scale)  0.141  0.140  0.141  0.136  0.138 
t-ratio  5.962  5.913  5.927  5.764  5.849 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
DIV  0.186  0.184  0.185  0.191  0.180 
t-ratio  2.804  2.770  2.790  2.893  2.710 
p-value  0.005  0.006  0.005  0.004  0.007 
Adj.  ER  1.073  1.068  1.076  1.102  1.083 
t-ratio  3.678  3.643  3.678  3.827  3.837 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
No.  of  cases  1661  1661  1661  1661  1661 
Adj.  R-  27.27%  27.24%  27.41%  28.48%  27.78% 
S  uare 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients. 
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PBT  seg  xm 
PBTE 
Model  6 
PBT  seg  xm 
PBTF 
Model  7 
PBT  seg  xm 
PBTß 
Model  8 
PBT  seg  xm 
PBTH 
Model  9 
PBT  seg  xm 
P8T1 
Model  10 
Intercept  0.607  0.629  0.616  0.615  0.572 
t-ratio  19.232  19.627  19.256  19.466  19.669 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.374  -0.371  -0.376  -0.372  -0.372 
t-ratio  -15.918  -15.726  -16.060  -15.864  -16.090 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
l  /Scale  1368.9  1315.4  1344.8  1351.1  1252.5 
t-ratio  2.432  2.350  2.399  2.405  2.310 
p-value  0.015  0.019  0.016  0.016  0.021 
BV  -0.108  -0.107  -0.103  -0.097  -0.078 
t-ratio  -2.008  -1.994  -1.916  -1.807  -1.483 
p-value  0.045  0.046  0.055  0.071  0.138 
PBT  2.062  1.964  1.904  1.924  1.962 
t-ratio  5.637  5.382  5.124  5.226  5.419 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  0.115  -0.202  -0.094  -0.134  0.228 
t-ratio  1.981  -4.940  -1.803  -2.552  4.530 
p-value  0.048  0.000  0.071  0.011  0.000 
DPBT  seg  x  -0.092  0.314  -0.243  0.287  -0.558 
t-ratio  -0.582  1.681  -0.725  0.887  -1.672 
p-value  0.561  0.093  0.468  0.375  0.095 
PBT-f(scale)  0.136  0.140  0.146  0.144  0.146 
t-ratio  5.761  5.942  6.090  6.053  6.300 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
DIV  0.182  0.180  0.188  0.187  0.190 
t-ratio  2.743  2.759  2.843  2.794  2.942 
p-value  0.006  0.006  0.004  0.005  0.003 
Adj.  ER  1.071  1.048  1.092  1.091  1.081 
t-ratio  3.696  3.577  3.749  3.776  3.745 
value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
No.  of  cases  1661  1661  1661  1661  1661 
Adj.  R- 
S  uare  27.36%  27.94%  27.36%  27.36%  28.63% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients. 
370 Table  6.15 
Profit-making  firms 
Basic  model 
Modell 
PBT  seg  x  
PBTA 
Model  2 
PBT  seg  x  
PBTB 
Model  3 
PBT  seg  xw 
PBTC 
Model  4 
PBT  seg  x  
PBTD1 
Model  5 
Intercept  0.526  0.527  0.530  0.534  0.526 
t-ratio  14.383  14.445  14.101  14.563  13.478 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.311  -0.305  -0.310  -0.285  -0.310 
t-ratio  -10.471  -10.016  -10.399  -9.377  -10.459 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/Scale  1599.1  1558.3  1447.0  1436.0  1714.4 
t-ratio  2.833  2.746  2.500  2.526  3.115 
p-value  0.005  0.006  0.012  0.012  0.002 
BV  -0.165  -0.163  -0.170  -0.170  -0.164 
t-ratio  -2.434  -2.396  -2.472  -2.564  -2.400 
p-value  0.015  0.017  0.013  0.010  0.016 
PBT  2.766  2.786  2.764  3.055  2.770 
t-ratio  6.246  6.256  6.174  6.827  6.260 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  -  -0.114  0.075  -0.442  0.006 
t-ratio  -  -0.891  1.474  -8.006  0.262 
p-value  -  0.373  0.141  0.000  0.794 
DPBT  seg  x  -  0.000  -0.412  0.483  0.215 
t-ratio  -  0.000  -1.314  3.615  1.318 
p-value  -  0.000  0.189  0.000  0.187 
PBT"f(scale)  0.153  0.151  0.153  0.141  0.153 
t-ratio  5.817  5.730  5.778  5.402  5.816 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
DIV  0.192  0.188  0.190  0.196  0.186 
t-ratio  2.662  2.597  2.623  2.722  2.570 
p-value  0.008  0.009  0.009  0.006  0.010 
Adj.  ER  1.516  1.506  1.527  1.583  1.561 
t-ratio  2.856  2.817  2.868  2.919  2.952 
-value  0.004  0.005  0.004  0.004  0.003 
No.  of  cases  846  846  846  846  846 
Adj.  R- 
S  uare  38.96%  38.93%  38.86%  41.00%  38.94% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients. 
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PBT  seg  x  PBT  seg  xý  PBT  seg  xý 
PBTE  PBTF  PBTG 
Model  6  Model  7  Model  8 
PST  segx  
PBTH 
Model  9 
PBT  sog  xa 
PBTI 
Model  10 
Intercept  0.516  0.542  0.533  0.532  0.511 
t-ratio  14.375  14.448  14.167  14.368  14.166 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.306  -0.310  -0.314  -0.312  -0.310 
t-ratio  -10.297  -10.357  -10.602  -10.485  -10.535 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/Scale  1866.0  1630.2  1541.0  1677.4  1569.5 
t-ratio  3.420  2.973  2.677  2.856  2.731 
p-value  0.001  0.003  0.007  0.004  0.006 
BV  -0.186  -0.166  -0.166  -0.158  -0.157 
t-ratio  -2.740  -2.472  -2.456  -2.336  -2.388 
p-value  0.006  0.013  0.014  0.019  0.017 
PBT  2.956  2.760  2.671  2.694  2.729 
t-ratio  6.741  6.257  5.975  6.025  6.202 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  0.269  -0.134  -0.089  -0.094  0.157 
t-ratio  3.904  -2.906  -1.413  -1.689  2.896 
p-value  0.000  0.004  0.158  0.091  0.004 
DPBT  seg  x  -0.352  0.106  -0.303  0.169  -0.198 
t-ratio  -1.255  0.569  -0.883  0.495  -1.501 
p-value  0.210  0.570  0.377  0.621  0.133 
PBT-f(scale)  0.142  0.152  0.159  0.157  0.155 
t-ratio  5.504  5.810  5.973  5.898  5.984 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
DIV  0.171  0.187  0.198  0.193  0.183 
t-ratio  2.398  2.633  2.797  2.612  2.557 
p-value  0.016  0.008  0.005  0.009  0.011 
Adj.  ER  1.602  1.481  1.552  1.549  1.597 
t-ratio  2.953  2.934  2.923  2.918  3.157 
p-value  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.004  0.002 
No.  of  cases  846  846  846  846  846 
Adj.  R- 
S  uare  40.25%  39.36%  39.13%  38.97%  39.55% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients. 
372 Table  6.16 
Profit-making  firms 
Intercept 
NEGMV 
1/Scale 
BV 
PBT 
PBTA 
PBTB 
PBTC 
PBTD1 
PBTE 
PBTF 
PBTG 
PBTH 
PBTI 
DPBTB 
DPBTC 
DPBTD1 
DPBTE 
DPBTF 
DPBTG 
DPBTH 
DPBTI 
PBT'f(scale) 
DIV 
Adj.  ER 
No.  of  cases 
Adj.  R-Square 
Single  and  multiple  Industry  firms 
Model  I 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  I 
Multiple  Industry  firms 
Model  2 
CoeN.  t-ratio  P-value 
0.647  19.124  0.000  0.552  13.079  0.000 
-0.350  -14.599  0.000  -0.268  -8.707  0.000 
1092.790  1.993  0.046  1536.540  2.609  0.009 
-0.095  -1.806  0.071  -0.185  -2.811  0.005 
2.008  5.360  0.000  3.015  6.705  0.000 
-0.122  -0.967  0.333  -0.185  -1.330  0.184 
0.151  1.690  0.091  0.157  2.152  0.031 
-0.457  -7.351  0.000  -0.444  -7.428  0.000 
-0.081  -3.627  0.000  0.006  0.204  0.838 
0.040  0.646  0.518  0.207  2.902  0.004 
-0.190  -4.511  0.000  -0.112  -2.328  0.020 
-0.115  -2.160  0.031  -0.096  -1.460  0.144 
-0.118  -2.234  0.026  -0.068  -1.178  0.239 
0.164  3.278  0.001  0.110  1.999  0.046 
-1.641  -1.095  0.274  -0.414  -1.325  0.185 
0.366  2.274  0.023  0.392  2.854  0.004 
0.444  2.749  0.006  0.278  1.599  0.110 
0.107  0.699  0.484  -0.174  -0.679  0.497 
0.255  1.439  0.150  0.052  0.273  0.785 
-0.093  -0.276  0.782  -0.214  -0.635  0.525 
0.371  1.321  0.187  0.177  0.578  0.563 
-0.462  -1.436  0.151  -0.095  -0.720  0.472 
0.143  5.985  0.000  0.142  5.433  0.000 
0.179  2.816  0.005  0.157  2.210  0.027 
1.139  4.148  0.000  1.797  3.429  0.001 
1661  846 
31.0%  42.7% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  the  regression 
coefficients. 
373 Table  6.17 
Multi-industry  firms-year  observations  Single  and  multi-Industry  firm-years 
Segments  (no.  of  cases=838)*  (no,  of  cases.  1661)" 
Pbtab  43  39  48  43 
Pbtabc  134  125  159  148 
pbtdl  570  554  1017  999 
Pbtfg  354  335  450  431 
Pbteh  311  293  387  368 
Pbta  27  27  29  29 
Pbtb  16  12  19  14 
Pbtc  95  90  115  109 
Pbtd  433  421  670  656 
Pbtda  329  315  539  525 
Pbte  175  169  241  234 
Pbtf  234  219  286  271 
Pbtg  161  152  205  196 
Pbth  170  157  180  167 
Pbti  276  256  452  430 
*  Samples  exclude  loss-making  firms  and  outliers 
Table  6.18 
-makin!  firms 
Single  and  multiple  Indust  ry  firms  Multiple  Industry  firms 
Model  I  Model  2 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.633  18.830  0.000  0.526  12.447  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.356  -14.711  0.000  -0.281  -9.180  0.000 
I/Scale  1206.720  2.230  0.026  2004.450  3.838  0.000 
BV  -0.075  .  1.427  0.154  -0.155  -2.367  0.018 
PBT  2.015  5.391  0.000  3.018  6.648  0.000 
PBTABC  *  -0.251  -4.753  0.000  -0.231  -3.933  0.000 
PBTD1  -0.080  -3.575  0.000  0.009  0.321  0.749 
PBTE  0.051  0.837  0.402  0.226  3.183  0.001 
PBTF  -0.195  -4.643  0.000  -0.115  -2.417  0.016 
PBTG  -0.109  -2.050  0.040  -0.080  -1.209  0.226 
PBTH  -0.133  -2.513  0.012  -0.087  -1.532  0.126 
PBTI  0.161  3.199  0.001  0.104  1.873  0.061 
DPBTABC*  -0.152  -0.452  0.651  0.133  1.091  0.275 
DPBTDI  0.448  2.781  0.005  0.281  1.641  0.101 
DPBTE  0.031  0.173  0.863  -0.280  -0.907  0.365 
DPBTF  0.257  1.461  0.144  0.049  0.258  0.797 
DPBTG  -0.101  -0.302  0.762  -0.235  -0.702  0.483 
DPBTH  0.395  1.403  0.160  0.196  0.642  0.521 
DPBTI  -0.463  -1.436  0.151  -0.099  -0.744  0.457 
PBT'f(scale)  0.142  5.975  0.000  0.142  5.368  0.000 
DIV  0.188  2.922  0.003  0.170  2.367  0.018 
Ad  ER  1.099  3.921  0.000  1.700  3.296  0.001 
No.  of  cases  1661  846 
Ad  . 
R-S  uare  30.3%  41.9% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  the  regression 
coefficients. 
374 APPENDIX  6.2 
Appendix  6.2  reports  regressions  which  are  scaled  by  alternative  scale- 
proxies. 
Tables  6.7TA,  6.10TA,  6.13TA  and  6.14TA  report  regressions  scaled 
by  Group  Total  Assets. 
Tables  6.7Sale,  6.1OSale,  6.13Sale  and  6.14Sale  report  regressions 
scaled  by  Group  Sales. 
Tables  6.7MV,  6.10MV,  6.13MV  and  6.14MV  report  regressions  scaled 
by  the  one  year  lagged  equity  market  value. 
375 Table  6.7TA  (TA-deflated  model) 
Profit-making  firms 
Dividend  &  non-Dividend  firms 
Controlling  for  segment-level  losses 
Model  1  Model  2 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.051  0.950  0.342  0.030  0.553  0.580 
NEGMV  -0.375  -8.770  0.000  -0.367  -9.037  0.000 
1/TA  2.498  2.066  0.039  2.510  2.078  0.038 
BV  0.289  2.134  0.033  0.287  2.167  0.030 
PBTO  2.578  1.105  0.269  2.389  1.008  0.313 
PBT1  2.403  3.166  0.002  2.404  3.161  0.002 
PBT2  4.389  6.222  0.000  4.371  6.167  0.000 
PBT3  3.484  4.405  0.000  3.493  4.424  0.000 
PBT4  4.638  5.012  0.000  4.604  4.965  0.000 
PBT5  6.282  7.890  0.000  6.265  7.865  0.000 
PBT6  4.795  3.094  0.002  4.699  3.011  0.003 
PBT7  1.892  1.886  0.059  2.031  2.005  0.045 
PBT8  2.316  1.771  0.076  2.298  1.661  0.097 
PBT9  10.512  6.522  0.000  10.807  6.576  0.000 
PREST  1.049  1.299  0.194  0.627  0.779  0.436 
DPBTO  -13.219  -0.693  0.489 
DPBT1  -8.102  -1.488  0.137 
DPBT2  -4.539  -1.740  0.082 
DPBT3  7.047  0.182  0.855 
DPBT4  -73.349  -1.384  0.166 
DPBT5  -6.973  -1.779  0.075 
DPBT6  157.536  4.359  0.000 
DPBT7  22.080  1.549  0.121 
DPBT8  14.311  1.112  0.266 
DPBT9  -20.587  -2.422  0.015 
PBT'f(ta)  0.938  4.719  0.000  0.998  5.026  0.000 
DIV  4.040  3.093  0.002  4.081  3.144  0.002 
Ad'.  ER  0.527  1.195  0.232  0.730  1.815  0.070 
No.  of  cases  1670  1670 
Adj.  R-S  uare  49.2%  49.6% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  the  regression 
coefficients. 
376 Table  6.7TA  (continued  from  the  previous  page...  ) 
Dividend  firms  only 
Controlling  for  segment-level  losses 
Model  3  Model  4 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.068  1.234  0.217  0.051  0.913  0.361 
NEGMV  -0.357  -8.617  0.000  -0.353  -8.601  0.000 
1/TA  0.184  0.160  0.873  0.051  0.043  0.968 
BV  0.205  1.674  0.094  0.211  1.718  0.086 
PBTO  4.455  1.838  0.066  4.336  1.760  0.078 
PBT1  3.797  5.508  0.000  3.835  5.513  0.000 
PBT2  5.616  9.114  0.000  5.641  9.075  0.000 
PBT3  4.848  6.841  0.000  4.890  6.881  0.000 
PBT4  6.086  7.378  0.000  6.107  7.380  0.000 
PBTS  7.607  10.962  0.000  7.657  10.994  0.000 
PBT6  6.440  4.441  0.000  6.401  4.378  0.000 
PBT7  3.402  3.726  0.000  3.573  3.869  0.000 
PBT8  4.351  3.291  0.001  4.117  2.884  0.004 
PBT9  12.613  7.030  0.000  12.944  7.074  0.000 
PREST  2.142  2.881  0.004  1.804  2.477  0.013 
DPBTO  -40.677  -2.545  0.011 
DPBTI  -8.665  -1.481  0.139 
DPBT2  -5.725  -2.421  0.015 
DPBT3  4.380  0.118  0.906 
DPBT4  -71.439  -1.370  0.171 
DPBT5  -11.368  -4.954  0.000 
DPBT6  143.462  4.247  0.000 
DPBT7  23.143  1.498  0.134 
DPBT8  25.543  4.689  0.000 
DPBT9  -14.518  -4.745  0.000 
PBT'f(ta)  0.715  4.111  0.000  0.758  4.379  0.000 
DIV  3.072  2.313  0.021  2.966  2.236  0.025 
Adj.  ER  0.672  1.596  0.110  0.818  2.114  0.035 
No.  of  cases  1612  1612 
Ad'.  R-S  uare  51.5%  51.7% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  the  regression 
coefficients. 
377 Table  6.7S  (Group  Sales-deflated  model) 
Profit-making  firms 
Dividend  &  non-Div  firms 
Controlling  for  segment-level  losses 
Model  I  Model  2 
Coeff.  t-ratlo  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.073  2.444  0.015  0.066  2.153  0.031 
NEGMV  -0.449  -9.607  0.000  -0.448  -9.551  0.000 
1/Sale  0.887  1.217  0.224  0.877  1.172  0.241 
BV  0.441  4.530  0.000  0.439  4.353  0.000 
PBTO  7.529  2.771  0.006  7.541  2.778  0.005 
PBTI  3.611  4.060  0.000  3.658  4.054  0.000 
PBT2  5.973  7.489  0.000  6.012  7.440  0.000 
PBT3  4.449  4.636  0.000  4.544  4.687  0.000 
PBT4  6.360  5.771  0.000  6.405  5.777  0.000 
PBT5  7.018  7.571  0.000  7.032  7.511  0.000 
PBT6  7.386  3.311  0.001  7.372  3.237  0.001 
PBT7  1.801  1.773  0.076  1.803  1.750  0.080 
PBT8  2.168  1.883  0.060  2.442  1.871  0.061 
PBT9  14.730  5.554  0.000  14.863  5.358  0.000 
PREST  2.791  3.166  0.002  2.730  3.083  0.002 
DPBTO  5.871  0.500  0.617 
DPBT1  -10.060  -1.564  0.118 
DPBT2  -2.192  -0.627  0.531 
DPBT3  -8.644  -0.328  0.743 
DPBT4  -81.507  -1.516  0.129 
DPBT5  -0.285  -0.024  0.981 
DPBT6  7.030  0.266  0.791 
DPBT7  7.965  0.795  0.426 
DPBT8  -29.423  -0.746  0.456 
DPBT9  -12.079  -2.506  0.012 
PBT'f(sale)  0.353  2.205  0.027  0.361  2.260  0.024 
DIV  4.877  3.194  0.001  4.891  3.160  0.002 
Ad'.  ER  0.732  1.083  0.279  0.798  1.159  0.246 
No.  of  cases  1671  1671 
Ad'.  R-S  uare  52.3%  52.2% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  the  regression 
coefficients. 
378 Table  6.7S  (continued  from  the  previous  page...  ) 
Intercept 
NEGMV 
1/Sale 
BV 
PBTO 
PBT1 
PBT2 
PBT3 
PBT4 
PBT5 
PBT6 
PBT7 
PBT8 
PBT9 
PREST 
DPBTO 
DPBT1 
DPBT2 
DPBT3 
DPBT4 
DPBT5 
DPBT6 
DPBT7 
DPBT8 
DPBT9 
PBT"f(sale) 
DIV 
Ad'I.  ER 
Dividend  firms  only 
Controlling  for  segment-level  losses 
Model  3  Model  4 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
0.061  1.922  0.055  0.056  1.698  0.089 
-0.453  -8.322  0.000  -0.447  -8.270  0.000 
1.820  0.986  0.324  1.910  0.873  0.383 
0.383  3.119  0.002  0.375  2.971  0.003 
8.103  3.080  0.002  8.055  3.113  0.002 
4.110  4.365  0.000  4.126  4.218  0.000 
6.361  7.574  0.000  6.384  7.363  0.000 
4.997  5.012  0.000  5.047  4.950  0.000 
6.735  5.946  0.000  6.744  5.814  0.000 
7.426  7.656  0.000  7.426  7.438  0.000 
7.933  3.508  0.000  7.883  3.411  0.001 
2.306  2.155  0.031  2.287  2.063  0.039 
2.629  2.126  0.033  2.701  1.907  0.056 
16.661  4.897  0.000  16.812  4.845  0.000 
3.228  3.488  0.000  3.066  3.274  0.001 
13.954  0.448  0.654 
-4.437  -0.717  0.473 
-2.838  -0.837  0.403 
-10.077  -0.361  0.718 
-81.626  -1.461  0.144 
-14.085  -1.794  0.073 
7.346  0.247  0.805 
3.989  0.393  0.694 
30.497  3.441  0.001 
-13.669  -2.609  0.009 
0.402  2.530  0.011  0.426  2.645  0.008 
4.064  2.405  0.016  3.959  2.333  0.020 
0.959  1.419  0.156  1.011  1.499  0.134 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  the  regression 
coefficients 
379 Table  6.7MV  (One  year  lagged  MV-deflated  model) 
Profit-making  firms 
Dividend  &  non-Div  firms 
Controlling  for  segment-level  losses 
Model  1  Model  2 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.828  20.533  0.000  0.817  20.199  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.503  -14.018  0.000  -0.502  -14.063  0.000 
1/MV  0.159  0.868  0.385  0.194  1.003  0.316 
BV  0.260  5.339  0.000  0.264  5.394  0.000 
PBTO  1.695  3.125  0.002  1.673  3.104  0.002 
PBT1  1.286  3.524  0.000  1.279  3.510  0.000 
PBT2  1.523  4.494  0.000  1.506  4.507  0.000 
PBT3  1.417  3.145  0.002  1.426  3.162  0.002 
PBT4  1.706  4.218  0.000  1.729  4.281  0.000 
PBT5  2.376  6.409  0.000  2.416  6.528  0.000 
PBT6  2.390  2.704  0.007  2.344  2.639  0.008 
PBT7  1.629  3.400  0.001  1.688  3.535  0.000 
PBT8  2.029  2.280  0.023  2.029  2.014  0.044 
PBT9  7.871  5.332  0.000  8.425  5.491  0.000 
PREST  1.523  4.493  0.000  1.505  4.505  0.000 
DPBTO  7.911  1.681  0.093 
DPBT1  -0.235  -0.098  0.922 
DPBT2  -2.662  -2.583  0.010 
DPBT3  -27.522  -9.228  0.000 
DPBT4  0.575  0.026  0.979 
DPBT5  5.408  1.791  0.073 
DPBT6  98.680  4.404  0.000 
DPBT7  11.318  1.198  0.231 
DPBT8  8.944  4.276  0.000 
DPBT9  -8.618  -4.905  0.000 
PBrf(mv)  0.053  0.611  0.541  0.073  0.843  0.399 
DIV  -0.165  -0.180  0.857  -0.035  -0.038  0.969 
Ad'.  ER  0.589  1.761  0.078  0.761  2.532  0.011 
No.  of  cases  1331  1331 
Ad'.  R-S  uare  23.1%  23.7% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  the  regression 
coefficients. 
380 Model  6.7MV  (continued  from  the  previous  page...  ) 
Dividend  firms  only 
Controlling  for  segment-level  losses 
Model  3  Model  4 
Coeff.  t-ratlo  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.832  19.647  0.000  0.817  19.261  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.494  -13.775  0.000  -0.494  -13.812  0.000 
1/MV  0.288  0.753  0.452  0.314  0.749  0.454 
BV  0.231  4.595  0.000  0.233  4.631  0.000 
PBTO  1.733  2.483  0.013  1.687  2.400  0.016 
PBT1  1.118  2.903  0.004  1.116  2.877  0.004 
PBT2  1.426  4.016  0.000  1.393  3.968  0.000 
PBT3  1.286  2.624  0.009  1.300  2.608  0.009 
PBT4  1.501  3.574  0.000  1.524  3.607  0.000 
PBT5  2.227  5.687  0.000  2.274  5.756  0.000 
PBT6  2.272  2.540  0.011  2.226  2.472  0.013 
PBT7  1.544  3.069  0.002  1.613  3.219  0.001 
PBT8  1.801  1.997  0.046  1.755  1.722  0.085 
PBT9  8.478  4.432  0.000  9.158  4.645  0.000 
PREST  1.426  4.014  0.000  1.392  3.967  0.000 
DPBTO  6.822  1.017  0.309 
DPBT1  0.061  0.024  0.981 
DPBT2  -2.689  -2.568  0.010 
DPBT3  -28.128  -9.081  0.000 
DPBT4  -2.528  -0.115  0.908 
DPBT5  1.653  0.842  0.400 
DPBT6  106.397  4.459  0.000 
DPBT7  9.409  1.001  0.317 
DPBT8  8.650  4.042  0.000 
DPBT9  -9.612  -4.440  0.000 
PBT"f(mv)  0.085  0.946  0.344  0.111  1.240  0.215 
DIV  0.203  0.205  0.838  0.411  0.418  0.676 
Adj.  ER  0.599  1.737  0.082  0.787  2.616  0.009 
No.  of  cases  1287  1287 
Ad'.  R-S  uare  21.8%  22.6% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  the  regression 
coefficients 
381 Model  6.7MV  (continued  from  the  previous  page...  ) 
Wald  test  of  the  significance  of  valuation  differential  between  each  pair  of  specific 
segments  included  in  Model  2  and  Model  4 
Mode12  Model4 
Compared  segments  p  -value  p-value 
PBTO  vs  PBT1  0.381  0.330 
PBTO  vs  PBT2  0.691  0.602 
PBTO  vs  PBT3  0.614  0.523 
PBTO  vs  PBT4  0.905  0.782 
PBTO  vs  PBT5  0.099  0.314 
PBTO  vs  PBT6  0.436  0.561 
PBTO  vs  PBT7  0.976  0.902 
PBTO  vs  PBT8  0.717  0.948 
PBTO  vs  PBT9  0.000  0.000 
PBT1  vs  PBT2  0.337  0.252 
PBTI  vs  PBT3  0.624  0.561 
PBT1  vs  PBT4  0.081  0.110 
PBTI  vs  PBT5  0.000  0.000 
PBT1  vs  PBT6  0.169  0.152 
PBTI  vs  PBT7  0.178  0.116 
PBT1  vs  PBT8  0.404  0.475 
PBT1  vs  PBT9  0.000  0.000 
PBT2  vs  PBT3  0.799  0.777 
PBT2  vs  PBT4  0.405  0.622 
PBT2  vs  PBT5  0.000  0.000 
PBT2  vs  PBT6  0.287  0.291 
PBT2  vs  PBT7  0.581  0.522 
PBT2  vs  PBT8  0.570  0.695 
PBT2  vs  PBT9  0.000  0.000 
PBT3  vs  PBT4  0.353  0.501 
PBT3  vs  PBT5  0.001  0.002 
PBT3  vs  PBT6  0.257  0.254 
PBT3  vs  PBT7  0.478  0.427 
PBT3  vs  PBT8  0.516  0.625 
PBT3  vs  PBT9  0.000  0.000 
PBT4  vs  PBT5  0.010  0.005 
PBT4  vs  PBT6  0.452  0.390 
PBT4  vs  PBT7  0.904  0.800 
PBT4  vs  PBT8  0.744  0.801 
PBT4  vs  PBT9  0.000  0.000 
PBT5  vs  PBT6  0.927  0.952 
PBT5  vs  PBT7  0.028  0.056 
PBT5  vs  PBT8  0.677  0.576 
PBT5  vs  PBT9  0.000  0.000 
PBT6  vs  PBT7  0.406  0.441 
PBT6  vs  PBT8  0.786  0.684 
PBT6  vs  PBT9  0.000  0.001 
PBT7  vs  PBT8  0.713  0.878 
PBT7  vs  PBT9  0.000  0.000 
PBT8  vs  PBT9  0.000  0.001 
382 Table  6.10TA  (TA-deflated  model) 
Profit-making  firms 
Basic  model 
Modell 
PBT  seg  x  
PBTO 
Mode12 
PBT  seg  xm 
PBT1 
Mode13 
PBT  seg  x  
PBT2 
Mode14 
PBT  seg  xa 
PBT3 
ModelS 
Intercept  0.203  0.238  0.267  0.242  0.248 
t-ratio  3.467  4.268  4.784  4.267  4.368 
p-value  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.393  -0.404  -0.417  -0.403  -0.404 
t-ratio  -8.036  -9.000  -9.186  -8.804  -8.857 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/TA  2.996  2.881  2.782  2.843  2.852 
1-ratio  2.527  2.422  2.328  2.371  2.393 
p-value  0.012  0.015  0.020  0.018  0.017 
BV  -0.023  -0.032  0.023  -0.048  -0.038 
t-ratio  -0.143  -0.224  0.157  -0.322  -0.257 
p-value  0.886  0.822  0.875  0.747  0.797 
PBT  5.527  5.199  5.161  5.476  5.252 
t-ratio  7.415  7.261  7.298  7.174  7.375 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  -  -1.022  -2.757  -0.557  -1.328 
t-ratio  -  -0.521  -8.605  -1.654  -2.823 
p-value  -  0.602  0.000  0.098  0.005 
DPBT  seg  x  -  -3.094  13.141  -2.715  19.947 
t-ratio  -  -0.169  1.067  -2.174  0.511 
p-value  -  0.866  0.286  0.030  0.609 
PBT'f(ta)  0.385  0.512  0.521  0.461  0.489 
t-ratio  1.908  2.575  2.674  2.319  2.496 
p-value  0.056  0.010  0.008  0.020  0.013 
DIV  7.735  6.381  6.432  6.543  6.505 
t-ratio  4.470  4.055  4.136  4.179  4.134 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Adj.  ER  0.345  0.343  0.367  0.390  0.342 
t-ratio  0.567  0.552  0.614  0.631  0.551 
p-value  0.571  0.581  0.539  0.528  0.582 
No.  of  cases  1670  1670  1670  1670  1670 
Adj.  R-S  uare  40.0%  40.0%  41.2%  40.0%  40.1% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients. 
383 Table  6.10TA  (continued  from  the  previous  page...  ) 
PBT  seg  x- 
PBT4 
Mode16 
PBT  seg  xm 
PBTS 
Mode17 
PBT  seg  xa 
PBT6 
Model8 
PBT  seg  xm 
PBT7 
Model9 
PBT  seg  x  
PBT8 
Mode110 
PBT  seg  x  
PBT9 
Modelli 
Intercept  0.241  0.187  0.244  0.241  0.242  0.214 
t-ratio  4.234  3.466  4.275  4.234  4.258  3.863 
p-value  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.403  -0.420  -0.401  -0.394  -0.404  -0.366 
t-ratio  -8.800  -9.379  -8.781  -8.683  -8.831  -8.649 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/TA  2.869  2.743  2.862  2.865  2.869  2.721 
t-ratio  2.409  2.236  2.400  2.411  2.412  2.346 
p-value  0.016  0.025  0.016  0.016  0.016  0.019 
BV  -0.041  0.130  -0.051  -0.029  -0.035  -0.050 
t-ratio  -0.277  0.915  -0.343  -0.196  -0.233  -0.347 
p-value  0.782  0.360  0.731  0.845  0.816  0.729 
PBT  5.242  4.127  5.311  5.161  5.210  4.314 
t-ratio  7.435  5.739  7.374  7.221  7.332  6.169 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  0.051  2.474  1.519  -2.044  -1.484  6.862 
t-ratio  0.085  5.844  1.084  -4.083  -1.369  4.490 
p-value  0.932  0.000  0.278  0.000  0.171  0.000 
DPBT  seg  x  -22.827  -5.321  238.687  30.949  1.841  -13.822 
t-ratio  -0.674  -1.240  5.558  5.959  0.150  -1.487 
p-value  0.500  0.215  0.000  0.000  0.881  0.137 
PBT"f(ta)  0.499  0.617  0.471  0.524  0.511  0.655 
t-ratio  2.558  3.214  2.329  2.666  2.607  3.424 
p-value  0.011  0.001  0.020  0.008  0.009  0.001 
DIV  6.328  5.417  6.389  6.353  6.321  8.140 
t-ratio  4.021  3.800  4.072  4.044  4.017  5.410 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Adj.  ER  0.344  0.406  0.366  0.380  0.359  0.656 
t-ratio  0.554  0.717  0.597  0.615  0.578  1.188 
p-value  0.580  0.473  0.551  0.539  0.563  0.235 
No.  of  cases  1670  1670  1670  1670  1670  1670 
Ad'.  R-S  uare  39.9%  42.7%  40.0%  40.0%  39.9%  43.7% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients 
384 Table  6.10Sales  (Group  Sales-deflated  model) 
Profit-making  firms 
PBT  seg  xs 
PBTO 
Modell 
PBT  seg  xa 
PBT1 
Mode12 
PBT  seg  xm 
PBT2 
Mode13 
PBT  seg  x  
PBT3 
Model 
PBT  sog  xm 
PBT4 
ModolS 
Intercept  0.178  0.207  0.174  0.186  0.166 
t-ratio  5.882  6.792  5.762  6.042  5.435 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.549  -0.557  -0.553  -0.552  -0.557 
t-ratio  -9.479  -9.469  -9.317  -9.343  -9.438 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/Sale  1.232  1.134  1.229  1.220  1.189 
t-ratio  1.276  1.198  1.261  1.259  1.237 
p-value  0.202  0.231  0.207  0.208  0.216 
BV  0.398  0.408  0.399  0.398  0.415 
t-ratio  3.806  3.926  3.792  3.801  4.000 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  6.872  6.915  7.023  6.912  7.057 
t-ratio  7.244  7.370  6.825  7.280  7.542 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  2.296  -2.680  -0.239  -1.902  1.205 
t-ratio  0.947  -8.175  -0.561  -3.749  1.525 
p-value  0.344  0.000  0.575  0.000  0.127 
DPBT  seg  x  21.274  0.510  -2.224  -3.062  7.222 
t-ratio  1.558  0.051  -1.206  -0.149  0.232 
p-value  0.119  0.959  0.228  0.881  0.816 
PBT'f(sale)  -0.081  -0.097  -0.096  -0.088  -0.132 
t-ratio  -0.439  -0.550  -0.507  -0.487  -0.755 
p-value  0.661  0.583  0.612  0.626  0.450 
DIV  4.238  4.620  4.343  4.405  4.155 
t-ratio  2.511  2.852  2.629  2.670  2.556 
p-value  0.012  0.004  0.009  0.008  0.011 
Adj.  ER  0.220  0.119  0.195  0.202  0.201 
t-ratio  0.243  0.131  0.212  0.220  0.223 
p-value  0.808  0.896  0.832  0.826  0.824 
No.  of  cases  1671  1671  1671  1671  1671 
Adj.  R-S  uare  41.7%  42.4%  41.5%  41.6%  41.6% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients. 
385 Table  6.10Sale  (continued  from  the  previous  page...  ) 
PBTsegxa 
PBT5 
Mode16 
PBTsegxm 
PBT6 
Modell 
PBTsegxu 
PBT7 
Modele 
PBTtog  x  
PBT8 
Model9 
PBTtog  x  
PBT9 
Modell0 
Intercept  0.176  0.166  0.106  0.166  0.152 
t-ratio  6.312  5.495  3.431  5.443  5.385 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.524  -0.552  -0.525  -0.553  -0.512 
t-ratio  -8.867  -9.355  -9.354  -9.367  -9.845 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/Sale  1.173  1.270  1.190  1.261  1.147 
t-ratio  1.183  1.291  1.298  1.298  1.285 
p-value  0.237  0.197  0.194  0.194  0.199 
BV  0.359  0.403  0.514  0.413  0.401 
t-ratio  3.504  3.835  4.921  3.910  4.048 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  5.905  6.947  6.494  6.850  5.712 
t-ratio  6.194  7.270  6.961  7.234  6.583 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  2.307  2.279  -3.724  -1.903  9.420 
t-ratio  5.812  1.075  -7.959  -3.085  3.605 
p-value  0.000  0.282  0.000  0.002  0.000 
DPBT  seg  x  -17.434  128.231  41.992  -35.615  -6.559 
t-ratio  -1.559  4.943  3.921  -0.971  -2.054 
p-value  0.119  0.000  0.000  0.331  0.040 
PBT'f(sale)  0.044  -0.091  0.107  -0.061  0.048 
t-ratio  0.247  -0.496  0.612  -0.341  0.285 
p-value  0.805  0.620  0.541  0.733  0,776 
DIV  3.823  4.587  5.719  4.557  6.400 
t-ratio  2.480  2.760  3.482  2.744  3.974 
p-value  0.013  0.006  0.000  0.006  0.000 
Adj.  ER  0.279  0.269  0.721  0.198  0.269 
t-ratio  0.326  0.298  0.846  0.216  0.320 
-value  0.744  0.766  0.398  0.829  0.749 
No.  of  cases  1671  1671  1671  1671  1671 
Adj.  R-S  uare  43.7%  41.6%  43.2%  41.7%  46.5% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients 
386 Table  6.10MV  (One  year  lagged  MV-deflated  model) 
Profit-making  firms 
basic 
model 
Modell 
PBT  seg  xm 
PBTO 
Mode12 
PBT  seg  xm 
PBT1 
Mode13 
PBT  seg  xm 
PBT2 
Mode14 
PBT  seg  xw 
PBT3 
ModelS 
PBT  seg  x  
PBT4 
Model6 
Intercept  0.907  0.906  0.903  0.903  0.906  0.907 
t-ratio  22.135  22.004  22.076  21.968  22.157  22.115 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.500  -0.500  -0.507  -0.498  -0.497  -0.500 
t-ratio  -13.554  -13.562  -13.690  -13.456  -13.510  -13.562 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/MV  0.160  0.171  0.120  0.151  0.190  0.159 
t-ratio  0.884  0.923  0.670  0.843  1.011  0.878 
p-value  0.377  0.356  0.503  0.399  0.312  0.380 
BV  0.223  0.224  0.238  0.221  0.221  0.223 
t-ratio  4.480  4.476  4.845  4.441  4.458  4.491 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  2.045  2.036  2.117  2.073  2.053  2.041 
t-ratio  6.027  5.970  6.128  6.095  6.048  6.033 
p-value  -  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  -  -0.097  -0.687  0.000  -0.395  -0.059 
t-ratio  -  -0.233  -3.593  -0.309  -1.455  -0.263 
p-value  -  0.816  0.000  0.758  0.146  0.792 
DPBT  seg  x  -  6.021  3.207  -3.017  -24.171  46.357 
t-ratio  -  1.829  1.144  -2.575  -9.675  1.649 
p-value  -  0.067  0.253  0.010  0.000  0.099 
PBT"f(mv)  -0.044  -0.041  -0.037  -0.039  -0.049  -0.043 
t-ratio  -0.544  -0.507  -0.464  -0.485  -0.609  -0.534 
p-value  0.586  0.612  0.643  0.627  0.542  0.593 
DIV  -1.143  -1.141  -1.019  -1.147  -1.004  -1.130 
t-ratio  -1.282  -1.281  -1.143  -1.286  -1.107  -1.258 
p-value  0.200  0.200  0.253  0.199  0.268  0.208 
Adj.  ER  0.590  0.589  0.611  0.624  0.591  0.588 
t-ratio  1.719  1.711  1.799  1.834  1.725  1.705 
p-value  0.086  0.087  0.072  0.067  0.084  0.088 
No.  of  cases  1331  1331  1331  1331  1331  1331 
Adj.  R- 
S  uare  15.5%  15.4%  16.0%  15.5%  15.6%  15.4% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients. 
387 Table  6.10MV  (continued  from  the  previous  page...  ) 
PBT  seg  x= 
PBT5 
Mode17 
PBT  seg  x- 
PBT6 
Model8 
PBT  seg  x- 
PBT7 
Mode19 
PBT  Beg  x  
PBT8 
ModellO 
PBT  Beg  x  
PBT9 
Modelll 
Intercept  0.881  0.906  0.907  0.907  0.854 
t-ratio  20.678  22.096  21.685  22.109  22.171 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.503  -0.500  -0.501  -0.500  -0.499 
t-ratio  -13.408  -13.548  -13.552  -13.345  -14.533 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/MV  0.126  0.161  0.160  0.154  0.220 
t-ratio  0.689  0.891  0.885  0.852  1.230 
p-value  0.491  0.373  0.376  0.394  0.219 
BV  0.235  0.220  0.222  0.221  0.247 
t-ratio  4.757  4.427  4.363  4.347  5.447 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  1.773  2.063  2.048  2.078  1.711 
t-ratio  5.295  6.015  5.983  6.067  5.173 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  0.704  0.709  0.061  0.360  6.451 
t-ratio  3.588  0.934  0.213  0.491  4.283 
p-value  0.000  0.351  0.832  0.623  0.000 
DPBT  seg  x  -2.149  84.929  4.717  5.008  -7.701 
t-ratio  -0.345  4.818  2.209  2.493  -4.596 
p-value  0.730  0.000  0.027  0.013  0.000 
PBT'f(mv)  0.017  -0.051  -0.045  -0.052  0.021 
t-ratio  0.212  -0.622  -0.548  -0.647  0.267 
p-value  0.832  0.534  0.584  0.518  0.789 
DIV  -1.083  -1.086  -1.143  -1.163  -0.114 
t-ratio  -1.235  -1.215  -1.279  -1.307  -0.128 
p-value  0.217  0.224  0.201  0.191  0.898 
Adj.  ER  0.656  0.606  0.590  0.583  0.582 
t-ratio  2.013  1.782  1.720  1.697  1.739 
-value  0.044  0.075  0.085  0.090  0.082 
No.  of  cases  1331  1331  1331  1331  1331 
Adj.  R-S  uare  16.5%  15.5%  15.4%  15.4%  22.1% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients 
388 Table  6.13TA  (TA  -deflated  model) 
Profit-making  firms 
Dividend  &  non-Div  firms 
Controlling  for  segment-level  losses 
Model  I  Model  2 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.228  4.016  0.000  0.203  3.543  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.359  -8.676  0.000  -0.356  -8.786  0.000 
1/TA  2.483  2.485  0.013  2.329  2.283  0.022 
BV  -0.104  -0.926  0.354  -0.099  -0.886  0.376 
PBTA  1.982  1.716  0.086  2.171  1.914  0.056 
PBTB  8.188  2.130  0.033  8.342  2.059  0.039 
PBTC  0.462  0.501  0.616  0.545  0.592  0.554 
PBTD  4.325  5.732  0.000  4.294  5.694  0.000 
PBTDA  4.540  6.239  0.000  4.521  6.221  0.000 
PBTE  5.766  6.025  0.000  5.702  5.972  0.000 
PBTF  5.138  6.080  0.000  5.090  6.041  0.000 
PBTG  4.959  5.329  0.000  4.929  5.301  0.000 
PBTH  4.834  3.072  0.002  4.507  2.879  0.004 
PBTI  7.736  8.327  0.000  7.856  8.389  0.000 
PREST  3.164  3.660  0.000  2.837  3.269  0.001 
DPBTB  -7.160  -1.599  0.110 
DPBTC  -7.718  -1.476  0.140 
DPBTD  0.876  0.387  0.699 
DPBTDA  -3.359  -1.976  0.048 
DPBTE  -2.347  -0.893  0.372 
DPBTF  -4.354  -0.836  0.403 
DPBTG  -5.930  -2.048  0.041 
DPBTH  0.782  0.043  0.966 
DPBTI  -9.911  -3.473  0.001 
PBT"f(ta)  0.762  3.629  0.000  0.815  3.847  0.000 
DIV  5.754  3.588  0.000  5.911  3.653  0.000 
Ad'.  ER  0.562  1.045  0.296  0.644  1.241  0.215 
No.  of  cases  1670  1670 
Adj.  R-S  uare  44.88%  45.14% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  the  regression 
coefficients. 
389 Table  6.13TA  (continued  from  the  previous  page...  ) 
Div  firms  only 
Controlling  for  segment-level  losses 
Model  3  Model  4 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.217  3.400  0.001  0.203  3.162  0.002 
NEGMV  -0.359  -8.036  0.000  -0.363  -8.235  0.000 
1/TA  0.735  0.708  0.479  0.419  0.402  0.688 
BV  -0.092  -0.586  0.558  -0.088  -0.567  0.570 
PBTA  2.343  2.052  0.040  2.589  2.283  0.022 
PBTB  9.684  2.596  0.009  10.083  2.557  0.011 
PBTC  1.359  1.410  0.159  1.485  1.537  0.124 
PBTD  5.570  7.805  0.000  5.607  7.839  0.000 
PBTDA  5.719  8.304  0.000  5.771  8.374  0.000 
PBTE  7.075  7.763  0.000  7.080  7.780  0.000 
PBTF  6.401  7.900  0.000  6.417  7.932  0.000 
PBTG  6.304  6.904  0.000  6.359  6.963  0.000 
PBTH  6.953  4.310  0.000  6.446  4.050  0.000 
PBTI  9.008  9.525  0.000  9.113  9.597  0.000 
PREST  4.454  5.663  0.000  4.322  5.403  0.000 
DPBTB  -10.356  -2.478  0.013 
DPBTC  -3.742  -1.362  0.173 
DPBTD  -0.188  -0.077  0.939 
DPBTDA  -4.786  -2.625  0.009 
DPBTE  -1.880  -0.765  0.444 
DPBTF  -10.350  -1.689  0.091 
DPBTG  -19.511  -3.352  0.001 
DPBTH  14.446  0.674  0.500 
DPBTI  -10.730  -1.870  0.061 
PBT'f(ta)  0.558  2.824  0.005  0.579  2.915  0.004 
DIV  4.668  2.694  0.007  4.750  2.726  0.006 
Ad'.  ER  0.720  1.354  0.176  0.809  1.547  0.122 
No.  of  cases  1600  1600 
Adj.  R-S  uare  45.82%  45.81% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  the  regression 
coefficients 
390 Table  6.13Sale  (Group  Sale-deflated  model) 
Profit-making  firms 
Dividend  &  non-Div  firms 
Controlling  for  segment-level  losses 
Model  1  Model  2 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.129  2.971  0.003  0.117  2.742  0.006 
NEGMV  -0.536  -7.097  0.000  -0.526  -7.336  0.000 
1/Sale  1.415  1.239  0.216  0.348  0.336  0.737 
BV  0.473  3.165  0.002  0.437  2.921  0.003 
PBTA  4.600  2.506  0.012  5.114  2.749  0.006 
PBTB  9.966  3.018  0.003  11.285  3.179  0.001 
PBTC  -0.229  -0.156  0.876  0.008  0.005  0.996 
PBTD  5.827  3.632  0.000  6.107  3.792  0.000 
PBTDA  5.032  4.453  0.000  5.266  4.695  0.000 
PBTE  2.993  2.228  0.026  3.148  2.309  0.021 
PBTF  5.180  4.283  0.000  5.417  4.493  0.000 
PBTG  5.176  3.398  0.001  5.629  3.715  0.000 
PBTH  4.562  1.621  0.105  6.384  2.521  0.012 
PBTI  8.583  6.004  0.000  9.118  6.507  0.000 
PREST  3.505  3.205  0.001  3.434  3.090  0.002 
DPBTB  -6.230  -1.975  0.048 
DPBTC  -13.384  -1.063  0.288 
DPBTD  -4.182  -1.237  0.216 
DPBTDA  -4.147  -1.962  0.050 
DPBTE  -0.437  -0.064  0.949 
DPBTF  -0.899  -0.181  0.856 
DPBTG  -9.822  -0.625  0.532 
DPBTH  -12.144  -2.218  0.027 
DPBTI  -10.513  -1.580  0.114 
PBT'f(sale)  0.116  2.019  0.044  0.117  2.023  0.043 
DIV  4.125  2.031  0.042  4.059  2.020  0.043 
Ad'.  ER  0.169  0.211  0.833  0.164  0.205  0.838 
No.  of  cases  1670  1670 
Ad'.  R-S  uare  40.5%  40.8% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  the  regression 
coefficients. 
391 Table  6.13Sale  (continued  from  the  previous  page...  ) 
Dividend  firms  only 
Controlling  for  segment-level  losses 
Model  3  Model  4 
Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value  Coeff.  t-ratio  P-value 
Intercept  0.096  2.607  0.009  0.097  2.554  0.011 
NEGMV  -0.491  -7.634  0.000  -0.496  -7.388  0.000 
1/Sale  1.147  0.704  0.481  0.441  0.271  0.786 
BV  0.323  2.081  0.037  0.319  1.918  0.055 
PBTA  4.897  2.847  0.004  5.224  2.932  0.003 
PBTB  11.241  3.539  0.000  12.328  3.770  0.000 
PBTC  0.512  0.328  0.743  0.598  0.372  0.710 
PBTD  6.991  4.294  0.000  7.141  4.333  0.000 
PBTDA  6.112  5.349  0.000  6.255  5.433  0.000 
PBTE  4.426  3.251  0.001  4.563  3.302  0.001 
PBTF  6.352  5.105  0.000  6.489  5.174  0.000 
PBTG  6.021  4.193  0.000  6.229  4.260  0.000 
PBTH  9.204  3.487  0.000  8.762  3.210  0.001 
PBTI  10.210  7.012  0.000  10.380  6.953  0.000 
PREST  4.371  3.817  0.000  4.439  3.858  0.000 
DPBTB  -6.379  -2.433  0.015 
DPBTC  -3.312  -0.529  0.597 
DPBTD  -5.203  -1.502  0.133 
DPBTDA  -6.144  -3.117  0.002 
DPBTE  -1.157  -0.163  0.870 
DPBTF  -3.807  -0.549  0.583 
DPBTG  -10.199  -0.621  0.534 
DPBTH  19.588  0.657  0.511 
DPBTI  -1.187  -0.189  0.850 
PBT"f(sale)  0.101  1.693  0.090  0.097  1.629  0.103 
DIV  3.958  1.726  0.084  3.827  1.631  0.103 
Adj.  ER  0.470  0.592  0.554  0.485  0.609  0.542 
No.  of  cases  1601  1601 
Ad.  R-S  uare  43.3%  43.1% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  next  to  the  regression 
coefficients. 
392 Model  6.13Sale  (continued  from  the  previous  page...  ) 
Wald  test  of  the  significance  of  valuation  differential  between  each  pair  of  specific 
segments  included  in  Model  2  and  Model  4 
Model  2  Model4 
segments  p-value  p-value 
PBTA  VS  PBTB  0.098  0.039 
PBTA  VS  PBTC  0.004  0.006 
PBTA  VS  PBTD  0.554  0.224 
PBTA  VS  PBTDA  0.924  0.487 
PBTA  VS  PBTE  0.223  0.656 
PBTA  VS  PBTF  0.851  0.405 
PBTA  VS  PBTG  0.763  0.515 
PBTA  VS  PBTH  0.607  0.161 
PBTA  VS  PBTI  0.018  0.002 
PBTB  VS  PBTC  0.005  0.002 
PBTB  VS  PBTD  0.158  0.131 
PBTB  VS  PBTDA  0.092  0.068 
PBTB  VS  PBTE  0.022  0.019 
PBTB  VS  PBTF  0.102  0.082 
PBTB  VS  PBTG  0.128  0.075 
PBTB  VS  PBTH  0.235  0.387 
PBTB  VS  PBTI  0.556  0.574 
PBTC  VS  PBTD  0.000  0.000 
PBTC  VS  PBTDA  0.000  0.000 
PBTC  VS  PBTE  0.003  0.000 
PBTC  VS  PBTF  0.000  0.000 
PBTC  VS  PBTG  0.000  0.000 
PBTC  VS  PBTH  0.003  0.001 
PBTC  VS  PBTI  0.000  0.000 
DPBT  VS  PBTDA  0.316  0.291 
PBTD  VS  PBTE  0.001  0.007 
PBTD  VS  PBTF  0.422  0.442 
PBTD  VS  PBTG  0.610  0.289 
PBTD  VS  PBTH  0.893  0.485 
PBTD  VS  PBTI  0.015  0.011 
PBTDA  VS  PBTE  0.002  0.018 
PBTDA  VS  PBTF  0.804  0.703 
PBTDA  VS  PBTG  0.648  0.971 
PBTDA  VS  PBTH  0.585  0.279 
PBTDA  VS  PBTI  0.000  0.000 
PBTE  VS  PBTF  0.003  0.014 
PBTE  VS  PBTG  0.002  0.033 
PBTE  VS  PBTH  0.069  0.035 
PBTE  VS  PBTI  0.000  0.000 
PBTF  VS  PBTG  0.814  0.751 
PBTF  VS  PBTH  0.643  0.327 
PBTF  VS  PBTI  0.000  0.000 
PBTG  VS  PBTH  0.698  0.259 
PBTG  VS  PBTI  0.004  0.001 
PBTH  VS  PBTI  0.202  0.500 
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Sz  Co  aaaaaaaao.  aa000000000a0 Table  6.13MV  (continued  from  the  previous  page...  ) 
Wald  test  of  the  significance  of  valuation  differential  between  each  pair  of  specific 
segments  included  in  Model  2  and  Model  4 
Model  2  Model4 
SEGMENTS  p-value  p-value 
PBTA  VS  PBTB  0.109  0.089 
PBTA  VS  PBTC  0.641  0.940 
PBTA  VS  PBTD  0.462  0.441 
PBTA  VS  PBTDA  0.040  0.0474 
PBTA  VS  PBTE  0.074  0.079 
PBTA  VS  PBTF  0.135  0.151 
PBTA  VS  PBTG  0.237  0.280 
PBTA  VS  PBTH  0.079  0.079 
PBTA  VS  PBTI  0.001  0.002 
PBTB  VS  PBTC  0.142  0.075 
PBTB  VS  PBTD  0.170  0.143 
PBTB  VS  PBTDA  0.545  0.462 
PBTB  VS  PBTE  0.464  0.401 
PBTB  VS  PBTF  0.383  0.318 
PBTB  VS  PBTG  0.367  0.288 
PBTB  VS  PBTH  0.919  0.848 
PBTB  VS  PBTI  0.946  0.896 
PBTC  VS  PBTD  0.569  0.121 
PBTC  VS  PBTDA  0.001  0.000 
PBTC  VS  PBTE  0.012  0.002 
PBTC  VS  PBTF  0.077  0.022 
PBTC  VS  PBTG  0.242  0.133 
PBTC  VS  PBTH  0.097  0.054 
PBTC  VS  PBTI  0.000  0.000 
DPBT  VS  PBTDA  0.001  0.001 
PBTD  VS  PBTE  0.020  0.028 
PBTD  VS  PBTF  0.122  0.161 
PBTD  VS  PBTG  0.346  0.452 
PBTD  VS  PBTH  0.130  0.136 
PBTD  VS  PBTI  0.000  0.000 
PBTDA  VS  PBTE  0.646  0.694 
PBTDA  VS  PBTF  0.385  0.409 
PBTDA  VS  PBTG  0.411  0.365 
PBTDA  VS  PBTH  0.567  0.551 
PBTDA  VS  PBTI  0.016  0.036 
PBTE  VS  PBTF  0.680  0.668 
PBTE  VS  PBTG  0.627  0.552 
PBTE  VS  PBTH  0.467  0.468 
PBTE  VS  PBTI  0.018  0.039 
PBTF  VS  PBTG  0.880  0.815 
PBTF  VS  PBTH  0.376  0.369 
PBTF  VS  PBTI  0.009  0.021 
PBTG  VS  PBTH  0.358  0.321 
PBTG  VS  PBTI  0.029  0.038 
PBTH  VS  PBTI  0.814  0.895 
395 Table  6.14TA  (TA-deflated  model) 
Profit-making  firms 
Basic  model 
Model  I 
PBT  seg  x= 
PBTA 
Model  2 
PBT  seg  xý 
PBTB 
Model  3 
PBT  seg  x 
PBTC 
Model  4 
PBT  seg  x  
PBTD 
Model  5 
PBT  seg  x  
PBTDa 
Model6 
PBT  seg  xý 
PBTE 
Model  7 
Intercept  0.350  0.350  0.359  0.360  0.359  0.354  0.342 
t-ratio  6.320  6.323  6.428  6.489  6.451  6.391  6.131 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.376  -0.369  -0.377  -0.366  -0.382  -0.379  -0.381 
t-ratio  -8.267  -8.155  -8.377  -8.141  -8.335  -8.376  -8.353 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1lTA  3.444  3.436  3.375  3.411  3.424  3.415  3.468 
t-ratio  3.248  3.233  3.130  3.196  3.223  3.193  3.278 
p-value  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
BV  -0.349  -0.346  -0.368  -0.341  -0.342  -0.354  -0.349 
t-ratio  -2.844  -2.806  -3.058  -2.784  -2.786  -2.900  -2.837 
p-value  0.004  0.005  0.002  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.005 
PBT  5.350  5.376  5.346  5.446  5.418  5.499  5.453 
t-ratio  6.636  6.645  6.607  6.712  6.634  6.587  6.773 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  -  -2.979  3.594  -4.299  -0.826  -0.675  1.554 
t-ratio  -  -2.333  0.961  -6.719  -2.163  -1.803  2.300 
p-value  -  0.020  0.336  0.000  0.031  0.071  0.021 
DPBT  seg  x  -  -  -4.266  -3.192  4.973  -0.933  0.491 
t-ratio  -  -  -1.017  -0.673  1.665  -0.579  0.211 
p-value  -  -  0.309  0.501  0.096  0.563  0.833 
PBT'f(ta)  0.480  0.473  0.484  0.465  0.461  0.462  0.440 
t-ratio  2.378  2.335  2.366  2.299  2.267  2.281  2.220 
p-value  0.017  0.020  0.018  0.021  0.023  0.023  0.026 
DIV  6.818  6.787  6.647  6.718  7.175  7.002  6.757 
t-ratio  4.296  4.266  4.132  4.228  4.556  4.451  4.251 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Adj.  ER  0.546  0.543  0.556  0.605  0.529  0.554  0.522 
t-ratio  0.915  0.908  0.934  1.020  0.896  0.909  0.878 
p-value  0.360  0.364  0.350  0.308  0.370  0.363  0.380 
No.  of  cases  1670  1670  1670  1670  1670  1670  1670 
Adj.  R-  40.3%  40.3%  40.5%  40.7%  40.4%  40.4%  40.4% 
Square 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients. 
396 Table  6.14TA  (continued  from  previous  page...  ) 
Intercept 
t-ratio 
p-value 
NEGMV 
t-ratio 
p-value 
1/TA 
BV 
t-ratio 
p-value 
t-ratio 
p-value 
PBT 
t-ratio 
p-value 
PBT  seg  x 
t-ratio 
p-value 
DPBT  seg  x 
t-ratio 
p-value 
PBT*f(ta) 
t-ratio 
p-value 
DIV 
t-ratio 
p-value 
Adj.  ER 
t-ratio 
p-value 
PBT  seg  x= 
PBTF 
Model  8 
PBT  seg  x= 
PBTG 
Model  9 
PBT  seg  x 
PBTH 
Model  10 
PBT  seg  xm 
PBTI 
Model  11 
PBT  seg  xn 
PBTABC" 
Model  12 
PBT  sop  xa 
PBTD1  " 
Model  13 
0.350  0.348  0.349  0.264  0.355  0.367 
6.292  6.287  6.297  4.954  6,433  6.633 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
-0.377  -0.374  -0.377  -0.370  -0.359  -0.385 
-8.258  -8.193  -8.381  -8.836  -7.710  -8.468 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
3.445  3.442  3.447  2.596  3.388  3.333 
3.249  3.239  3.248  2.526  3.139  3.072 
0.001  0.001  0.001  0.012  0.002  0.002 
-0.349  -0.357  -0.349  -0.129  -0.344  -0.358 
-2.839  -2.906  -2.828  -1.167  -2.827  -2.981 
0.005  0.004  0.005  0.243  0.005  0.003 
5.343  5.369  5.346  3.666  5.314  5.500 
6.543  6.654  6.617  4.855  6.579  6.473 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
0.106  0.587  -0.026  3.791  -2.600  -0.917 
0.174  1.077  -0.020  5.476  -2.171  -2.626 
0.862  0.282  0.984  0.000  0.030  0.009 
0.893  -14.702  -13.302  -7.855  1.519  0.233 
0.158  -6.534  -0.644  -2.924  0.729  0.117 
0.874  0.000  0.519  0.003  0.466  0.907 
0.481  0.466  0.481  0.764  0.484  0.465 
2.374  2.280  2.379  3.814  2.396  2.267 
0.018  0.023  0.017  0.000  0.017  0.023 
6.817  6.883  6.846  7.268  7.039  7.608 
4.285  4.342  4.300  4.703  4.490  4.908 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
0.554  0.518  0.548  0.537  0.607  0.558 
0.929  0.866  0.918  0.942  1.029  0.926 
0.353  0.387  0.358  0.346  0.304  0.355 
No.  of  cases  1670  1670  1670  1670  1670  1670 
Adj.  R-  40.2%  40.3%  40.2%  44.0%  40.6%  40.7% 
Square 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients. 
397 Table  6.14Sale  (Group  Sale-deflated  model) 
ofit-making  sample 
Basic  model 
Modell 
PBT  seg  x= 
PBTA 
Model  2 
PBT  seg  x= 
PBTB 
Model  3 
PBT  seg  xý 
PBTC 
Model  4 
PBT  seg  xý 
PBTD 
Model  5 
PBT  seg  x  
PBTDa 
Model6 
PBT  seg  xý 
PBTE 
Model  7 
Intercept  0.221  0.221  0.234  0.228  0.209  0.227  0.186 
t-ratio  5.846  5.850  6.134  6.016  5.034  5.949  5.125 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.582  -0.581  -0.582  -0.562  -0.578  -0.583  -0.569 
t-ratio  -7.463  -7.366  -7.506  -7.227  -7.450  -7.494  -7.576 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/Sale  2.001  2.000  1.823  1.967  2.018  1.988  1.857 
t-ratio  1.574  1.571  1.567  1.546  1.582  1.563  1.477 
p-value  0.116  0.116  0.117  0.122  0.114  0.118  0.140 
BV  0.364  0.364  0.368  0.357  0.372  0.356  0.425 
t-ratio  2.661  2.661  2.694  2.606  2.701  2.555  2.928 
p-value  0.008  0.008  0.007  0.009  0.007  0.011  0.003 
PBT  6.280  6.281  6.024  6.460  6.201  6.371  6.117 
t-ratio  5.314  5.313  5.031  5.449  5.389  5.225  5.180 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  -  -0.237  4.564  -4.949  0.791  -0.489  -1.676 
t-ratio  -  -0.133  1.181  -6.497  0.948  -0.967  -3.057 
p-value  -  0.894  0.238  0.000  0.343  0.334  0.002 
DPBT  seg  x  -  -  -1.801  -6.015  -1.727  -1.916  -0.544 
t-ratio  -  -  -0.476  -0.515  -0.548  -0.867  -0.068 
p-value  -  -  0.634  0.606  0.584  0.386  0.946 
PBTf(sale)  0.008  0.008  0.028  -0.001  0.010  0.006  0.026 
t-ratio  0.145  0.144  0.479  -0.014  0.190  0.101  0.453 
p-value  0.885  0.886  0.632  0.989  0.849  0.919  0.651 
DIV  3.958  3.957  3.364  4.061  3.795  4.011  4.939 
t-ratio  1.917  1.916  1.587  1.989  1.818  1.939  2.441 
p-value  0.055  0.055  0.113  0.047  0.069  0.053  0.015 
Adj.  ER  -0.253  -0.254  -0.191  -0.200  -0.213  -0.251  -0.137 
t-ratio  -0.267  -0.268  -0.203  -0.212  -0.226  -0.263  -0.148 
p-value  0.789  0.789  0.839  0.832  0.821  0.793  0.883 
No.  of  cases  1670  1670  1670  1670  1670  1670  1670 
Adj.  R-  36.3%  36.3%  36.6%  36.7%  36.3%  36.3%  36.6% 
Square 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients. 
398 Table  6.14Sale  (continued  from  the  previous  page...  ) 
PBT  seg  xc 
PBTF 
Model  8 
PBT  seg  x= 
PBTG 
Model9 
PBT  seg  x= 
PBTH 
Model  10 
PBT  seg  x  
PBTI 
Model  I 
PBT  seg  x= 
PBTABC" 
Model  12 
PBT  seg  x  
PBTD1" 
Model  13 
Intercept  0.222  0.217  0.221  0.190  0.220  0.215 
t-ratio  5.834  5.599  5.837  5.401  5.853  4.993 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.582  -0.581  -0.580  -0.558  -0.578  -0.580 
t-ratio  -7.439  -7.411  -7.377  -7.586  -7.066  -7.477 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/Sale  2.001  1.965  1.813  1.369  2.184  2.008 
t-ratio  1.573  1.540  1.432  1.101  1.659  1.579 
p-value  0.116  0.124  0.152  0.271  0.097  0.114 
BV  0.365  0.359  0.367  0.382  0.364  0.370 
t-ratio  2.651  2.605  2.528  3.019  2.654  2.613 
p-value  0.008  0.009  0.011  0.003  0.008  0.009 
PBT  6.281  6.364  6.290  4.542  6.239  6.220 
t-ratio  5.316  5.328  5.321  3.884  5.192  5.267 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  0.039  0.737  -1.013  4.353  -0.212  0.217 
t-ratio  0.068  1.033  -0.495  4.432  -0.095  0.363 
p-value  0.946  0.302  0.621  0.000  0.925  0.717 
DPBT  seg  x  7.604  -19.599  -8.953  -7.833  3.368  -0.803 
t-ratio  1.080  -3.578  -2.282  -1.152  1.362  -0.292 
p-value  0.280  0.000  0.023  0.249  0.173  0.771 
PBTf(sale)  0.008  0.003  0.005  0.075  0.010  0.010 
t-ratio  0.138  0.046  0.097  1.311  0.172  0.176 
p-value  0.890  0.963  0.923  0.190  0.864  0.860 
DIV  3.950  4.019  4.122  5.136  4.058  3.896 
t-ratio  1.913  1.942  2.014  2.543  1.962  1.855 
p-value  0.056  0.052  0.044  0.011  0.050  0.064 
dj.  ER  -0.246  -0.248  -0.253  -0.195  -0.246  -0.244 
t-ratio  -0.260  -0.263  -0.267  -0.218  -0.260  -0.259 
p-value  0.795  0.792  0.789  0.827  0.795  0.796 
No.  of  cases  1670  1670  1670  1670  1670  1670 
Adj.  R-S  uare  36.2%  36.3%  36.4%  39.2%  36.3%  36.2% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients. 
399 Table  6.14MV  (One  year  lagged  MV-deflated  model) 
Profit-making  firms 
Basic 
model 
Modell 
PBT  seg  x 
=  PBTA 
Model2 
PBT  seg  x 
=  PBTB 
Model3 
PBT  seg  x 
   PBTC 
Model  4 
PBT  sog  x 
   PBTD 
Model5 
PUT  seg  x 
   PBTDa 
Mode16 
PBT  seg  x 
   PBTE 
Model7 
Intercept  0.925  0.922  0.926  0.920  0.935  0.918  0.927 
t-ratio  22.832  22.605  22.893  22.425  23.009  22.297  22.792 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.512  -0.508  -0.511  -0.511  -0.511  -0.511  -0.512 
t-ratio  -14.209  -14.312  -14.165  -14.183  -14.189  -14.312  -14.169 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/MV  216.226  192.026  237.066  199.792  207.239  155.448  236.588 
t-ratio  0.931  0.834  0.953  0.863  0.889  0.691  1.005 
p-value  0.352  0.405  0.341  0.388  0.374  0.489  0.315 
BV  0.233  0.239  0.232  0.238  0.234  0.235  0.226 
t-ratio  4.949  4.997  4.880  5.013  5.003  4.978  4.719 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  2.065  2.098  2.042  2.141  2.100  2.035  2.108 
t-ratio  6.077  6.158  5.941  6.076  6.172  5.850  6.211 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  0.000  -1.035  0.670  -0.561  -0.645  0.262  0.434 
t-ratio  0.000  -1.632  0.568  -2.145  -3.358  1.189  1.514 
p-value  0.000  0.103  0.570  0.032  0.001  0.235  0.130 
DPBT  seg  0.000  0.000  -0.144  -0.762  2.301  -2.654  2.651 
t-ratio  0.000  0.000  -0.108  -0.410  4.603  -2.441  0.434 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.914  0.682  0.000  0.015  0.664 
P13T'f(mv)  -0.024  -0.026  -0.022  -0.024  -0.027  -0.020  -0.028 
t-ratio  -1.053  -1.146  -0.969  -1.079  -1.223  -0.878  -1.234 
p-value  0.292  0.252  0.333  0.280  0.221  0.380  0.217 
DIV  -1.297  -1.286  -1.312  -1.333  -1.010  -1.365  -1.350 
t-ratio  -1.439  -1.427  -1.451  -1.474  -1.125  -1.522  -1.495 
p-value  0.150  0.154  0.147  0.140  0.261  0.128  0.135 
Adj.  ER  0.600  0.586  0.608  0.621  0.578  0.620  0.598 
t-ratio  1.807  1.756  1.837  1.875  1.754  1.889  1.807 
p-value  0.071  0.079  0.066  0.061  0.079  0.059  0.071 
No.  of 
cases  1344  1344  1344  1344  1344  1344  1344 
Adj.  R- 
S  uare  15.1%  15.1%  15.0%  15.1%  15.5%  15.2%  15.1% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients. 
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PBT  seg  x= 
PBTF 
Model  8 
PBT  seg  x  
PBTG 
Model  9 
PBT  seg  x= 
PBTH 
Model  10 
PBT  seg  x0 
PBTI 
Model  11 
PBT  seg  x  
PBTABC" 
Model  12 
PBT  sog  x  
PBTD1" 
Model  13 
Intercept  0.928  0.922  0.924  0.894  0.917  0.929 
t-ratio  22.841  22.732  22.819  22.428  22.241  22.194 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NEGMV  -0.513  -0.509  -0.512  -0.507  -0.509  -0.513 
t-ratio  -14.240  -14.213  -14.150  -14.288  -14.298  -14.190 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1/MV  225.023  194.241  204.272  33.125  213.635  189.882 
t-ratio  0.947  0.841  0.880  0.145  0.874  0.818 
p-value  0.344  0.401  0.379  0.885  0.382  0.413 
BV  0.235  0.225  0.227  0.258  0.244  0.231 
t-ratio  4.977  4.787  4.598  5.603  5.080  4.860 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  2.080  2.068  2.076  1.677  2.146  2.143 
t-ratio  6.109  6.099  6.045  4.898  6.002  6.091 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PBT  seg  x  0.071  0.031  0.627  1.326  -0.539  -0.180 
t-ratio  0.211  0.068  0.708  4.560  -2.054  -0.997 
p-value  0.833  0.946  0.479  0.000  0.040  0.319 
DPBT  seg  x  6.380  -9.375  -4.434  -3.315  1.075  -3.203 
t-ratio  6.413  -5.363  -0.709  -5.661  1.915  -2.870 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.479  0.000  0.055  0.004 
P8T-f(mv)  -0.024  -0.024  -0.024  -0.003  -0.025  -0.026 
t-ratio  -1.088  -1.071  -1.078  -0.134  -1.126  -1.163 
p-value  0.276  0.284  0.281  0.893  0.260  0.245 
DIV  -1.379  -1.144  -1.261  -0.989  -1.309  -1.208 
t-ratio  -1.517  -1.285  -1.396  -1.130  -1.452  -1.347 
p-value  0.129  0.199  0.163  0.259  0.147  0.178 
Adj.  ER  0.624  0.587  0.600  0.640  0.607  0.614 
t-ratio  1.903  1.767  1.811  1.986  1.829  1.855 
p-value  0.057  0.077  0.070  0.047  0.067  0.064 
No.  ofcases  1344  1344  1344  1344  1344  1344 
Adj.  R- 
S  uare  15.1%  15.4%  15.0%  16.9%  15.1%  15.2% 
White  adjusted  (heteroskedasticity-consistent)  t-ratios  and  p-values  are  reported  below  the  regression 
coefficients. 
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SUMMARY  &  CONCLUSIONS 
7.1  RESEARCH  OBJECTIVES  AND  RESEARCH  METHODS 
This  study  comprises  an  empirical  investigation  of  the  value  relevance  and 
pricing  of  specific  firm-level  and  segment-level  financial  statement  information 
reported  by  UK  multi-segment  firms  in  the  annual  reports.  In  the  UK,  the  accounting 
standards  specify  that  firms  which  are  geographically  or  industrially  diversified  disclose 
some  basic  financial  information  on  each  material  segment.  The  issue  of  usefulness  of 
the  segment-level  reporting  for  security  valuation  and,  hence,  the  value  relevance  of  this 
information,  is  one  of  the  focal  concerns  of  this  study.  The  investigation  focuses  on 
whether  the  operations  of  a  cross-section  of  UK  multi-segment  firms,  reported  from 
segments  operating  in  specific  geographic  locations  or  industries,  are  perceived  by 
investors  to  have  differential  association  with  (or  relative  contributions  to)  the  equity 
market  value  of  the  entire  firm.  In  addition,  this  study  concerns  the  issues  of  value 
relevance  and  pricing  of  specific  consolidated  or  firm-level  accounting  information.  It 
also  identifies  and  explores  factors  and  contexts  that  impact  on  these  relationships.  The 
study  seeks  to  provide  the  empirical  evidence  on: 
(i)  the  relationships  (in  terms  of  value  relevance  and  pricing)  between  the  firm's 
equity  market  value  and  firm-level  financial  statement  information,  such  as 
contemporaneous  equity  book  value,  earnings  and  dividends; 
(ii)  the  existence  (or  the  lack  of  it)  of  relationships  between  the  firm's  segment- 
level  financial  information  and  the  entire  firm's  equity  market  value;  and 
(iii)  the  relative  valuation  patterns  of  segments  with  specific  geographic  or  line- 
of-business  profiles. 
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evidence  on  the  broader  issues,  including:  (i)  the  value  relevance  of  consolidated 
financial  statement  information  reported  by  UK  publicly  traded  firms  over  the  period 
from  1987  to  2002;  (ii)  the  adequacy  of  the  UK  segment  reporting  accounting  standard 
SSAP  25;  and  (iii)  the  quality  of  segment  disclosures  in  the  UK.  A  brief  summary  of 
finding  is  presented  in  section  7.2. 
The  study  adopts  the  positivist  methodology,  in  that  it  mainly  relies  on  the 
empirical  knowledge  as  the  primary  reliable  and  valid  form  of  knowledge.  To  some 
extent,  the  basic  valuation  model,  employed  in  this  study  for  capturing  the  empirics  of 
the  relationships  in  question,  represents  a  fusion  of  valuation  frameworks  developed  and 
utilised  in  earlier  studies  [e.  g.,  Edwards  and  Bell  (1961),  Peasnell  (1981,1982),  Ohlson 
(1989,1995),  Rees  (1997),  Garrod  and  Rees  (1998),  Wysocki  (1998)]. 
In  its  basic  analytical  form,  the  employed  consolidated-level  valuation  model 
expresses  the  equity  market  value  of  the  firm  as  a  linear  function  of  thee  value  drivers: 
equity  book  value,  earnings  for  ordinary,  and  dividends  for  ordinary  shareholders. 
When  transformed  into  the  regression  format,  to  allow  the  empirical  testing  of  the  firm- 
level  relationships,  this  model  is  deflated  by  a  scale  proxy  and  appended  with  additional 
control  and  dummy  variables.  To  investigate  the  segment-level  relationships,  the 
earnings  for  ordinary  variable  is  further  disaggregated  into  its  segment-level  elements. 
This  approach  allows  the  testing  of  the  difference  in  value  contribution  of  earnings  from 
different  geographic  or  industrial  segments. 
7.2  MAIN  FINDINGS 
Empirical  findings  reported  in  this  study  can  be  divided  into  three  sections:  (i) 
firm-level  valuation;  (ii)  geographic  segment  valuation;  and  (iii)  business  segment 
valuation. 
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The  behaviour  of  the  explanatory  power  of  the  valuation  model,  which  is  a 
measure  of  the  composite  value  relevance  of  the  firm-level  value  drivers,  appears  to  be 
distinctively  influenced  by  such  factors  as  the  firms'  industry  and  time  periods.  For 
example,  the  accounting  numbers  reported  by  firms  operating  in  the  Financial  sector 
explain  twice  as  much  of  the  cross-sectional  variation  of  equity  market  value  as  similar 
information  reported  by  firms  operating  in  the  Services  sector. 
The  composite  value  relevance  of  accounting  numbers  has  not  been  stable 
throughout  the  sample  period  (1987-2002).  By  and  large,  the  results  suggest  that  the 
value  drivers  included  in  the  model  have  become  gradually  more  value  relevant  over  the 
first  half  of  reported  period.  In  the  second  half,  however,  there  has  been  a  sharp  reversal 
of  this  trend,  with  the  value  relevance  reaching  the  all  times'  low  in  year  1999. 
Among  other  contexts,  affecting  the  combined  informativeness  of  the  value 
drivers  is  the  sign  of  the  reported  earnings  and  book  values.  In  general,  the  explanatory 
power  of  the  regression  is  lower  when  firms  report  losses  (i.  e.,  negative  earnings)  and/or 
negative  book  value.  This  suggests  that  the  negative  financial  results  are  perceived  by 
the  market  to  have  lower  degree  of  persistence.  Finally,  the  value  relevance  of  the 
accounting  numbers  is  higher  for  firms  that  trade  at  a  discount  to  book  value,  and  when 
the  dividend  paying  firms  are  compared  to  the  non-dividend  firms. 
The  value  relevance  and  pricing  of  specific  value  drivers  is  found  to  be  highly 
contextual.  For  example,  negative  earnings  are  not  capitalised,  while  positive  earnings 
are  always  positively  related  to  value.  Furthermore,  the  magnitude  of  the  earnings 
coefficient  varies  across  the  industries,  being  particularly  large  in  the  services  and  trade- 
related  sectors,  and  much  smaller  in  the  finance,  construction  and  agriculture  related 
404 sectors.  Another  interesting  finding  is  that  reported  profits  tend  to  have  little  or  no 
valuation  role  for  firms  trading  at  a  discount  to  book  value. 
For  firms  that  report  losses  the  book  value  of  equity  becomes  the  most  value 
relevant  factor,  and  serves  as  the  value  anchor.  In  the  normal  circumstances,  however, 
book  value  appears  to  be  the  least  important  value  driver,  and  becomes  completely 
irrelevant  when  it  has  a  negative  sign  (i.  e.,  when  the  firm  is  in  financial  distress). 
Contrary  to  the  predictions  of  the  dividend  displacement  theory,  results  indicate 
that  dividends  are  positively  priced.  In  situations  where  firms  report  losses  and/or 
negative  book  values,  dividends  become  the  key  value  driver.  However,  there  are 
circumstances  when  dividends  play  contrasting  roles:  they  are  positively  (negatively) 
priced  when  firms  trade  at  a  premium  (discount)  to  book  value.  In  addition,  there  is 
some  indication  that  the  pricing  of  dividends  can  vary  sharply  across  industries.  There 
has  also  been  some  peculiar  reversal  in  the  pricing  of  dividends  over  the  sample  period. 
7.2.2  Geographic  segment  valuation  results 
Overall,  the  results  suggest  that  the  geographically  diversified  firms  are  valued 
at  a  premium  in  relation  to  domestic  firms.  The  stock  market  appears  to  price  the 
earnings  reported  by  the  diversified  firms  higher  than  those  reported  by  domestic 
companies.  However,  a  significantly  higher  and  positive  capitalisation  of  dividends  is 
observed  for  the  domestic  firms,  while  dividends  paid  by  multinationals  appear  value- 
irrelevant. 
When  the  firm-level  financial  results  are  disaggregated  into  two  broad 
geographical  segments,  domestic  and  foreign,  the  domestic  segment  has  always  a  higher 
pricing.  However,  when  the  generic  foreign  segment  is  disaggregated  into  specific 
foreign  segments,  no  longer  the  UK  segment  remains  the  highest  relative  contributor  to 
the  value  of  the  firm. 
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geographic  locations  has  not  been  static.  During  the  early  economic  periods  (pre-1994 
or  pre-1996)  segmental  profits  reported  from  the  America  segment  had  the  highest 
capitalisation.  The  domestic  operations  had  the  second-highest  pricing.  However, 
during  the  more  recent  economic  period  (1994-1997)  the  UK  segment  was  associated 
with  the  highest  relative  contribution  to  firm  value.  Perhaps  the  most  interesting  results 
are  those  related  to  the  most  recent  economic  period  (1998-2002).  In  this  period,  none 
of  the  profits  reported  from  the  foreign  segments  are  value-relevant.  This  time-related 
change  is,  perhaps,  the  reflection  of  the  dynamics  of  the  changing  economic  prospects 
in  various  parts  of  the  world,  and/or  investors'  sentiments  and  perceptions. 
Although  no  direct  tests  have  been  carried  out,  there  is  some  evidence  of 
association  between  the  pricing  of  geographic  segments  and  the  degree  of  popularity  of 
specific  geographic  locations.  Across  all  tests  the  Middle  East  &  Africa  segment  always 
comes  last  in  the  valuation  ranking,  and  in  many  tests  has  a  negative  association  with 
firm  value.  This  segment  represents  the  most  rare  investment  location  for  the  UK 
multinationals.  Asia  is  the  second-least  priced  segment  and  the  second  least-popular 
investment  location.  America  and  Europe  have  higher  relative  pricing  and, 
correspondingly,  are  more  popular  foreign  investment  locations. 
7.2.3  Business  segment  valuation  results 
On  the  firm-level,  there  is  some  empirical  evidence  that  the  industrially 
diversified  firms  have  lower  valuation  than  the  focused  firms.  These  results  contrast  to 
those  of  the  geographically  diversified  firms,  which  are  found  to  be  more  valuable  than 
the  domestic  firms.  The  rest  of  the  key  firm-level  results  (such  as  the  pricing  of  the 
firm-level  earnings,  book  values  and  dividends,  as  well  as  the  valuation  implications  of 
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similar  to  those  of  the  entire  sample. 
There  is  considerable  variation  of  the  value  relevance  of  segmental  earnings 
among  business  segments  operating  in  different  industries.  Thus,  the  segments 
operating  in  the  Hi-Tech  and  knowledge-intensive  sectors  (e.  g.,  IT,  Telecommunication 
services,  etc.  )  have  the  highest  pricing  and  relevance  to  the  value  of  the  firm.  Segments 
involved  in  the  services-related  operations  have  the  second-highest  pricing  and  value 
relevance,  after  the  IT  sector. 
In  contrast,  the  `old'  or  less  knowledge-intensive  sector  segments,  such  as 
Agriculture,  Mining,  Basic  Industries  and  Utilities,  are  associated  with  the  lowest 
relative  contribution  to  the  equity  market  value  of  the  firm.  Segments  operating  in  the 
remaining  economic  sectors  are  in  the  middle  range  of  valuation. 
Somewhat  interesting  is  the  finding  on  the  valuation  of  dividends.  They  are 
positively  prised  and  have  incremental  information  content  when  the  firm-level  model  is 
used  for  the  business-segment  reporting  firms.  However,  when  earnings  are 
disaggregated  into  business  segment  elements,  the  dividend  coefficient  loses  its 
statistical  significance.  This,  possibly,  implies  that  the  segment-disaggregated  earnings 
represent  a  better  summary  of  value-relevant  (forward  looking)  information,  which 
overrides  the  information  contained  in  the  dividends. 
Finally,  all  business  segment-level  results  remain  robust  to  addition  test  designs, 
where  the  basic  regression  has  been  deflated  by  alternative  scale-proxies. 
By  and  large,  empirical  tests  suggest  that  segment-level  accounting  data 
communicate  value  relevant  information,  which  is  often  incremental  to  the 
consolidated-level  data.  In  particular,  segment  disclosures  have  incremental  information 
content  in  situations  where  on  the  consolidated  level  the  firm  reports  losses  (which  are 
not  priced),  while  on  the  disaggregated  level  profits  are  reported  for  some  of  the 
407 disclosed  segments.  Nevertheless,  geographic  segment  reports  are,  on  average, 
relatively  more  informative  (value  relevant)  than  the  business  segment  reports.  This, 
perhaps,  reflects  the  relatively  higher  level  of  discretion  allowed  to  firms  by  the 
business  segment  reporting  requirements  section  of  SSAP  25,  when  identifying, 
grouping  and  reporting  line-of-business  operations. 
7.3  KEY  FINDINGS 
"  The  extent  of  value  relevance  and  the  pricing  of  book  value,  earnings  and  dividends 
are  dependent  upon:  the  sign  of  reported  earnings  and  book  values:  the  value  of  the 
book-to-market  ratio;  the  economic  time-periods;  the  dividend  status  of  the  firm;  the 
firm's  industrial  affiliation; 
"  Industrially  diversified  firms  have  lower  valuation  than  focused  firms,  while 
geographically  diversified  firms  have  higher  valuation  than  domestic  firms; 
"  Geographic  and  line-of-business  segment  data  are,  by  and  large,  value  relevant  and 
have  incremental  information  content,  particularly  when  firms  report  firm-level 
losses. 
"  Earnings  related  to  most  geographic  segments  and  some  business  segments  have 
differential  relative  pricing.  For  example,  the  Services  and  IT  sector-related  segment 
operations  are  priced  statistically  higher  than  other  segments.  However,  neither  the 
pricing  of  specific  segments,  nor  their  value  relevance  remains  constant  over  time. 
"  Overall,  segmental  information,  disclosed  in  accordance  with  SSAP25  requirements, 
appears  to  be  of  limited  value  relevance,  as  perceived  by  the  stock  market. 
7.4.  MAIN  CONTRIBUTIONS 
The  empirical  findings  reported  in  the  study  might  contribute  to  our  knowledge 
and  understanding  of  the  complex  relationships  existing  between  the  market's 
408 perception  of  the  equity  value  and  the  specific  firm-level  and  segment-level  accounting 
fundamentals.  There  are  several  aspects  to  the  contributions  of  this  research. 
First,  this  study  contributes  to  the  academic  literature  by  filling  some  of  the 
gaps  in  the  market  based  accounting  research  area.  It  improves  understanding  of  the  role 
and  importance  of  the  corporate  segmental  information  to  the  stock  market.  On  the  level 
of  segmental  analysis  this  study  extends  the  previous  studies  (see  Chapter  2)  in  several 
respects.  I  have  investigated  both  dimensions  of  the  corporate  diversification  and 
segment  disclosures  of  the  UK  firms:  geographic  and  line-of-business.  In  addition  to 
testing  differential  valuation  of  `domestic'  vs.  `foreign'  operations,  I  have  investigated 
the  relative  pair-wise  valuations  across  all  geographic  segment  locations  (i.  e.,  UK, 
Europe,  America,  Asia,  Middle  East  and  Africa).  A  similar  pair-wise  approach  is  used 
to  assess  differential  value  contributions  associated  with  segments  operating  in  specific 
industries.  Another  feature  of  this  study  is  that  it  uses  a  longer  time  period  and  tests  the 
impact  of  a  wider  range  of  valuation-affecting  contexts.  This  study  also  provides 
evidence  on  the  specificity  of  the  value  relevance  of  key  firm-level  financial  value 
drivers  of  the  UK  firms,  subject  to  such  factors  as  economic  periods,  industry  of  the 
firm  and  its  financial  health. 
Second,  apart  from  the  contributions  to  the  academic  literature,  the  findings  of 
this  study  might  be  of  practical  interest  to  the  UK  bodies  and  institutions  involved  in  the 
process  of  the  development  of  accounting  standards.  The  study  argues  and  presents 
evidence  to  suggest  that  the  segment  reporting  standard,  SSAP  25,  is  not  entirely 
adequate  for  ensuring  that  the  segment-level  financial  information,  disclosed  by  firms, 
is  value  relevant  (i.  e.,  useful  for  investors)  and  is  of  good  quality  (i.  e.,  comparable 
across  different  firms  and  over  time).  The  Accounting  Standards  Board  might  consider 
using  the  reported  empirical  evidence  on  the  usefulness  of  segmental  data  to  make 
further  improvements  to  some  of  the  principles  and  requirements  of  the  Statement  of 
409 Standard  Accounting  Practice  no.  25.  In  particular,  the  business  segment  reporting 
section  of  SSAP  25  could  be  appended  with  an  additional  clause  that  would  require 
firms  to  report  the  2,3  or  4-digit  Standard  Industrial  Classification  (SIC)  code  or  the 
FTSE  Global  Classification  System  code  for  each  business  segment.  This  would  make 
business  segment  information  comparable  both  cross-sectionally  and  over  time.  In 
addition,  SSAP  25  could  be  appended  by  requiring  firms  to  present  the  basis  for  the 
computation  of  the  reported  segmental  net  assets  (NAs)  and  profit  before  tax  (PBTs). 
This  will  help  the  analyst  to  substantiate  the  quality  of  the  reported  NA  and  PBT 
numbers,  making  them  more  informative,  hence,  value  relevant. 
Third,  this  study  might  offer  the  firms'  finance  officers,  who  make  decisions  on 
the  content  of  segmental  disclosures,  valuable  insights  into  how  the  segment 
information  is  perceived  by  investors  and  capitalised  into  the  share  price.  The 
knowledge  of  the  market's  perception  of  the  segment-level  information  and  markets 
valuation  of  specific  segments  can  help  the  firm's  managers  tailor  the  segmental  report 
more  adequately.  The  segment  information  contained  in  the  report  might  be  structured 
and  disclosed  in  such  way  that  it  would  be  positively  perceived  by  the  market  and 
reflected  in  the  value  of  the  firm.  In  other  words,  the  reporting  of  the  segment-level 
financial  information  could  be  optimised,  to  minimise  the  adverse  reception  of  this 
information  by  investors. 
Finally,  both  the  results  and  the  model  development  sections  of  this  study  may 
contribute  to  the  work  of  financial  analysts.  On  the  modelling  level,  analysts  may  find 
some  of  the  modelling  tools  and  approaches,  examined  in  Chapter  3,  appropriate  for 
factoring  them  into  their  own  valuation  techniques/methods.  On  the  value  driver  or 
valuation  factor-level,  the  empirical  results  might  be  used  for  determining  factors  which 
should  be  given  more  weight  or  controlled  for  (under  certain  conditions  or  valuation 
contexts),  when  developing  the  value  estimates  for  a  company  or  its  segments.  In 
410 addition,  results  that  expose  the  dynamics  of  the  changing  relative  valuation  of  specific 
geographic  locations  or  lines-of-business,  as  perceived  by  the  market,  might  have 
practical  implications  for  decisions  concerning  portfolio  allocation  and  investment 
management. 
7.5  LIMITATIONS  OF  THE  STUDY 
In  an  empirical  accounting  study  that  uses  a  valuation  model  as  the  major 
analytical  tool,  the  results  and  conclusions  would,  by  and  large,  depend  on  how  close 
the  employed  model  reflects  reality.  From  the  methodological  point  of  view,  more  than 
one  model  class  might  be  appropriate  for  addressing  a  given  research  question.  The  task 
of  model  class  selection,  its  development  and  justification  is  always  a  challenging 
exercise.  What  unites  all  possible  model-based  approaches  is  the  lack  of  universal 
consensus. 
The  model  employed  in  this  study  is  not  necessarily  the  only  possible  pathway 
for  addressing  the  research  question.  In  chapters  2  and  3I  have  argued  that  the 
employed  basic  model  is  the  most  adequate,  given  the  specifics  of  the  research  question 
and  availability  of  data.  Nevertheless,  much  of  the  empirical  results  might  still  be 
influenced  by  some  choices  and  assumptions,  which  are  necessary  to  make  when 
operationalising  the  model.  Among  the  choices  which  have  to  be  made  are: 
(i)  the  appropriate  regression-representation  of  the  analytical  model:  linear  vs. 
non-linear  regressions; 
(ii)  the  regression  estimation  technique  (e.  g.,  OLS,  GLS,  WLS,  rank  regressions, 
etc.  ),  which  usually  requires  knowledge  of  the  loss  function; 
(iii)  the  alternative  methods  for  dealing  with  the  effect  of  cross-sectional 
differences  in  scale  on  the  estimated  regression  parameters.  This,  for 
411 example,  might  necessitate  deflation  of  the  model  by  a  scale  proxy,  which,  in 
turn,  would  require  to  decide  on  the  `best'  scale  proxy;  and 
(iv)  the  definition  and  identification  of  over-influential  cases  and/or  outliers,  and 
how  to  deal  with  the  outliers; 
The  availability  and  reliability  of  the  firm-level  and,  specifically,  segment-level 
financial  statement  data  is  another  limiting  factor  for  this  study.  Some  of  the  variables, 
required  by  the  analytical  model,  are  not  readily  available  and/or  cannot  be  imputed.  In 
addition,  the  available  segment-level  data,  collected  from  the  Extel  database,  often 
appear  to  be  inconsistent,  cross-sectionally  and  longitudinally  incomparable,  and,  in 
general,  has  low  quality  (i.  e.,  contain  multiple  errors  which  are  difficult  to  trace).  In 
addition,  the  implicit  ambiguity  in  the  segment  reporting  standard  SSAP  25  contributes 
to  these  problems,  as  it  is  unclear  to  what  extent  the  disclosed  segmental  data  reflects 
the  firm's  actual  segmental  organisation. 
These  data-related  problems  have  `bottlenecked'  the  initial  analytical  model, 
and,  at  times,  necessitated  the  use  of  a  simpler  model,  as  has  been  applied  in  this  study. 
Nevertheless,  in  the  course  of  this  study  numerous  tests  for  the  sensitivity  of  the  results 
to  various  estimation  techniques,  outlier  definitions  and  scale  factors  have  been 
performed,  and  the  main  results  and  findings  have  been  found  robust. 
7.6  DIRECTIONS  FOR  FUTURE  RESEARCH 
In  light  of  the  findings  and  limitations,  this  research  can  be  extended  in  several 
directions. 
Work  on  valuation  model:  this  might  include  further  empirical  testing  of  the 
basic  model's  performance  using  different  definitions  of  the  loss  function,  or  different 
alternative  ad  hoc  explanatory  or  dependent  variables,  scale  factors,  non-linear  model 
specifications,  treatment  of  influential  observations  and  outliers. 
412 Work  on  value  relevance  of  firm-level  financial  information: 
"  empirical  analysis  of  value  relevance  of  additional  forward-looking  firm-level 
accounting  fundamentals,  with  special  attention  to  specific  contexts; 
"  further  examination  of  the  determinants  of  the  pronounced  time-related  changes 
in  the  value  relevance  of  accounting  fundamentals,  and  valuation  significance  of 
specific  firm-level  accounting  numbers. 
Work  on  value  relevance  of  segment-level  financial  information:  further 
identification  and  investigation  of  the  determinants  of  differential  valuation  of 
operations  reported  from  specific  line-of-business  or  geographical  segments. 
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